Bloomberg Audio Studios, Podcasts, radio news.

Bloomberg Audio Studios, Podcasts, radio news.

The question was put to me in late twenty sixteen after the election, and I went to Trump Tar and I met a number of the key protagonists in a very surreal afternoon. And after I had met Anthony Scaramucci and Mike Flynn and Steve Bannon and Michael Cohen, I phoned my wife up and I said, this will end in a welter of litigation. We're going to have nothing to do with it. Good call.

The question was put to me in late twenty sixteen after the election, and I went to Trump Tar and I met a number of the key protagonists in a very surreal afternoon. And after I had met Anthony Scaramucci and Mike Flynn and Steve Bannon and Michael Cohen, I phoned my wife up and I said, this will end in a welter of litigation. We're going to have nothing to do with it. Good call.

Welcome to the first episode of voter Nomics, where politics and markets collide. This year, voters around the world have the ability to affect markets, countries, and economies like never before, so we've cooked up this series to help you make sense of it all. I'm Stephanie Flanders. I lead our government and economics coverage at Bloomberg, also our economic research, and back in the day, I was once BBC Economics editor.

Welcome to the first episode of voter Nomics, where politics and markets collide. This year, voters around the world have the ability to affect markets, countries, and economies like never before, so we've cooked up this series to help you make sense of it all. I'm Stephanie Flanders. I lead our government and economics coverage at Bloomberg, also our economic research, and back in the day, I was once BBC Economics editor.

I'm alegra Stratton, I author Bloomberg's read Out newsletter. And I used to work in Number ten, but also number eleven, number nine, and then also actually sorry number twelve downing steeks.

I'm alegra Stratton, I author Bloomberg's read Out newsletter. And I used to work in Number ten, but also number eleven, number nine, and then also actually sorry number twelve downing steeks.

Anyway, we'll maybe get into that later.

Anyway, we'll maybe get into that later.

And I made rim Woodbridge I've never worked in Downing Street, but I'm an opinion columnist and I'm an author, and for thirty two years I worked for The Economist. I wrote the Lexington column, the Schumpeter column, and the Badget column, and I can sense them not all at once successively.

And I made rim Woodbridge I've never worked in Downing Street, but I'm an opinion columnist and I'm an author, and for thirty two years I worked for The Economist. I wrote the Lexington column, the Schumpeter column, and the Badget column, and I can sense them not all at once successively.

This is already chaos. It's going to be so much fun. Okay, So you just heard from the historian and pundit Neil Ferguson. Later in the episode, we're going to chat with him about the state of the world, the state of the US, and what he thinks about it all. You won't want to miss it, you, Allegra, particularly since you weren't part of the interview, and I'm sorry. Also on the show this week, we have Bloomberg senior reporter in Washington, Nancy Cook, who tells us everything that's going on in US politics, and also a little bit about the upcoming White House Correspondence dinner. That that invitation that at least some people would like. Maybe've established that Adrian wouldn't like that. But before we get into it, I guess we should just explain to people why on earth we're doing this. Adrian. I mean, at first, I guess we should say that you know this Bloomberg News Agency. We haven't just stumbled on the fact that there were a lot of neglections this year or that they were going to affect economies. But the more we listened to what everyone else was saying about them, the more we felt like there was a bit of a gap we could fill. What do you mean everyone else? All the other podcasts, There are other posts by men. I'm told there are other podcasts, many of them hosted by men.

This is already chaos. It's going to be so much fun. Okay, So you just heard from the historian and pundit Neil Ferguson. Later in the episode, we're going to chat with him about the state of the world, the state of the US, and what he thinks about it all. You won't want to miss it, you, Allegra, particularly since you weren't part of the interview, and I'm sorry. Also on the show this week, we have Bloomberg senior reporter in Washington, Nancy Cook, who tells us everything that's going on in US politics, and also a little bit about the upcoming White House Correspondence dinner. That that invitation that at least some people would like. Maybe've established that Adrian wouldn't like that. But before we get into it, I guess we should just explain to people why on earth we're doing this. Adrian. I mean, at first, I guess we should say that you know this Bloomberg News Agency. We haven't just stumbled on the fact that there were a lot of neglections this year or that they were going to affect economies. But the more we listened to what everyone else was saying about them, the more we felt like there was a bit of a gap we could fill. What do you mean everyone else? All the other podcasts, There are other posts by men. I'm told there are other podcasts, many of them hosted by men.

Bloomberg has a unique take on these elections because of the welter of economic analysis. I when we're sitting in the podcast recording studio and if I look out at of the glass windows, I can see screen upon screen of data and economic analysis going on. So we're absolutely in the belly of the beast in the city of London looking at the economics and how they might impact on how people will vote.

Bloomberg has a unique take on these elections because of the welter of economic analysis. I when we're sitting in the podcast recording studio and if I look out at of the glass windows, I can see screen upon screen of data and economic analysis going on. So we're absolutely in the belly of the beast in the city of London looking at the economics and how they might impact on how people will vote.

And the other thing I think is that we're truly a global news service and these are global elections. I mean there are elections, really big elections in Written in the United States, in South Africa, every corner of the world. They're taking place. So we want to bring a global perspective as well as an economic and business perspective to it.

And the other thing I think is that we're truly a global news service and these are global elections. I mean there are elections, really big elections in Written in the United States, in South Africa, every corner of the world. They're taking place. So we want to bring a global perspective as well as an economic and business perspective to it.

And it speaks to one of the reasons that you're here, Adrian, is that that sort of politics and geopolitics has been forcing its way onto the agenda for businessmen and people and politicians and policy makers all around the world in a way. I mean, I certainly noticed doing Stephanomics, a sort of previous partial version of this that that just kept we kept on having to talk about geopolitics and history in a way that I don't think would have been true if we were doing a sort of narrow show on the global economy a few years ago.

And it speaks to one of the reasons that you're here, Adrian, is that that sort of politics and geopolitics has been forcing its way onto the agenda for businessmen and people and politicians and policy makers all around the world in a way. I mean, I certainly noticed doing Stephanomics, a sort of previous partial version of this that that just kept we kept on having to talk about geopolitics and history in a way that I don't think would have been true if we were doing a sort of narrow show on the global economy a few years ago.

Absolutely, if you look at companies, there's always been some sorts of companies that have had to take geopolitics into consideration. If you're an energy company, you have to do that, and you put xpis and you put ex ambassadors on your board and all sorts of things. Now it's an extraordinary range of companies, pharmaceutical companies, it companies, even if you're in the food business. You're being impinged upon by JEOE strategic tensions, threats by politicians in the way that we've never seen before. In every single way, you can't understand politics without understanding economics and business and vice versa.

Absolutely, if you look at companies, there's always been some sorts of companies that have had to take geopolitics into consideration. If you're an energy company, you have to do that, and you put xpis and you put ex ambassadors on your board and all sorts of things. Now it's an extraordinary range of companies, pharmaceutical companies, it companies, even if you're in the food business. You're being impinged upon by JEOE strategic tensions, threats by politicians in the way that we've never seen before. In every single way, you can't understand politics without understanding economics and business and vice versa.

And the phrase that I keep coming back to, which I hope that this podcast will sort of interrogate over time, is it's the economy stupid, because I don't know if it is anymore, and I want this podcast to help me because sometimes I think, yeah, you know, you can see the economics driving people to vote in certain ways. And then in America, which we're going to talk about in depth in a second, it's more complicated, isn't it.

And the phrase that I keep coming back to, which I hope that this podcast will sort of interrogate over time, is it's the economy stupid, because I don't know if it is anymore, and I want this podcast to help me because sometimes I think, yeah, you know, you can see the economics driving people to vote in certain ways. And then in America, which we're going to talk about in depth in a second, it's more complicated, isn't it.

No, in a very I remember, even just a few years ago, sort of wise economic policy maker saying to me, I think it was just sort of in the wake of the Eurozone economic crisis, but saying, you know, we often say, we economists often say old politicians they don't understand the laws of economics, they don't understand basic arithmetic, and that's why they get into these troubles. And then he paused and he said, though, I have to say, I think quite a lot of us don't understand the laws of politics, and we tend to ignore that too much. And that's I've had that running through my head quite a lot the last two is. So that's what we're about. I think we're going to go off. You can already tell we're going to go off in a number of different directions. Who knows, especially when we have the three of us sitting in this room. But I think there'll be some sort of common threads for each episode, one of which is we will have a conversation with someone we think is interesting, maybe someone you've heard before, but we'll be asking them much better questions. It may also be someone that you had not realized you ought to know about. And so more of that in the coming weeks. And we'll be checking in with one of our colleagues from around the world on a pretty regular basis to get a sense of what they're seeing on the ground and how it feeds into this sort of big picture, grand thoughts that we are hopefully having occasionally or hearing from other people. And in that vein, I wanted to introduce you to Nancy Cook, one of our senior reporters in d C. Writes a lot about economic policy, but we've also had her out on the campaign trail quite a lot in the last few months because obviously, you know, things are hotting up in the US presidential race. See thank you, Thank you so much. For doing this. You know, we tend to look at the US election partly for the sort of horse race aspect of who's going to win, but also thinking about how important it is for the rest of the world. How are you seeing the rest of the world figure in what you're writing about day to day on the campaign trail.

No, in a very I remember, even just a few years ago, sort of wise economic policy maker saying to me, I think it was just sort of in the wake of the Eurozone economic crisis, but saying, you know, we often say, we economists often say old politicians they don't understand the laws of economics, they don't understand basic arithmetic, and that's why they get into these troubles. And then he paused and he said, though, I have to say, I think quite a lot of us don't understand the laws of politics, and we tend to ignore that too much. And that's I've had that running through my head quite a lot the last two is. So that's what we're about. I think we're going to go off. You can already tell we're going to go off in a number of different directions. Who knows, especially when we have the three of us sitting in this room. But I think there'll be some sort of common threads for each episode, one of which is we will have a conversation with someone we think is interesting, maybe someone you've heard before, but we'll be asking them much better questions. It may also be someone that you had not realized you ought to know about. And so more of that in the coming weeks. And we'll be checking in with one of our colleagues from around the world on a pretty regular basis to get a sense of what they're seeing on the ground and how it feeds into this sort of big picture, grand thoughts that we are hopefully having occasionally or hearing from other people. And in that vein, I wanted to introduce you to Nancy Cook, one of our senior reporters in d C. Writes a lot about economic policy, but we've also had her out on the campaign trail quite a lot in the last few months because obviously, you know, things are hotting up in the US presidential race. See thank you, Thank you so much. For doing this. You know, we tend to look at the US election partly for the sort of horse race aspect of who's going to win, but also thinking about how important it is for the rest of the world. How are you seeing the rest of the world figure in what you're writing about day to day on the campaign trail.

I think that's act will be hugely important for the rest of the world, and it will just present dramatically different outcomes based on who's elected. And we're already seen that. We're seeing a bunch of foreign leaders already make pilgrimages tomorrow Lago or Trump Tower to meet with the former president. You know, even world leaders are really trying to get their hands around what this election will look like, because based on who wins, it will have very different outcomes for trade, for foreign policy, just for general US alliances, for the future of NATO, for what will happen in Ukraine. And so I think that people are wise to really sort of pay attention to this.

I think that's act will be hugely important for the rest of the world, and it will just present dramatically different outcomes based on who's elected. And we're already seen that. We're seeing a bunch of foreign leaders already make pilgrimages tomorrow Lago or Trump Tower to meet with the former president. You know, even world leaders are really trying to get their hands around what this election will look like, because based on who wins, it will have very different outcomes for trade, for foreign policy, just for general US alliances, for the future of NATO, for what will happen in Ukraine. And so I think that people are wise to really sort of pay attention to this.

Can you take us inside the mind of the average American voter. They are for us, certainly for me, this curious thing where they are living in a booming economy, but they are not happy.

Can you take us inside the mind of the average American voter. They are for us, certainly for me, this curious thing where they are living in a booming economy, but they are not happy.

So I think that the average American voter at this point is pretty disengaged from this election. You know, the majority of Americans are not really happy with their choices. They're not enthusiastic about Biden, They're not enthusiastic about Trump. They think they're both too old, you know, too problematic.

So I think that the average American voter at this point is pretty disengaged from this election. You know, the majority of Americans are not really happy with their choices. They're not enthusiastic about Biden, They're not enthusiastic about Trump. They think they're both too old, you know, too problematic.

Are they right?

Are they right?

I mean, I think that they're right to some extent, and that you know, these are, you know, two of the oldest candidates we've ever seen, and I think a lot of Americans feel like we've we know them well, we know their flaws, well, we know what they're good at, well, we know what they're you know, and so I think people really would have been more excited to see sort of fresh, new candidates, but that's not how it ended up working in the US primary system, and so the average American voter is wildly disengaged. I'm not expecting them to become you know, start paying attention really until the fall, most likely. And I think that, you know, they're very worried about things as I was talking about, like the economy. I think women and young people are very worried about reproductive rights in the US because you know, the state by state there's so many states that are sort of banning abortion or doing a lot of restrictions on reproductive rights, and I think the average American voter has just kind of tuned out at this point, which is wild, because you know, I think this election A will be very close and B will be decided by a very small number of people in seven swing states, and so it's just a wild thing to feel like there's a US election that no one in the US is actually excited about and there will be like maybe sixty thousand people that ultimately decide it.

I mean, I think that they're right to some extent, and that you know, these are, you know, two of the oldest candidates we've ever seen, and I think a lot of Americans feel like we've we know them well, we know their flaws, well, we know what they're good at, well, we know what they're you know, and so I think people really would have been more excited to see sort of fresh, new candidates, but that's not how it ended up working in the US primary system, and so the average American voter is wildly disengaged. I'm not expecting them to become you know, start paying attention really until the fall, most likely. And I think that, you know, they're very worried about things as I was talking about, like the economy. I think women and young people are very worried about reproductive rights in the US because you know, the state by state there's so many states that are sort of banning abortion or doing a lot of restrictions on reproductive rights, and I think the average American voter has just kind of tuned out at this point, which is wild, because you know, I think this election A will be very close and B will be decided by a very small number of people in seven swing states, and so it's just a wild thing to feel like there's a US election that no one in the US is actually excited about and there will be like maybe sixty thousand people that ultimately decide it.

Nancy, we've got a good taster of what we are going to have from you over the course of many episodes. We will be coming back to you. I hope you're not going to sound just more and more tired as the campaign goes on. But before I go, I mean, we're going to try and be very lofty and global and also think about the kind of broader you know, at the real America. But there's a very unreal Washington event happening this weekend, which I did go to last year, and then I just couldn't go this year because my liver needed at least a year more than a year's rest and that. But I did want to go once so that I could relive the broadcast news the movie. But the Washington Correspondent's Dinner is this week? Can Nancy are you looking forward to it? Is the whole of the Washington wishing they had an invitation? Or is it more everything around it that people are now going to.

Nancy, we've got a good taster of what we are going to have from you over the course of many episodes. We will be coming back to you. I hope you're not going to sound just more and more tired as the campaign goes on. But before I go, I mean, we're going to try and be very lofty and global and also think about the kind of broader you know, at the real America. But there's a very unreal Washington event happening this weekend, which I did go to last year, and then I just couldn't go this year because my liver needed at least a year more than a year's rest and that. But I did want to go once so that I could relive the broadcast news the movie. But the Washington Correspondent's Dinner is this week? Can Nancy are you looking forward to it? Is the whole of the Washington wishing they had an invitation? Or is it more everything around it that people are now going to.

Well, people who have lived in Washington for a long time, like myself, always roll their eyes at it, but then they are SVP to all the parties and go to everything, you know, willingly.

Well, people who have lived in Washington for a long time, like myself, always roll their eyes at it, but then they are SVP to all the parties and go to everything, you know, willingly.

You know it is.

You know it is.

It'll be interesting this year because President Biden is speaking. He went last year and it's always interesting to see sort of how he interacts with the public and the media, particularly during a campaign year. And you know, basically it's a lot of Washington networking. The parties have now expanded to basically Thursday through Sunday, So.

It'll be interesting this year because President Biden is speaking. He went last year and it's always interesting to see sort of how he interacts with the public and the media, particularly during a campaign year. And you know, basically it's a lot of Washington networking. The parties have now expanded to basically Thursday through Sunday, So.

Who can that be? One night is enough? I mean it's horrible, That's why how can it go on for four days?

Who can that be? One night is enough? I mean it's horrible, That's why how can it go on for four days?

That's why the economy's growing?

That's why the economy's growing?

So you know, it's a chance to kind of catch up with a lot of people in Washington in a very short period of time, efficiently by going to many many cocktail parties.

So you know, it's a chance to kind of catch up with a lot of people in Washington in a very short period of time, efficiently by going to many many cocktail parties.

What is the best party in town. That's the hardest thing to get an invitation too.

What is the best party in town. That's the hardest thing to get an invitation too.

I think that there and there's several parties at embassy's that the ambassadors throw, and I think that those are always the hot parties.

I think that there and there's several parties at embassy's that the ambassadors throw, and I think that those are always the hot parties.

The Parrot, the French Embassy, yeah.

The Parrot, the French Embassy, yeah.

There, you know, there's the Swiss Embassy. The British ambassador, you know, is very social and likes to throw parties. So there's a bunch of different ambassador parties over the next four days, and I feel like those are kind of the or Thursday through Sunday, and those are the hot tickets because going to an embassy.

There, you know, there's the Swiss Embassy. The British ambassador, you know, is very social and likes to throw parties. So there's a bunch of different ambassador parties over the next four days, and I feel like those are kind of the or Thursday through Sunday, and those are the hot tickets because going to an embassy.

I have that saying.

I have that saying.

The best one used to be, although I have very very vague memories of it, was the Christopher Hitchin's party, which was absolutely fantastic.

The best one used to be, although I have very very vague memories of it, was the Christopher Hitchin's party, which was absolutely fantastic.

You probably had fake memories of it the next day. Absolutely all right, Nancy, we'll let you go, but thank you and we'll listen to you again.

You probably had fake memories of it the next day. Absolutely all right, Nancy, we'll let you go, but thank you and we'll listen to you again.

Thanks so much for having me.

Thanks so much for having me.

Before chaos breaks out again. Let's get to our guest this week, Neil Ferguson, Bloomberg opinion columnist. He's a Millbank Family senior fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University and the author of gazillion books, but most recent Doom The Politics of Catastrophe. As we were saying earlier, the whole idea of voter nomics is to take stock of the way that geopolitics is overturning a lot of long standing assumptions about economics and indeed business around the world. So Neil seemed like an excellent person to start with to get a very intelligent mashup of economics, geopolitics and history. So let's get to that conversation. When we look at the US election from the UK, although we talk a lot about the economy and why isn't Biden doing better from the surprisingly strong economy, it does feel like international events are looming larger than they usually do in a US general election. So I'm just wondering, from your perspective, does this feel like a foreign policy election?

Before chaos breaks out again. Let's get to our guest this week, Neil Ferguson, Bloomberg opinion columnist. He's a Millbank Family senior fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University and the author of gazillion books, but most recent Doom The Politics of Catastrophe. As we were saying earlier, the whole idea of voter nomics is to take stock of the way that geopolitics is overturning a lot of long standing assumptions about economics and indeed business around the world. So Neil seemed like an excellent person to start with to get a very intelligent mashup of economics, geopolitics and history. So let's get to that conversation. When we look at the US election from the UK, although we talk a lot about the economy and why isn't Biden doing better from the surprisingly strong economy, it does feel like international events are looming larger than they usually do in a US general election. So I'm just wondering, from your perspective, does this feel like a foreign policy election?

I doubt it. I think if you look at the key voters in the swing states and that those are the not very committed independence and the people who flip between elections, I doubt that they're sitting with maps of the Middle East pondering whether Prime Minister Netanya, who should make a move against Hezbollah. They are probably more interested in Trump's New York criminal trial, because when you look at the polling, that's very interesting. If you ask people how would you vote tomorrow? Trump wins in the swing states, But if you ask them if you had a criminal conviction, how would you vote tomorrow? It flips and so much more hinges on the law fare than the actual warfare in this election.

I doubt it. I think if you look at the key voters in the swing states and that those are the not very committed independence and the people who flip between elections, I doubt that they're sitting with maps of the Middle East pondering whether Prime Minister Netanya, who should make a move against Hezbollah. They are probably more interested in Trump's New York criminal trial, because when you look at the polling, that's very interesting. If you ask people how would you vote tomorrow? Trump wins in the swing states, But if you ask them if you had a criminal conviction, how would you vote tomorrow? It flips and so much more hinges on the law fare than the actual warfare in this election.

As far as all, let me push back on that mail, because what's handy at Columbia University at the moment seems to be extremely polarizing and motivating and voters. And when I was in New York last week and the Columbia University stuff massively occupied people's minds as compared with the Trump trial, which basically was boring to people. Isn't this sort of protest something that annoys swing voters? When't we see more of it in Chicago at the Democratic Convention? That perhaps? And would it shift quite a lot of people?

As far as all, let me push back on that mail, because what's handy at Columbia University at the moment seems to be extremely polarizing and motivating and voters. And when I was in New York last week and the Columbia University stuff massively occupied people's minds as compared with the Trump trial, which basically was boring to people. Isn't this sort of protest something that annoys swing voters? When't we see more of it in Chicago at the Democratic Convention? That perhaps? And would it shift quite a lot of people?

As last I heard New York as one of the swing states. I have to say that the Trump campaign is basically the twenty sixteen campaign, and it's about economic issues, it's about immigration, It's really about the same themes of that twenty sixteen election eight years ago still works for the base. They're still motivated, especially on the idea that there's an open border criminal gangs are pouring through. That's the Trump campaign. The Trump campaign isn't really about woke Columbia student that exercises the chattering classes enormously. But between New York and California, where I also spend time, I'm struck by how much conversation on those subjects is irrelevant to this election because those states are not in play. You gotta ask yourself the question, Adrian, which counties in which states are in play? And what do people there care about? And I honestly doubt that they care about campus politics. I'm exposed to it at very close quarters because I have to tell you, Stanford hasn't been a whole lot better than Columbia, and I just don't think it's going to be decisive in this election.

As last I heard New York as one of the swing states. I have to say that the Trump campaign is basically the twenty sixteen campaign, and it's about economic issues, it's about immigration, It's really about the same themes of that twenty sixteen election eight years ago still works for the base. They're still motivated, especially on the idea that there's an open border criminal gangs are pouring through. That's the Trump campaign. The Trump campaign isn't really about woke Columbia student that exercises the chattering classes enormously. But between New York and California, where I also spend time, I'm struck by how much conversation on those subjects is irrelevant to this election because those states are not in play. You gotta ask yourself the question, Adrian, which counties in which states are in play? And what do people there care about? And I honestly doubt that they care about campus politics. I'm exposed to it at very close quarters because I have to tell you, Stanford hasn't been a whole lot better than Columbia, and I just don't think it's going to be decisive in this election.

I still feel that it matters, and the person who comes to my mind is Richard Nixon. And the way that you got this backlash against student protests student radicalism really feeding into Middle Americans feeling as though this wasn't the sort of thing they could go with.

I still feel that it matters, and the person who comes to my mind is Richard Nixon. And the way that you got this backlash against student protests student radicalism really feeding into Middle Americans feeling as though this wasn't the sort of thing they could go with.

There's one thing I'll agree with you about. If they have another Chicago convention of the sort that undoubtedly damaged the Democratic cause in the Nixon era, then yeah, because that will put it in squarely in the national political debate. So if in August it's a complete fiasco in Chicago and there are pro Palestinian protests disrupting the convention, then I think that will undoubtedly help Trump, But I'm skeptical that it's the key issue at the moment. Look, if it were, Trump would be pulling ahead. But as far as I can see, Biden's closed the gap in the last couple of months for two reasons. One that people are beginning to come round to the view that the economy is actually quite good, and that's taken a while because there was so much disillusion with the inflation spike in twenty twenty two. The other thing that's interesting is that for most Americans we began by discussing, I don't think foreign policy is at all a top priority in this election. It's not ranked highly in the issues. But in the last couple of months, Republicans have been entirely divided on the Ukraine question. One part of their party, especially in the House of Representatives, is isolationists and wants Ukraine essentially to be thrown under the nearest available Russian bus. And then there are a whole bunch of other people like Mike Pompeo and Mike Gallagher and Matt Possenger who are more hawkish than the Democrats on every major conflict issue, and I think that's actually somewhat damaging to the Republican cause. We haven't mentioned it, but abortion is the one issue where the Democrats have an edge over the Republicans, that reproductive writs, whatever you want to call it. Frankly, I'll be surprised if the antics of work college students really show up in the polling. We'll know in a guess in a few weeks if you're right and I'm wrong.

There's one thing I'll agree with you about. If they have another Chicago convention of the sort that undoubtedly damaged the Democratic cause in the Nixon era, then yeah, because that will put it in squarely in the national political debate. So if in August it's a complete fiasco in Chicago and there are pro Palestinian protests disrupting the convention, then I think that will undoubtedly help Trump, But I'm skeptical that it's the key issue at the moment. Look, if it were, Trump would be pulling ahead. But as far as I can see, Biden's closed the gap in the last couple of months for two reasons. One that people are beginning to come round to the view that the economy is actually quite good, and that's taken a while because there was so much disillusion with the inflation spike in twenty twenty two. The other thing that's interesting is that for most Americans we began by discussing, I don't think foreign policy is at all a top priority in this election. It's not ranked highly in the issues. But in the last couple of months, Republicans have been entirely divided on the Ukraine question. One part of their party, especially in the House of Representatives, is isolationists and wants Ukraine essentially to be thrown under the nearest available Russian bus. And then there are a whole bunch of other people like Mike Pompeo and Mike Gallagher and Matt Possenger who are more hawkish than the Democrats on every major conflict issue, and I think that's actually somewhat damaging to the Republican cause. We haven't mentioned it, but abortion is the one issue where the Democrats have an edge over the Republicans, that reproductive writs, whatever you want to call it. Frankly, I'll be surprised if the antics of work college students really show up in the polling. We'll know in a guess in a few weeks if you're right and I'm wrong.

Just to finish this off, the obvious place where people do point to a cost to Biden of the dynamics the Middle East and that strong feelings on that is somewhere like Michigan. Do we overstate the impact that some of those sort of the marginal voter who may just not turn out for the Democrats, actually they're out campaigning and they don't feel like he's on the right side of history.

Just to finish this off, the obvious place where people do point to a cost to Biden of the dynamics the Middle East and that strong feelings on that is somewhere like Michigan. Do we overstate the impact that some of those sort of the marginal voter who may just not turn out for the Democrats, actually they're out campaigning and they don't feel like he's on the right side of history.

I think Michigan's very important in the sense that you have a substantial Muslim vote, which was not something Richard Nixon had to worry about. And you also have the kind of fellow traveler sympathizers with the Palestinian cause on the progressive left, not only in Michigan but everywhere and everything since ex Ober the seventh has been tricky for the Democrats from that point of view, because they have on one side they're traditionally strong support amongst Jewish Americans saying you're not doing enough, you are not supportive enough, and then you have the Michigan Muslims and the woke fellow travelers saying you're being far too helpful to Israel. And this is a very difficult issue for the Biden campaign, and it's going to continue to be difficult right through the year because it ain't over in the Middle East. They're certainly going to be a further round of conflict there. I would imagine that the IDF will go after Hesballa at some point on the Lebanese border between now and the election, and so the issue is not going to go away. And that's why I think Adrian has a really good point about the Chicago convention, because if if the Charkago convention coincides, then is really offensive against Hesballah, it's going to get pretty great for Biden. Yeah, that could be a that could be a problem, But I don't think Columbia students are a problem for the Democrats, not yet.

I think Michigan's very important in the sense that you have a substantial Muslim vote, which was not something Richard Nixon had to worry about. And you also have the kind of fellow traveler sympathizers with the Palestinian cause on the progressive left, not only in Michigan but everywhere and everything since ex Ober the seventh has been tricky for the Democrats from that point of view, because they have on one side they're traditionally strong support amongst Jewish Americans saying you're not doing enough, you are not supportive enough, and then you have the Michigan Muslims and the woke fellow travelers saying you're being far too helpful to Israel. And this is a very difficult issue for the Biden campaign, and it's going to continue to be difficult right through the year because it ain't over in the Middle East. They're certainly going to be a further round of conflict there. I would imagine that the IDF will go after Hesballa at some point on the Lebanese border between now and the election, and so the issue is not going to go away. And that's why I think Adrian has a really good point about the Chicago convention, because if if the Charkago convention coincides, then is really offensive against Hesballah, it's going to get pretty great for Biden. Yeah, that could be a that could be a problem, But I don't think Columbia students are a problem for the Democrats, not yet.

Why is Biden not walking this as an incumbent president with a booming economy, a really strong economy, How does it look so close?

Why is Biden not walking this as an incumbent president with a booming economy, a really strong economy, How does it look so close?

That's an easier question. Larry Sommers came with a paper a couple of weeks ago now saying, yeah, it's true that inflation has come down since the spike of twenty twenty two. Remember, inflation got up to nine percent consumer price index inflation, and of course people didn't like that. Been a long time since anybody saw nine percent inflation in the US, and there's a lot of resentment that persists. People are also sensitive to food inflation, and they're sensitive to gasoline inflation, and there's still a sense that the Federal Reserve hasn't got this under control. Larry's argument was, you have to remember that although mortgages can be set for very long periods in the United States, the land of the thirty year mortgage. There are lots of other forms of debt that are far more sensitive to interest rates, and he argues, you've got quite a lot of pain in auto loans and another short maturity consumer debt. I think that's an important point. I think if you look closely at the labor mark, the first signs of that long awaited and now no longer believed in recession can be seen. So the nightmare scenario for Team Biden is that the economy looks terrible by the time we get to labor Day, and then people will I think, revert to a negative view of the Biden economy. When I heard that the Biden team wanted to run on the economy, which was like last year's story, I'm like, good luck with that. That that will lose the election. So they've had to flip to a different strategy, which is running on Trump and then desperately trying to get Trump to say something about abortion that they can then run against. But yeah, the economy doesn't work for them as an issue. If they had stuck with that plan, then I think Trump would have had a good shot at winning.

That's an easier question. Larry Sommers came with a paper a couple of weeks ago now saying, yeah, it's true that inflation has come down since the spike of twenty twenty two. Remember, inflation got up to nine percent consumer price index inflation, and of course people didn't like that. Been a long time since anybody saw nine percent inflation in the US, and there's a lot of resentment that persists. People are also sensitive to food inflation, and they're sensitive to gasoline inflation, and there's still a sense that the Federal Reserve hasn't got this under control. Larry's argument was, you have to remember that although mortgages can be set for very long periods in the United States, the land of the thirty year mortgage. There are lots of other forms of debt that are far more sensitive to interest rates, and he argues, you've got quite a lot of pain in auto loans and another short maturity consumer debt. I think that's an important point. I think if you look closely at the labor mark, the first signs of that long awaited and now no longer believed in recession can be seen. So the nightmare scenario for Team Biden is that the economy looks terrible by the time we get to labor Day, and then people will I think, revert to a negative view of the Biden economy. When I heard that the Biden team wanted to run on the economy, which was like last year's story, I'm like, good luck with that. That that will lose the election. So they've had to flip to a different strategy, which is running on Trump and then desperately trying to get Trump to say something about abortion that they can then run against. But yeah, the economy doesn't work for them as an issue. If they had stuck with that plan, then I think Trump would have had a good shot at winning.

When I was in New York Las week. I notice talking to money people, to finance people, and the rest of it is how many people are leaning to Trump, saying that we could really lower corporate taks a bit more deregulation and the booming economy will boom even more. I hadn't expected so many, as it were respectable, educated people who happened to be rich, to be pro Trump. Is that a distorted impression of what's going on? Or is there a sort of shift amongst the wealthier people. This is in New York, which is not exactly democratic stronghold.

When I was in New York Las week. I notice talking to money people, to finance people, and the rest of it is how many people are leaning to Trump, saying that we could really lower corporate taks a bit more deregulation and the booming economy will boom even more. I hadn't expected so many, as it were respectable, educated people who happened to be rich, to be pro Trump. Is that a distorted impression of what's going on? Or is there a sort of shift amongst the wealthier people. This is in New York, which is not exactly democratic stronghold.

I think that there are a number of issues that matter a lot to the wealthy elite of New York, and those include elite universities and the culture conflict that has been going on there since October the seventh. Wall Street had not noticed, despite my attempts to point it out over the past ten years, that the alma mater they felt so warmly towards had gone bananas. But after October the seventh, they noticed, and that was when Wall Street began to care finally about what happened to the hundreds of millions of dollars that they chuck at Harvard and Columbia. So I think that's part of what's going on. When you talk to the Wall Street crowd, A lot of them have had the scales fall from their eyes about work academia a bit belatedly in my view, but they finally got the message. There's also a sense that the economy was an absolute home run for Donald Trump. People forget, but the Trump administration's economic outcomes were among the best of any presidential term since Ron Reagan, and one might even go back further and say about as good as the post war period has seen because after a period of what seventeen years of flatlining, median household income in real terms went up by more than ten percent in the first three years pre COVID of the Trump residency, and even after COVID was still substantially up where it had been between nineteen ninety nine and twenty sixteen. By the way, it's in negative territory under Joe Biden. Last I checked, Wall Street would love to have a repeat of the Trump rally that kicked off pretty much on election Night in November twenty sixteen. Now, I'm sure that this is a flawed analogy, because I don't think a second Trump term will be anything like the first Trump term because the conditions, the initial conditions are so different. But there's definitely a perfectly straightforward view that the Trump administration was pretty good at the economy, and so why not have the Trump administration two point zero?

I think that there are a number of issues that matter a lot to the wealthy elite of New York, and those include elite universities and the culture conflict that has been going on there since October the seventh. Wall Street had not noticed, despite my attempts to point it out over the past ten years, that the alma mater they felt so warmly towards had gone bananas. But after October the seventh, they noticed, and that was when Wall Street began to care finally about what happened to the hundreds of millions of dollars that they chuck at Harvard and Columbia. So I think that's part of what's going on. When you talk to the Wall Street crowd, A lot of them have had the scales fall from their eyes about work academia a bit belatedly in my view, but they finally got the message. There's also a sense that the economy was an absolute home run for Donald Trump. People forget, but the Trump administration's economic outcomes were among the best of any presidential term since Ron Reagan, and one might even go back further and say about as good as the post war period has seen because after a period of what seventeen years of flatlining, median household income in real terms went up by more than ten percent in the first three years pre COVID of the Trump residency, and even after COVID was still substantially up where it had been between nineteen ninety nine and twenty sixteen. By the way, it's in negative territory under Joe Biden. Last I checked, Wall Street would love to have a repeat of the Trump rally that kicked off pretty much on election Night in November twenty sixteen. Now, I'm sure that this is a flawed analogy, because I don't think a second Trump term will be anything like the first Trump term because the conditions, the initial conditions are so different. But there's definitely a perfectly straightforward view that the Trump administration was pretty good at the economy, and so why not have the Trump administration two point zero?

Because we are also we're going to be very global on this podcast, and we are also specifically thinking about how geopolitics is intervening in the way everyone thinks about everything. And I was struck by something you said in a recent column that you seem to be saying that that isolationism was just not going to win out in US politics, and that President Trump had recognized that or was likely to recognize that having seen a bipartisan consensus develop over the need to confront China in this kind of new Cold War. Is that sort of wishful on your part, or you think genuinely isolationism is not going to be a winning strategy in the US for either party.

Because we are also we're going to be very global on this podcast, and we are also specifically thinking about how geopolitics is intervening in the way everyone thinks about everything. And I was struck by something you said in a recent column that you seem to be saying that that isolationism was just not going to win out in US politics, and that President Trump had recognized that or was likely to recognize that having seen a bipartisan consensus develop over the need to confront China in this kind of new Cold War. Is that sort of wishful on your part, or you think genuinely isolationism is not going to be a winning strategy in the US for either party.

I don't think it's plausible, and I think it's very striking. The Speaker Johnson Mike Johnson, relatively recently installed House Speaker, went from being opposed to funding Ukraine's war effort to arguing passionately for doing so. Why was that because the intelligence briefings scared the hell out of him, And I just wish that Marjorie Taylor Green could have had those briefings too, because if you let Russia win in Ukraine, that is no bueno from almost any vantage point that is rational. I'm excluding the Tucker Carlson position that it would just be fine if Putin won. The interesting thing about this is that Trump himself changed the conversation on US national security strategy, which for the entire period, really after the end of the Cold War, had been a sleep walk towards Chinese ascendancy, culminating when Susan Rice was Obama's National security advisor and the national security strategy basically said China's rising, Oh well, it's okay, why worry? And Trump campaigned against China was as important as the border issue. In twenty sixteen, he came in, he talked about tariffs and China. He'd been really fueled by the policy elite, which has been up until the Trump presidency on critically pro free trade. And the Trump administration completely changed the conversation because they imposed the tariffs, they stood up to China, they rewrote the national security strategy as one of competition with China as the main US rival along with Russia. HRC Master Nadia Shadlow nailed it fantastic document set a new course for American strategy that the Biden administration did not dare change. And on this issue, it seems to me Trump has a lot of credibility because everything that the Trump administration said about China has turned out to be right. I think the isolationist position is inherently stupid. It's like being an apologist for the Ttalitarians in the nineteen thirties and nineteen forties. You're just getting it wrong because they clearly aspire to a world in which American privacy is over. That's the one thing that brings Jan Ping and Vladimir Putin and the Iatolis in Tehran and Kim Jong In together. They don't have anything in common except that they really quite against democracy, the rule of law, individual freedom, and primacy. An isolationist positions, such as Tucker Carlson staked out after he left Fox, is as big a loser in my view as the same position was in the nineteen thirties. That all the Republicans have to do is as Mitke Pultinger and Mike Gallagher argue in the latest Issue of Foreign Affairs is be more hawkish than the Democrats, who have been really bad at foreign policy. It's like how not to do deterrence one oh one, twenty twenty two, total failure to deter Pudin from invading Ukraine, twenty twenty three, total failure to Iran from unleashing its proxies against Israel, and twenty twenty four they can't even deter Bibi from finishing off Hamas in Gaza. And so this administration is terrible at foreign policy. It's really woeful. After it makes Jimmy Carter look like one of the masters of geopolitics. If the Trump campaign could focus on that, if that was what the electorate really cared about, then Trump would win the way Reagan won in nineteen.

I don't think it's plausible, and I think it's very striking. The Speaker Johnson Mike Johnson, relatively recently installed House Speaker, went from being opposed to funding Ukraine's war effort to arguing passionately for doing so. Why was that because the intelligence briefings scared the hell out of him, And I just wish that Marjorie Taylor Green could have had those briefings too, because if you let Russia win in Ukraine, that is no bueno from almost any vantage point that is rational. I'm excluding the Tucker Carlson position that it would just be fine if Putin won. The interesting thing about this is that Trump himself changed the conversation on US national security strategy, which for the entire period, really after the end of the Cold War, had been a sleep walk towards Chinese ascendancy, culminating when Susan Rice was Obama's National security advisor and the national security strategy basically said China's rising, Oh well, it's okay, why worry? And Trump campaigned against China was as important as the border issue. In twenty sixteen, he came in, he talked about tariffs and China. He'd been really fueled by the policy elite, which has been up until the Trump presidency on critically pro free trade. And the Trump administration completely changed the conversation because they imposed the tariffs, they stood up to China, they rewrote the national security strategy as one of competition with China as the main US rival along with Russia. HRC Master Nadia Shadlow nailed it fantastic document set a new course for American strategy that the Biden administration did not dare change. And on this issue, it seems to me Trump has a lot of credibility because everything that the Trump administration said about China has turned out to be right. I think the isolationist position is inherently stupid. It's like being an apologist for the Ttalitarians in the nineteen thirties and nineteen forties. You're just getting it wrong because they clearly aspire to a world in which American privacy is over. That's the one thing that brings Jan Ping and Vladimir Putin and the Iatolis in Tehran and Kim Jong In together. They don't have anything in common except that they really quite against democracy, the rule of law, individual freedom, and primacy. An isolationist positions, such as Tucker Carlson staked out after he left Fox, is as big a loser in my view as the same position was in the nineteen thirties. That all the Republicans have to do is as Mitke Pultinger and Mike Gallagher argue in the latest Issue of Foreign Affairs is be more hawkish than the Democrats, who have been really bad at foreign policy. It's like how not to do deterrence one oh one, twenty twenty two, total failure to deter Pudin from invading Ukraine, twenty twenty three, total failure to Iran from unleashing its proxies against Israel, and twenty twenty four they can't even deter Bibi from finishing off Hamas in Gaza. And so this administration is terrible at foreign policy. It's really woeful. After it makes Jimmy Carter look like one of the masters of geopolitics. If the Trump campaign could focus on that, if that was what the electorate really cared about, then Trump would win the way Reagan won in nineteen.

Eighty without all the deals. I think I would absolutely agree with you that President Trump was the one who did most to provide a wake up call and a recognition that the China strategy of those many years had been completely wrong, or at least been disproved by Shijinping's approach to government. I was sitting in US Treasury when we let China into the WTO, and that the view of how that was going to go just turned out completely wrong. But the problem I find when I think, okay, is President Trump going to be ironically a less scary, potentially more constructive force on the international stage if he's reelected than these as you described incompetent President Biden and Tony Blincoln. I've got two problems with that. One is, although President Trump has often sounded very belligerent about China and raised the alarm, he's also come across as quite liking dictators, wanting to do deals, and he's very against underpinning a sort of packs America if there's a threat on Taiwan. It's not clear to me looking at Trump's previous pronouncements, some of them suggests he would underpin Taiwan's security, quite a lot of them suggest otherwise. And the other thing I would say is his clientalism, whether it's over TikTok Ban or other things. He seems quite keen to respond to kind of business lobbying and business pressure. It doesn't seem to take much to get him to kind of roll over on some of these things. So I just I take a lot of what you're saying. But I just wonder on those two points, is he going to want to underpin the security of Asia and isn't he going to be quite easily bought off.

Eighty without all the deals. I think I would absolutely agree with you that President Trump was the one who did most to provide a wake up call and a recognition that the China strategy of those many years had been completely wrong, or at least been disproved by Shijinping's approach to government. I was sitting in US Treasury when we let China into the WTO, and that the view of how that was going to go just turned out completely wrong. But the problem I find when I think, okay, is President Trump going to be ironically a less scary, potentially more constructive force on the international stage if he's reelected than these as you described incompetent President Biden and Tony Blincoln. I've got two problems with that. One is, although President Trump has often sounded very belligerent about China and raised the alarm, he's also come across as quite liking dictators, wanting to do deals, and he's very against underpinning a sort of packs America if there's a threat on Taiwan. It's not clear to me looking at Trump's previous pronouncements, some of them suggests he would underpin Taiwan's security, quite a lot of them suggest otherwise. And the other thing I would say is his clientalism, whether it's over TikTok Ban or other things. He seems quite keen to respond to kind of business lobbying and business pressure. It doesn't seem to take much to get him to kind of roll over on some of these things. So I just I take a lot of what you're saying. But I just wonder on those two points, is he going to want to underpin the security of Asia and isn't he going to be quite easily bought off.

That's a reasonable question to ask, Stephanie. But one has to remember that the president isn't the king. In practice. The president sits a top a complex national security bureaucracy, and it's only got more complex over the last fifty years, and it has to be staffed by people who know what they're doing. And you just can't make Tucker secondary state. That's not an option. So you have to look around and ask who will staff up the second Trump administration, and the answer is people like my Pompeo and Matt Pottinger and maybe Mike Gallaher, and those people are all much more hawkish and much more convinced that behind every threat to democracy, whether it's in Ukraine or in Taiwan or in Israel, is the Chinese Communist Party. So although Trump himself is transactional and has a kind of level of cynicism, but that is always somewhat staggering in practice. Or Republican administration is unlikely to sell Taiwan for a bunch of golf courses or casinos with John Bolton's passage that everybody should And in that passage, Adrian you may have read it, Trump is explaining the significance of Taiwan and he pulls that He's sitting in the Oval office, and he pulled it's a sharpie, these pens that he likes to sign his name with. And he says, you see this, sharpie, this is Taiwan. You see this desk of the Resolute, this is China. Are we really going to send the US Navy across the Pacific to rescue a sharpie? That's how Trump feels. And by the way, it's not a stupid position, because actually going to war over Taiwan, in my view, would be the single stupidest thing an American administration can do at this point, because there would be a non trivial chance that it would lose. So I don't disagree with Trump that staking the future of American power on a naval expedition to run a blockade of Taiwan is a bad idea. But if you talked to Mike Pompeo or Matt Pottinger or Mike Galpher or Elbert Tolby, for example, who might still be in a Trump administration. They will all tell you that this is the make or break decision of their lives. So I don't think it's possible to imagine a fully staffed isolationist administration or a fully staffed trump is administration that we just do deals on all of these Nash.

That's a reasonable question to ask, Stephanie. But one has to remember that the president isn't the king. In practice. The president sits a top a complex national security bureaucracy, and it's only got more complex over the last fifty years, and it has to be staffed by people who know what they're doing. And you just can't make Tucker secondary state. That's not an option. So you have to look around and ask who will staff up the second Trump administration, and the answer is people like my Pompeo and Matt Pottinger and maybe Mike Gallaher, and those people are all much more hawkish and much more convinced that behind every threat to democracy, whether it's in Ukraine or in Taiwan or in Israel, is the Chinese Communist Party. So although Trump himself is transactional and has a kind of level of cynicism, but that is always somewhat staggering in practice. Or Republican administration is unlikely to sell Taiwan for a bunch of golf courses or casinos with John Bolton's passage that everybody should And in that passage, Adrian you may have read it, Trump is explaining the significance of Taiwan and he pulls that He's sitting in the Oval office, and he pulled it's a sharpie, these pens that he likes to sign his name with. And he says, you see this, sharpie, this is Taiwan. You see this desk of the Resolute, this is China. Are we really going to send the US Navy across the Pacific to rescue a sharpie? That's how Trump feels. And by the way, it's not a stupid position, because actually going to war over Taiwan, in my view, would be the single stupidest thing an American administration can do at this point, because there would be a non trivial chance that it would lose. So I don't disagree with Trump that staking the future of American power on a naval expedition to run a blockade of Taiwan is a bad idea. But if you talked to Mike Pompeo or Matt Pottinger or Mike Galpher or Elbert Tolby, for example, who might still be in a Trump administration. They will all tell you that this is the make or break decision of their lives. So I don't think it's possible to imagine a fully staffed isolationist administration or a fully staffed trump is administration that we just do deals on all of these Nash.

Isn't there a case for Trump's transactionalism and for his lack of consistency in the sense that we need to have two sets of policies towards China. We need to stand up to it, but we also need to trade with it and engage with it. And just because liberal engagement didn't work all the time when Stephanie was in the Treasury, it doesn't mean that he can't work at some point in the future. She didn't pink May at some point will at some point die. There is a liberal faction within liberal in loose terms, within China. We need to give them some sort of off ramp whereby we can say, if you behave in a different sort of way, you're in a more liberal way, we will engage with it. We will have a different sort of set of policies. So I'm not sure that the consistency of Pompeo is better than the inconsistency and opportunism of Trump.

Isn't there a case for Trump's transactionalism and for his lack of consistency in the sense that we need to have two sets of policies towards China. We need to stand up to it, but we also need to trade with it and engage with it. And just because liberal engagement didn't work all the time when Stephanie was in the Treasury, it doesn't mean that he can't work at some point in the future. She didn't pink May at some point will at some point die. There is a liberal faction within liberal in loose terms, within China. We need to give them some sort of off ramp whereby we can say, if you behave in a different sort of way, you're in a more liberal way, we will engage with it. We will have a different sort of set of policies. So I'm not sure that the consistency of Pompeo is better than the inconsistency and opportunism of Trump.

I'll just imagine a scenario like in November the sixth, No sooner have we got the results in than we hear that there's a blockade of Taiwan, which the Chinese could do tomorrow, but they might wait until after the election. What then, what do you do? Because if you send the naval expeditionary force, like I don't know, two or three aircraft carrier strike groups, there's a non trivial risk that you are rerunning the Cuban missile crisis with the real risk of World War III, and we're not particularly well positioned for that war as things stand. It is not nineteen eighty, it's not the mid nineteen nineties. Either. The Chinese can sink US aircraft carriers. They've got missiles that can do just that, and we would run out of precision missiles in a week, and the war games are pretty clear on that. So I think the US should be speaking a lot more softly about Taiwan and trying to find the big stick that it currently doesn't have. And until such times as you have that big stick. The right strategy is they don't negotiate with them, engage with them, whatever it is, arms control, economics, exchanges, just talk about it. European security talk about it is better to be engaged in those conversations with the other superpower than to risk a Cuban missile crisis, which is way too dangerous. And I think that's what the Biden people wanted to do. I think that was definitely Jake Sullivan's instinct. I think that was what they were trying to achieve in the run up to the meetings in November. The problem they had was, as in the First Cold War, you're doing daketall when the midd least blows up and you weren't expecting that. He certainly wasn't expecting that, and it happens, and it's greatly weakened the national security strategy of Team Biden. That's why they're in trouble at the moment. Not their China policy, which I think was quite smart. In fact, the China policy of the Biden administration was especially smart because they found the Chinese Achilles Heel, which turned out to be high end semiconductors.

I'll just imagine a scenario like in November the sixth, No sooner have we got the results in than we hear that there's a blockade of Taiwan, which the Chinese could do tomorrow, but they might wait until after the election. What then, what do you do? Because if you send the naval expeditionary force, like I don't know, two or three aircraft carrier strike groups, there's a non trivial risk that you are rerunning the Cuban missile crisis with the real risk of World War III, and we're not particularly well positioned for that war as things stand. It is not nineteen eighty, it's not the mid nineteen nineties. Either. The Chinese can sink US aircraft carriers. They've got missiles that can do just that, and we would run out of precision missiles in a week, and the war games are pretty clear on that. So I think the US should be speaking a lot more softly about Taiwan and trying to find the big stick that it currently doesn't have. And until such times as you have that big stick. The right strategy is they don't negotiate with them, engage with them, whatever it is, arms control, economics, exchanges, just talk about it. European security talk about it is better to be engaged in those conversations with the other superpower than to risk a Cuban missile crisis, which is way too dangerous. And I think that's what the Biden people wanted to do. I think that was definitely Jake Sullivan's instinct. I think that was what they were trying to achieve in the run up to the meetings in November. The problem they had was, as in the First Cold War, you're doing daketall when the midd least blows up and you weren't expecting that. He certainly wasn't expecting that, and it happens, and it's greatly weakened the national security strategy of Team Biden. That's why they're in trouble at the moment. Not their China policy, which I think was quite smart. In fact, the China policy of the Biden administration was especially smart because they found the Chinese Achilles Heel, which turned out to be high end semiconductors.

As somebody who jumps from one side of the Atlantic to another. What do you say I'm seeing in Britain in terms of ourcoming election, which may well be almost the same time as the election as the Trump Biden election, that you've seeing any interesting patterns emerging that might cast light between the two.

As somebody who jumps from one side of the Atlantic to another. What do you say I'm seeing in Britain in terms of ourcoming election, which may well be almost the same time as the election as the Trump Biden election, that you've seeing any interesting patterns emerging that might cast light between the two.

There's all almost complete disconnects. But itcause Britain's rerunning the nineteen seventies, like some brilliantly executed BBC costume drama in which everybody talks as if it's the nineteen seventies. Ah well, mustn't grumble. Nothing works and you go from a weak conservative government or a weak labor government. They'll make it worse, won't they. I mean, pretty kear Starmer as he enters Downing Street. The predicament is really dire from the point of view of the fiscal situation and all the wonderful things that Rachel Reeves said in her much lauded speech reminded me of the white heat of technology. And it's going to be just Wilson Reducts with the inevitable consequences. So Britain's going to rerun the seventies and it's going to be probably good for sitcom and music and terrible for just about everything else.

There's all almost complete disconnects. But itcause Britain's rerunning the nineteen seventies, like some brilliantly executed BBC costume drama in which everybody talks as if it's the nineteen seventies. Ah well, mustn't grumble. Nothing works and you go from a weak conservative government or a weak labor government. They'll make it worse, won't they. I mean, pretty kear Starmer as he enters Downing Street. The predicament is really dire from the point of view of the fiscal situation and all the wonderful things that Rachel Reeves said in her much lauded speech reminded me of the white heat of technology. And it's going to be just Wilson Reducts with the inevitable consequences. So Britain's going to rerun the seventies and it's going to be probably good for sitcom and music and terrible for just about everything else.

But we had this surge of populism that generated Brexit and Boris Johnson, and we had a surge of populism in the United States that generated Trump. Why have they moved in such different directions in terms of politics, Because trump Ism had a serious and credible case that if you changed your attitude.

But we had this surge of populism that generated Brexit and Boris Johnson, and we had a surge of populism in the United States that generated Trump. Why have they moved in such different directions in terms of politics, Because trump Ism had a serious and credible case that if you changed your attitude.

On taxation, which they did, and on China, which they did, and tried to toughen up border policing, which they did, they would be meaningful economic benefits to the average American household. That was a serious and well executed platform. The problem with Brexit was that it contained a good deal of rhetoric and high quality marketing. Don Cummings very good at that, but the content was utterly vacuous. I'm afraid to say that if one looks back on the economic critique of the Brexit of the Leave case, it was right that it was simply going to be very costly for Britain to exit the European Union. It was a divorce with a pretty high price tag, and that price tag would take the form, amongst other things, of the serious decline in investment. So the problem with Brexit was that it was not really economically serious. I love you, but you're not serious people. That's how I feel about all my friends who supported Brexit. I love you, but you're not serious people. When I read the case for Brexit, just as an economic historian, I was like, this is stupid. This is stud I wouldn't give a graduate student a B for this. It's like a C paper. So I was wi. I was a remainer, not because I have warm feelings towards Brussels, but just because I can see stupid when I see stupid written down. Bit was economic stupidity, and it shows Look at the UK today.

On taxation, which they did, and on China, which they did, and tried to toughen up border policing, which they did, they would be meaningful economic benefits to the average American household. That was a serious and well executed platform. The problem with Brexit was that it contained a good deal of rhetoric and high quality marketing. Don Cummings very good at that, but the content was utterly vacuous. I'm afraid to say that if one looks back on the economic critique of the Brexit of the Leave case, it was right that it was simply going to be very costly for Britain to exit the European Union. It was a divorce with a pretty high price tag, and that price tag would take the form, amongst other things, of the serious decline in investment. So the problem with Brexit was that it was not really economically serious. I love you, but you're not serious people. That's how I feel about all my friends who supported Brexit. I love you, but you're not serious people. When I read the case for Brexit, just as an economic historian, I was like, this is stupid. This is stud I wouldn't give a graduate student a B for this. It's like a C paper. So I was wi. I was a remainer, not because I have warm feelings towards Brussels, but just because I can see stupid when I see stupid written down. Bit was economic stupidity, and it shows Look at the UK today.

Sadly we begin to live it. You see it, and we get to live it.

Sadly we begin to live it. You see it, and we get to live it.

Yeah, it's Mississippi. It's Mississippi. Is the economic outcome. You look at it. You look at the rest of the country outside London, which remains a prosperous city, and it's really quite I mean, I've spent most of the last quarter century working in the US and now I'm spending much more time in the UK for family reasons, and it's pretty provincial. Britain is a shockers Mississippispi.

Yeah, it's Mississippi. It's Mississippi. Is the economic outcome. You look at it. You look at the rest of the country outside London, which remains a prosperous city, and it's really quite I mean, I've spent most of the last quarter century working in the US and now I'm spending much more time in the UK for family reasons, and it's pretty provincial. Britain is a shockers Mississippispi.

Mississippi is rich compared with a lot of provincial Britain.

Mississippi is rich compared with a lot of provincial Britain.

That opens a whole other Neil, you have. You've given us a fantastic start to this series and plenty of topics to return to. And I'm sure there will be people spluttering over their tea or anything stronger as they listen to or trip over the dog lead as they walk the dog. I guess the only the obvious question that arises from some of what you've said, if there are going to be grown ups in the room in our next Trump administration, is Neil Ferguson available for any of these roles.

That opens a whole other Neil, you have. You've given us a fantastic start to this series and plenty of topics to return to. And I'm sure there will be people spluttering over their tea or anything stronger as they listen to or trip over the dog lead as they walk the dog. I guess the only the obvious question that arises from some of what you've said, if there are going to be grown ups in the room in our next Trump administration, is Neil Ferguson available for any of these roles.

The answer to that question is the question was put to me in late twenty sixteen after the election, and I went to Trump Tar and I met a number of the key protagonists in a very surreal afternoon. And after I had met Anthony Scaramucci and Mike Flynn and Steve Bannon and Michael Cohen, I phoned my wife up and I said, this will end in a welter of litigation. We're going to have nothing to do with it. Good call.

The answer to that question is the question was put to me in late twenty sixteen after the election, and I went to Trump Tar and I met a number of the key protagonists in a very surreal afternoon. And after I had met Anthony Scaramucci and Mike Flynn and Steve Bannon and Michael Cohen, I phoned my wife up and I said, this will end in a welter of litigation. We're going to have nothing to do with it. Good call.

Who knows you might still get another knock on the door. But thank Neil fergus and thank you so much.

Who knows you might still get another knock on the door. But thank Neil fergus and thank you so much.

I read that transcript. First thing, this morning. I didn't listen to it just now, and it was like drinking ten shots of coffee in one go. And I don't drink caffeine anymore. So can you imagine that my poor body from the paper? It felt like he thought that that Trump was. I think he thinks he's going to win.

I read that transcript. First thing, this morning. I didn't listen to it just now, and it was like drinking ten shots of coffee in one go. And I don't drink caffeine anymore. So can you imagine that my poor body from the paper? It felt like he thought that that Trump was. I think he thinks he's going to win.

I think he would probably consider, as most people would, that you can't really tell with Trump. He's such an unpredictable figure. He might go in all sorts of directions, but nevertheless that there is a possibility that for economic reasons, for business reasons, and for foreign policy reasons, he might not be the disaster that most of the sort of global establishment is.

I think he would probably consider, as most people would, that you can't really tell with Trump. He's such an unpredictable figure. He might go in all sorts of directions, but nevertheless that there is a possibility that for economic reasons, for business reasons, and for foreign policy reasons, he might not be the disaster that most of the sort of global establishment is.

I was quite strong that well, but I was quite struck that, you know, especially when I was sort of pinning him down a bit on sort of can we really count on Trump to quote unquote do the right thing when it comes to Taiwan or other things that he fell back on saying, oh, there'll be grown nuts in the room. You can't bear a secretary of State job to you know, any old person. Whereas actually the impression you get very much of trum two point. Oh, it's precisely that it will be the people who Trump can absolutely rely on who will defer to him, and all the people who were the grown ups in the room often didn't last very long in the first Trump administration will be nowhere to be seen. So I thought it was interesting that he was still sort of relying very heavily on that.

I was quite strong that well, but I was quite struck that, you know, especially when I was sort of pinning him down a bit on sort of can we really count on Trump to quote unquote do the right thing when it comes to Taiwan or other things that he fell back on saying, oh, there'll be grown nuts in the room. You can't bear a secretary of State job to you know, any old person. Whereas actually the impression you get very much of trum two point. Oh, it's precisely that it will be the people who Trump can absolutely rely on who will defer to him, and all the people who were the grown ups in the room often didn't last very long in the first Trump administration will be nowhere to be seen. So I thought it was interesting that he was still sort of relying very heavily on that.

It was very much a twenty sixteen mindset. You know, we've got this crazy guy, but there's lots of responsible people who can hold him back. Now we learned We've learned a couple of things in recent years. One is that those responsible people can't necessarily hold him back because he's this sort of extraordinary figure, unpredictable figure. But secondly that you're getting the emergence of a real sort of populist policy, established populist intelligence, so that it won't be just the old Republican wise men who will be in the room, the whole group of new intellectuals, of new policy, people who really believe in this populist agenda, who really believe in isolationism. You've got groups like the Heritage Foundation who this enormous policy document which is all about strong governments, about getting rid of checks and balances, which is about empowering true trumpst believers, and they've got binders full of populists. They've got a whole set of people that they want to populate the White House who weren't available before. So I think he's thinking applying a twenty sixteen paradigm to something that's going to be a very different thing. I just wanted to say one other thing about the nature of our conversation, which I think really illustrates the world that we're talking about. We're talking about Taiwan. Now, what has Taiwan been since about nineteen eighty It's been this place where you produce cheap stuff and then you produce semiconductors. Everybody has seen it as a fantastic place where you can get all this manufacturing skill, you can produce all this really cheap good stuff. It now produces ninety percent of the world's semiconductors. This has one of the world's great companies, the world's greatest semiconductor producing company in the world. There everybody had seen it through that lens. Now in this conversation with seeing Taiwan through a very different lens, is it somewhere that we should go to war to protect? Or is it somewhere that we might concede to China because they care more about it. That's a dramatic demonstration of the theme that is at the heart of this.