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US Battles for ‘Hearts and Minds’ in a Conflicted World with Daleep Singh

Published Jun 3, 2024, 8:40 PM

On this special Monday episode, White House national security adviser for economics Daleep Singh explains how America is seeking to maintain global influence. Bloomberg senior editor Ruchi Bhatia discusses the likely victory of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s party in India’s election and what it means for the world’s fastest-growing major economy. And Stephanie and Allegra discuss the election results in South Africa and Mexico. 

Bloomberg Audio Studios, Podcasts, Radio News.

Hello, this is Stephanie Flanders. I just wanted to let you know that we have edited this episode of Voter Nomics since it went out on Monday night to spare you a rather out of date conversation about the Indian election results. Like most people, when we recorded the episode, we thought, looking at exit polls, that Narinda Modi was heading for a comfortable victory. It turns out the Indian voters had other ideas. We will probably have something to say about the actual results in the episode that airs later this week, but in the meantime, enjoy this one.

If we can find a way to get an a cessation of the conflict and a release of the hostages and a political discussion emerges from it, There's look, this is going to take years and years unfold, and we're still the last best chance for the region to find a way forward.

Welcome to voter Nomics, where politics and Markets collide. This year, voters around the world have the ability to affect markets, countries, and economies like never before, so we've created this series to help you make sense of it all. I'm Stephanie Flanders.

And I'm alegra Stratton and Adrian Waldridge is normally with us, but this week we think he's recuperating from anchoring Friday's episode on his own.

And very good job he did too. At the top of the show, you heard from our guest this week, Dleepe Singh Deleep is the Deputy National Security Advisor for International Economics in the White House. That's a role in the Biden administration that he returned to earlier this year after working for a shortish stint as Chief Global Economist at p JIM. This is a guy who's been very much associated with the geoeconomics, with the sort of bidernomics pe pie of the US administration's international policy over the last few years, carving out what economic state craft in this new world means. And one area that I asked him about was the Middle East, a place where you would have said there was a positive argument for economic diplomacy actually forging a more peaceful, sustainable outlook. You would have said that anytime up to October seventh, but talking about it now extremely difficult. So what he had to say about that, what he had to say about the sanctions against Russia that he was very much part of crafting, and of course China was all pretty interesting.

It was really interesting, and you're completely right, it was particularly interesting for his tone, and as somebody who used to do interviews from government, I did sympathize quite a few times with the tension because he's trying to choose exactly the right word for somebody's who's actually crafting public policy from government as you were speaking to him, Stephanie. It's high stakes, and it was incredibly interesting for that reason too.

And you know, he's an economist that is now in the crosshairs of some of the biggest kind of geopolitical and most sensitive issues facing the US right now, whether it is the Middle East where we spoke. He'd also just imposed or helped the administration just impose a load of new tariffs on Chinese goods, so there was plenty to talk about. It was a couple of weeks ago. Nothing's happened to really outdate anything he said. But it's always important to mention that we've got so many elections to talk about in this episode, we're going to have to talk about them pretty briefly before we get to all that. I guess those who did listen to Adrian's episode. At the end of last week, he spoke to our economist yvon Maango about the state of play in the South African election. We've obviously now had the results, and I was pretty struck actually because Yvonne had put a number in my mind, which was that anything under forty five would be quite a bad result for the A and C forty five percent of the vote, and actually it looks like it's going to be closer to forty and it does have some coalition building to do now.

They're can be scrabbling around similar Rather opposer is going to have to contend with the return of a return of his nemesis, Jake Zuma. I'm interested deaf in how voters, what decisions they made in that central coal belt in South Africa, the fact that they had constant shut downs of electricity, how that impacted their decision and their view of the A and C and the ruling government versus the move that is afoot in the international community to get South Africa to transition from these coal power plants to renewable energy.

One of our columnists, Justice Malala, who had spoken in a lead up to the election as this being a result that could in a sense mark them sort of normalizing of South Africa's democracy. You know, it's not normal for a country to get sixty to seventy percent of the vote as A ANDC has in many years after the end of Aparthei, you've had now this fracturing of the party, far left elements breaking off, Jacob Zuma's party breaking off, and at least, just as Malala says, you know, the key thing now for many people would be avoiding what's known as a doomsday coalition, so avoiding a coalition with those more far left. What needs to happen, at least according to him, is a coalition with the White lad opposition Democratic Alliance, which is led by a woman Helen Zilla, who he says is crotchety, pugilistic and controversial, but a very effective political operator. And the important thing about that would be again to cement the normalizing of South Africa's democracy, hands across the racial aisle, however you want to talk about it. That would be as force for market reforms, potentially for a economic growth, would be positive for investors worried about what's going to happen with the budget. But I think it would also be a rejection of very kind of race based dividing lines.

And it's interesting as well because it's pure votonomics, right, what's going on in South Africa where you have people's lived experience dealing with these energy shutdowns and then this high level of unemployments as well as violence and so on, and that expressing itself, as you say, stare for the first time in the history of it as a democracy at the polls.

So we are going to wait and see what happens. Then. The other thing that's happened with the other major emerging market democracy to have got a change of leadership is of course Mexico.

Yeah, and its first female president in a landslide victory. Though she does appear, you know, it's well known that she is the anointed air to the incumbent, the previous leader, and it seems like for her. The big issues in her intrea the extreme violence in Mexico. Thirty eight candidates were killed in this election.

The violence of the cartel violence, the control over different parts of the country is extraordinary. I do find in these conversations it's almost like a split screen conversation. On the one hand, our reporters are reporting about this basic level of lawlessness, particularly outside Mexico City, caused by the cartels, caused by drug violence. You also have President Trump talking very aggressively about sending people back to Mexico, potentially sending Americans troops if he wins the election into Mexico to prevent immigration, but also to tackle the drugs issue. And yet almost in the same breath, we'll have investors, market analysts talking about what a great bet Mexico is. You know, Mexico is going to be one of these countries that benefits enormously from a more regionalized global economy, people turning away from China wanting to have a closer connection, be closer to America. And I just find that extraordinary. And she's inheriting that sort of two sided schizophrene legacy, and someone, I mean, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador Amlo, who's been the president all this time, was an extraordinary figure. It's very kind of seventy style populist. She's kind of inherited that slightly populist tradition, yet she herself is a social scientist apparently doesn't take a lot of risks. It's going to be interesting to watch let's got on to my very interesting conversation with Dleepe Singh, the United States Deputy National Security Advisor for International Economics in the White House. Deleep, among many other things, was a key architect of those unprecedented sanctions that were imposed on Russia after its invasion of Ukraine in twenty twenty two. Do a lot of conversation about how effective those sanctions have been, given that Russia has continued to make a lot of money from selling its oil. So I started the conversation by asking him whether he thinks the sanctions are working.

So the way I always think about policy is how does it look relative to the counterfactuals. So relative to the counterfactual of doing nothing, of allowing the redrawing of borders by force in the heart of Europe, to go and check, no doubt the sanctions are doing their job. Admittedly, it's not the nosedive that I predicted two years ago, but I would not mistake Russia's rebound for resilience. If I had to classify, I'd say it's another potent in facade, because what Putin has done is to prevent a collapse of the economy in the short term by sacrificing Russia's long run potential. That's what capital controls do. They limit the flow up money getting out, and therefore they prevent the freefall of the ruble and the collapse of the financial system. But there's a cost, which is the isolation of Russia from most of the advanced economies in the world. If you look at the imports from the Western countries to Russia, they've nosed dived by about seventy five percent since the war. I would make the same point in terms of the effect of Russia weaponizing its energy supply. Yes, it led to a spike of oil and gas prices that drove record trade surpluses. It's flattered GDP growth, but at the cost of permanently losing well over half of its global market share and energy exports. And then the third step he took was to ramp up government spending to fuel the war machine. And you know it's up to eight percent of GDP. I think that's the post Soviet record. Yes, that cushioned the contraction, but here again at the cost of depleting Russia's national savings. It set Russia on a course for the policy rates now sixteen percent. I believe inflations close to eight percent, and they're going to have chronic budget deficits. So look, Stephanie, I think reasonable people can disagree about Russia's short term prospects, but there's no doubt that Russia's long term outlook is bleak. That's what those bleed interest rates and inflation do. They choke growth. So will the exit from Russia of more than a thousand multinationals. So will the flight of up to a million of Russia's best and brightest, and so all the loss of access to global capital markets and leading edge technology. So I think this is still going to be a smaller, weaker, more isolated, less sophisticated economy for a generation.

Of course, it was never going to stop Russia from being able to pursue the war, but that a lot of goods are going over the border through Azerbaijan in other places, and there's a lot of trade going there from countries that are part of the sanctions resume. I noticed in February UK sold twenty six pounds worth of luxury cars to Azerbaijan, which as of a couple of years ago we probably sold about two So how much are you actively trying to plug those kind of entry points or is that just impossible without making a lot of enemies.

Now this is very much our focus because I mean, Messani is the mother of invention, and we knew Russia would try to evade sanctions by exploiting loopholes, and that's what they're doing. And we have to prepare over the medium and long run for a cat and mouse game if we want to sustain the impact of the sanctions that we put in place a couple of days after the war began. You're pointing to where we have to focus, and it's disarming the Russian war machine. That to me is really a lot of supply chain analysis. What are the components the inputs that are currently making the biggest difference for Russia on the battlefield, So think of UAVs or ammunition or heavy engineering equipment or armored vehicles, and then if you take those battlefield advantages, we're mapping out the supply chains that provide the advantage, including the raw materials and the precursors. And look, China is very much part of this conversation because it's been willing to serve as the factory of the Russian war machine in a very real sense. And if you look at the trade data, Russia's imports in the G seven countries has collapsed by about seventy five percent, but imports from China have more than tripled. It's now more than half of all of Russia's imports. And microchips, machine tools, optics, cruise, missile components, weapons, propellants are all part of what's being bought by Russia from China. Just to give you a stat in twenty twenty three, ninety percent of Russia's microchips came from China, and those microchips for use were used for missiles, tanks, aircraft, many many battlefield advantages came from those chips. Seventy percent of Russia's machine tool imports came from China in Q four of twenty twenty three. So we have issued warnings, we have written letters, and it may be time soon for us to provide a demonstration effect of our seriousness.

I shouldn't laugh at the thought of sending letters, but when you think of the sort of the full force of the United States, you know, writing lots of letters, I mean, what comes next?

Well, I mean I know it may sound funny to issue letters. But I mean the best, the best sanctions are those that never have to get used.

Who is it you're writing to when you write the letters?

Oh so? Uh? You know, so the relevant authorities in the countries from which transhipment is occurring or these components are originating, if they're diminishing returns to sending signals and having conversations, then you you follow it up with action. Uh. And and those actions can generate a chilling effect that's many multiples larger than the direct impact. And that's where we are in this in this conflict. We've we've got to find ways to disarm the Russian war machine, and then we've got to turn our attention in parallel really to to defunding it. And that really points to where his income is coming from, and that's energy, you know, Stephanie. We implemented a price cap to exert leverage from our dominant position in oil services, and the design was calibrated to limit the price at which Putent could sell is oil using those services, so that we could reduce his revenues while keeping the keeping steady the supply of oil to global markets. Well, everyone knows now he's adapted by launching a shadow fleet that doesn't use G seven oil services, and so now we've got to find ways to increase the cost of using his shadow fleet, force him back into the Price Cap Coalition's ecosystem, and that's where we have the bargaining power to drive down his marginal revenues relative to marginal cost. So disarm and defund the Russian war machine. That's our focus now, is that G seven action.

You know, what kind of places are you looking to act further on?

Well, I'm going to be vague because we're not in the business of telegraphing exactly what we do, but in a general sense, first we want to shift more of the activity from the shadow fleet to within the price cap coalition. Within the price Cap Coalition, we have a number of levers that we can use again to reduce his revenues while keeping supply steady. I think you're probably familiar with what those levers are, but want I don't want to be specific here.

And one of the positive side effects of sanctions that sort of looked like it was potentially going to happen over the last year was for the seized Russian assets to provide in one way or another, provides financial support for Ukraine. Where do we stand on that?

I think it's worth saying, Stephanie, why why we feel justified in mobilizing Russia's assets for the benefit of Ukraine. I mean, I started from the principle that Russia should pay for the burden of rebuilding the country that it's terrorized on a colossal scale. A second, I mean the precedent of imposing compensation claims after a wrongful invasion that was set long ago, most recently after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The third point is Russia has profited to the tune of hundreds of billions of dollars from higher energy prices since the war began, in part is it weaponize its supply, So any claim that Russia's weymar Germany is completely bogus in my view. And for look, the goal of forcing Russia to pay it's not to punish, it's to finance or rebuild in Ukraine. That will likely cost more than five hundred billion dollars, maybe multiples of that amount. So the question really is how should that burden get financed? Should it be solely on the back of Western taxpayers or the people of Ukraine? I mean The answer is, of course not. The Kremlin has to pay its fair share. So you know, what are we doing. We have a G seven, a leader's summit that to me is the action forcing event in the near term. We all know the situation on the battlefield remains very difficult right now. By the time our leaders gather in Apulia make it worse. There is still a large financing gap in Ukraine, even after taking into account our sixty one billion supplemental package, even after the EU's fifty billion euro facility. The external financing gap, if you include military needs on top of budget and balance of payment support, it could be close to one hundred million dollars. So the G seventh summit really is the best opportunity before November to close the gap. And we know, I mean you alluded to this in your question the seizure of principle. We know that's a redline for certain G seven members. We also know that loans to Ukraine that are backed by reparation claims is a non attractive idea for at least a couple of member states due to the messy history. And we know fiscal space is scarce for every member state. So we are working on a proposal that makes maximal use of the present value of the interest income that you can generate from the immobilized assets. And the way to really get maximal use is to offer an upfront dispersement to Ukraine on the basis of assurance is that the interest income from the immobilized assets will be available to repay it, and that upfront dispersement can be as large fifty billion dollars or more depending on how many years of interest income you bring forward.

It sounds like there might be movement on that at the G seven summer.

I mean, I think so, because what we've done is we've listened to our partners, We've understood their red lines, and we're now making maximal use of what we can do within those constraints. We want it to be done with solidarity, but we also want to have the flexibility to mobilize the rest of the assets that we froze if we want to later. So that's what we're working towards.

We have finally managed to get the military support passed through Congress. But do you if you look at what's happening on the battlefield now, do you just worry? It's sort of almost at a personal level that that has come too late for Ukraine.

Well, I was just in Kiev a few weeks ago, and I mean it is. It is a dire situation in terms of air defense, in terms of manpower, and you see what's happening in the northeast and to the energy infrastructure more generally. But I think there's a chance for a psychological inflection point, not just and I don't mean to overemphasize psychology, but if you can connect the dots and almost draw an arc between the EU's fifty billion dollar facility, the US sixty one billion dollar facility, the G seven summit, where if we mobilize fifty billion dollars that adds to the sum that we've already raised so far this year, and then you have the NATO summit. You can create a positive inflection point if all of those events go as we hope, and then you can imagine the path for Ukraine in which it's able to outlast Putin, regardless of what happens in the elections in the US or anywhere else for the rest of the year, and that really has the best chance of shaping Putin's calculus and ultimately giving Ukraine leverage to pursue whatever path it wants.

China, one of the big announcements which seems for the administration recently is a lot of new tariffs on Chinese goods, including an increase in the tariff on China these electrical vehicles to over one hundred percent. And I guess to remind listeners of tariff is just a tax which is levied on goods important from in other countries. So you're you're massively increasing what were the cost of what were previously quite cheap evs. Why do you want to discourage Americans from buying evs by making them so much more expensive?

Well, I think you have to start this conversation with a diagnosis of the geoeconomic backdrop, Stephanie, because it's often missing in these discussions around tariffs. And if you if you start from a diagnosis that president She's ambition is to restore China's tegebony at least in the endno Pacific. But I would argue beyond, you know, I would say he's seeking that dominance mostly through economic and technological primacy. And you know, as a corollary, he sees the US in particular. But democracies in general is being in structural decline, and he's willing to take tactical risks to realize his strategic And if you take that as a diagnosis, then it follows that the China's economic model is going to become increasingly state led and centralized, and the trend line is not going to change because market oriented reforms require a loss of control that president she is not willing to accept. And that all means that China's growth strategy is going to remain underpinned by stay on and enterprises and national champions that rely on unrivaled levels of government subsidies, discriminatory regulations, currency distortions, weak energy and labor standards, and sometimes theft. That's all to say. The basis for our strategy follows from that diagnosis, and it's not centered around tariffs. It's centered around investments at home to strengthen and scale our productive capacity. The second leg of it is partnerships abroad with countries that are playing by the same rules, so we can give each other access to our productive capacity and our purchasing power. But yeah, I mean regrettably. The third leg is the US restrictive tools when necessary and tear ups are one of those tools, and we use them with trading partners that are not playing by the same rules, and we do so to prevent our investments from getting undercut. You know, you asked about evs in particular the question of shouldn't we just decarbonize as fast as possible and let every Chinese ev into the US. We all love low prices. I mean, in no doubt we want to decarbonize as fast as we can. But I would say risk management one oh one says we shouldn't be dependent on a single supplier for a critical good. That was the lesson we learned globally after the pandemic. It was a lesson Europe was reminded of after Russia weaponized it's gas flows. I mean, it was the lesson we learned after the first China shock. So I mean the point I'm making Stephanie's cost is not all that matters. If you want to sustain decarbonization, clean energy has to be reliably sourced. It has to be robust to geopolitical conflict. Clean energy should be treated with clean inputs coal fired power plants and I mean the polysilicon and solar wafers can't be made with forced labor. So the last point I'll make is if you want to make the transition to clean energy sustainable, it does have to pass political muster. I mean people equip and it's right climate change is a global problem. But policy choices are made at the national level, and so the economic benefits of making this transition they have to outweigh the costs across political cycles, and that does require attention to whether the strategy is a net contributor to jobs and investment in growth and productivity.

You have I think a one exemption or potential exemption in the solar sector to help solar domestic solar producers not be affected by these But did you consider having more exclusions or easing up on some of the Trump tariffs.

As part of this, Well, I think it's it's important to know that that of the eighteen billion dollars in tariffs, eleven billion of the tariffs don't go into effect until twenty twenty six, and the remainder split in terms of implementation dates across twenty twenty four and twenty twenty five. And there will be exclusions if there are supply chain disruptions that were unanticipated if the private sector needs more time to adjust, will certainly be attendant to those concerns. So this was really designed in order to allow us to make a transition to domestic production, but also production from partners who are again adhering to similar rules of competition, to allow them to scale up and again not to get flooded by a production trajectory in China. That's many multiples of any plausible estimate of global demand.

If Chinese companies right now can just in fact, they are going to Mexico to make electric vehicles there and then those can just ship straight to the US, what are you going to do about that? I mean, it seems like a massive loophole.

Well, we're right. This is one tool of many in the toolkit. So we also have an executive order that's looking at national security risks from connected cars. That's an ongoing investigation, but that's another tool that could be deployed for the circumstance that you're describing. US MTA is set for review in twenty twenty six, and part of that discussion could involve, you know, greenfield factories that are being built. Yes, that's the trade agreement between the US and Canada. We can review the scope of the rules in USMCA and apply it to the current future context. And there are other trade tools that we can deploy as well that have not been used in quite some time.

We've talked about sanctions and then we've talked about tariffs, and which are both you know, sticks, But I know that you in particular are sort of focused on also thinking about how do we give people a more positive vision of economic stakecraft. It's not all about being punished that you actually have reason to want to be part of the team, a part of the sort of multilateral system that the US supports. So you know, how do you see the Biden them in the stration actually proceeding on that, because it sort of does feel like a lot of the positive elements about reaching out to developing countries and all of those things have not progressed as fast as the more sort of stick based things that we've been talking about.

It's harder because you know, when you're talking about executive orders that put in place sanctions or export controls or teriffs or price caps or investment restrictions, you know that can flow through the executive branch and you can run it relatively quickly. But when you're talking about developing or reimagining or inventing positive tools of statecraft, that typically requires money, and so that's a different kind of process that requires Congress and engaging the broader public so that we can boost our financial firepower. But you're right, I mean, I am very focused on the question of whether we're striking the right balance and the use of restrictive tools of statecraft versus positive tools. I mean, we didn't choose this, but we're in the most intense period of geopolitical competition, arguably since the Cold War, maybe going all the way back to World War Two, and you know, both Russia and China are challenging the US led order. We're pushing back. A number of countries are trying to figure out how they want to align themselves, and that's going to be a period of protracted uncertainty. And let's hope, because the great powers that we're in competition with are also nuclear powers, let's hope that the competition doesn't veer into conflict. And the whole world knows that we have been using sanctions and export controls with more frequency and potency than ever before, but that doesn't win hearts and minds, you know, and we would not want to have a narrative take hold that we're simply focused and spending all of our time and energy on developing the tools that impose economic pain, that break linkages in the global economy, whether it's in trade or capital flows or technological diffusion. I think we've got to have a standing preference for the use of tools that offer the prospect of mutual economic gain. And we have a number of tools on the shelf that we just haven't used with the same frequency and potency as we have the more punitive tools. So think of debt relief or concessional lending. We have sovereign loan guarantees, but we've only used them six times in the past thirty years. We have something akin to a sovereign wealth fund in the Exchange Stabilization Fund at Treasury. Could we reimagine it to make long term strategic investments in the developing world. We have a strategic petroleum reserve, and it was designed when we were net importers of petroleum. Well now we're net exporters and what we really need are critical minerals and refined products. Could this petroleum reserve be refashioned as a strategic resilience reserve, and again make investments at home and abroad, particularly in developing countries that have essential clean energy inputs. I could go on and on, but what I'm saying is, if we have a focus over the next let's hope four plus years on developing, reimagining, and refining the positive tools of economic statecraft, that gives us our best chance of forging an enduring alignment with those geopolitical swing states that right now want to do more business with the US. They want to have a deeper economic relationship, and they're looking for our value proposition to improve.

If one I was looking at a place a year ago where economic diplomacy could have actually been a really positive force in building a basis for peace, it would have been the Middle East, and it would have been that whole discussion around Saudi Arabia's normalization of relations with Israel that we were so close to before October seventh. I just wanted to I mean, do you feel that that economic path to peace in the region is now completely dead?

We can't let it be. I mean, we can't let this remain a zero sum, intractable conflict over that takes place over land. We have to transform it into a positive thumb economic conversation. Ultimately, that's the only way for a sustainable piece to emerge, and it has to start, of course, with a ceasefire and a hostage deal, but it has to lead to a normalization process that involves a lot of the tools we've been talking about already in the reconstruction of Gaza and the creation of a more positive dynamics. That's the only way I can think of to transform what has been just an outright tragedy for everyone involved over the past eight months.

But there's a lot of people who will now what not want to come to the table or consider the US to be a good broker of that kind of deal, given what's happened in Gaza.

I still think diplomacy is never dead. The deal space with Saudi Arabia remains very wide. We have very senior officials over there almost almost every other week. And if we can find a way to get a cessation of the conflict and a release of the hostages and a political discussion emerges from it, there's Look, this is going to take years and years to unfold, and we're still the last best chance for the region to find a way forward.

This is a guy who is clearly carrying a lot on his shoulders, and I've got to know him a little bit over the last couple of years because he was so focused on some of the issues that I'm interested in, that interplay between economics and politics. But you know, he's the one who's actually living in day to day some of those really difficult trade offs where what the answer is from a national security perspective may be very different from what would say.

And also very interesting to hear. You both discussed that they use a lot of sticks, but they've got to get better at what the carrots are. And he accepted that as a point, but it wasn't obvious that they actually had many carrots in the in the in the fridge.

Just before he went back into the administration, he'd written an article that was very much along those lines, saying, you need to have a more positive offer for the world.

That's tricky stuff, isn't it. Because we're at this point, not only this point in the US electoral cycle, where so much of their economic policy is protectionist. What do they have to play with? Did you get did you get that sense from talking to him that they had nice offers.

Well, I think he would admit it's a challenge because it's and as he said, it's easier to do the sticks than the carrots, especially if you have a not very supportive Congress. You know, look how hard it was to get the Ukraine aid package through through Congress. But to some extent, it's about still wanting to be in the American club, in that circle of countries, and you would think that lots of countries want to be part of that. But as we've pointed out many times, actually playing both sides, being in the middle can be quite an attractive place for policymakers to be right now. And I'm not sure that anyone can really address that sitting in the White House or not anytime soon, especially looking at what's happening in the Middle East, which I guess which is where we ended that conversation. I mean, it is just it does not so far as not making the case for positive economic diplomacy, to say the least. Thanks for listening to this week's Photonomics from Bloomberg. This episode was hosted by me, Stephanie Flanders and Allegra Strap. It was produced by summer Sadi with help from Chris marklu Sound designed by Moses and dam and Blake Maples. Brendan Francis Newnham is our executive producer, and Sage Bowman is Head of Podcasts. Special thanks this week to Delete Singh and Rushi Battia. Please, if you like the show, subscribe, rate, review, tell your friends wherever you listen to podcasts.

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