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Fareed Zakaria Explains Why Today Is Just Like the 1920s

Published Aug 6, 2024, 4:00 AM

Democratic powers in Europe, as well as Japan and Australia could be left out on a limb should Donald Trump win the US presidential election in November, cable news host and author Fareed Zakaria tells Adrian Wooldridge in this episode of Voternomics. He says the former president and convicted felon may opt for a policy of protectionism instead of America’s long-standing practice of internationalism—all as US political influence continues to wane.  

Zakaria, host of the CNN program GPS, contends the world is experiencing a backlash to globalization similar to one in the 1920s—as set out in his new book, Age of Revolutions, which makes Wooldridge’s summer reading list. This dynamic is made all the more stark by Trump’s transformation of the Republican Party into an anti-immigrant, trade-skeptic entity, he says. 

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Welcome to Voteronomics, where politics and markets collide. I'm made from Woodridge. For my summer reading selection, I've chosen the latest release from Fared Zacaria, Age of Revolutions. Freed, of course, hosts CNN's flagship international affairs show, fored Zakaria GPS. He writes a weekly column for The Washington Post and is the author of the Future of Freedom, the Post American World, and Ten Lessons for a Post Pandemic World. But as I said, this conversation focuses on Age of Revolutions, Progress and backlash from sixteen hundred to the present. This is really a fascinating book about the rise of the liberal order and the possible collapse of that liberal order. For Reid, you have a record of taking on read big themes, the Future of Freedom, the post American World. But this is your biggest theme yet, the Age of Revolutions, Progress and Backlash from sixteen hundred to the present. Tell us a bit about your argument. What was it that inspired this book and what is the main thesis.

That's a wonderful question, Adrian, What inspired the book, or at least triggered the book was that about ten years ago I started to notice something that I thought was very unusual, which was the rise of the Tea Party. And the reason I thought it was unusual was it was a kind of grassroots insurgency that was taking over or upending, the most hierarchical of the political parties in America and one of the most hierarchical in the Western world. If you think of the Republican Party, the old saying about presidential nominations used to be that the Democrats have to fall in love, but Republicans fall in line. And if you think about, you know, the Democrat nominating John Kennedy and Clinton and Obama, you understand that, whereas the Republicans would nominate you know, Nixon and then Nixon and then Nixon and then Bush and another Bush. You know, it was very hierarchical. You stud your turn. And here the Tea Party was upending that bottom up and was animated by issues that were not the traditional Republican issues, not about economics, cutting budgets, all that stuff. It was all cultural immigration, Obama as a black president. And it made me just begin to think about how politics was changing. And I read a speech by Tony Blair, in which he talked about how the old division of left versus right on the basis of economics, you know, kind of the size of the state was giving way to a politics based on your attitude towards a world that was open versus closed, you know, globalization, immigration, technology, even and that's where it all began. And then in order to you know, I found myself asking, if we're going through this kind of period of enormous change which is producing a backlash, when did this begin? When have we seen this before? And I thought about the Industrial Revolution, But then that took me back further and I ended up, as you know, starting with the Dutch in the seventeenth century. The basic argument of the book is that whenever you have periods of enormous technological and economic change, it tends to transform societies and you also end up getting a third revolution, which is a kind of identity revolution. People change the way they think of themselves. So when the Dutch for the first time became rich, they began to think of themselves differently, not as part of the Habsburg Empire, not as simply Christians, but as Protestants, and essentially broke away from the Habsburg Empire and created the Dutch Republic, and then that identity revolution trans most into a political revolution. And whenever you have this process that I just described, there is almost always a backlash. And how you navigate through this forward movement and backlash determines how successfully you kind of make your way in the world. The Dutch and the British, I argue, in the sixteenth seventeen eighteenth centuries handled this largely well. The French, in the French Revolution, handled it very badly. And those are in some ways the two archetypal examples, one being evolutionary change of bottom up these trends of technology, economics to reshaping society and politics adapting to it, versus the French, who decide top down political elites are going to decree a revolution in a transformation of society, and the whole thing explodes.

So the Dutch, followed by the British, followed presumably by the Americans, of the good guys exactly, and the French not quite so good is that because they go over the top, and then you know, the revolution with all its blood leads to Napoleon. Is that the sequence of events.

Basically, the French get it all wrong in the sense that France was not a society that was being transformed bottom up by economics and technology. At the time of the French Revolution. France was a large agrarian, centralized society. It was not particularly urban, the merchants were not particularly dominant. So all the forces of kind of modernization and change that had been roiling or transforming the Netherlands in Britain were absent in France. But the French politically, a certain group of Frenchman decide that they want to accelerate change and to achieve not quite a merchant republic, but a republic nonetheless, and they decreate it from above. And what it turns out is that France is still a very old fashioned, traditional agrarian society and it doesn't take and so the revolution goes, you know, it kind of goes helter skelter in various ways. As you know, the story of the French orpwe is so complicated. One of the great challenges of the book was getting it down to forty pages. But basically, the best way to think about it is it fails on its own terms. This is a revolution that begins with the execution of a monarch and it ends with Napoleon crowning himself as monarch. So on its own terms, it is unable to achieve the political modernization it looks for.

But you have a great lineage of liberal societies starting with the Netherlands, going to Britain and then going to the United States with this sort of failed detour with France. Can you tell us something about what that means for the for the modern world. This is essentially North European Anglo Saxon lineage of ideas.

Yeah, it's actually fascinating when you think about how unusual or narrow or serendipitous this path is. You know, you have this, this extraordinary breakout in the Netherlands. This is the first country to really redefine national power by using not agriculture and extraction. That was the old way. The only way people countries knew how to get rich was you know, your agriculture, which basically produced about the same level of wealth per capita for thousands of years, or you could go into another country stealer's goal. Those are the two way and that and the Dutch basically find that they use innovation, they use tech chnological innovation, they use financial innovation. Crucially important to Holland's rise is the invention of the joint stock company, the invention of the Amsterdam stock Market, first grade multinational company in the world, the Dutch East Indies Company, and all these things propel the Netherlands to become the richest country in Europe, which means the richest country in the world. And that part of the practices are, you know, an emphasis on an egalitarian political and social structure, a republic rather than a monarchy, a merchants having an enormous say, political parties for the first time rather than a court being the locusts of political influence. Tolerance because you discover that tapping human talent wherever it is becomes important. So the Dutch, you know, are much more tolerant towards Jews, much more tolerant towards Protestants and Catholics than any other place in Europe. That model moves to England, which had many similar characteristics, also very decent centralized part of Europe. Both of these places were the farthest provinces of the Roman Empire and were therefore the least centrally governed from Rome, and so they had developed a kind of autonomy as a result, and it is in this cocoon, the Netherlands, in Britain and England, really that ideas about individual liberty, individual rights, private property, the idea of the dignity of the individual and his or her and really his ability to pursue a life that he wants freed from monarchical tyranny, church dogma. All these ideas sort of take root in this area. And then I would argue, because of the inherent virtue of these ideas, or certainly the technical superiority of these ideas, Britain becomes the most powerful country since Rome, and it colonizes parts of the world and globalizes these ideas. So a crucial part of that is that Britain ended up colonizing North America, which became the next superpower. But also important is the fact that Britain spread these ideas to all over the world, from India to South Africa to Australia. They developed a kind of a broad universe of liberal ideas. But I think crucial to the spreading of them was the fact that then Britain passes the mantle to the United States. So if you think about it for two and a half centuries. Now we have lived in a world in which the dominant power has been one that adopted these very peculiar ideas that grew out of a tiny part of northwestern Europe.

Now this is a very weak liberal interpretation of human history. And let me say that I completely agree with it. But let me put on my woke cat for a moment and saying that what you're doing is celebrating the triumph of capitalist imperialism, That these are countries that grew rich partly by colonialism, partly by slavery, partly by exploiting what they would have regarded as lesser breeds. You're an Indian, but you're celebrating that the power of this liberal imperialism. How do you respond to them? To the critique which is very dominant in America American higher education.

Now it's a very fair critique, and it's a fair argument. It's worth noting that the original opposition to Whig history came actually from the right, not from the left. There was a much more traditional kind of deep historical school of thought in Britain in other places which said this whole idea that there is any progress in history is the fallacy. The Whigs think that things have gotten better, and this is nonsense. Where the history is cyclical, you know, morally we have degenerated. This used to be the argument against Whig history, and when Herbert Butterfield writes his his essay on wik history, that's what he's defending himself against. Today, You're absolutely right, the critique comes from the left. And look what I would say is, there's no question I'm celebrating capitalism and democracy and individual liberty and individual rights because I do believe they are in they are fundamentally superior to everything that came before them in terms of political organization, from the point of view of the rights of individuals, which I hold very dear, and everything that has come after in terms of challengers, whether it's been fascism, communism, Islamic fundamentalism, whatever else you may look at. I regard, you know, the social democracy as a variant of of liberalism. On the imperialism part, it's a it's a harder one, it's it's entire It's absolutely true that part and parcel of this process was the exploitation of people who were considered second class citizens, lesser breeds and such. I would argue that was not inherent in the project. I don't think you can make the case that Britain only gained its strength from colonies, so that they did help. You can look at I mean, I go through this as you know in the book Japan had you know, is a good contrast because they both had textile industries. Japan had no colonies, Britain had colonies. You know, it's it's not it's not easy to make the case in my view that Britain only advanced because of the because of the colonies. And much more importantly, what you can see the power of these ideas by the fact that it is these ideas that caused Europe to decolonize. And it is only in Europe that you begin you got the anti slavery movement. There's slavery all over the world, but what caused Europe to be come the locusts classics of anti slavery. It was these liberal ideas. So I think there's something to it, and it's it's probably worth always remembering that the rise of these liberalism and industrialization did come along with an enormous exploitation of other countries. You know, as as somebody who grew up in India. I'm well aware of it, and you know, we lived it. I mean I saw it more from my father's generation. But my father was very attracted to British ideas of liberalism and in his case, kind of Fabian socialism as well, but always also aware that for Britain they came coupled with a certain kind of pretty unvarnished racism. There was the reality that Britain was, in a sense the tutor for so much of the Indian kind of political elite, and yet the same political elite were jailed by the British and in trials that were not free and fair. They walk past clubs and buildings which said which had signs which said dogs and Indians not allowed. You know, my father once pointed out a couple of places where there used to be that sign. So that is the mixed legacy of the Enlightenment, and you can't get away from it. But I think it was a historical fact, not a logical fact.

But when Kipling says take up the white man's burden, he's talking to the United States, and this mixed legacy is even stronger in the United States, I think than Britain, because it has the institution of slavery, and it has the institutions of Jim Crow, right, you know, and voting discrimination and things like that right up to the nineteen sixties. It does seem to be extraordinary that you can have liberal values and those very very anti liberal values coexisting within this global hegemon, which is the United States. How can we explain that?

Yeah, it's a very good point, and I think it's a point that tells us something about the present as well, which is tribalism and tribal affiliation is one of the deepest social organizing factors of life. The ability to think about your tribe as separate, distinct better than the other tribe is the oldest form of politics, really, and what you see with liberalism is that it is not able to completely overcome that, and that it rests uneasily alongside that reality. And in the American case, think of Jefferson as such an interesting example, right, because of course he's a slaver owner, but as so many of the biography's point out, he was tortured by this. Yeah, quite not so tortured that he freed his own flags, but you know, it was tortured by it, and ultimately what gets rid of slavery is the you know, those same liberal ideals, as a Lincoln points out that we're in the Declaration, you know that were that were in there and in a sense have to be have to triumph over the tribalism that says white sou superior to blacks. And then what makes Jim Crow disappear is again those same ideals. You know, Martin Luther King talks about how the Declaration of Independence was a promisory note to blacks, in other words, saying, you know, we are using those same ideas to break through the irrational tribalism that has kept us down. And even now, you know, we see that the return to tribalism is very easy. And whether you look in the United States, whether you look in Europe, you see that it doesn't take a lot to get us back to a kind of tribal way of thinking.

Now, I'm quite convinced by your wig interpretation of history. I share it quite strongly. I'm less convinced by this notion of the open versus the closed, which is something that Tony Blair embraced and you embraces in this book, that liberals are essentially open to the world, open to change, open to immigration, open to globalization, and nonliberals, conservatives, reactionaries, whatever you want to call them, are much more closed. And let me say why, I'm a bit skeptical about this. It strikes me that it's rather the victor's propaganda, and that many liberals, though they claim to be open, are actually very good at protecting themselves. They protect themselves through educational credentials, through various sorts of certificates, licenses to operate. For example, barristers in this country don't let solicitors go into courts. If you go to university towns, they seem to be well defended against change. And if you look at the service sector, it's much much less globalized than the manufacturing sector. If you look at immigration, openness to immigration, the's so called disupposedly troglodite people who are opposed to immigration actually a people who are badly affected by immigration. They lose jobs, they see their wages decline, whereas most liberals benefit from immigration. They get cheap servants, they get cheap cheap services and things like that. Isn't this a bit of a liberal illusion that they open.

Yeah, So let me first explain in the broadest sets what I meant I mean by that, and in a way you can see it in the transformation of the Republican Party. The old model, the Republican Party was basically a free market party, believed in low taxes, low regulation, low tariffs, welcomed immigration. Ronald Reagan famously signed the eighty six amnesty Bill, So it was, you know, it was arrayed largely along the kind of free market orientation. And what has happened to the Republican Party now it's essentially almost entirely transformed itself. It is now largely skeptical of In fact, it is the most protectionist major party, I would argue in the Western world these days. It has become much more uneasy about even things like fiscal conservatism. You know, Trump was a big spender. The degree to which it has completely try and reversed itself on immigration is striking. So it's become a party more comfortable with the idea of a society that's more closed, more protected, more culturally chauvinistic, more nationalistic. Now, when you get to liberals, you're right, they have a slightly more uneasy relationship. In general, I would say they are more comfortable with the world that's open and things like that. In theory, they are in favor of meritocracy. You are right that they preach more meritocracy than they practice, and that they quietly managed to find some ways to protect themselves. But I recall a wonderful book Meritocracy by ade Reinvolridge that basically concludes, look for all its problems, there is no other solution, and the answer to the problems of meritocracy is surely more meritocracy. In other words, you're absolutely right that there are places where they do this. But just as you know, Martin Luther King used liberalism to push out the illiberal features of life, I think one could effectively use liberalism. And it is as you know, there is now pressure on universities, for example, not to have legacy admissions in that sense. Most people don't realize this, but Oxford and Cambridge are much more meritocratic than Harvard and Yale. Oxford and Cambridge just have a you know, essentially an entrance exam these professions, though they would argue they're trying to maintain a certain kind of standards, but those standards again should be more meritocratic. But I think that to me, the question is is politics becoming more about these two poles not so much? Are liberals always consistently open or consistently closed. I think in all politics there's a certain amount of hypocrisy and all that. What I would ask you is, isn't it fair to say that the old left right divide has gone away largely because the two parties are relatively close to one another. You can see this in Britain where the Labor Party has come in to barn this seemingly revolutionary election and said, oh, by the way, we're not going to change anything that the Conservatives have done on economic policy. The battleground is now immigration and so called woke woke ideology and assimilation and culture.

I'm skeptical about it. I'm willing to be skeptical about it. Is when you talk about the rise of the rest and the relative decline of America, which you do in this book towards the end, is it true that we're seeing the rise of the rest and the relative decline of America? Or is America pretty constant? You know, twenty five percent of GDP in nineteen ninety twenty five percent of GDP now a big chunk of the most highly valued companies in the world now American. Isn't it really what we're seeing the decline of Europe, American maintaining its position, the rest certainly rising, particularly India and obviously China. But really, isn't it a story of the decline of this chunk of the West that is Europe that we're saying at the moment.

Yeah, it's a very good question, because it's The answer is I think complicated, and I tried to explain it better in I think in my book The Post American World, Which is the reason I talk about the decline of America in a post American world, is that the most important shift that's taken place is the decline in American influence, not American power. You're absolutely right, American heart power has stayed constant. In fact, you could argue on some levels, Adrian, as I'm sure you would agree, American power has grown. American technological dominance of the world is probably today than it's ever been. I looked it up to see what were the top top ten technology companies in nineteen eighty nine. Only four were American, four were Japanese, and two were European. Today, ten out of ten out of ten are American. So American power has stayed at least constant, if not increased, but American influence has declined. And what I mean by that is and this is why the rise of the rest becomes important. Take a country like Turkey. Forty years ago, Turkey was a basket case economy with a military junta that ruled it and was absolutely reliably pro American and did whatever Washington told it to do. Today, the Turkish economy is about four times bigger, or maybe five times bigger than it was forty years ago. It has a stable political system with a very powerful, charismatic leader who routinely tells the United States to go to hell when America asks it what to do. That pattern recurs with India, because of course with China and with Russia, but with Indonesia, with Vietnam, with Brazil. And that's what I was trying to get across, which was that the United States had a certain kind of extraordinary political influence after the end of the Cold War. It literally set the terms for the rest of the world. And that influences waning because you have a lot of uppity middle powers who are willing to say, we're just going to do our own thing. And look at India and the way it's handling the Ukraine War. You know, it is happy to be courted by Washington and sometimes agrees with Washington when it serves its own India's purposes, for example, the anti Chinese element to Indian policy. But at the same time, it happily buys oil from Russia, trades with Russia, consorts with Russia, buys weapons from Russia because that helps it on its own defense independence line. So that's the reality of the world today. And I couldn't I couldn't think of a better term than post American because it's not a Chinese word. Dominated world certainly, but it's not quite the American dominance that you had now Europe, I think just the coda to I would say to Europe is, in my view, you're absolutely right by the way, of course Europe has declined and China's rise in India's rise has all come out. You know, if you're trying to think about Europe, Yeah, who declined so that China could rise? It was Europe. But Europe was never politically powerful, unified and strategic in the first place. So the economic decline of Europe has not actually had that much geopolitical effect, because Europe has never been united as a geopolitical player.

One wrinkle to the argument that strikes me is it used to be the case that America was influential because it exported its best features, like good governance, like the charisma of of Kennedy, like the commitment of the liberal democratic order. Now it seems as America is getting better at exporting its worst features, which you know, to some extent is wocism, to some extent is polarization, and to some extent is a sort of technology that exacerbates anger and angst. America is. People around the world are obsessed by America, but they no longer see it on as a shining city on the hill. They quite often see it as a sort of version of hell. Actually it doesn't stop them being obsessed, but they're still fixated, but not fixated in an admiring way. America is treated as an example of politics we don't want to imitate, as an example of an administrative system we don't want to imitate, and in an example is a healthcare system that we don't want to imitate. It's a very different sort of influence from the nineteen sixties influence.

Yeah, I would agree with that, and I think that that's part of what has caused the decline in American influence. As you know, in the book, I argue there's sort of there were three bloss to American influence. One, the Iraq War damaged America's military credibility. The economic crisis of oaight damaged its economic credibility. And the rise of populism and the paralysis that came out of that damaged its political credibility. And those three things together, I think you put it very well. I would actually even border it's not just the healthcare system, I think, and you may be more uncomfortable with this as I am as well, but most of the world sees Europe's social market as much more attractive than America's kind of laissez faire, you know, And I would argue highly inefficiently say fair system, because as you know, we do plenty of government spending, it's just very badly done. And you know, we have our own weird welfare state which mostly coddles the middle class and it miserates the poor. I saw a poll recently that ipsisted as I recall twenty four thousand people thirty one countries. Most people were still very admiring of or not admiring, thought that America did more good in the world than China or Russia by far. But when asked what model people liked, Europe was number one, America was number two. In a way, Europe has done something very extraordinary, even as it has declined in terms of raw power, it has shown that past a certain level of economic wealth, what matters is not just sheer economic wealth. What matters is quality of life. What matters a certain level of equality and things like that. You know the Europeans have. As you know, for most of history, a kind of general quality of life was closely correlated with wealth. The richer you were, the better. And what's happened in the most in the richest countries in the world is that has now gotten decoupled. I think most people would say that they would prefer to live as an average person in your Europe than they would in Americas. It's so great to be rich in America, probably better than anywhere else. But for the average person, I think Europe is the model.

Absolutely, And this brings me on to the final thing I want to talk about, which is the notion of a liberal hegimen. That since about eighteen hundred we've pretty much always had a liberal hegimen, starting off with Britain, which, for all its faults, is wedded to a certain set of liberal values and a certain set of liberal norms about how to run into national affairs. America takes over that position. It's a bit of a messy handover. But even during the sort of the messiest part of the handover, the nineteen twenties and nineteen thirties, America is essentially a liberal power which is in a state of retrenchment. And then of course after forty five America takes up the burden and becomes the great liberal hegimen. We are now, as far as I can see, in danger of having a hegeman which is not a liberal power. I mean by that that Trump and JD. Vance are not liberals. They will be in charge of the world's most powerful country, but wedded to a set of policies and a set of assumptions which we haven't seen in two hundred years. Is that true? And if so, does it worry you?

It worries me deeply. So there are two problems. One I think is exactly what you say with Trump and Vance, who fundamentally reject that kind of open liberal internationalism that really has been practiced by every American administration since FDR. I think what we are watching historically, I mean, it comes straight out of my book, is that the period of high open globalization immigration led to a backlash in the twenties, as you note, and you know, the United States ended up very closed with the immigration policy much more restrictive than anything Trump or Vance as proposing. And maybe we're watching a similar kind of retreat or turning back. But there's a you know, the optimist in me hopes, just as the twenties didn't last forever, that that will be reversed. I hope it doesn't take a world war to do that. But I think that there's a I'm still I still believe that the larger liberal project is so it benefits so many countries, it benefits so many human beings around the world, that ultimately, you know, we will come to we will come to realize that. For example, I don't think Europe will go in that direction if America goes in that direction. I don't think this is a case you know, for one thing, other countries can't become as protectionists as America because they don't have the option. The US is a huge internal market. You know, there are only two countries that can really thrive in this kind of America first World, ironically, and that's America and China, the two vast internal markets. But for a country like Britain or Germany, where trade is almost half the economy, you can't, you know, you can't succeed. So I think that there will be a kind of self limiting quality to it. I think the fact that half of America doesn't agree with what Trump and Vans agree with helps enormously. The second problem, though, is harder, which is this decline of American influence. We've never had a world, a liberal world without a liberal hegemon. And if the liberal hegemon is getting weaker in influence of not in raw power, how do you sustain that. My hope is that you can have a kind of coalition of liberal powers Europe, the United States, Japan, Australia, countries like Singapore, even countries like Saudi Arabia. At the end of the they want an open international system. But would that work, you know, We've never had power that way shared that way. You've never we've never had the world run by committee, and that is a real puzzle. But we are going to run this experiment, both experiments. You know, probably if you assume Trump wins, we have to try the experiment of a coalition of liberal powers, and in a way, that's a more stable you know, in the long term, you can't just hope that you're always going to have one enormous liberal hegemon. Maybe you have to hope that enough of the world is converted to this idea because it really does help everyone. You know. That's why at the end of the day, I'm an optimist, because I do believe that these are better values.

But that means Europe stepping up a bit more in terms of defense spending, in terms of acting on the global stage, of course, but it's very hard for Europe to do that at a time when America is treating and embracing a set of values which sometimes look like more like the values of autocracies than they do like liberal powers. I mean, even if you go back to the nineteen twenties and thirties, you know, the Harding and Coolidge sort of seem half liberal and half not. I mean, both Trump and Vance do seem to be very hostile to the liberal project.

There's a possibility that that actually spurs the Europeans to do more absolutely for example, on you know, on defense, they realize they have no option and they do it. Look, it's it's back to that ageal struggle between tribalism and liberalism. Because in a way, the Europeans talk a good game, but at the but at the end of the day, you know, the Paris wants to make French foreign policy and Berlin wants to make German foreign policy, and they talk about delegating and having a unified strategic European foreign policy. But you know, they don't want to give up the national chauvinism and you know, so so maybe this is a bit more of a spur for it happening. I also do think that maybe I'm wrong about this, but the trumpad clash is, you know, it's not the wave of the future. I mean, look at the people who vote for Trump. They're older, they're wider, they're they're you know, this is the part of America that is fading, and it might take a while to fade. But there is a demographic reality to the change that's taking place, so you know it can't go on forever.

I think the's truth in that, but I also think that liberalism needs to examine itself and reform itself and defend both the liberal cause but also the interests of ordinary working, working people a bit better than it has. But Freed, thank you, thank you very much for everything you've said and for being here.

Arian's a huge pleasure to have this conversation.

Thank you, thanks for listening to this week's Photonomics from Bloomberg. This episode was hosted by me Adrian Woodridge. It was produced by Samasadi, with booking support from Chris Martleau, production support and sound design from Moshus and m Random. Francis Newnham is our executive producer. Sage Bowman is Head of Podcasts Special thanks to Farid Zacaria. Please subscribe, rate, and review highly wherever you listen to our podcasts.

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