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Anne Applebaum Says Trump 2.0 Could Be Good News For Dictators

Published Jul 30, 2024, 4:00 AM

A network of dictators from China to Venezuela could be the beneficiaries of a welcoming White House should Donald Trump win the US election come November. That’s according to journalist and historian Anne Applebaum, who warns that the self-proclaimed dealmaker and convicted felon’s foreign policy may be more personal and even less predictable in a second term. Applebaum joins Voternomics host Stephanie Flanders to discuss her latest book Autocracy, Inc: The Dictators Who Want to Run The World. 

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Hello voter Nomics listeners. Stephanie Flanders here, and it's that time of year where everyone has summer holiday plans, including the three hosts of this show. So to keep thinking simple, we thought it would be a good idea to offer up a voter Nomics summer reading list for the beach, the mountain, or the campaign trail, depending. We've each picked a non fiction book touching on politics and economics that we thought was worth reading right now. Some of them are fresh off the presses, some a little older, and even if you don't end up reading them, I hope you'll enjoy hearing us talk about them with the author. And for my summer reading selection, I'm speaking with Anne Applebaum about her newest book, Autocracy, Inc. The Dictators Who Want to Run the World, and as a columnist for The Atlantic and Senior Fellow at Johns Hopkins University, author of many other books, including Goolag a History which won the Pulitzer Prize, and my recent favorite, the best selling Twilight of Democracy, The Failure of Politics and the Parting of Friends. As that title suggests, the strength of her writing for me, especially in recent years comes not only from her unique experience and expertise living and working in Poland, the UK, and the US, but the directly personal way she writes about the shift that has happened in the world since, roughly speaking, the fall of the Berlin Wall, as what initially appeared to many of us to be a great flourishing of liberal values and democracy in many parts of the world metastasized into well autocracy incorporated. And thanks so much for doing this opening question very broadly. Tell us what this book is about and why we should be reading it on the beach or anywhere else this summer.

Yes, no, definitely you want to read it on the beach. So first of all, thank you very much for having me. It's a great it's privilege to be talking to you. The book is the book is a little bit less personal than my previous book, although it does it was borne out of personal experiences. For many years, I've known people who are active in the Russian opposition, in the Iranian opposition, in the Venezuelan opposition, and over in recent years I've come to understand that much of what they do isn't working anymore, and even though they are popular, they would win, certainly the Venezuelan opposition would win a free election, and the Iranian opposition are fighting a very, very unpopular government. They are no longer fighting a single dictator in a single country. They're fighting a network of dictators. And the book describes this network. It's not an alliance, it's not an axis, and I don't think we're locked in a new Cold war with them. So there's deocratic Iran and bolivarian socialists Venezuela and nationalist Russia and communist China don't have similar goals, but they do all have similar enemies. And the enemy is us. The enemy is my friends, the democracy or the transparency, the anti corruption activists. And the reason why is that they see our ideas and I speak, are includes we in the democratic world. We have ideas that would challenge them. And this is the idea of transparency, of accountability, of the rule of law, of rights, of human rights, and all of these things are challenged to their particular form of dictatorship. And the book describes how that world came to be, and it describes the financial and the propaganda arms of those regimes, as well as some of the military and strategic arms it's a brief read. I don't know about beaches, but you can certainly read it on a plane or a train. It's meant to make you aware of how it works, and once you see it, I find that you can't unsee it. And I now almost every day I pick up a newspaper or your radio program, I think, ah, yeah, it's at work again.

There is something about the message of the book when you step back, and it is a great read, it's very easy read. It does open your eyes to a lot of things. But there's something about it that does go against the grain for say, skeptical journalists who've spent a lot of time trying to douse conspiracy theories or the idea that x or y sinister global organization is out to get us. Because although you explicitly say there isn't a single sort of James Bond Island where they're all sitting and plotting, you are basically claiming that there's these very disparate figures. President Madua of Venezuela, Prime Minister Maningagua and Zimbabwe, and Vladimir Putin are all working together at some level, united by this desire to defeat a certain set of values.

I repeat, it is not a conspiracy. They don't coordinate their activity, but they do watch what one another does, and sometimes they help one another out. There is no question, for example, that the Venezuelan regime, which probably would have fallen a long time ago, which is has been you know, economically and politically disastrous for what was once the wealthiest country in South America, has been rescued by Russian armaments and weapons, by Chinese investment in Chinese surveillance technology, by Cuban secret policemen, and even with the help of the Iranians. You know, you think about Venezuela and Iran, these are countries that have really nothing to do with one another geopolitically or historically, or culturally or in any other way. But they are both countries that are subject to sanctions. They both produce oil, and they have found ways. Iran helps Venezuela and break sanctions, and Venezuela has offered visas and other kinds of help, for example, to Hesbala Act in Europe. So it's again, it's not a plot. It's just that they have they have things in common the way that we American and Britain have things in common in America and France and Germany have things in common, and they act to help one another out and to cooperate. But it's not it is None of it is a conspiracy. You can see it all on the surface. You do not have to have secret knowledge to interpret it. You don't need access to secret documents. Most of the stuff that connects them they say it in public, and what they do is visible.

I think the power of the book actually is that you're is the journalism involved in tracing some of these examples and the way that these different regimes are sort of playing each other's songs. So I wonder if it's worth just giving us one of those examples to show the kind of thing that you're talking about.

Well, one of the examples was, you know, the example of Venezuela and how it's been propped up by the other regimes. I mean, I suppose another example that I use in the book. I talk about the way in which their propaganda is again coordinated, makes it sound you know, too conspiratorial, but in which they echo and repeat one another. So the Chinese have made a huge investment, I mean tens of millions, probably hundreds of millions of dollars in TV, radio websites broadcasting in many, many languages all over the world. Some of it is Chinese state TV and media, some of it is content sharing arrangements with other organizations, all kinds of investments in Shinhwa, which is the Chinese news wire, is cheap or free in many countries, and some of that, for a long time has just been the way that that's just what the Chinese did to get out their messages about why you should trade with us, and a lot of them is even pretty boring. The Russians simultaneously created this whole system of fake websites. I mean, we got a little glimpse of that in the US twenty sixteen elections, and that has also been expanding its well beyond fake Facebook post. Now they create fake news organizations that look like they're Ecuadorian or Peruvian, but they're really designed in Moscow and so on. And these systems have been in creation for a while, and you can argue about how important they are, but what interested me was the way in which they were starting to say the same things, and others were as well. And so one of the story that I trace in the book is the story of the Ukrainian biolabs. I don't know how many of your listeners remember this, but at the very beginning of the Ukrainian War, the Russians made this claim that there were US biological weapons laboratories in Ukraine. And this is not true, and it was proven to be not true, and it was actually the UN Security Council declared that it wasn't true in multiple international organizations. Nevertheless, you could find that conspiracy theory, I mean, that lie was all over Russian media, it was all over Chinese state media. It was therefore picked up by all kinds of African media. It was picked up by the US far right. So Tucker Carlson repeated it on he was then still a Fox News host. There were a couple of Internet figures who put it on Twitter or who put it elsewhere, who got an enormous echo, and it spread very widely. The rumor probably benefited from the recent memory of COVID. People are paranoid about viruses being created laboratories, and the Chinese were probably eager to promote it because it somehow absolved them of the accusation they had helped create COVID. In a laboratory. It was also designed to muddy the story of the Russian invasion. So the Russian invasion Ukraine was a very brutal colonial invasion. It was an imperial invasion of occupation. The occupied territories were treated brutally. Their concentration camps were set up, people were arrested, children were deported, and all that was somehow muddied by the idea that well, there are these US biolabs in Ukraine, and that I'm not even quite sure I understand the logic of how that explains the war, but but it does. It makes it makes it, you know, less less crystal clear. And but the point was is that I found this conspiracy theory all over the place. Again. I found it in Venezuela. I found it in Africa. I found it in as I said, Chinese, Russian, you know, other other media. Yeah, I don't think somebody there were people who sat in your room, is at right, We're now going to everyone's going to do this. It was just that people saw it coming out of Russia and they repeated it and used it. And that's an example now of how how the narrative spread and how they're copied and imitated it, and then then they and then create a kind of giant echo chamber where you can hear this story about biolabs from lots of different sources.

You were saying at the start that you don't need to have a special conspiracy they because you can hear it and see it in what they say and what they're doing. But of course, I guess part of the point with campaigns like that is that you can you cannot realize how much an idea is being propagated around the world and through social media, because even that is so untransparent.

Yeah, you cannot know where ideas are coming from. And actually, the way that the Russians now often spread ideas or spread narratives is they'll sometimes post something on social media or in a video form, and then it will begin to be repeated, and then they'll take down the original posting. So sometimes they go to great efforts to hide that they are the originators of a particular idea or theory or or explanation or story. So, you know, they spend a lot of time thinking about it, they care about it, they put a lot of money into it. You know. Some of this actually, of course, is pretty cheap and it's hard to measure how much it matters or how much it works. But we did have in the last few months some evidence that it does. And so, for example, one conspiracy theory that went out on Russian media and Russian sort of Russian aligned media and social media in the last year was that Presidents Lensky had bought two yachts, and pictures of the yachts circulated online. And of course they were not his yachts, they belong to other people. Nevertheless, the yacht story somehow filtered into the ecosystem, and during the debate on Ukraine aid in the US Senate, apparently some US senators brought up the yachts in their common you know, why should we help Ukraine when the money is going on yachts. I mean, this is completely false, not true. Nevertheless, it had infiltrated the conversation to such an extent that was part of the American political debate. So if you want evidence that these things matter, that was it.

You have also a great example that's sort of almost comical, of a similar dynamic in the much smaller forum, where you have the story around for the Taiwanese why the Taiwanese people trapped in a Japanese typhoon had not been rescued when there had been a Chinese but coaches coming to rescue them. And then it turns out that all of that completely untrue. But then it had started this whole debate about why does the Taiwanese government not look after its poor stranded tourists. I thought, it's just such an ob thing.

And what was important about that this was the story that was told to me in Taiwan. What was important about it is that it played into a larger narrative, so that Chinese want to convince the Taiwanese, and they spent they do a lot of information warfare and targeting in Taiwan. They want to convince the Taiwanese that their state is weak, that they don't have any friends, that they're incompetent, that democracy is is less efficient, less effective than dictatorship, and that little story about supposedly some Chinese buses rescuing Taiwanese tourists was designed to play into that bigger, larger meta narrative, and the story became so viral, pushed by both by actual Chinese people and by kind of pro Chinese media in Taiwan that there was a diplomat connected to the story who killed himself. I mean it led to a suicide because there was this outcry, why are why are we so incompetent? Why can't we rescue our tourists? So these are you know again, they seem like little things, but they're they're meant to be part of a larger narrative about the stability and success of dictatorship, about the division and degeneracy sometimes even the sexual generacy of democracies. And you know, they and it's kind of non stop. So they do it all the time. They frame stories and they tell them in a way that's designed to i mean disabilizes a wrong word because it sounds too active, but undermine people's sense of security and stability in the democratic world, whether it's Taiwan or Britain or the United States.

You've got to know her long before I did, but Audrey Tang, the former Digital Minister in Taiwan, that was very much her. The point she was making is not just about the message, but also that it's about making people apathetic and not really believe in government. It doesn't have to be active. I want to move on later to how has this confronted what you've described, because that's an important bit of the book. But I guess we have to have a bit of a conversation about how Donald Trump fits into this, because it's definitely not a book about Donald Trump, but it certainly feels like it has a lot of residents for the US election campaign.

I began to write it at a moment when I did not know that Donald Trump was going to be the Republican Party candidate, but I did have some aspects of trump Ism in my head. What Trump has in common with the autocratic world is his transactionalism. So these are regimes that, as I said, they're not knit together by ideology or values of any kind. Instead, they do deals with one another. And this is how Trump thinks. We saw it in his first term, when he was still surrounded by people who wanted to keep the US in NATO and wanted the US to remain a leader of the democratic world. I worry that in Trump's second term those people would be gone, and his natural instinct, which is to do deals with whoever wants to do deals with them for his personal benefit, maybe for the benefit of his friends in the business community, maybe for the benefit of his family, that that would be the purpose of his foreign policy would be to not for the benefit of Americans and certainly not for the benefit of the democratic world, but it would be for him personally. And so I was just talking to somebody this morning about what his China policy would be, and she was saying, well, it's very confusing because he says different things, right, Sometimes he sounds very hawkish. Sometimes he says how marvelous Chi Jinping is and how much he admires him. And you know, my answer to that is his policy will be whatever he decides is most beneficial for him. If he decides the China hawk thing works for him politically or in some other way, he'll do it. And if he thinks it's not going to work for him, he won't. And this course very hard for you know, a policy analysts and maybe even business people to understand when they hear that, because we're used to thinking of Western or American Rather, I don't try to use the word Western, American or European democratic politicians as acting somehow in the interest of a set of idea years or you know, certainly in the interest of their country or where they believe is to be the interest of their country, and he will not do that, and that is why he could be extremely dangerous, and the deals that he could make could be very well be detrimental to American interests and maybe even to the global interests of the democratic world.

We had that conversation around the ambiguity on China, specifically with one of the people who might be as national security advisor at Elberte Colby last week, but also a while ago with Neil Ferguson, whose claim and he's not the only one, A lot of people like Neil who was sort of hoping to at least that there'll be a sort of clear course on foreign policy out of a Trump administration says, well, it will depend on who's in the room, and there'll be someone in the room who will be hawkish, because the Republicans are hawkish. I guess in that context, I wondered, we're speaking quite soon after the selection of J. D. Vance as Donald Trump's running mate. You know, what would the Confederation of strong man autocrats think about his selection as vice president? Do you think is he likely to tilt policy further in the that more autocratic direction in a second Trump administration.

So funny if what concerns me about gd Vance is not stuff that he says, which seems to change depending on what the political mood is. What diserves me about him is the degree to which his candidacy was lobbied for by Elon Musk and David Sachs, who have very clear ideas at least about Russia and Ukraine. And so what I worry about is that Vance is there because you know, Trump was essentially selling the vice presidency. Mean, who's going to give me more for it? You know, what's the you know? And I don't know what exactly that means, but I'm not sure that his policies are as important as the group of business people whom he represents are or might be.

As the name of the book suggests, you are focused on the financial corporate side of autocracy, Inc. And one of the distinctive things about them that you highlight is that they are working together to not just to stay in power, but they have been very financially motivated as well. What kind of challenge does that present to those who are trying to combat this or undermine these autocrats.

One of the big differences between the autocrats of the current day and some of their predecessors in the twentieth century. Is that these are individually, very very rich people. So either they are billionaires or their families or billionaires, they've enriched groups of people around them. That's one of the reasons why they stay in power. It's one of the reasons why they want power. It's one of the reasons why they why they hate the conversation about transparency and accountability and the rule of law so much, because the instinct that most people have about justice, you know that this is unfair. Why is our economy so opaque? You know? You know they need to push back again that all the time, because they need to protect their wealth and the wealth of of their inner circle. How did they obtain this wealth? I mean, that's a long story and I won't tell it all here, but partly it was by taking advantage of the loopholes in the Western financial system. So I essentially Putin came to power by stealing money from Russia, by laundering it in the West, and then by bringing it back in. And his story was pretty typical of a lot of people at that time in the nineteen nineties, and he did so with the help of Western lawyers, bankers, partners, you know, all kinds of accountants, all kinds of people. And one of the great challenges for the democratic world is will we shut down that system? Can we stop enabling the theft of money from populations, whether it's in Africa or it's in Eurasia, Can we stop that happening? And can we draw a line both because it's good for those countries, but also because it's good for us, because the amount of dirty money washing around in our systems. I mean, some of in the US is a special case where politics have become insane and very driven by money. But even in European countries where it's not clear who has money and why, it's not clear who owns property in London, I mean, none of that is conducive to good governance or good public conversation or democracy. More broadly, you.

Know, one thing that has kind of quote unquote saved the West from itself or I agree with you with West is awkward, but liberal democracy from itself in the past is the self interest of the commercial class. You know, at key points there was a recognition that democratic norms were needed to make capitalism work, even if those norms also constrained individual capitalists from doing everything they wanted to do. I guess the question back to you is that just doesn't seem there doesn't seem to be that rationale operating. There's something that's not working in the system. I mean, in an age of corporate social responsibility. We still have a lot of big businesses apparently not at all concerned about Donald Trump as a threat to US democracy, if that's what you think he is, and still continuing even to operate in Russia or countries allied with Russia, despite the sanctions that we've seen. It doesn't feel like the self interest of capitalists is quite moving in that direction as we have it seen in the past.

So it depends what kind of company. These are often companies with global ambitions and sometimes bases who are hoping that a Trump administration will give them special access or special deals. So it's a little bit like in Britain's Russia or in Orbon's Hungary, where people who are close to power get special arrangements, you know, the foreign policies made in their interests, or even sometimes the domestic policy. And there's always been lots of influence of business on democratic governments. I'm not going to say otherwise, but where this is a scale of it is different. Now, that doesn't mean that it's going to be good for everybody else. I lived in Poland over the last ten years, and in Poland we had a kind of autocratic populist party that sought to capture the state and had business favorites, especially some of the state companies that they were using to reward their friends and so on. It was a disaster for normal companies. So companies that depend on the rule of law, that need a reliable judicial system, that need contracts to be recognized, that need the rules of the game to be clear and fair. You know, when there's a system that encourages favoritism, it's not corruption necessarily in the old fashioned sense. People aren't necessarily being given bribes.

But transactionalism.

Let you transactionalism at a very high level. This might be good for people who are on the inside, and it might be really bad for everyone else. And I'm actually surprised by the degree to which the US business community hasn't fully wrecked. I mean, I know some have, but the degree to which this could be very bad for a lot of people I'm not sure is understood yet. I mean, think about what we were just talking about, a transactional China policy. I mean, to a company that sells things in China or trades with China, I mean, you need a policy that's predictable, that you understand, that's based on, you know, some kind of some strategy that makes sense. And if you're if instead there's going to be a policy that depends on whoever Donald Trump is in the room with and whoever pays the most money to his political campaign or invests in some company that's close to him, then you're going to have a lot of trouble doing business. And having that kind of government you know, in the long run is bad for the economy. And you can look around the world at every single, every single instance of it, and we see that.

Well, it's funny you should say that, because when we sat down we Bloomberg sat down with President Trump a few weeks ago, and he was quite explicit precisely this point. We said, well, surely the tariffs, it could be bad for a lot of American business. Anyone who has a problem with the tariffs, they should just come to me, Like Tim Cook took he to me. He's a smart businessman. He did a deal. Anyone can do a deal. And as you you know, as you suggest, of course if you're a small if you're a small business, that's not going to work. Just thinking more about how to confront this and some of the things in your book about that. You know, as you said when you were talking about Taiwan, there are these kind of central ideas being propagated by China and by the whole group in terms of the sort of information war, which is that democracy brings chaos, it doesn't deliver. To combat that, as Audrew Tanger told us in a previous episode, you need to prove otherwise that it does work. You know. President Biden is probably the Western leader that's taken that most to heart and has tried to operationalize that, making it work for people and bringing work back to the US and all that just doesn't seem to have worked.

I mean, the part of Biden's problem is specific to him, which is that he was not good at selling what he had done or explain it to people. And some of that was I mean, maybe I don't know who to blame exactly for it. Some of it was that some of it may have been his age. He wasn't a convincing public speaker. His television appearances weren't convincing. I mean, to get across to millions of Americans through mass media, you need to have an outsized personality. I mean, whether it's Barack Obama or or Bill Clinton, you know, you need someone who can sell their message. And he was not good at doing that. And that's a part of the explanation. I mean, I'm sure you've had a million guests on who told you the other parts of the explanation, which is to do with the ways in which people still feel shut out of the housing market and they still there are piece parts of the economy that don't work for people. And of course the other piece of it, and this, I think is why he wanted to run for president again. Is that some of what he did, you know you don't see the impact yet. I mean, you created the chipsack, which is designed to create more high tech jobs in the United States when you pass it. That doesn't mean the effects of passing the law are felt six months later. I mean they maybe felt four years later. And so some of what he does I think hasn't hasn't had an effect. Yet there are examples around the world that are that are also going to be relevant. I mean, so the British Labor Party just won an election basically arguing we're competent, we're going to manage things better. We have people who have experience in government and nobody economics, and we're going to fix things and their government and their legacy will rise or fall on whether people perceive that to be true. And of course perception is partly about what people really experience in their ordinary lives, and partly it's about how it's communicated. But I mean the test that the Kamala Harris campaign is also going to be partly about, you know, can she retell the Bidens story? Can she convince people that she can make things work? So's it's it's not that this, it's not that that's wrong. It's just that it you know, much depends on your execution and your and your explanation.

There have been Biden's staff as over the last few years who've been exasperated that he wasn't giving more speeches about bridges, and I sort of felt like that probably wasn't It's probably not going to help that much to just be constantly talking about big infrastructure projects, but that was maybe part of it.

The other election that I had the chance to observe recently was the Polish election in October, and you know, I have a declaration of mintance my husband as a Polish politician, although he wasn't a candidate. You know, how how did Donald Tusk, who's now the Prime minister, how to any campaigns? Campaigned by going around and around the country for six months and stopping in small towns, big towns, big city. I mean, he simply talked and met with people every single day. You know, it's a genuine grassroots campaign because he had to get around their problem, which was the capture of the state media by the ruling party. But you know, any any US or European politician has a similar problem. How do you break through to people and how do you link up with them, and how do you talk about the things they care about? I mean, you might have to spend a lot of time on the road, and that wasn't something that Biden could do. He didn't talk about the investments that were beginning. He didn't spend enough time on factory floors. I get it. He's the president of the United States, and he's busy, but but someone has to do.

Some of this is not about economic outcomes though, right, I mean, and that's what also comes through in the book. The sort of information war that these leaders are waging, you know, has achieved is a sort of lack of identification with some of those democratic values, of feeling it doesn't resonate necessarily the idea of a rule based order, if that's what we're trying to defend, sort of democratic values, and people actually no longer see the value of it or even and particularly think the US is not a very good ambassador for it, having not necessarily respected people's sovereignty or always respected democracy. How does one get around that?

I can't give you a kind of three sentence solution, but actually, know who's very good at this is the people. I began the conversation with the democracy activists of the autocratic world reminding people of what happens when you lose your rights and what it's like to live in a state where you don't have rule of law. I mean, you know, in the US we're getting a little closer to that. I mean, you now have judges in the system who you know, people now talk about Trump judges and Obama judges, which is something you know, we used to hear in Poland. You know, did you what kind of judge you got in your case would affect the ruling? That's already the beginning of a slippery slope in the in the wrong direction. And convincing people that this will affect their lives and it will begin to change what kind of choices they have is part of the argument. I mean, this is actually why again, just to use the Polish election as example, abortion turned out to be a big issue in Poland. Well, abortion was already illegal in Poland, but it was tightened further so that in effect, many doctors would not help women who were dying. They were they had problematic pregnancies. And two women died. And when people realize that a decision made by judges, you know, sitting in robes in some distant place, had led, after a series of events, to the deaths of these two women, that created a kind of outrage. If Harris or people around your are able to connect changes in the digital system to people on the ground, that's a way of explaining, you know, what it is that you lose when you lose rights when you lose the rule of law, it can begin to affect you personally. I mean, those words don't mean that much to people, you know, the you say judicial independence and it doesn't make people scream and yell and clap and cheer and run out on the streets. But when people begin to see the longer term effect of the loss of judicial independence, sometimes the mood changes.

You've stolen my last question, which was to be ending on a moment of a sort of some hopefulness in that you are in Poland, a country that has succeeded in at least for the moment, turning a certain kind of tide against a more personal, more autocratic style of leadership. You've won that election, asked auto or at least those forces won the election. Donald Tusk is now Prime Minister again. Do you feel like that shows that, you know, we can do more, maybe than many people now think when they look at what the force is coaliesting in the US and elsewhere.

I mean, there is no law of history, There is no rule that says we have to decline or democracy will decline, or you know, the twenty first century is the century of autocracy and doesn't work like that. That's not who history works. You know, what happens tomorrow depends on the actions of a lot of people today, and there is always space for a cific engagement. There's space for people to involve themselves in the political lives of their countries if they care about the direction that they're going. And I mean, I've always believed that, and I think it's more true than ever.

An Applebaum, thank you so much, Thank you thanks for listening to this week's some of Book's Photonomics from Bloomberg. This episode was hosted by me Stephanie Flanders. It was produced by Samma Sadi, with booking support from Chris Martlou, production support and sound design by Moses Ander. Brendan Francis Nenham is our executive producer and Sage Bowman is head of Bloomberg Podcast. With special thanks to Anne Applebaum. Please subscribe, rate, and review highly this show wherever you listen to it.

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