Over the last several years, the world has watched as China edges close to or past the technological frontier in more and more areas. Earlier this year, US investors were jolted even further when DeepSeek's AI model proved to be close to the state of the art American models. So what is the process by which China actually develops new tech? Why has it worked out so well? And how do priorities set by President Xi Jinping actually get transmitted to researchers and businesses? On this episode, we speak to Kaiser Kuo, the host of the Sinica podcast. He discusses the cultural dimension of tariffs, and what he sees as a fundamentally different attitude towards the benefits of technological progress in China vs. what is seen in the US.
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Hello and welcome to another episode of the Odd Lots podcast.
I'm Joe Wisenthal and I'm Tracy Alloway.
Tracy, we talk a lot about the tech competition between the US and China, but I still think we talked about it in sort of broad strokes. We talked about some of the policies obviously made in twenty twenty five, but actually how the process of tech innovation in China still seems like important. There's more to learn about there.
I totally agree. And actually we have a really good example recently in the form of deep Seek, right, and this thing that people acted like it came out of nowhere, but actually a lot of the papers had been published over the course of months, but it seemed to surper right.
I don't know if it's true, you know, the story that, oh, is just the side project of a quantitative hedge fund, Like that's such a good story. I'm not entirely sure if that's true. And they made it so like, oh yeah, well they were doing this quant fun they built deep Seek on the side, like such a it's such an alluring story.
Well, not just a quant hedge fund. Isn't the story supposedly that the founder decided to go into AI after she Shinping was kind of complaining, Yeah, how much talent and resources is being wasted on finance in various ways.
Yeah, heard that.
People like these are like great stories, right, and of course there is a lot of truth to them in the particularly in the broad sense that we know that and we talked about this at the time. Several years ago there was this sort of announced hard pivot away from the sort of like consumer internet tech and they sort of had their legs cut out from under them towards these more like serious capital t tech hardware, hardware, things like that, things that have more stakes than say social networking or something like that. So like, how do you actually do that?
Though?
How do you actually like direct talent in certain ways? You know, I think that if President Trump came out tomorrow and said, we want people to and you guys actually talked about this, but then we want to do more hard tech, I don't think there's like a real easy, straightforward mechanism and how do you transmit certain ambitions into the actual landscape. I think there's more to be learned on that well.
I think also We in America are very used to thinking about technology as this like very creative process and the outcome of Jeff Bezos working in his garage, Yeah, something like that, And it's hard to imagine often the same environment existing in China. I think that's just like a cultural difference perhaps between Americans and Chinese.
So we should talk about it totally. Well, I'm really excited to say we're gonna be talking to one of the best China watchers there is who has a lot of interesting thoughts on this time topic, someone we've never had on the podcast. We're going to be speaking with Kaiser quote. He is the host of the Seneca Podcast, which has been around since twenty ten.
Wow.
Yeah, we've been doing this for about little less than ten years, so it's very impressive this sort of longevity. Someone who spent a lot of time in China, splits his time between the US and China, lived there for several years. Kaiser, thank you so much for coming on Outlocks.
Hi Joe, and Hey Tracy, This is a huge honor for me. Thanks, thanks so much for having me.
Thank you for coming on. What is the Seneca podcast? What has been your project in the last fifteen years.
Yeah, So Sinica is an hour longer, sometimes much longer, interview format show. We bring on academics and policymakers occasionally. I've had a number of the former assistant Secretaries of State, Free Stasia Pacific on. I've had no ambassadors and so forth on. But it's changed the mission. It initially started off as being sort of more here's what's in the news, and here's a couple of people who can talk about it intelligently having to do with China. Since twenty sixteen, when I moved to the States, the focus has really been on US China relations, and it's got more American guests on than previously. We're but we tuckle everything under the sun. I mean US China relations, China, India, China, Russia, China, India, China, what have you, and the Chinese macroeconomy. Technology. Lots on technology and culture. But the idea is that it's it's supposed to look at the way that we think and talk about China. Now it's really evolved into something with which I think has a longer shelf life.
Wait, why did you decide to start it? Because you were in a band, right, that was your main gig.
Yeah, that's correct. Something for some reason, everyone knows about me. I mean I transitioned. I went out. I left that band in nineteen ninety nine, and like other people who didn't have many marketable skills, I.
Went into podcasting.
Well not right away. I mean I worked for internet companies for a number of years, and I worked as a reporter for quite number of years, and then in twenty ten it was just sort of on a lark. I was about to start a job at bay Do as they're head of international comms, and a very good friend of mine in Beijing. We've gotten conversation about what podcasts we're listening to, and I, you know, I said, oh, you know, the usual, this American Life and Radio Lab and whatnot, and he had a few, and then we just sort of said, why don't we start a podcast. We're both talkers, we both know everybody. Let's just do one and see what happens. And we did and it took off. It did pretty well. We got acquired in twenty sixteen, right around the time I was moving to the States, and the company that bought us folded in twenty twenty three, and I just sort of struck out on my own doing a sub stack, and I've stuck with it, managed to find a little bit of support and those few and hopefully after this more subscribers. But we're continuing to put them out every week. It's just me solo, but it's a group effort.
I'm in a band. I'm trying to go the other direction. I have a country music band, and maybe one day I'll leave casting. No, no, no, I've never got to leave podcasting behind.
You know, I'm actually not going to leave podcasting, but I've gotten back into my old band Reform when I was back in China recently. So are you on Spotify as of this summer? We are. Yeah, you can look up Twins show C h U and Qiu. You've got to put a space in between them for okays. It's springing autumn in English.
I'm going to start with like a really super broad based question that maybe it's not even really that it's probably a full hour long or too our long episode, but in your years of covering China from a journalistic perspective or at least from a sort of conversational perspective, and watching American media or American pundit to talk about China, is there like a persistent blind spot or a thing that stands out to you as something that people talk about China that does not accord with your experience of having lived there and having reported on it yourself.
Are There's so many I don't even know where to start one that I would usually focus on. I mean, and it's a whole cluster of issues that are related to this. But I think that people aren't mindful of just how compressed and how rapid China's transformation has been, what has happened in the course of one working lifetime. I mean, I like to tell people that if you can imagine graduating junior high or high school in nineteen seventy nine on the eve of reform and opening, and then forty years later, at the end of your life, the end of your working life, you're thinking about retiring, and you've seen the per capitaal GDP go from about one hundred and seventy five dollars at the beginning of your working life till thirteen thousand dollars. Now, that transformation is just profound and it's just so quick. So I think that what people get wrong is that they don't see that the hardware that's visibly advanced has done so, just at a much faster pace than the software. People don't change overnight. I mean, I like to that movie I don't know, Joe, if you and Tracy have seen Big.
With Ti Hang with My kids, keep going, yeah.
Yeah, great movie. It's actually aged well. But you know, Tom Hanks makes a wish and goes to bed at what he's like eleven, and he wakes up and he's in his thirties, right, And that's kind of China, right. It's like the mind is still out of that eleven year old in a lot of ways, but it's in the body with thirty. So we look at this fully grown adult and expect it to behave as a fully grown adult.
That's what people get wrong, you know how I measure China's technological progress go on. So I remember in the early two thousands, I was on a trip in the countryside and I experienced one of the worst toilets I've ever experienced in my entire life, like basically just a hole in the ground. And then I went back in twenty nineteen to Beijing and I went to one of the nicest bathrooms that I've ever been in in like a luxury shopping mall, and I thought, wow, things have changed.
Yeah, Yeah, that's a good measure. It's a good propit.
Yeah, I should do that all the time. Okay, So I guess I'll just jump into the technology aspect of this. But does technology come from a different place in China versus the US? Kind of getting back to the intro, there's this sense in America that technology is the product of freedom and creativity, and you have the ability to start a new company in your garage, whereas in China maybe there's a different sense of how tech actually gets started.
Yeah, so there's that American myth about the loan genius toiling inbscurity in his garage, either in Menlo Park, New Jersey or Menlo Park, California. Right. I think there's some of that's definitely that mythology in China, but I think the reality is very, very different. I think China does place a premium on that kind of ex nilo kind of from scratch zero to one innovation, but I think it places more of a premium on the scaling up of technology and the diffusion of technology in a way that I think the American mythology has sort of blinded us to Yeah, we're constantly caught off guard by Chinese technological advances.
Yeah.
I think we keep seeing this tech momentum despite all the decoupling, despite the chip bands, in spite of all the economic headwinds that China is obviously facing. And I think that the reasons are pretty deep. They're actually societal and even cultural, so that I think that gets to part of the way that technology is conceived of in China. You'll find pockets, of course, in America where people are still really really techno optimistic. There's still very solutionists, they're still very accelerationist, right, but it's incredibly common in China, whereas it's only here in pockets. I think American society now, and I think the West more broadly has for some time now had a fear. If you look at our science fiction, if you look at the way technology is thought about broadly in society, there's a real anxiety over it. Right. Our leading technologists, are leading natural scientists talk all the time about the existential threat that AI pose is. I don't want to diminish that threat, but I have to say that in China, you just do not hear that conversation, certainly not nearly as frequently, and not coming from the leading technologists themselves. So it's very different.
Why is it different? You know, I'm thinking about your big analogy. Actually I'm going to extend the metaphor a little bit too far. But you know, my phone. I have a love hate relationship with my phone. I'm on it all the time, but I also think it's doing significant damage to my mental health. Whereas if I were to, like, you know, my daughter wants a phone, and if I were to give her one, she would probably be thrilled for a long time. I'm not going to let her have a phone for a long time, but she would be like thrilled, and this is an incredible addition to my life that she would be very excited about. Again, do people have the same love hate relationships with gadgets and new technologies that we seem to have here?
I mean, there are some people, of course who have anxieties over it, but no, I think broadly speaking, you know, when I've sat on the sidelines of a soccer game watching our kids play, and I'm trying to talk to the other parent about how they limit screen time he's there scrolling on his device, going, hey, I secon let me asker this email. What we're saying just now about screen time? What I mean, It's like the question doesn't compute. They don't see it as such a threat. I think part of that, of course, is because the social media environment in China is a lot more sanitized. There isn't the threat that Junior is going to be scrolling porn all day, right, That's part of it. But I think really more to the point is that for these many years now, ordinary Chinese people have seen their lives, their material lives just improve pretty much in lockstep with the quality of the technology they have in their hand or in their purse or in their pocket. Right. Their bandwidth at home, how fast their network speed is, and how powerful their handheld device is basically tracked with their livelihood. Right. So there's not that reason for suspicion. Now, that isn't to say that everyone in China has experienced It's certainly not, but I think for the vast majority, and not just of urbanites, but the vast majority of people have seen this correlation.
Wait, but there is some negative feeling towards some technology in China and I'm thinking specifically of She shin ping and his big crackdown on consumer online tech. And he's not a fan of video games precisely because he thinks it's a waste of time and kids are staring at the screen too much. So there is an element.
Of that that also tracks with the Chinese parent thing, right, they all want us to be really good on computers, but not to waste our time playing video games or just chatting up people. Yeah, I think you were saying it in your intro, and I thought that was really interesting how Donald Trump he wouldn't be able to just simply order everyone, the physicists to start doing physics and not go work for quantitative hedge funds in China, you kind of can, It's not. I mean, again, that's an exaggeration. There isn't a way. I mean, there are still plenty of people who go to school and study the social sciences, or who graduate with engineering degrees and then go to work for a major social media company or go to work designing complicated financial derivatives or whatever. But he doesn't like that. He thinks that that's been one of the pathologies of the United States is that it's over financialized, and that our best and brightest here in the US have gone to work for these companies that basically don't make anything and just suck at people's time and create polarization in the country. So they're worried about that and they have more wherewithal to direct people. It's not coercive, though, let me be clear about that. They have ways to incentivize it. And I think that this again, this is part of the popular culture. There's all sorts of reasons. I mean, we can start at the top. If you look at the composition of the Chinese leadership, I mean, what do we have in Congress, Who do we have heading major agencies. It's almost all lawyers, people with illegal training. And that's good in a country that really prizes rule of law, and it's good for many reasons. But in China, the analogy is that you look at the senior leadership. If you look at you know, who runs the provinces, whether the party or the state. You look at who are the mayors or the party secretaries of cities of a million people or more, and you're almost all going to find engineers. They're going to be like seventy eighty percent engineers. If the ladder of success, if the people who are top it all did one thing in common, they did a four year degree in the natural sciences or in engineering, there's a good chance that you're going to tell your kids to do the same, or your kid is the case, maybe yeah, to do the same. So I think there's a lot of pressure that way in terms just of social mobility, in terms of what the perceived path of mobility is.
By the way, this point about engineers and lawyers or regular odd law I guess. Dan Wong has a book coming out August twenty sixth, twenty twenty five. It's up for sale on Amazon right now. You can pre order it about exactly this dimension of a sort of lawyer society versusn engineering society. I'm looking forward to reading that. I'm looking forward to having this.
Dan Wong is great. So I interviewed him for this Nova documentary that I did called Inside China's Tech Boom, and the whole thesis of it was really, I mean, in many ways inspired by some of Dan's ideas about the importance of process knowledge. How the fact that China has not stopped manifacted there was not for a maker's movement to China because they didn't need to be one. They are always making stuff right the fact that they still have all the hardware there. It creates this sort of frictionless ecosystem of innovation where you know, if you're a guy with an idea for some gadget and you're in Shinjin, you can have your designer just send you over on we Chat his latest design. You can take it to your ODM, which is just a quick bike ride down the street. They can have you a proto type by the afternoon. You can make some tweaks and iterate, and they'll just keep changing the thing over tight and it's practically frictionless. And I think that's a huge piece of China's innovation success as well.
But what happens when hesion ping comes out and says, you know what, we're not as into social networking anymore, We're not as into video games. We really want to focus on other areas of hard tech, important tech, something like that. What is the process of here is this national priority and then the transmission and diffusion of these priorities into choices that maybe students make or technologists make.
That's a great question. I think it's actually one that I can answer with three letters KPI. Right. What happens when you have these kind of abstract directives the will of the leader from on high is that they get translated not into specific policies, not right away certainly, but into this expectation set you know, from the leadership on down that this is how I'm going to score my brownie points, this is how I am going to get promoted within the party, is if I tick these boxes, if I do these things. Let's say, you know, we decide that the thing is we all need to have data centers. So suddenly every municipality in every province is going to want to build data centers. They're going to fight each other for it. They're going to figure out, here's the best place for us to build ours, and here's all this money that we're going to put into that. I mean, they're going to want to tick that box. This is the sort of the way that everything gets done in China. When recently, when She'sing Ping announced that they were going to be and this is director that came not out of just the State Council but out of the party as well, that they were going to boost consumption. A lot of people just sort of sneered and said, yeah, I don't see a lot of policy here in place to do that. But you can bet your bottom dollar that every one on down they took this very very seriously, and they're all figuring out ways where in their little patch of dirt they're going to figure out how we can boost consumption because that's the way that I'm going to get promote. They did the same thing with cleaning up air pollution. They do the same thing with cleaning up rivers. They make it part of your KPI. That's what they're going to do with this as well. That's what they did. I mean the question that you asked about how they made sure these physicists were doing physics. It's much the same.
There's also, I feel like a sense of clarity in some of these policy directives. So China very often explicitly will say where it's investing.
Right.
So when we have the consumer tech crackdown, it came with a simultaneous announcement that everyone should go into hardware basically, and we saw that repeated in various ways. I remember Chairman Rabbit was tweeting that people should go to the industries that actually fit the central government's general policies. So I feel like it's just very clear as well, and the messaging is kind of on point.
We have a word in Chinese phone call which literally means sort of wind mouth. It's the place where the wind will be will be blowing. It's like that little wind tunnel, and they telegraph that. They tell you, you know, well in advance, here is where we're going to. This in the fourteenth five year plan. This you know, in the fifteenth five year Plan they say exactly which industries are going to not only receive a lot of government investment, but where the paths are going to be cleared. There's going to be removal of a lot of regulatory hurdles, there's going to be favorable policy for you if you get into this, and if you're an investor, that's where you're going to put your money. That's what you're going to do. You're going to you know, it doesn't take a genius. You need to read the important documents and you figure out exactly what their priorities are. Just as you say, there's that clarity.
I have to admit, you know, like when I say a sheson ping speech translated into English, or maybe I just have a chat GPT translated Like, there is often not a lot of like specifics or arguably even substance in them. There's a lot of like really sort of high level grand things. But this sort of makes sense now. Granted, the leaders around the world often don't get into a lot of specifics, but it makes a little bit more sense to me in the context of Okay, these priorities are announced and immediately on down I have to you know, imagine provincial leaders, leaders of school systems, universities then immediately get the message that their futures and their success in their careers will be about who can show the best results on what maybe sounds like some sort of vague priority.
And you're missing the biggest piece of it, which is parents. Oh, they're getting this message as well. They're the ones who are ultimately deciding, No, you're not going to be in a life actual historian if you're going to study yeah, you know, you're going to study engineering physics, Sorry, buddy, because you're going to get a job at ten Center, at UID or at Huawei when you graduate. Yeah. So I think that's the thing. A friend of mine once joked that a lot of people in the West have a great deal of difficulty imagining how the leader of an authoritarian nation can do all these things that seem so apparently cruel, arbitrary, but actually have your best interests in mind. But for anyone who grew up with Chinese parents, they know exactly how it works.
Wait, so, just on the authoritarian point, I know you touched on this already, but just to press on this, would you say authoritarianism is a net positive or a net negative for technological development?
I think it's a wash in most stays. I mean, look, maybe this is my upbringing talking, but you know, I am not willing to discard the idea that a lack of intellectual freedom, of academic freedom, of freedom to query into to experiment without any ideological fetters, that if you don't have that, in the long run, you are hobbled. I think that's probably still the case. But I think in America we've taken it too far. We have this idea. I mean, do you remember back in twenty thirteen, twenty fourteen, when Joe Biden and even Carly Fiorina, who really ought to have known better. I mean, she was the see of a major technology company. They were going around and they were making these speeches. You know, Biden was making these graduation speeches. Furina was on the campaign trail and she was talking about that Biden was talking about. They said the same talking point. It's like, show me one thing that China's ever innovated. You know, as long as we have freedom, we will always be in the lead of innovation. And I mean I think that takes it from a necessary condition, which I even have quibbles with. In fact, I don't believe that it's a necessary Freedom is a necessary condition for technological innovation, but it even elevates it to sufficient condition. Yeah, where you know, it's like just because we're free, we're always going to be ahead in innovation. So I mean that's part of the reason why we're constantly just being just sideswiped, just completely just blindsided by Chinese tech advances.
It's you hear that to this day. I think you hear less of it, but it is less remarkable the degree to which you still hear that. What's your version of deep seek? Where did it come from? And how much does it fit this story of like, oh, they were doing quant stuff and then suddenly they're like, oh, we should pivot to AI, Like, what's the deep Seek story?
Well, I mean the biography of Young one film is not in question. I mean he ran a quant fund called high Flyer, right, and he pivoted. Now to what extent they were just developing this as a sideline hobby or I mean I think more likely they were developing AI that would help them in trades, right, help them in high frequency, high velocity trading. Right. But the pivot being you know, attributed to Seizing making this policy changed. It makes that totally tracks. I don't know the precise details, but it totally tracks. It doesn't seem suspicious to me. I have no reason to doubt that that's the case. I mean, plenty of people have made that kind of a pivot. I mean, maybe not all of them have enjoyed the kind of world striding success that Deep Sea has, but it certainly tracks.
I want to talk.
About the export controls from the Biden administration. So what role would you say those have played in China's technological progress? Because one thing I sometimes hear people used to use the analogy of the three body problem. I don't know, did you ever read that joke.
I never read.
I did.
Yeah, oh sorry, Amfeizer, Yeah, oh yeah, for sure.
Neil Ferguson actually used that at Davos a few years ago. I was there. I was, you know, working this little side hustle on. It's kind of a note taker for the World economic for him. But he actually, without explaining anything, he just simply said, you know, what the United States is trying to do to China right now is exactly what the Tri Solarians were trying to do earthbody help, and without explaining what he meant, but just don the assumption that when the audience had read it, and probably most people had, but yeah, trying to basically stemy technological advance, right.
Right, So I feel like we should explain it now. But I guess it's the idea that in the three body problem, Earth is threatened by this alien species and because of that, humanity kind of reorganizes itself and technological progress thrives, at least for a while.
Yeah, And I think that that's kind of what we've seen happen. I mean, I use a more Quotitian metaphor, the one that I think not everyone has have read this really really long turgid science fiction classic form. But I think we've basically compelled the frog to leap again. And it was happy enough just sort of hopping along well behind the US when it came to cutting edge semiconductors. But now it may leap the United States as the frog, you know, our metaphoric frog did in five G or in renewable energy like solar and and electric vehicles. Right, So we have now given China both the kind of urgency and the sense of imminent threat that was needed to light a fire to that that frog's posterior and now it's you know, it's in the air.
It's maybe directly over our heads, maybe gon't land in front of us.
One of the things that's really elemental to us tech is the vision in dreams of gigantic monopoly profits. This is sort of like the Peterteel idea. It's like the goal is to like build a monopoly and get insanely rich doing it, and the people who go into tech dreams of fortunes, et cetera. There is this huge liquid stock market that becomes the destination either for I pos or acquisitions. Talk to us about the capital markets component of Chinese tech is it the same like path to getting super rich that American technologists see here? Like what incentivizes and motivate the technologists in China.
Well, I think that they're exactly the same. I think that there's very little daylight between. Well, first of all, I mean in the nineties, in that first technology boom in China came right on the heel of what you saw in the United States. All these people Charles Jong who left MIT and went back to China, and I think it was like ninety seven or ninety eight to start this company. So who all these other entrepreneurs, Robin Lee who I used to work for it by do, A lot of them were returneys from the United States, and they had the same glint in their eye. And you have to remember these guys, they had American business business models. Essentially, they went to American vcs from Sandhill Road to raise their money. They went to American capital markets right when they wanted to list. Their exits were always on Nasdaq or on New York Stock Exchange, only in rare exceptions where they actually not ten cents. An exception, Ali Baba is a little bit of an exception. But most of them, I mean, hundreds of them went to the United States forces, right, And yeah, I think it's it's the same, it's the same motivating force. The cultures are remarkably or were remarkably similar. So that was like the only thing I felt comfortable working. I mean, as a guileless American who just had my I would just have my my, my posterior handed to me in any kind of corporate setting except in the Internet, where you know, the same kind of Silicon Valley egalitarianism and that kind of enterprise culture prevailed. So that was like one of the only safe places for people who you know, were clueless like me. Since you mentioned so, I think they're the same. I think they're the same.
Since you mentioned culture, can I ask a slightly random question, but I think I think you're a good person to ask about it, given your background as a musician. But China kah has been very successful in exporting technology, so you know, whether it's byd cars or TikTok or whatever, I think we can all agree that it's come from nowhere basically and is now certainly a major player. Meanwhile, in sort of pop cultural exports, the lack of Chinese pop culture exports has been a sort of long running discussion point now, and if you compare China to a place like Japan where there's jpop, or Korea where there's k pop, it does feel like something is kind of lacking there. I guess my question is is it fair to say that China has fallen down on cultural exports at least compared to technology, and then b why is that?
Yeah, No, that's a great question. It's something I've pondered for a very long time too. I mean, I think there's no arguing that China's got a gigantic gap. It's not punching at its weight. But let's figure out how we calculate that way. Because you know, when you look at when did we all start eating sushi and watching the Cure Kurosawa films like in the eighties? Right, So that's when Japan's soft power starts to really really peak, right, we all start driving Japanese cars. This is at a point where Japan's per captain GDP was about seventy five percent of what the United States was at that time, and Koreas similarly, around the time where we start all listening to Gongnam style and then you know, all our daughters or whatever posters of bts on their walls, as mon still does. This was at a time when South Korea's per capita GDP it's like seventy two, seventy three percent of America's GDP per capita. I think that has something to do with it. I think that per capita GDP kind of shows what a nation's priorities are going to be. When it's low, it's still going to be in that stage of we've got to work really, really hard. Just this is why I mean in China. I mean, I play music, so I'm constantly frustrated by the fact that for most people, for the overwhelming number of people, it is just entertainment. There's nobody who thinks of it as an art form anymore, I mean, or if there ever was. I think that it has to do with that. But I think there's also and it's obvious to me that the first rule of soft power should just be don't talk about soft power. That China's government's obsession with trying to create soft power is one of the big impediments to it actually having soft power. Again, let me let me be very very clear, it has plenty of soft power in the developing world. I mean, if you look in Southeast Asia, a lot of people are watching these insufferable costume dramas about you know, the palace intrigue in the Qing.
Dynasty ones, a bunch of them nowadays.
Yeah, yeah, I guess the Thai ones are really popular these days.
That's interesting, so that that's actually popular content in Southeast Asia.
Yeah, it's huge. It's absolutely huge all over Southeast Asia, in Indonesia and Malaysia and Thailand and the Philippines, even in Vietnam anyway where in Southeast Asia, Ego, there's a lot of this stuff. But yeah, but no, to your point, in Europe and the United States, no, it's not really registering. And I think there's that's one of the reasons. But I think ultimately the reason is, well, soft power tends to be created on the periphery. It creeps in through the cracks, you know. It's a grassroots thing. It's not supposed to be created top down. And yeah, you can look at South Korea and say there was a lot of government, you know, and a lot of these gigantic conglomerates who created Korean soft power boy bands and stuff, But that may be sort of the anomaly Kaiser.
We could go on a long time. There are just so many questions, but I think that's a good spot to ramp it. Thank you so much for coming on, Odlocks. We'll have to have you back on again soon.
I would love to come back on. Thank you so much for having me than you.
That was fun.
I thought it was really interesting. I like the point about everyone getting the message and then everyone doing their own thing to sort of prove that they're getting a message. And we talked about this on our episode with Sam Damico, the Impulse Labs guy. This idea of Okay, there's some priority, and then all the different provinces compete on how well they're doing and fulfilling their priority. It makes a lot of sense that that's a very broadly applicable lesson to like different sectors and different parts of the economy.
Totally, I really think the messaging is kind of key here. Yeah, the message is very clear. It's if you choose this route that the Chinese government is encouraging you to take, your life is going to be a lot easier than if you take another route. And I think that's kind of different to the way industrial policy, I guess works in the States, where you know, even if a president stands up and says we want a lot more semiconductors in the US, there's still a lot of bureaucracy, a lot of uncertainty, a lot of paperwork attached to getting support from the government for a semiconductor project. And so I think that uncertainty like still feeds into the US certainly.
Yeah. Prisident Trump recently gave a speech at University of Alabama, I think it was their graduation ceremony, and he said that he was like, to the business students here, don't just think about your portfolios, think about your country. And I like that message, but I don't know, like, what are the levers that actually get towards that. And so oh, also, Tracey, I have a take?
Oh oh really, just one?
Yeah, just one take?
Okay, hit me.
This is something I've been workshopping, and so I'm leaving it to the end.
I can't believe you're not tweeting it. Are you going to tweet it? Are you workshopping for a tweet?
I'm workshopping it for you here. I figured a lot of people aren't listening by this point, so I can drop it here, which is I'm kind of coming around to this idea that like complex financial products, that they have a bad rep.
They have a bad they are bad.
Know that they have a bad rep. That actually, this is like a sort of contra to a lot of popular thing. It's like, oh, complex semiconductor is good, complex financial products bad. I'm just throwing it out there that maybe we should talk more about why people get paid so much to design complex financial products in a market economy and why they're so highly valued. I'm just throwing it out there.
We should do an episode on Ray Dalio and the chicken nugget again.
That's exactly right. That's exactly right. Derivatives gave us the chicken nugget. Anyway, talking to Kaiser about this just reminded me of that that I want to explore this idea, and I'm saying it here now kind of as a remind myself, reminder of myself to think about this one.
Chicken nuggets is the ultimate example of American technological and financial supremacy.
We do great, complicated things in the United States, but because we have this bias against finance as being extractive or or something, I think we don't sufficiently recognize where we're at the cutting edge.
It is true that in China finance and industry are often working hand in hand. And if the government says that, for instance, hardware is now very important, you will see the banks start to loosen up on lending standards and things like that. So a valid point, Joe.
What is a supply chain but a payment chain in reverse?
That's Sultan Posar's line.
Oh he said, stole that, Yeah, I stole it from Sultan. All right, that's right, Yeah, credit to Sultan. But you know, maybe we should think about this a little more.
Yeah, all right, shall we leave it there?
Let's leave it there.
This has been another episode of the Odd Lots Podcast. I'm Tracy Alloway. You can follow me at Tracy Alloway and.
I'm Joe Wisenthal. You can follow me at the Stalwart. Check out our guest, Kaiser Quote. He's at Kaiser Quo, and check out the Cineca podcast and substack. Follow our producers Kerman Rodriguez at Kerman Ermann, dash Ol Bennett at Dashbot and Kale Brooks at Kale Brooks. For more Oddlots content, go to Bloomberg dot com slash Odd Lots where we have a daily newsletter and all of our episodes, and you can chaut about all of these topics twenty four to seven in our discord discord dot gg slash odlines.
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