The swift collapse of Bashar Al-Assad’s regime in Syria threatens a key Russian airbase in the country that Moscow has depended on to project influence throughout Africa. On this week’s episode, Bloomberg’s Simon Marks and Katarina Hoije join Jennifer Zabasajja to explain why these bases are so crucial to operations in Africa - and whether the regimes they are supporting have a plan B, if russia leaves them behind
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President Asad has left Syria, bringing an end to more than half a century of his family's rule.
The collapse of the Acid regime, the tyranny in Damascus offers great opportunity but also is fraught with significant danger.
We have to see this is an opportunity for the future of Syria.
That's a future without the terrorism and violence that we've seen far too much of in this brutal regime.
It's a moment of historic opportunity belong suffering people of Syria to build a better future for the proud country.
It's also a moment of risk and uncertainty.
But with Asad gone, Russia has lost a key ally and potentially key air and naval bases crucial for its operations in Africa.
The absolute priority for US is the safety of all Russian citizens located on the territory of the Syrian state, as well as the in vilability of Russian facilities and missions diplomatic, military, and others.
On today's episode of The Next Africa podcast, we'll ask whether Russia still has the ability to project influence on Africa and how regimes dependent on Russia for support are planning for the future. I'm Jennifer's Abasaja and this is the Next Africa podcast, bringing you one story each week from the continent, driving the future of global growth with the context only Bloomberg can provide. So joining us to discuss how Russia's operations in Africa could be under threat are our Bloomberg reporters, Simon Marx who is in Nairobi, and Katerina Hooye in Dakar.
Hi both, Hi to you, both, Thank you for joining. How's it going, Hi Jen, thanks for having us.
Let's just start on you know essentially what we do know when it comes to the situation in Syria. The world is still trying to work out the nones and the unknowns. But why is losing the Middle Eastern ally so important to Russia when it comes to its relations and its connections to the African continent.
Make that connection for us if you can, Simon.
Syria is a real lynchpin in Russia's ability to send supplies including weapons and fuel and other exports to countries where it has a presence. In Africa, in recent years, we've obviously seen Russia through the use of the mercenary outfit Wagner, and then since its leader died in a plane crash last year, the Russian Defense Ministry have been really making moves to spread their geopolitical influence in Africa, particularly in the Sahel, but also in the Central African Republic and Sudan. And they need an air base and a port in Syria as an air bridge to these countries. Should these locations be unavailable to them, that air bridge just falls to pieces, and so does their ability to have influence. Quite simply in Africa.
What sort of influence though, are we talking about? Is it physical bodies, getting people on the ground, is it supplies? I mean, what exactly was the key point and the importance for this region?
So it's all of the above. Both the Hamaimim air Base as well as a port in Tatus have been used to bring in fuel primarily and weapons, but then also to send soldiers and mercenaries to the countries where Russia has a role in supporting the government there. The issue is is that Syria is close enough for Russian cargo planes to make a stop, refuel on board whatever it might be, soldiers or supplies, military supplies, and then send them onwards to places such as bon Ghee or wagadougu In Bokina Fessa, and.
You both make the point in your story about the mileage and really how far it is getting supplies all the way from Russia to Africa, Katerina. If that air base, if that area is not an option for them, what else potentially is a way around that?
If there is anything else?
Well, I mean, one option that's being mentioned by Russian partners in Africa is using Turkey as a base. Another one is Libya, but then I mean it's still you don't have that, which would be an option. If Turkey allowed Russian military cargo flights through its airspace, then they could reach Libya fully loaded. This has happened on rare occasions in the past, but it's still something that Russia would have to negotiate. Other options that has been mentioned is using Algeria or even Egypt as as sort of a transit point into the countries where they keep troops, which is basically IMALI what have about the thousand Kremlin linked Wagner forces underground, but also no Nesia, Bookina, Faso and Central Africa and republics. As Simon mentioned, another way would be a land option. But that would not really work when it comes to two quotations and getting supplies into the ground. Another option is Sudan Port Sudan, where Russia has been negotiating for access.
Russia has been lobbying the army in Sudan for many years now, actually to build a military base on the Red Sea, but it has proved quite arduous for them to succeed. Iran is also pushing but there's a lot of opposition to this from the likes of the US, who clearly do not want to see Moscow have a substantial military base on the Red Sea and gain even more influence in Africa than they already have. Sudan so far has taken somewhat of a backstep not made that deal with Russia. They're quite aware of the geopolitics and don't want to cause too much controversy at the moment.
And is it safe to say that we've seen Russia's influence on the continent waning a bit? I mean, I wonder how this situation if we try to piece together where Russia is in terms of its influence on the continent and how this could affect that. Simon, what would you say, how would you describe it.
I think in the last five to ten years, Russia has really stepped up its attempt to gain relevance geopolitically and also economically throughout Africa, and we've seen them put a lot of pressure through disinformation campaigns but also through cutting bilateral deals with governments where a whole host of military cups have taken place in recent years. And as a result of that, we've seen a waning in the ability of of more sort of legacy partners, colonial era partners like France, you know, to keep their troops and keep their business operations flowing in the same way. And likewise, the US have also scaled back the number of troops fighting Islamist groups on the continents. So it's it's looking pretty good really for Russia, I would say in Africa. But I think Katerina for sure can elaborate on this help.
Yeah, I mean, speaking to leaders here, they seem convinced that, you know, the partnership with Russia is going to be sustained, even those events, the recent events in Syria, and that Russia would try to find out a military basis elsewhere if it loses access to Syria. I mean that said the questions has been raised their own social media and also among populations in the Three to Hell States Mali, Bukina, Faso, Ni year as in, what if the same scenario reproduces here? What if there's a maybe not an attack on the capital or rebels taking the country, but we have seen a text in Mali's capital recently, there's been big a text in Guagadougo. What if that happens in Russia doesn't have this axis, would it actually step in and help these leaders? I mean, we just saw them sort of dropping a side in Syria. What would actually be their reaction to a similar scenario in Africa.
Stick with us, Simon and Katerina. When we come back, we're going to talk more about how the country is dependent on Russia, have reacted and what could potentially come next. We'll be right back. Welcome back today on the podcast, we're digging into Russia's relationship with Africa as it loses a key ally and potentially a key air bridge with the fall of Asad in Syria. We have Bloomberg, Simon Marks, and Katerina Hooyhei with us. Now, Katerina, you were just speaking about the reaction that you're getting from people and leaders in the Sahal, I mean generally is their concern amongst most of the region about what this could potentially mean.
I mean, I think the majority still feels that, you know, that Russia is a reliable partner, especially after having cut ties with their Western allies and going towards severeignity product that these states are on. That said, I mean again, recent events in Mali and Bukina Faso where Russia hasn't stepped in, and also most recently now in Syria, does have people questioning the efficiency of their presence underground in actually fighting fighting the limits insurgents or the rebels that have been threatening these three countries. I think also seeing it in the level of the states where all of these three countries have sought other partnerships. I mean Mali actually has a Turkish private company training the soldiers underground, Nidia and Bukkina fas Or using drones from Turkey and China, and in Central Africaan the public they have turned to US private military company Bancroft. So there's definitely some sort of of trying to diversify their relations to not fully rely on Russia. It still remains a very very trusted partner. The main partner is securityations, operations from outside the continent.
Is there one of these countries that perhaps needs Russia more than the others? And I think about some of them that are are landlocked, I mean, are they more reliant on a partner like Russia being there on the ground.
Simon, Well, you mentioned obviously landlocked countries, and the Central the Central African Republic fits that bill exactly. You know, it's a it's a it's an isolated country which in order for the president to hold onto power there and resist armed groups a coalition of rebel groups in the country, they have been very dependent on Wagner Group, but also they have a military deal with with the Kremlin, which also plays a role in the country. And in Libya, they use one of four air bases there, it's called the Black Alshati Air Base, where they send personnel and military supplies in from and in order to get stuff to this air base, they need Syria. Quite simply, this airbase is too far from Russia from anywhere in Russia to reach in one cargo flight, So losing these Syrian operations they would be forced to reroute quite simply, and Katerina mentioned earlier one way that they could potentially do that is via the UAE, but that's it's far from clear if indeed they could do that.
Is it too early to tell really how the fallout will be across the region Based on the sources that you both were speaking to for this story, do they have.
A clear indication of where things are headed to next?
If Russia is not able to sort of keep up the link with Syria needs to find another option. I mean, it could definitely impact you know, two quotations, the abilities to get supplies into into the forces in these countries, and obviously then you can't you can't maintain troops for that long. The people were speaking too, don't think them and it's not going to be an immediate pullout, but obviously they have to rethink their operations becomes because they become more costly or take more time. Maybe they would cut countries like Nigeer or Bukina Faso, but they already have a live into the presence in terms of the impact on the countries and especially in the a health states, I mean Mali, who does rely on the assistant of Wagner to fight islamits insurgencies and the rebel groups that they've been trying to push back in the north there would definitely have an impact less so in Bukina, Faso and Niger.
All these countries where Russia's present are inherently extremely fragile states. And while on the on on the outset, on looking at it frontally, it seems like, you know, there are entrenched military hunters in a lot of these countries. Now they are nonetheless very run ruble to to outside uprisings both from the public and also from from well equipped rebel armies and an instability from neighboring countries as as Chad and Sudan are a fine example for the case of Central African Republic. So it's very possible that you could that you could see, you know, some shifts in in who controls were in the coming twelve months.
And you can read all of our coverage on the rapidly evolving situation in Syria across Bloomberg platforms. Now here's some other stories we've been following across the region. This week, Ethiopia and Somalia agreed to lower tensions over a deal that would allow Addis Ababah to build a military base on the coast of the breakaway region of Somaliland in exchange for a stake in its national airline. The two countries have agreed to forego and leave behind differences and contentious issues and forge ahead and start technical negotiations to resolve disputes with Turkey's help no later than the end of February of twenty twenty five. A joint declaration said. Also, Ghana's economic growth accelerated in the third quarter to the fastest pace in almost five years after solid gains in the industrial sector.
The data follows the election.
Victory of John Mohamma, who ran a campaign focused on economic stability and debt relief. And on debt relief, the IMF says it's open to renegotiating Ghana's financing program, something Mohammad campaigned on if the economic objectives of.
The reform plans are realized.
You can follow these stories across Bloomberg, including the Next African Newsletter. Will put a link to that in the show notes. This program was produced by Adrian Bradley. Don't forget to follow and review this show wherever you usually get your podcasts.
I'm Jennifer's ob Asaga. Thanks for listening,