On this episode of Newtsworld. Overnight last Saturday, Iran launched its first direct attack on Israeli soil, firing hundreds of missiles and drones at multiple targets. I wanted to discuss the escalating tensions in the Middle East. So I'm really pleased to welcome my guests, Adam Weinstein, Deputy director of the Middle East Program at the Quincy Institute for Responsible state Craft. Adam, welcome, and thank you for joining me on Newtsworld.

On this episode of Newtsworld. Overnight last Saturday, Iran launched its first direct attack on Israeli soil, firing hundreds of missiles and drones at multiple targets. I wanted to discuss the escalating tensions in the Middle East. So I'm really pleased to welcome my guests, Adam Weinstein, Deputy director of the Middle East Program at the Quincy Institute for Responsible state Craft. Adam, welcome, and thank you for joining me on Newtsworld.

Thanks for having me speaker Gimlish.

Thanks for having me speaker Gimlish.

So I want to start just with an overview of what just happened. Iran launched nearly three hundred and fifty attack drones and missiles against Israel on April thirteenth. Now part of the cause of that was that on April first, Israel launched an air strike that killed a top Iranian general, Brigadier General Muhammad Reza Zahidi, the commander of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Kuds Force in Syria and Lebanon. The Kuds Force is the militant arm that carries out terrorism and supports the various proxies around the region. The Israelis believed that this general was the key Iranian military official in charge of relations with Hesbelah and Lebanon and the pro Iranian militias in Syria, and they believe the Israelis that he was in fact responsible for organizing and training and preparing for the October seventh attack. So from their standpoint, he was a very high value target. And the fact is he's the most senior IRGC officer killed since the assassination. Of course, i'm solemoni by the US and January of twenty twenty. From your perspective, explain for our listeners what is the cause of the Iranian Israeli on ending hostility.

So I want to start just with an overview of what just happened. Iran launched nearly three hundred and fifty attack drones and missiles against Israel on April thirteenth. Now part of the cause of that was that on April first, Israel launched an air strike that killed a top Iranian general, Brigadier General Muhammad Reza Zahidi, the commander of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Kuds Force in Syria and Lebanon. The Kuds Force is the militant arm that carries out terrorism and supports the various proxies around the region. The Israelis believed that this general was the key Iranian military official in charge of relations with Hesbelah and Lebanon and the pro Iranian militias in Syria, and they believe the Israelis that he was in fact responsible for organizing and training and preparing for the October seventh attack. So from their standpoint, he was a very high value target. And the fact is he's the most senior IRGC officer killed since the assassination. Of course, i'm solemoni by the US and January of twenty twenty. From your perspective, explain for our listeners what is the cause of the Iranian Israeli on ending hostility.

In one sense, the cause is that the Iranian regime has made hostility towards Israel and support for this general support for a Palestinian state a cornerstone of their foreign policy and their legitimacy is somewhat rooted in that. So it's very difficult for them to move away from that. And I think there is genuine ideological support within the elites of the regime so far as challenging Israel. They see that as their place in the world. Iran views itself as a regional power, and one of the ways it asserts itself is by challenging Israel. Now, of course, neither side has really done much to de escalate those tensions.

In one sense, the cause is that the Iranian regime has made hostility towards Israel and support for this general support for a Palestinian state a cornerstone of their foreign policy and their legitimacy is somewhat rooted in that. So it's very difficult for them to move away from that. And I think there is genuine ideological support within the elites of the regime so far as challenging Israel. They see that as their place in the world. Iran views itself as a regional power, and one of the ways it asserts itself is by challenging Israel. Now, of course, neither side has really done much to de escalate those tensions.

When I hear the members of the Iranian parliament chant death to Israel and death to America, and I see Ayatola Hamani go on national television, which he did about two months ago to assure the Iranian people the death to America is not a slogan, it's a policy. From your perspective, how should I take that? How should I interpret it?

When I hear the members of the Iranian parliament chant death to Israel and death to America, and I see Ayatola Hamani go on national television, which he did about two months ago to assure the Iranian people the death to America is not a slogan, it's a policy. From your perspective, how should I take that? How should I interpret it?

I think there's a propaganda element to it.

I think there's a propaganda element to it.

At the end of the day, Remember that the Supreme Leader allowed the Iran nuclear deal to go through, which was with the United States, and of course it was the Trump administration that left that deal. I think death to America has become a slogan. Of course, it's an offensive slogan. I find it offensive, but I don't think it is a policy. I think the policy is challenging America in the Middle East and Iran asserting itself as the regional hedgemon in the Middle East, or at least attempting to do so. I think that's the real policy. At the end of the day, the Iranian government knows that it can't challenge the United States head on, nor can it really challenge Israel head on. And you saw that in the beginning of this crisis. After October seventh, the Iranians actually took a relatively restrained position. Hezbollah did not challenge Israel, despite the fact that Israel was conducting strikes deep inside Lebanese territory. So I think at the end of the day, the regime is pragmatic, but it requires these slogans because it bases its legitimacy on this revolutionary fervor and the idea that Iran is the regional hedgemon and Iran can influence these other states.

At the end of the day, Remember that the Supreme Leader allowed the Iran nuclear deal to go through, which was with the United States, and of course it was the Trump administration that left that deal. I think death to America has become a slogan. Of course, it's an offensive slogan. I find it offensive, but I don't think it is a policy. I think the policy is challenging America in the Middle East and Iran asserting itself as the regional hedgemon in the Middle East, or at least attempting to do so. I think that's the real policy. At the end of the day, the Iranian government knows that it can't challenge the United States head on, nor can it really challenge Israel head on. And you saw that in the beginning of this crisis. After October seventh, the Iranians actually took a relatively restrained position. Hezbollah did not challenge Israel, despite the fact that Israel was conducting strikes deep inside Lebanese territory. So I think at the end of the day, the regime is pragmatic, but it requires these slogans because it bases its legitimacy on this revolutionary fervor and the idea that Iran is the regional hedgemon and Iran can influence these other states.

We get two different reports, one that the substantial popular unhappiness with the regime, you know, things like women refusing to wear headscarves. A couple of years ago, there were serious demonstrations, but the other that the regime basically is pretty solid and probably actually represent it's a substantial majority of the Iranian people. But what's your analysis.

We get two different reports, one that the substantial popular unhappiness with the regime, you know, things like women refusing to wear headscarves. A couple of years ago, there were serious demonstrations, but the other that the regime basically is pretty solid and probably actually represent it's a substantial majority of the Iranian people. But what's your analysis.

Well, of course I'm not inside Iran, but I think both of those things are true. In fact, right now, there's a crackdown on women who aren't in the view of the regime aren't wearing the hitjob properly. So look, we can't get around it. It's an oppressive regime, that's a fact. But there's also substantial support for it from segments of Iranian society. But it's also deeply unpopular among a substantial portion of Iranian society. We can throw out percentages, but I don't know how accurate any of that is in terms of the regime's viability. I think the reality is that its critics are not willing to take the steps necessary or able to take the steps necessary that would overthrow the regime. So for years we've heard people say this regime is on its last legs. The Iranian people are going to rise up. There's a difference between being discontent and unhappy with the regime versus being willing to risk your life and your livelihood to overthrow the regime. And I think there's still a gap between the Iranian people's unhappiness with the regime and their willingness or ability to take the steps necessary to overthrow the regime. So whenever I hear folks say the regime is on his last legs, I take that with a grain of salt.

Well, of course I'm not inside Iran, but I think both of those things are true. In fact, right now, there's a crackdown on women who aren't in the view of the regime aren't wearing the hitjob properly. So look, we can't get around it. It's an oppressive regime, that's a fact. But there's also substantial support for it from segments of Iranian society. But it's also deeply unpopular among a substantial portion of Iranian society. We can throw out percentages, but I don't know how accurate any of that is in terms of the regime's viability. I think the reality is that its critics are not willing to take the steps necessary or able to take the steps necessary that would overthrow the regime. So for years we've heard people say this regime is on its last legs. The Iranian people are going to rise up. There's a difference between being discontent and unhappy with the regime versus being willing to risk your life and your livelihood to overthrow the regime. And I think there's still a gap between the Iranian people's unhappiness with the regime and their willingness or ability to take the steps necessary to overthrow the regime. So whenever I hear folks say the regime is on his last legs, I take that with a grain of salt.

From your perspective and your analysis the capacity of the security forces and the secret police, etc. And the Revolutionary Guard as a military, this is a relatively stable dictatorship for now.

From your perspective and your analysis the capacity of the security forces and the secret police, etc. And the Revolutionary Guard as a military, this is a relatively stable dictatorship for now.

I think it's a relatively stable dictatorship.

I think it's a relatively stable dictatorship.

I think the protesters in Iran, especially the peaceful protesters and many of the young people who risk their lives, some of whom were executed for protesting, I think they're brave, but right now they're not able to meaningfully challenge the security forces that protect the regime.

I think the protesters in Iran, especially the peaceful protesters and many of the young people who risk their lives, some of whom were executed for protesting, I think they're brave, but right now they're not able to meaningfully challenge the security forces that protect the regime.

So when you look at the attack the other day and you see first of all the sheer volume and the sophistication, because they're firing weapons that arrive at the same time but have to be fired in a calibrated way, because the ballistic missiles will arrive very quickly and the drones will arrive after a couple of hours, And they were able to coordinate all of that pretty well. But in the end, ninety nine percent of the drones and missiles were intercepted, according to both Israeli and American sources. From the standpoint of the Iranians, was that a success or a failure.

So when you look at the attack the other day and you see first of all the sheer volume and the sophistication, because they're firing weapons that arrive at the same time but have to be fired in a calibrated way, because the ballistic missiles will arrive very quickly and the drones will arrive after a couple of hours, And they were able to coordinate all of that pretty well. But in the end, ninety nine percent of the drones and missiles were intercepted, according to both Israeli and American sources. From the standpoint of the Iranians, was that a success or a failure.

I think they think it's a success because there was a theatric component to it, and a messaging component. I mean, they launched some of the missiles from the gravesite of the Iranian general who the Israelis killed, and I think it was necessary for them to respond. But the Iranians don't actually want in all out war with Israel because they know it would be potentially devastating for them. From the Israeli perspective, in one sense, okay, well, they demonstrated that they can defend themselves against Iran, although with significant US help. On the other hand, it is an embarrassment for the Israeli state that Iran was willing to cross this red line by launching strikes from Iranian soil into Israel. From Israel's perspective, I think it would have been more acceptable had Iran used one of its proxies like Hasbella. Instead, they launched the strikes directly from Iranian soil, and even though those didn't result in much damage, it is an escalation, and I suspect the Israeli state is going to respond in some way. They're debating that right now. I call it a success from the Iranian perspective. Of course, from a more rational point of view, this isn't a success for either side because the region is destabilizing.

I think they think it's a success because there was a theatric component to it, and a messaging component. I mean, they launched some of the missiles from the gravesite of the Iranian general who the Israelis killed, and I think it was necessary for them to respond. But the Iranians don't actually want in all out war with Israel because they know it would be potentially devastating for them. From the Israeli perspective, in one sense, okay, well, they demonstrated that they can defend themselves against Iran, although with significant US help. On the other hand, it is an embarrassment for the Israeli state that Iran was willing to cross this red line by launching strikes from Iranian soil into Israel. From Israel's perspective, I think it would have been more acceptable had Iran used one of its proxies like Hasbella. Instead, they launched the strikes directly from Iranian soil, and even though those didn't result in much damage, it is an escalation, and I suspect the Israeli state is going to respond in some way. They're debating that right now. I call it a success from the Iranian perspective. Of course, from a more rational point of view, this isn't a success for either side because the region is destabilizing.

So you have President Biden and his senior officials all saying that Israel should claim that they had won because the damage done was trivial, and not strike back. Do you think that's a sustainable position inside Israeli society.

So you have President Biden and his senior officials all saying that Israel should claim that they had won because the damage done was trivial, and not strike back. Do you think that's a sustainable position inside Israeli society.

With foreign policy, there's always the right answer, and then there's the answer that takes into account domestic politics. And I think what President Biden is counseling that in Yahoo to do is the right answer. I think they should call it even and move on. I don't think it's in Israel's interests to open up a new war with Iran or to potentially open up a northern front with Hesbelah. I don't think it's in the US interests, and I think Biden should do everything in his power to try to restrain that in Yahoo. But I also think it is true that at the end of the day, domestic politics matter to political leaders and and Yahoo wants to look strong, and given the track record of Israel over the last six months, I think it is highly unlikely that Israel will not respond. I mean, if I was analyzing this inside the US government, I would say, Israel's likely to respond, even though the Biden administration is counseling it not too.

With foreign policy, there's always the right answer, and then there's the answer that takes into account domestic politics. And I think what President Biden is counseling that in Yahoo to do is the right answer. I think they should call it even and move on. I don't think it's in Israel's interests to open up a new war with Iran or to potentially open up a northern front with Hesbelah. I don't think it's in the US interests, and I think Biden should do everything in his power to try to restrain that in Yahoo. But I also think it is true that at the end of the day, domestic politics matter to political leaders and and Yahoo wants to look strong, and given the track record of Israel over the last six months, I think it is highly unlikely that Israel will not respond. I mean, if I was analyzing this inside the US government, I would say, Israel's likely to respond, even though the Biden administration is counseling it not too.

Isn't the pressure of the Israeli public overwhelmingly to hit back.

Isn't the pressure of the Israeli public overwhelmingly to hit back.

Yeah, I think there's some of that, and it's understandable because you can imagine how Americans would feel if ballistic missiles were flying over the skies of the United States, even if all of them were and drones even if all of them were intercepted. But I also think it's incumbent on responsible leaders to not simply follow the anger and the sentiment of the general public if following that will lead to a bigger conflict. I mean, the reality is that if a direct conflict is opened up with Iran, or if a northern front is opened up with Hezbalah, Israelis are going to lose their lives. And I think it would be foolish to simply to respond in a way that ends up risking Israeli lives. But again, that's what Naanyah who might do. And nanya who has his own political reasons to appear strong right now, and he has his own political reasons to confront Iran, and of course there's folks in his Cabinet and in the Israeli state who probably feel that right now is the time for a confrontation. They're never going to get a better chance to confront Iran than they have right now. They might truly believe that.

Yeah, I think there's some of that, and it's understandable because you can imagine how Americans would feel if ballistic missiles were flying over the skies of the United States, even if all of them were and drones even if all of them were intercepted. But I also think it's incumbent on responsible leaders to not simply follow the anger and the sentiment of the general public if following that will lead to a bigger conflict. I mean, the reality is that if a direct conflict is opened up with Iran, or if a northern front is opened up with Hezbalah, Israelis are going to lose their lives. And I think it would be foolish to simply to respond in a way that ends up risking Israeli lives. But again, that's what Naanyah who might do. And nanya who has his own political reasons to appear strong right now, and he has his own political reasons to confront Iran, and of course there's folks in his Cabinet and in the Israeli state who probably feel that right now is the time for a confrontation. They're never going to get a better chance to confront Iran than they have right now. They might truly believe that.

It is interesting to me that, well, we all focus on Netnya, who as the Prime Minister and as this kind of world figure who's been around for three decades. There is a war cabinet, and apparently the war cabinet has been having a really intense, serious debate, although the debate seems to be about how to react, not whether to react. At least in the last report I saw Nanya who hasn't come down on either side yet. He literally is presiding over a very serious debate among people, most of whom have an enormous amount of experience at dealing with survival and is.

It is interesting to me that, well, we all focus on Netnya, who as the Prime Minister and as this kind of world figure who's been around for three decades. There is a war cabinet, and apparently the war cabinet has been having a really intense, serious debate, although the debate seems to be about how to react, not whether to react. At least in the last report I saw Nanya who hasn't come down on either side yet. He literally is presiding over a very serious debate among people, most of whom have an enormous amount of experience at dealing with survival and is.

That's true?

That's true?

And I don't think he's decided. I also think he's experiencing immense pressure from the Biden administration to restrain his response. And we also have to remember that Israel is experiencing a little bit of breathing room right now. I mean, the focus is off of Gaza. Sympathy has been restored, for Israel, foreign ministries in Europe and the State Department in the United States that a few days prior to this attack by Iran, we're issuing statements criticizing Israel. Now they're issuing statements expressing sympathy for Israel and ironclad partnership, and so this is an opportunity for Israel to think about what to do next. They have toned down the campaign in Gaza. It's not as kinnectic as it was before. I would argue that this is an opportunity for Israel to step back, cut some of its losses and think about a more sustainable approach to Gaza, including a potential ceasefire. But of course cooler heads may not prevail, and they may see this as an opportunity instead to confront Iran in view set back the Iranian threat by decades by perhaps engaging in certain targeted strikes, including on their nuclear facilities, and they may see that as the way to make Israel safe for long term. I would argue that that risks isolating Israel even further on the world stage, and it won't actually eliminate the threats to Israel.

And I don't think he's decided. I also think he's experiencing immense pressure from the Biden administration to restrain his response. And we also have to remember that Israel is experiencing a little bit of breathing room right now. I mean, the focus is off of Gaza. Sympathy has been restored, for Israel, foreign ministries in Europe and the State Department in the United States that a few days prior to this attack by Iran, we're issuing statements criticizing Israel. Now they're issuing statements expressing sympathy for Israel and ironclad partnership, and so this is an opportunity for Israel to think about what to do next. They have toned down the campaign in Gaza. It's not as kinnectic as it was before. I would argue that this is an opportunity for Israel to step back, cut some of its losses and think about a more sustainable approach to Gaza, including a potential ceasefire. But of course cooler heads may not prevail, and they may see this as an opportunity instead to confront Iran in view set back the Iranian threat by decades by perhaps engaging in certain targeted strikes, including on their nuclear facilities, and they may see that as the way to make Israel safe for long term. I would argue that that risks isolating Israel even further on the world stage, and it won't actually eliminate the threats to Israel.

Well, they were faced with a similar situation with Iraq when they went in and took out the French nuclear reactor that the Iraqis were building. And at the time, even the Reagan administration initially condemned their attack, but it did seem to eliminate the Iraqi ability to generate a nuclear weapon in the short run. And I think people like Ntnia who clearly have that as a part of their historic memory of what's going on. But are you suggesting I'm very curious beyond not hitting Iran, would you accept the Biden notion that somehow rough of the big city that's still left in southern Gaza, that they should not go in and they should find some way to accommodate Hamas or how do you see that part of the Israeli equation.

Well, they were faced with a similar situation with Iraq when they went in and took out the French nuclear reactor that the Iraqis were building. And at the time, even the Reagan administration initially condemned their attack, but it did seem to eliminate the Iraqi ability to generate a nuclear weapon in the short run. And I think people like Ntnia who clearly have that as a part of their historic memory of what's going on. But are you suggesting I'm very curious beyond not hitting Iran, would you accept the Biden notion that somehow rough of the big city that's still left in southern Gaza, that they should not go in and they should find some way to accommodate Hamas or how do you see that part of the Israeli equation.

You know, it's a tough question, and of course I haven't heard anyone, including myself, offer a true solution in how to deal with Hamas because Hamas is a violent terrorist organization and the reality is that a ceasefire with Hamas is a risk because historically Hamas has not adhered to the ceasefires. But the current game plan isn't working. I mean, we have massive civilian casualties. Israel Is isolated on the world stage. I would argue that the Israeli government needs to look at things from a long term perspective. I think right now they have significant support in US Congress, But I mean, do you really think that's going to hold true when future generations millennials and gen.

You know, it's a tough question, and of course I haven't heard anyone, including myself, offer a true solution in how to deal with Hamas because Hamas is a violent terrorist organization and the reality is that a ceasefire with Hamas is a risk because historically Hamas has not adhered to the ceasefires. But the current game plan isn't working. I mean, we have massive civilian casualties. Israel Is isolated on the world stage. I would argue that the Israeli government needs to look at things from a long term perspective. I think right now they have significant support in US Congress, But I mean, do you really think that's going to hold true when future generations millennials and gen.

Z take power.

Z take power.

I think Israel is right now destroying its global image, destroying its image in the United States in a way that threatens.

I think Israel is right now destroying its global image, destroying its image in the United States in a way that threatens.

Its long term support and long term stability.

Its long term support and long term stability.

So I think it would be foolish for the Israeli government to prioritize short term threats over its long term partnerships and prestige in the world. And so going into RAFA. While I acknowledge it might kill more Hamas foot soldiers and there's the potential to get certain leaders, I don't think it's worth it, even from the Israeli security perspective. This has been the calculation by the Israeli government since October seventh. It makes sense to destroy Hamas regardless of the cost. So if there's even a small chance of a senior Hamas commander being an apartment complex, it makes sense to destroy the apartment complex, even if you kill four hundred civilians. In the process, because at least they will have eliminated a Hamas commander. I don't think that's good for Israel long term, because I think what we're going to see is support for Israel in the Internet community eroding over time. For many young Americans, I think this war is the formative impression that they have of Israel. They don't remember Israel being kind of a David and Goliath story in which all of its neighbors had teamed up against it and sought to destroy it, and Israel overcame those kinds of hostilities with the younger generations in Europe and the USC is Israel is a strong military with significant US support that is engaging in war crimes in Gaza, and I think that perception is dangerous for Israel long term. I wouldn't use the word to accommodate Hamas because I think Hamas is a very dangerous organization. I think it's difficult to truly have long term diplomacy with Hamas. I would argue that Israel needs to have long term diplomacy with the Palestinian people in a way that can potentially sideline Hamas over time or force Hamas to be more pragmatic.

So I think it would be foolish for the Israeli government to prioritize short term threats over its long term partnerships and prestige in the world. And so going into RAFA. While I acknowledge it might kill more Hamas foot soldiers and there's the potential to get certain leaders, I don't think it's worth it, even from the Israeli security perspective. This has been the calculation by the Israeli government since October seventh. It makes sense to destroy Hamas regardless of the cost. So if there's even a small chance of a senior Hamas commander being an apartment complex, it makes sense to destroy the apartment complex, even if you kill four hundred civilians. In the process, because at least they will have eliminated a Hamas commander. I don't think that's good for Israel long term, because I think what we're going to see is support for Israel in the Internet community eroding over time. For many young Americans, I think this war is the formative impression that they have of Israel. They don't remember Israel being kind of a David and Goliath story in which all of its neighbors had teamed up against it and sought to destroy it, and Israel overcame those kinds of hostilities with the younger generations in Europe and the USC is Israel is a strong military with significant US support that is engaging in war crimes in Gaza, and I think that perception is dangerous for Israel long term. I wouldn't use the word to accommodate Hamas because I think Hamas is a very dangerous organization. I think it's difficult to truly have long term diplomacy with Hamas. I would argue that Israel needs to have long term diplomacy with the Palestinian people in a way that can potentially sideline Hamas over time or force Hamas to be more pragmatic.

How would you do that?

How would you do that?

I would have done things differently from the beginning. If I was in Netanyahu's war cabinet, I would have had more targeted strikes. I would have focused on Hamas leaders. I would have tried to send a message to the Palestinian people that were not against you, were against Hamas. Of course, that's easy for me to say sitting in New York City. I know that net and Yahoo had to keep his coalition together. I know Netanyahu cares about his political future, and I know that the attacks on October seventh radicalized Israeli society. And I can understand that because I saw what nine to eleven did to US society. But I think that approach would have been better than racking up over thirty thousand civilian casualties. I think there was immense sympathy for Israel following October seventh, and if I was in Israeli right now, I would be livid with Netanyahu for squandering that sympathy. And I don't think that eliminating Hamas again in the short term. It might reduce risks in the next ten years, let's say, but they're also engaging in a way that I think to create an organization worse than Hamas in the future. And the Palestinian and Israeli societies are mutually radicalizing one another right now in a way that makes long term peace unlikely.

I would have done things differently from the beginning. If I was in Netanyahu's war cabinet, I would have had more targeted strikes. I would have focused on Hamas leaders. I would have tried to send a message to the Palestinian people that were not against you, were against Hamas. Of course, that's easy for me to say sitting in New York City. I know that net and Yahoo had to keep his coalition together. I know Netanyahu cares about his political future, and I know that the attacks on October seventh radicalized Israeli society. And I can understand that because I saw what nine to eleven did to US society. But I think that approach would have been better than racking up over thirty thousand civilian casualties. I think there was immense sympathy for Israel following October seventh, and if I was in Israeli right now, I would be livid with Netanyahu for squandering that sympathy. And I don't think that eliminating Hamas again in the short term. It might reduce risks in the next ten years, let's say, but they're also engaging in a way that I think to create an organization worse than Hamas in the future. And the Palestinian and Israeli societies are mutually radicalizing one another right now in a way that makes long term peace unlikely.

In my view, you're really faced with two incompatible realities and no particular exit ramp, if you will. The whole Middle East in that sense, it seems to me, on the one hand, is moving in the right direction. Egypt, Jordan, uae, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, it's degenerating rapidly. Whether it's the Huthis in the South or Hesbaalah or the chaos in Syria. It's a very mixed bag. And in that context, we have sort of gradually dribbled American troops all over the place. Are those troops peacekeepers or are they actually hostages?

In my view, you're really faced with two incompatible realities and no particular exit ramp, if you will. The whole Middle East in that sense, it seems to me, on the one hand, is moving in the right direction. Egypt, Jordan, uae, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, it's degenerating rapidly. Whether it's the Huthis in the South or Hesbaalah or the chaos in Syria. It's a very mixed bag. And in that context, we have sort of gradually dribbled American troops all over the place. Are those troops peacekeepers or are they actually hostages?

I think they used to be peacekeepers and now they're hostages. I think.

I think they used to be peacekeepers and now they're hostages. I think.

US air power and US troops is critical to defeating ISIS, and we saw ISIS emerge in twenty thirteen after US troops left in twenty eleven, and they were able to take over Iraqi cities, and then the US had to come back to Iraq in twenty fourteen, and then because we could not train an effective proxy in Syria, we sent troops to Syria as well, special operators. Right now there's eight hundred. It's fluctuated between eight hundred and nine hundred. Now the US troops in Syria are in direct combat, whereas the US troops in Iraq are in an advisory mission. But of course they're still susceptible to attacks from rockets and mortars and so forth, and drones from Iran aligned militias in Iraq. Do those troops achieve something, Yes, they do. They help the Iraqi military and targeting of ISSIS cells, They help maintain their capability. In some sense, they help maintain US influence in Iraq, and they act as a mediator between different factions within the Iraqi military, because the Iraqi military's command structure is not like our military's command structure. It's not a top down command structure. Technically different units report to the Prime Minister, but in reality there's all kinds of different paramilitary wings of the Iraqi security forces that are more or less only accountable to themselves, or they're accountable to Iran, or a mix of both. And so I think having the US military there has been stabilizing in that sense, but the risk is that US troops are in contact. I mean, we thought we saw the three US soldiers get killed at Tower twenty two in Jordan, and that is a risk, and they are hostage to this ebb and flow of hostilities in the Middle East. Before October seventh, folks in the Biden administration thought the Middle East was yesterday's problem and their focus was on Ukraine and East Asia. Well, now we see it's not yesterday's problem, it's today's problem. And I think the benefits that we get out of having US troops in Syria and Iraq are far outweighed by the risks of them getting killed and getting dragged into a greater war. And also, I think we have a duty to our US troops. You know, we could say, okay, three US soldiers got killed, that's a relatively low casualty rate given how long we've been there. But at the end of the day, I think we have a duty to those US soldiers that they're not being killed in vain. And I would argue they are being killed in vain.

US air power and US troops is critical to defeating ISIS, and we saw ISIS emerge in twenty thirteen after US troops left in twenty eleven, and they were able to take over Iraqi cities, and then the US had to come back to Iraq in twenty fourteen, and then because we could not train an effective proxy in Syria, we sent troops to Syria as well, special operators. Right now there's eight hundred. It's fluctuated between eight hundred and nine hundred. Now the US troops in Syria are in direct combat, whereas the US troops in Iraq are in an advisory mission. But of course they're still susceptible to attacks from rockets and mortars and so forth, and drones from Iran aligned militias in Iraq. Do those troops achieve something, Yes, they do. They help the Iraqi military and targeting of ISSIS cells, They help maintain their capability. In some sense, they help maintain US influence in Iraq, and they act as a mediator between different factions within the Iraqi military, because the Iraqi military's command structure is not like our military's command structure. It's not a top down command structure. Technically different units report to the Prime Minister, but in reality there's all kinds of different paramilitary wings of the Iraqi security forces that are more or less only accountable to themselves, or they're accountable to Iran, or a mix of both. And so I think having the US military there has been stabilizing in that sense, but the risk is that US troops are in contact. I mean, we thought we saw the three US soldiers get killed at Tower twenty two in Jordan, and that is a risk, and they are hostage to this ebb and flow of hostilities in the Middle East. Before October seventh, folks in the Biden administration thought the Middle East was yesterday's problem and their focus was on Ukraine and East Asia. Well, now we see it's not yesterday's problem, it's today's problem. And I think the benefits that we get out of having US troops in Syria and Iraq are far outweighed by the risks of them getting killed and getting dragged into a greater war. And also, I think we have a duty to our US troops. You know, we could say, okay, three US soldiers got killed, that's a relatively low casualty rate given how long we've been there. But at the end of the day, I think we have a duty to those US soldiers that they're not being killed in vain. And I would argue they are being killed in vain.

I don't actually understand what a definable successful mission looks like and you've got a lot of troops there, But that really understates the commitment level because those troops have to have air power, and that means either aircraft carriers or basing rights, and without that air power, you are not capable of having those troops survive on their own. So there's actually a much larger commitment of American capability than just the number of Special Forces or Am I wrong? Is that not correct?

I don't actually understand what a definable successful mission looks like and you've got a lot of troops there, But that really understates the commitment level because those troops have to have air power, and that means either aircraft carriers or basing rights, and without that air power, you are not capable of having those troops survive on their own. So there's actually a much larger commitment of American capability than just the number of Special Forces or Am I wrong? Is that not correct?

No, that's correct.

No, that's correct.

I think from the Pentagon's perspective and Sentcom's perspective, David chi success, I mean ISIS has not been able to revive itself. There's no threat currently of ISIS being able to take even smaller towns, let alone major Iraqi cities. They're able to keep an eye on the Iranians and the land corridor that exists from Iran through Iraq and Syria into Lebanon, and so of course there's benefits that come with that, But the risk is US casualties.

I think from the Pentagon's perspective and Sentcom's perspective, David chi success, I mean ISIS has not been able to revive itself. There's no threat currently of ISIS being able to take even smaller towns, let alone major Iraqi cities. They're able to keep an eye on the Iranians and the land corridor that exists from Iran through Iraq and Syria into Lebanon, and so of course there's benefits that come with that, But the risk is US casualties.

The risk is these US troops.

The risk is these US troops.

Being used as pawns by these unaccountable Iran backed militias in Iraq and Syria and the US being dragged into a bigger conflict. And I think that risk outweighs the current benefits. And I also think we owe it to the American people not to keep US troops deployed in combat zones indefinitely. I mean, we can call it an advisory emission, but it's a combat zone. If US troops are being targeted by drones, that's a combat zone. There's a big difference between the experience of US troops in Iraq and the experts of US troops in South Korea.

Being used as pawns by these unaccountable Iran backed militias in Iraq and Syria and the US being dragged into a bigger conflict. And I think that risk outweighs the current benefits. And I also think we owe it to the American people not to keep US troops deployed in combat zones indefinitely. I mean, we can call it an advisory emission, but it's a combat zone. If US troops are being targeted by drones, that's a combat zone. There's a big difference between the experience of US troops in Iraq and the experts of US troops in South Korea.

What would happen if we simply withdrew our troops from Iraq and Syria.

What would happen if we simply withdrew our troops from Iraq and Syria.

Well, I don't think we should simply withdraw them. I think we need to have a plan. I've argued this in a brief wrote I think we need to come up with a plan that allows certain rotations of training missions to continue. I think we do need to continue to support the Iraqi military. First of all, if we withdrew from Iraq, we would probably have to withdraw from Syria anyway, because the troops in Syria rely, to some extent on logistics from Iraq. The reality is other powers would begin to assert themselves. I mean, we would see the Iran aligned militias assert themselves more. Iran would claim it as a victory. We would see perhaps hostilities towards our Kurdish partners in the SDF and Syria. We would see a rebalancing of power in those areas. And of course, I think that's what gives any US president pause from withdrawing, because especially in an induction year, because they don't want to be accused of gifting Iraq to Iran. But what I would step back and say is Iraq is always going to be a greater vital interest for Iran than it is for the United States. And if you want evidence of that, we only have twenty five hundred troops there. I mean, that's the evidence. We don't truly prioritize Iraq, or we would have more than twenty five hundred troops. We don't truly prioritize Syria, or we would have more than eight hundred to nine hundred troops. What we're trying to do is protect our interests in Iraq and Syria with a very low investment, and I think we should just accept the reality that we cannot alter conditions on the ground with the investment we're willing to make, and so it makes sense to leave and focus on on bigger issues.

Well, I don't think we should simply withdraw them. I think we need to have a plan. I've argued this in a brief wrote I think we need to come up with a plan that allows certain rotations of training missions to continue. I think we do need to continue to support the Iraqi military. First of all, if we withdrew from Iraq, we would probably have to withdraw from Syria anyway, because the troops in Syria rely, to some extent on logistics from Iraq. The reality is other powers would begin to assert themselves. I mean, we would see the Iran aligned militias assert themselves more. Iran would claim it as a victory. We would see perhaps hostilities towards our Kurdish partners in the SDF and Syria. We would see a rebalancing of power in those areas. And of course, I think that's what gives any US president pause from withdrawing, because especially in an induction year, because they don't want to be accused of gifting Iraq to Iran. But what I would step back and say is Iraq is always going to be a greater vital interest for Iran than it is for the United States. And if you want evidence of that, we only have twenty five hundred troops there. I mean, that's the evidence. We don't truly prioritize Iraq, or we would have more than twenty five hundred troops. We don't truly prioritize Syria, or we would have more than eight hundred to nine hundred troops. What we're trying to do is protect our interests in Iraq and Syria with a very low investment, and I think we should just accept the reality that we cannot alter conditions on the ground with the investment we're willing to make, and so it makes sense to leave and focus on on bigger issues.

So from that perspective, if we did leave, how would that affect our ability to work with Saudi Arabia.

So from that perspective, if we did leave, how would that affect our ability to work with Saudi Arabia.

You know, that's an interesting question.

You know, that's an interesting question.

I think Saudi Arabia has demonstrated that it's not going to simply follow the lead of the United States. It's going to engage with China when it makes sense for Saudi Arabia. It's going to engage with Iran when it makes sense for Saudi Arabia. So I think I don't think we need to maintain a footprint in Iraq and Syria simply to protect Israeli interests or Saudi interests, or anyone else's interests.

I think Saudi Arabia has demonstrated that it's not going to simply follow the lead of the United States. It's going to engage with China when it makes sense for Saudi Arabia. It's going to engage with Iran when it makes sense for Saudi Arabia. So I think I don't think we need to maintain a footprint in Iraq and Syria simply to protect Israeli interests or Saudi interests, or anyone else's interests.

If it's not in our interest.

If it's not in our interest.

I think there will still be ways to work with Saudi Arabia even if we do reduce our footprint, and I think Saudi Arabia has bigger concerns.

I think there will still be ways to work with Saudi Arabia even if we do reduce our footprint, and I think Saudi Arabia has bigger concerns.

Were you surprised by the Saudi's cooperation with Israel in repelling the Iranian attack?

Were you surprised by the Saudi's cooperation with Israel in repelling the Iranian attack?

I don't know the veracity of all the reports. I know the Jordanians intercepted drones. I know there's reports the Saudis did.

I don't know the veracity of all the reports. I know the Jordanians intercepted drones. I know there's reports the Saudis did.

It makes sense.

It makes sense.

I mean, at the end of the day, Iran violated the sovereign airspace of these countries. And I don't think Jordan or Saudi Arabia want to see a greater conflict between Iran and Israel. So in some sense, for them, it makes sense to try to mitigate the damage of these Iranian strikes on Israel, because of course, if the damage had been greater, it would be a foregone conclusion that there's going to be a bigger war, and that's not in the interests of these countries. All of these countries have an interest in stability. They do not have an interest in seeing a escalating conflict between Iran and Israel. And of course these aren't exactly countries that have a soft spot for Iran.

I mean, at the end of the day, Iran violated the sovereign airspace of these countries. And I don't think Jordan or Saudi Arabia want to see a greater conflict between Iran and Israel. So in some sense, for them, it makes sense to try to mitigate the damage of these Iranian strikes on Israel, because of course, if the damage had been greater, it would be a foregone conclusion that there's going to be a bigger war, and that's not in the interests of these countries. All of these countries have an interest in stability. They do not have an interest in seeing a escalating conflict between Iran and Israel. And of course these aren't exactly countries that have a soft spot for Iran.

The fear of Iran may be greater than their fear of Israel.

The fear of Iran may be greater than their fear of Israel.

I think that's absolutely true. Now these countries, they are accountable to some degree to public sentiment, and of course public sentiment is going to be very sympathetic to the plight of the Palestinians. But we have to remember neither Saudi Arabia nor Jordan have a soft spot for Hamas either. I mean, they view Hamas as an ideological threat to their own legitimates and if Hamas were to truly succeed in their objective, they view that as offering a blueprint for a challenge to their own rule. They definitely don't want to see Islamist movements that are modeled to some degree after the Muslim Brotherhood succeeding, because that is a threat to their own rule.

I think that's absolutely true. Now these countries, they are accountable to some degree to public sentiment, and of course public sentiment is going to be very sympathetic to the plight of the Palestinians. But we have to remember neither Saudi Arabia nor Jordan have a soft spot for Hamas either. I mean, they view Hamas as an ideological threat to their own legitimates and if Hamas were to truly succeed in their objective, they view that as offering a blueprint for a challenge to their own rule. They definitely don't want to see Islamist movements that are modeled to some degree after the Muslim Brotherhood succeeding, because that is a threat to their own rule.

Egypt and Jordan are as ruthlessly anti Muslim Brotherhood as Israel is anti Hamas. I mean, their secret police make no bones about going after people and blocking them and trying to destroy those things. And I think that's part of why they've been unwilling to accept refugees from Gaza. They think they would infect their political process with people who are dedicated to a very very different structure of power.

Egypt and Jordan are as ruthlessly anti Muslim Brotherhood as Israel is anti Hamas. I mean, their secret police make no bones about going after people and blocking them and trying to destroy those things. And I think that's part of why they've been unwilling to accept refugees from Gaza. They think they would infect their political process with people who are dedicated to a very very different structure of power.

I think that's some of it.

I think that's some of it.

I also think they just don't want to deal with the problem of having a protracted refugee population. I mean, no country wants to deal with that.

I also think they just don't want to deal with the problem of having a protracted refugee population. I mean, no country wants to deal with that.

Which gets you back, in a sense to how big the dilemma is going to be in the next couple of years as Israel tries to work through do you get to a Gaza that can be your neighbor. I think it's a really difficult problem.

Which gets you back, in a sense to how big the dilemma is going to be in the next couple of years as Israel tries to work through do you get to a Gaza that can be your neighbor. I think it's a really difficult problem.

I think it is, and both sides have made mistakes.

I think it is, and both sides have made mistakes.

I mean, I think it was shortsighted for Israel to isolate Gaza and have a blockade on Gaza the way it did. I think it actually empowered Hamas in some ways. Of course, Hamas is very difficult to work with. It sometimes gets forgotten that, in some sense, all Hamas ever really had to do with, say we agree to some kind of two state solution in principle. It wouldn't even have to define the borders. It wouldn't even have to get into specifics. If it's simply said, we agree to some kind of two state solution in principle, there could be a de escalation. But of course Hamas is not going to do that.

I mean, I think it was shortsighted for Israel to isolate Gaza and have a blockade on Gaza the way it did. I think it actually empowered Hamas in some ways. Of course, Hamas is very difficult to work with. It sometimes gets forgotten that, in some sense, all Hamas ever really had to do with, say we agree to some kind of two state solution in principle. It wouldn't even have to define the borders. It wouldn't even have to get into specifics. If it's simply said, we agree to some kind of two state solution in principle, there could be a de escalation. But of course Hamas is not going to do that.

Now.

Now.

That doesn't mean that the way Israel has approached Palestinians is correct. I mean, look at the way Israel has allowed settlers to essentially murder and steal from Palestinians in the West Bank. If you're a Palestinian, what future do you see with Israel. It's not so simple, as Ajamas is impossible to work with and Gaza is an impossible neighbor. I mean, even in the West Bank, where you have a much easier Palestinian leadership to work with. I understand there's problems without leadership as well, but even in the West Bank you see Israel engaging in these kinds of expansionists maximalist aims, and allowing settlers to go unpunished for murder. So I think a lot of Palestinians don't see an off ramp either. They don't see a viable future, and I think Israel has squandered an opportunity to communicate to Palestinians there is a future where there can be peace with Israel. I don't think a young Palestinian would be wrong in saying they don't see that as a possibility.

That doesn't mean that the way Israel has approached Palestinians is correct. I mean, look at the way Israel has allowed settlers to essentially murder and steal from Palestinians in the West Bank. If you're a Palestinian, what future do you see with Israel. It's not so simple, as Ajamas is impossible to work with and Gaza is an impossible neighbor. I mean, even in the West Bank, where you have a much easier Palestinian leadership to work with. I understand there's problems without leadership as well, but even in the West Bank you see Israel engaging in these kinds of expansionists maximalist aims, and allowing settlers to go unpunished for murder. So I think a lot of Palestinians don't see an off ramp either. They don't see a viable future, and I think Israel has squandered an opportunity to communicate to Palestinians there is a future where there can be peace with Israel. I don't think a young Palestinian would be wrong in saying they don't see that as a possibility.

We just did a podcast about two weeks ago with the people who do the Gallop Worldwide survey, and Israel was one of the top ten countries for happiness and they count the views of the twenty percent of Israel that are Arab who fit into that when we were talking about it, and there's apparently zero interest among Israeli Arabs in joining the Palestinians. I mean that there's a dramatically more acceptable world. They're going to have to have some model of rational behavior for what they do in Gaza after the fight's over, because they're going to have three million people sitting there. It's not something you just kind of ignore and turn into a huge refugee camp, which is what had happened in the past and leads to the kind of violence we now have. So I think it's one of the great challenges of statesmanship if you will, to try to think through what are the steps that gets you to a sustainable, governable Gaza and what are the steps that gets you to a more acceptable less Bank than the current problems. And I do think that means you have to restrain the more aggressive elements of Israeli society as well as trying to find ways to make life better or the average Palestinian.

We just did a podcast about two weeks ago with the people who do the Gallop Worldwide survey, and Israel was one of the top ten countries for happiness and they count the views of the twenty percent of Israel that are Arab who fit into that when we were talking about it, and there's apparently zero interest among Israeli Arabs in joining the Palestinians. I mean that there's a dramatically more acceptable world. They're going to have to have some model of rational behavior for what they do in Gaza after the fight's over, because they're going to have three million people sitting there. It's not something you just kind of ignore and turn into a huge refugee camp, which is what had happened in the past and leads to the kind of violence we now have. So I think it's one of the great challenges of statesmanship if you will, to try to think through what are the steps that gets you to a sustainable, governable Gaza and what are the steps that gets you to a more acceptable less Bank than the current problems. And I do think that means you have to restrain the more aggressive elements of Israeli society as well as trying to find ways to make life better or the average Palestinian.

Well, there's nothing more demoralizing than feeling that your house or your life can be taken with impunity, and that's what the Palestinians in the West Bank have been subjected to by settlers. Settlers who, by the way, don't contribute much to Israeli society so far as Israel being one of the happier countries in the world, including the Arab Israeli population, I think a lot of that has to do with the sense of community you see among those subgroups in Israel. That is a future that it could exist in the West Bank or Gaza, but it's on the Israelis to extend civil liberties and civil rights and to restrain, as you said, the more radical elements of Israeli society. What if the West Bank were a model for Gaza. But if you're a Gaza and you look at the West Bank, well, conditions might be better. It's not an open air prison, there's more freedom of mobility. It might be economically a little bit better. But at the end of the day, if a settler has a problem with you, they're able to abuse you with absolute impunity.

Well, there's nothing more demoralizing than feeling that your house or your life can be taken with impunity, and that's what the Palestinians in the West Bank have been subjected to by settlers. Settlers who, by the way, don't contribute much to Israeli society so far as Israel being one of the happier countries in the world, including the Arab Israeli population, I think a lot of that has to do with the sense of community you see among those subgroups in Israel. That is a future that it could exist in the West Bank or Gaza, but it's on the Israelis to extend civil liberties and civil rights and to restrain, as you said, the more radical elements of Israeli society. What if the West Bank were a model for Gaza. But if you're a Gaza and you look at the West Bank, well, conditions might be better. It's not an open air prison, there's more freedom of mobility. It might be economically a little bit better. But at the end of the day, if a settler has a problem with you, they're able to abuse you with absolute impunity.

So that's not a model either.

So that's not a model either.

Right, so honorarily then I have to go to a genuine rule of law and some kind of genuinely impartial system of justice. It's a huge problem, you know, Adam. I'm really impressed with how much you've worked on this, and I want to thank you for joining me. I want to encourage our listeners to visit the Quincy Institute website at quincinstitute dot org. That's QUI n c y I nst dot org, where they can read your latest report entitled Troops in Peril the risk of keeping US troops in Iraq and Syria, and I really appreciate your taking the time to help educate us today.

Right, so honorarily then I have to go to a genuine rule of law and some kind of genuinely impartial system of justice. It's a huge problem, you know, Adam. I'm really impressed with how much you've worked on this, and I want to thank you for joining me. I want to encourage our listeners to visit the Quincy Institute website at quincinstitute dot org. That's QUI n c y I nst dot org, where they can read your latest report entitled Troops in Peril the risk of keeping US troops in Iraq and Syria, and I really appreciate your taking the time to help educate us today.

Thanks for having me speaker, Gingrich. I think all Americans should support efforts towards the ceasefire, regardless of where you fall on the political spectrum, because that's what's in the US interest and frankly, that's what's in Israel's long term interests.

Thanks for having me speaker, Gingrich. I think all Americans should support efforts towards the ceasefire, regardless of where you fall on the political spectrum, because that's what's in the US interest and frankly, that's what's in Israel's long term interests.

Right Well, we will continue the dialogue and maybe in the not too distant future you can come back and brieface as the world keeps changing.

Right Well, we will continue the dialogue and maybe in the not too distant future you can come back and brieface as the world keeps changing.

I appreciate you having me on.

I appreciate you having me on.

Thank you to my guest, Adam Weinstein. You can get a link to his Quincy Institute report Troops in Peril on our show page at newtsworld dot com. Newtsworld is produced by Ginglish three sixty and iHeartMedia. Our executive producer is Guernsey Sloan. Our researcher is Rachel Peterson. The artwork for the show was created by Steve Penley. Special thanks to the team at ginglishtree sixty. If you've been enjoying Nutsworld, I hope you'll go to Apple podcasts and both rate us with five stars and give us a review so others can learn what it's all about. Right now, listeners of Nutsworld can sign up for my three free weekly columns at ginglishtree sixty dot com slash newsletter. I'm Newt Gingrich. This is Nutsworld

Thank you to my guest, Adam Weinstein. You can get a link to his Quincy Institute report Troops in Peril on our show page at newtsworld dot com. Newtsworld is produced by Ginglish three sixty and iHeartMedia. Our executive producer is Guernsey Sloan. Our researcher is Rachel Peterson. The artwork for the show was created by Steve Penley. Special thanks to the team at ginglishtree sixty. If you've been enjoying Nutsworld, I hope you'll go to Apple podcasts and both rate us with five stars and give us a review so others can learn what it's all about. Right now, listeners of Nutsworld can sign up for my three free weekly columns at ginglishtree sixty dot com slash newsletter. I'm Newt Gingrich. This is Nutsworld