Newt's WorldIn their new book, "We Win, They Lose: Republican Foreign Policy and the New Cold War," authors Matthew Kroenig and Dan Negrea argue that a GOP foreign policy consensus is emerging, which they call the Trump-Reagan Fusion. They believe that any viable GOP foreign policy must build on the legacies of Trump and Reagan. The authors argue that the Trump-Reagan fusion is superior to progressive alternatives and can guide the GOP, the United States, and the American people to greater levels of peace, prosperity, and freedom. They also discuss the challenges posed by China and Russia, and the need for a strategic approach to these threats.
On this episode of newts World, many argue that today's Republican Party is divided, but in their new book, we Win they Lose. Matthew Kronig and Dan Nogria argue that the outline of a GOP foreign policy consensus is emerging just beneath the surface. They call this the emerging Republican foreign policy doctrine, the Trump Reagan Fusion. Trump and Reagan were the most influential Republican presidents of the past several decades, and any viable GOP forign policy must build on their legacies and we win, they lose. They explain why the Trump Reagan fusion is superior to progressive alternatives and how it can guide the GOP, the United States, and the American people to greater levels of peace, prosperity, and freedom. Here to discuss their new book, please to welcome my guests, doctor Matthew Kronick, Vice President and Senior Director of the Atlantic Council Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, and Dan mcgrail, Senior Director of the Lantic Council's Freedom and Prosperity Center. Matthew and Dan, welcome and thank you for joining me on News World.
Thank you for having us on. It's a pleasure and it.
Could be here.
You two both have an immense amount of knowledge. Let me start by asking to talk about where did the title of the book come from.
Well, it comes from Ronald Reagan's classic quote about the First Cold War, and he was meeting with his future national security advisor. He was asked about his strategy for the Cold War, and he said, it's simple. Some might say it's simplistic, but it's this. It's we win and they lose. And Reagan was elected president followed that clear strategic vision, and by the end of his two terms in office, he'd succeeded in winning the first Cold War. And now we're entering a second Cold War, maybe more dangerous than the first, with the Chinese Communist Party and other revisionist autocracies. President Trump was correct to declare great power competition with China the foremost threat to the country and the national security strategy in twenty seventeen. But I think the United States and its allies are still struggling with the goal and coming up with the goal for a strategy is important, and so Dan and I thought, you can do no better than President Reagan. And we argue that the goal for this new Cold War with China should once again be we win and they lose.
I'm particularly fascinating because there have been a number of people who've written that Trump is a repudiation of Reagan, including people who served in Reagan's administration.
What's your reaction to the Well, what we arguing in our book is that this is not the correct view, because actually they have a lot in common and more than many people realized. They were both Democrats before they became Republicans, they were both entertainers. They were both viewed as reckless, as dangerous, threats to peace, unpredictable, but they were in the end the most consequential presidents that we've had.
What about the whoorument though that Trump somehow is an isolationist and Reagan champion and internationalism that Trump has abandoned.
Well, we argue that that's also incorrect, and that actually that the regn Night wing and the Trumpian wing are more united on the major issues than many people realize. And so, first, I think people sometimes misremember Reagan also used tariffs against allies try to get better trade deals, and that's the purpose behind Trump's tariffs, as well, it's not protectionism for its own sake. He's explicitly said that the goal is to get fair trade deals that are truly free and beneficial for the American people. And more broadly, in the book, we go through political philosophy, what does it mean to be a conservative? What does it mean to be a progressive? And Trumpians and Reaganites are both conservative and their basic worldview very different from progressives. We argue on defense policy, they both believe in peace through strength. On economic policy, again free and fair trade, they both believe in American exceptionalism, although slightly different variants. And when it comes to almost every major issue China, Iran, NATO, Allies, immigration, climate, there's broad agreement in the Republican Party, and so I think Ukraine, Ate or There are a few examples where there are real differences, but many people obsess over these differences and overlook the broader unity and continuity between Reagan and Trump.
There are a lot of people now before the next election, when Trump is leading in the polls, there is a real possibility that it will be president again, and they imagine worst case scenarios about President Trump. He may do this, and he may do that, I think the most important thing that we can do right now in trying to figure out what Trump will do in the second if he has a second term, is to look at what he did in the first term. And if we look at what he actually did in the first term, we see no indications that he was an isolationist. We view his policy as one that puts America first, but not that takes America out of the world. Allow me, sir, also, before I forget to add a disclaimer. Both Matt and I are senior directors running different centers at the Atlantic Council. The Atlantic Council is a nonpartisan institution. This is a partisan book. We call it a Republican foreign policy. The statements that we made at our own and not necessarily representing the positions of the Atlantic Council.
You two are here as authors, not as spokesman for the institution. Let me go, except for one of the things that has truck me is that we tend to remember Reagan backwards through morning in America, and by morning in America, he's already triumphant, and things are working, and the economy is gaining five and a half percent every quarter. I mean, it's an astonishing period, the civil unions begin to collapse. But for the people who worry about Trump's language, and I noticed that recently bloodbath became a key word in the New York Times distortion of Trump. I'm tempted to go around and just ask people, tell me who said the following. If it takes a blood bath, let's get it over with, no more appeasement, because in fact, it's Ronald Reagan as governor talking about Berkeley now, it is not Donald Trump. The reason I cite that is I first began studying Reagan in sixty five. I first met him in seventy four, and I helped work on the campaign in eighty and then served eight years in cong well he was president. He's a much tougher and much more subtle person than the popular memory, and I think that he actually would have in today's environment, with today's realities, he would be much closer to Trump than he would anybody on the left, or for that matter, any of the older Republican establishment who are horrified by Trump's caution when in fact, as you know, Reagan was very cautious. He had bold vision, we win, they lose, But he pursued that vision with an exquisite level of effort, to not get involved in big wars, to not do things that were damaging, to not suffer major defeats. Much closer I think, to Trump than to some of the current people, who would willing Nelly get a cent our fourth major long term war in the last quarter century. I think that's an important part of where we're at in what we're up against. So when you talk about peace through strength, how do you think Reagan would handle Ukraine?
Well? Peace through strength is a major theme of the book, and this essentially means that the United States is so strong that no adversary derek challenge us. But the peace part is also important. Both Reagan and Trump were skeptical of military interventions with MorphOS goals, and so both were willing to punch back hard when the United States were challenged, but both also sought to wind down a morphous military interventions. So when it comes to Ukraine, I think this is another area where there's a lot of agreement in the party. Surprisingly, I think there's agreement that Biden failed to deter Putin and Obama failed to deter Putin in twenty fourteen, but Putin didn't attack Ukraine during the Trump administration. I think there's also an agreement that the Biden administration hasn't yet laid out a clear strategy. Biden says will support Ukraine as long as it takes, but as long as it takes to do what is the goal. And so I think Trump has said that he'd like to in the war quickly. He said that he would do that through negotiations in twenty four hours. I think the twenty four hours is maybe an exaggeration, but given where the lines are now, I think some conservatives who want to help Ukraine win a decisive victory on the battlefield, that just doesn't seem realistic right now. The Russians have had time to dig in. The Biden administration has been cautious about providing Ukraine the weapons that it would really take to win. New technologies like drones seem to be giving the defense the advantage. So I do think a stalemate along the current lines is looking almost inevitable, and so getting to some kind of situation where the war dies down, maybe even a ceasefire, that could create the conditions then for security guarantees or other things for Ukraine. I think that's how Reagan would likely view it, and I think that's how Trump used it as well.
From next stand one, also, since me, Reagan was pretty good at getting the allies to do what he wanted. I mean, it took a lot of jaw owning, but ultimately, for example and support in solidarity and putting pressure on the Soviet Union over Poland, we are a pretty unified Western front.
Yeah. And actually, one of the important points that we make in the book that is essential to our strategy, both regarding Russia and regarding China, is to ask our allies to do significantly more, but also that we in the United States take our defense obligations much more seriously. So we look, for example, at the latest Biden National Defense Appropriations Act, that defense budget increases by one percent nominal, which in real terms is a cut. And if you look at the projection to thirty four, defense expenses as a percent of GDP go down from three point two to three point three now to two point four percent, it is shocking. If we are in a new Cold War, which we in our book assume, then we need to have defense spending that is comparable to what we had in the previous Cold War, and we need our European allies and our Asian allies to increase their expensive two levels comparable to the previous Cold War as well.
Wouldn't that imply a pretty substantial increase in places in Germany?
Yes, well, NATO allies have all agreed to spend two percent on their GDP by the end of this year. It's expected that only eighteen of the thirty two will have met that mark, and so that means that one third of the alliance is not meeting their commitments. Moreover, NATO introduced new regional plans at the Vilnia summit this year, essentially the first serious defense plans for defending NATO since the end of the Cold War. Outside estimates by the economists and others project that to meet the capabilities requirements in those plans, the NATO allies are going to have to spend something like three percent of their GDP on defense, and so they're not even close that is what they spent during the Cold War. You're right that Reagan was good to get them to step up. Trump was good at getting them to step up. People complained about his rhetoric, but if you look at the data, the biggest increases recent increases in European defense spending came under Trump. They actually were then reduced under Biden initially before coming back up after Russia's further invasion. And already we see that some of Trump's recent statements that are causing consternation in some capitals are having the intended effect, with European countries agreeing to spend more and Germany announcing just in the past few weeks that they will hit two percent for the first time since the Cold War this year. So I think that both Trump and Reagan we're good at getting the allies to step up and do the right thing.
Also, MISSUS Speaker Matt and I wrote recently an article together with General Todd Walters, who was NATO Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, and we make the argument in this article that we should ask our European allies to spend three percent. Already, at the Villainius Native Summit, there was a discussion that two percent is not sufficient, it should be two, two and a half and more. And I am puzzled on the reaction of the Biden administration after President Dudhah of Poland visited the White House and said that the European country should spend three percent or more. Poland is at four percent. The response from the spokesman of the State Department was, that's quote overly ambitious. Let's get everybody to two percent and then we should talk. They are in an existential threat situation where Russia is started the largest war in Europe since the Second World War? Why would we stop them if they are encouraged by another European country to spend more in Europe.
I'll go on a limb here. Why do you think the Biden administration adopts policies like this? I mean, what's the world view behind it?
I'll give you two guesses. I'll let Matt make his guesses. One guess is that in the Biden administration they know that the projected defense expenses for the United States in a democratic administration will go below three percent. So if we are not going to be a three percent, on what basis are we asking other people to be a three percent? That's one possibility. The other is the proposal came from Dudah, who is represents a conservative party that the Biden administration doesn't lack.
Matt, what's your take, y'all?
Add a quick third, what does it mean to support allies? I think in the Trump administration we saw that it was tough love, sometimes tough rhetoric, but to try to get them to not persist in mistakes and do the right thing. I think in the Biden administration and sometimes among Democrats, having happy talk is saying nice things about your allies, is getting along at meetings is what it means to support allies. I think they thought that two percent is already controversial. A third of the NATO allies are not spending two percent, and so saying now we should do three percent would just be too provocative, would make for difficult conversations in European capitals, and so they wanted to avoid the controversy.
You talk about a new Cold War in your minds, what are the primary parallels and what are the primary differences between the first and second Cold Wars.
I'm a huge admirer of use. I read several books that you wrote, and I'm a constant follower of your New World podcast, and I do remember you, by the way, after nine eleven one of the TV programs, and I remember what you said, it's a time for clarity. You're either with us or you are with a terrorists, and I remember your gesturesult you're either here or you're there. Clarity is extraordinarily important, and this is something that Reagan want. Clarity gives you an intellectual weapon to go in a dangerous world and figure out what you're going to do. What is extraornally important right now is to figure out if we are in a new Cold War or not, because if we are out of this premise, follow policies that are different from the policies that we have today, for example, defending the border. We are talking about defense spending. That's fine, that's one thing that we need to do, but there are these other things. What are we doing the border. I was shocked to find out the other day there are thirty five thousand Chinese citizens that they've entered into the United States unverified their background. We don't know who they are through the southern border. Imagine thirty five thousand Soviet citizens coming into the United States in the first Cold War. Similarly, on the energy policies and so on and so forth. So when we compare this Cold War with the previous Cold War, we knew who our adversary is and our policies to face the adversary that we had in the first Cold War. We're consistent they were obvious and there was a lot of understanding because there was leadership that understood that we were in a Cold war. I think this clarity is missing at this.
Point by saying it's a new Cold War, we're not saying it's exactly like the old Cold War. Of course, just like World War One and World War Two are different, there are similarities that are important. They're both world wars, So yes, there are differences here. There's greater economic interdependence between the United States and China than there was between the United States and the Soviet Union, but there are similarities. It's a contest for the future of global order between the United States and its democratic allies in the free world and a genocidal dictatorship on the other side. And so the states couldn't be higher. And that's what we mean by calling it a new Code war.
If you're doing a comparative analysis, as opponents, how would you compare the strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet Union at its peak and China and recision pain.
Let me start by saying that when I found out that will be on your program. I re read your book Trump Versus China. I know that you are viewing the challenge that we have from China as comparable to the four other great challenges in our history, the way you talk about Ittionary War, the Civil War, the Second World War, and the Cold War. China is much stronger than the Soviet Union economically, but at the same time it has the same pathologies that the Soviet Union has because it is an authoritarian system that does not allow self correction without dramatic convulsions, and it kills innovation. I know you're a historian and to love and know these things. The Soviet Union was ahead of the United States in space technology, for example, but then they lost it. They had a very strong economy, they produced highly sophisticated things, but then they lost it. The People's Republic of China right now seems to be ahead and is ahead in many areas, but their economy cannot for long y the vitality that it had during that it acquired during the Dank Show Pink period in the top heavy again high control from the center in the Shijing Pink period, and we are already seeing the GDP growth was ten percent in the dank show pink period. Granted from a lower basis, but it is now five percent, maybe four percent. People doubt even the four percent because they lie on the numbers. So it is formidable in many ways, but like the Soviet Union longer term, they are weak.
Not doing they have anything.
I agree with dan And I think this is one of our great strengths is our institutions, and that their autocratic system is their greatest weakness. We've seen time and time again she prioritized his own political control over China's economic performance, and we're seeing the results with Chinese growth slowing and as dandpoints out, maybe low or maybe non existing growth. A second, his aggressive foreign policy is getting the rest of the world to balance against him. First in the United States, with US after a twenty five year engagement strategy declaring great power competition with China our foremost priority, the Europeans declaring China systemic rival, the Quad and Aucus and other proto alliances forming in Asia, and then militarily, their greatest weakness is that they fear their own people more than their adversary, and they spend more on domestic repression than on their military. So if you just follow the money. They fear their own people more than the US Department of Defense. So they are a serious adversary. They're dangerous. We should take them seriously. But just like Reagan understood that we have strengths, the Soviet Union has weaknesses, if we force them to compete, we can prevail. I think the same is true here. We have real strengths, they have real weaknesses. If we press them, we can win the new Cold War.
So the process of thinking all this through, Part of what I'm struck with is that the Chinese in the Russians, then I would throw in Iran in North Korea. We don't take the threat of nuclear war seriously enough. That's one of the factors here that in a way elevates North Korea and Iran into being very major players, beyond any conventional war capability. Just because the extraordinary impact of nuclear weapons would be so devastating, to what extent does that have to be factored into how we think through our national security strategy.
Maybe I'll take this one first, if you don't mind. Dan and I've had the honor of serving currently on a US Congressional Commission on Strategic Posture, and we delivered our unanimous recommendations six Democrats, six Republicans to Congress in November. And this was the main challenge we were dealing with is for the first time in US history, the United States has to deal with not one peer nuclear power, but two peer nuclear powers, as China engages as in the massive nuclear build up, and then as you point out, Misters a Rod in North three also as North Korea as a nuclear rival in Iran could soon be a nuclear rival. And so I think what this means is that once again nuclear deterrence needs to be an important part of US defense strategy. And our commission report calls essentially for the first US strategic forces build up since the end of the Cold War, calls for more non strategic nuclear weapons in Europe and Asia like during the First Cold War, and for the first time in history, calls for a homeland missile defense to deal with Russia and China. And so I think this is another area where there's a Reagan Trump fusion. Of course, Reagan sponted a defense build up in the nineteen eighties focused on strategic forces. His idea of having a star Wars missile defense plan really frightened the Soviets. And I think that helped to in the first Cold War. I think this is where Trump's instincts are as well. He developed two new low yield nuclear weapons to deal with Russia, called for a nuclear arsenal quote at the top of the pack, and for a quote state of the art missile defense system. And so it would be nice so if we're interne world where we could reduce reliance on nuclear weapons, which is what Biden says he wants to do, But unfortunately, I think once again the United States needs to strengthen its strategic forces to deal with these serious challenges.
Dan, what's your take.
The only thing I would add to this is that it makes it doubly important to be extraordinarily clear that it is intolerable for Iran to become a nuclear power. Iran has a nuclear program that is clearly not designed for peaceful purposes. It is enriching to a level that is unnecessary for peaceful use, and it's developing missile capabilities that are becoming dangerous to the United States, not just to its region. So it is developing intercontinental missiles, which it doesn't need. So it is very important to be clear that this will be intolerable. Number Onenumber two. Trump was right to get out of the JCPOA agreement. He was right to have maximum economic pressure on Iran. At the end of the Trump term, their foreign exchange reserves where four billion. Now there are thirty five billion because sanctions are not being imposed. Iran needs to be constrained economically in the hope that the Iranian people will overthrow the regime of the Mulas, not that if they have less money they will invest in nuclear capabilities. They will invest whatever little money they have, look at North Korea. But we need to have this two track policy on Iran to make very clear that military means will be used if they get close to develop nuclear capabilities threatening the United States Number one, Number two constraining them economically.
Aren't they already at least some counts with an a matter of weeks anytime they want to build a weapon.
Yeah, the US Department of Defense has said that their breakout time is twelve days, so that's concerning. But what they mean by that is that it's a conditional twelve days. It's not that they'll have nuclear weapons in twelve days. But if the Supreme Leader made the decision right now to sprint and produce as much weapons grade uranium as possible. He would have enough fuel for his first bomb within twelve days. So we're running out of time, but we haven't run out of time yet. And so what I want to be hearing from the President is that all options are on the table. Military options are on the table, that they need to come to negotiate to put real limits on their program or else the pressure will continue to build it. And instead, I think we don't really have a very clear strategy right now. I think the Biden administration thought they were going to get back into the Iran deal, the nuclear deal. The ir audience clearly have different ideas, and now I'm not quite sure what the strategy is. But I think Dan's right. Returning to the maximum pressure strategy that the Trump administration put in place would be the next best step.
When you look ahead, how do we disengage from China and recenter our economy so we have no gaps in logistics or other kind of production based on Chinese policies. If you take seriously that we are in a strategic competition, don't we have to have pretty dramatic shift in how we think about trade with China and what we're prepared to do to minimize that trade and maximize our own capacity to produce things.
There are a lot of people who object to the term decoupling. In our book, we use the term selective decoupling. We also use the term de risking. But the reality is that both countries, both the People's Republic of China and the United States, have been in the process of selective decoupling for several years now. There is a growing recognition in the United States that it is unacceptable to, for example, depend on antibiotics to the ninety percent of our antibiotics are either coming from China or depend on Chinese raw materials. That's unacceptable. There are also rare earth on which we have a great dependence on them. At the same time, we recognize that we cannot allow Chinese companies to invest in the United States. We have a Cephius program, but there is a growing recognition that it's not just Chinese investment in the US, but also US investments in China, sort of reverse cephios that we need to do. And there is a realization on that. But guess what for Ever since Xijin Pink became president, he has had a policy that is publicly announced of increased reliance in China on Chinese companies and reducing their dependence on US companies and Western companies in general. So both countries have been already moving apart sort of in a natural process, as the tensions between the two countries have been increasing. And this process will continue, and it will continue in an accelerated manner because Chinese is becoming more and more obviously an adversarial nation, and even the Biden administration recognizes and has taken steps, for example, in the high end chips, to not allow the Chinese to have access to them because they can be used for military purposes.
In the book, we lay out a three part strategy for thinking about selective decoupling from China. So one, we argue there are areas of sensitive national security concern technology other areas where we do need a hard, complete decoupling. There's a second category where it's not a national security issue, but China's cheating on international trading rules, film industry, and other things. And so there we argue we need to punch back with countervailing measures and tariffs, just like President Trump did. Then, third, and finally we argue that there are areas where trade can continue. If China wants to buy American soybeans, if Americans want to buy T shirts made in China, that's fine. And so I think by promoting these three part strategy, we can protect our national security interest while continuing to allow some trade to continue.
That's a rational long term strategy for China. But isn't part of the complexity here that you have an immediate short term strategy with Russia which involves a great deal of kinetic activity. Well, at the same time, you're trying to modulate a sort of diplomatic, economic, and cultural strategy of China, and you're asking the same National Security Council and the same State Department to have sort of a schizophrenic ability to shift back and forth between those two really different worlds. Isn't that an additional complexity that we did not face in the Reagan years.
Yes, that's true. But we live in the world that we live and we need to adapt to it. This is why a concept that we introduce in the book that we think is important is we introduce the concept of the new Axis of Evil. Just like in the previous Cold War, we had the Soviet Union, and we called them their satellites. And then we had countries that were sympathetic to the Soviet Union. And this time we have the new access of evil. And I find it fascinating how many terms from the previous core are finding new usefulness. We have again a new free world. We have again our adversaries, and we have again a new non aligned movement. We have a group of countries, lots of countries, all of them developing countries that refuse to take a clear position when Article one in the Charter of the United Nations was clearly violated, and you said, ah, we are doing trade with them. They helped us in the colonization. We have some friends there. We'll let it pass. And it's shocking our sensibilities. But again it's the world that we have. Yeah, there are complexities.
It seems to me what you're suggesting is that these two challenges Russia and China, and then the secondary stage. In fact, we've done it once before. We can interact together and we can successfully prosecute a campaign to minimize Chinese capabilities and to condenced Russia the violence is not productive for themselves. And at the same time to convince Iram North Korea, that there are no survivable techniques for using the weapons they do in the sense that both of you, while you're concerned, you're actually optimist.
Yes, that's right. So two points. First, on the threat, I think it's a mistake to think of Russian and China as separate threats that increasingly these threats are interconnected. Russia and China have declared a no limits partnership. China is supporting Russia's war in Ukraine economically, diplomatically, and through other means. Russia, China, Iran have conducted joint military exercises. In fact, the collaboration between this kind of new axis of autocracies is even greater than the collaboration between the Axis powers and the run up to the Second World War. And so I think we should be very concerned about the interconnections, but ultimately we are confident. And one thing to look at is just capability. And many international relations scholars use GDP share of global GDP as a good measure of power. The United States still possesses twenty five percent of global GDP. That's where we were in the nineteen sixties. So people who say the United States is declining are incorrect. We're right where we've been for decades. Russia, China, orn North Korea together have about twenty percent of global GDP. So even if it was just the United States taking on the four I think we could do it. Fortunately, we don't have to do it on our own. We have more than thirty formal treaty allies. Together, we have something like sixty percent of global GDP. So if it's the free world against this new access of autocracies, we're by far in the stronger position. And if we can get our act together and follow some of the strategies we recommend in the book, we think that we can once again prevail.
I know from your writings Dear to your Heart, which is American exceptionalism. Just like in the First Cold War, America's ideological superiority was an important factor in the victory, and Reagan was very clear about and it also inspired the Polish resistance against their local tyranny and the Soviet tyranny. America is still the shining city on the hill. We have this huge problem with millions of people crossing our border. The Chinese don't have that problem. Nobody is trying to cross in the millions the Chinese border, nobody aspires so that because America is still the place where people aspire to come and live. And by the way, I'm an example of that, it defected from communist Romania, so I'm an example. We still have this ideological superiority. But we need leaders to call people to this noble duty to defend what America stands for. And we need people who are not dwelling on America's shortcomings but stress that we have been and are and we continue to be a force for good in worked.
I think your book when they lose Republican foreign policy in the New Cold War and their whole effort to build a Trump Reagan fusion could not come at a more important time. I think there are a lot of people who are very confused and don't understand because they have a misinformed view of what Reagan was all about. They don't realize how parallel in many ways both the challenges and the responses, and how much Reagan and Trump actually could have collaborated. Because it's not like Trump is a radical break from Reagan. He's a radical break from an establishment which wants to appease Iran, A peace China, a peace, Russia, an ignore North Korea, and Trump, like Reagan, I think, combines idealism with a level of realism that's really important. And this book could not come at a better time because there are people, smart people actively trying to understand what's going on and why it's different. And I really want to thank you both for joining me. Your new book is important, We Win, They Lose is available on Amazon and the bookstores everywhere, and we will certainly link to it on our show page. So I just really am grateful you too, who spend time with us talking about this.
Honored to talk to you, mister speaker.
Thank you very much, it's a pleasure to be here.
Thank you to my guests Matthew Kronig and Dan mcgrea. You can get a link to their new book, We Win, They Lose, Republican Foreign Policy in the New Cold War on our show page at newtsworld dot com. News World is produced by Ginger three sixty and iHeartMedia. Our executive producer is Guernsey Sloan. Our researcher is Rachel Peterson. The artwork for the show was created by Steve Penley. Special thanks to the team at Gingrid Sweet sixty. If you've been enjoying Newtsworld, I hope you'll go to Apple Podcast and rate us with five stars and give us a review so others can learn what it's all about. Right now, listeners of neutrald consign up from my three free weekly columns at ginglishwo sixty dot com slash newsletter. I'm Newt Gingrich. This is neutrald
