This is Bloomberg Law with June Grossel from Bloomberg Radio.

This is Bloomberg Law with June Grossel from Bloomberg Radio.

I just think that the law firms have to behave themselves, and we've proven that we have others that want to make a settlement also having to do with the election and other things. They behave very badly, very wrongly, and I appreciate the one. You know, these are the biggest firms.

I just think that the law firms have to behave themselves, and we've proven that we have others that want to make a settlement also having to do with the election and other things. They behave very badly, very wrongly, and I appreciate the one. You know, these are the biggest firms.

President Donald Trump has been complaining about a legal system rigged against him for many years, and he seems to think that any law firm that has challenged him in court has behaved quote very badly, and to get those firms to behave themselves, he's punishing them with executive orders that threaten their businesses and their ability to represent clients. In the last month, he's targeted four major law firms with executive orders. Three of the firms chose to defy Trump by suing him, but one firm, Paul Weiss, chose to surrender by cutting a forty million dollar deal in pro bono services with the administration, and another firm, scad and Arps, caved before an executive order was even issued against it, cutting a similar one hundred million dollar deal. My guest is an expert in the legal profession, Matthew Diller, a professor at Fordham Law School. Trump's attack on the legal system has really been multi pronged.

President Donald Trump has been complaining about a legal system rigged against him for many years, and he seems to think that any law firm that has challenged him in court has behaved quote very badly, and to get those firms to behave themselves, he's punishing them with executive orders that threaten their businesses and their ability to represent clients. In the last month, he's targeted four major law firms with executive orders. Three of the firms chose to defy Trump by suing him, but one firm, Paul Weiss, chose to surrender by cutting a forty million dollar deal in pro bono services with the administration, and another firm, scad and Arps, caved before an executive order was even issued against it, cutting a similar one hundred million dollar deal. My guest is an expert in the legal profession, Matthew Diller, a professor at Fordham Law School. Trump's attack on the legal system has really been multi pronged.

The Trump administration has really broad out its attack. Initially started with its attacks on the judiciary, and now it is continuing to attack the judiciary and has added in attacks on the legal profession really as a whole. And the attacks go to the fundamental ethos and role of the legal profession in our society. So from the very start of the administration, government lawyers, the lawyers who worked for the federal government were under siege. And those lawyers play a critical role in our system of law enforcements and upholding rules and making sure the government is not abusive. And so almost as soon as he came into office, President Trump began to remove the most experienced leaders within the Department of Justice. And I'm not talking about the political appointees. I'm talking about the career lawyers of the Department of Justice. We saw this with the blow up over the lawyers working on the Eric Adams case, quite a few of whom resigned. But there's also Denise Chung, the top prosecutor in the DCUs Attorney's Office who resigned when she was asked to launch an investigation without any basis. The Chief Irs Council was pushed out, the all the inspector generals and the different agencies, and so the lawyers in key positions who have put a premium on making sure that government follows the law, who put an allegiance to the law first, are being removed and being replaced with the lawyers who focused on loyalty to the administration. And that to me is scary because those government lawyers play a critical role. And then what's happened over the past few weeks is that the attack has broadened out to cover the private bar, and really the elements in the private bar that are the ones that the administration views as the biggest threat, which are the major of private law firms that have a lot of resources and a lot of experience in litigating against the government.

The Trump administration has really broad out its attack. Initially started with its attacks on the judiciary, and now it is continuing to attack the judiciary and has added in attacks on the legal profession really as a whole. And the attacks go to the fundamental ethos and role of the legal profession in our society. So from the very start of the administration, government lawyers, the lawyers who worked for the federal government were under siege. And those lawyers play a critical role in our system of law enforcements and upholding rules and making sure the government is not abusive. And so almost as soon as he came into office, President Trump began to remove the most experienced leaders within the Department of Justice. And I'm not talking about the political appointees. I'm talking about the career lawyers of the Department of Justice. We saw this with the blow up over the lawyers working on the Eric Adams case, quite a few of whom resigned. But there's also Denise Chung, the top prosecutor in the DCUs Attorney's Office who resigned when she was asked to launch an investigation without any basis. The Chief Irs Council was pushed out, the all the inspector generals and the different agencies, and so the lawyers in key positions who have put a premium on making sure that government follows the law, who put an allegiance to the law first, are being removed and being replaced with the lawyers who focused on loyalty to the administration. And that to me is scary because those government lawyers play a critical role. And then what's happened over the past few weeks is that the attack has broadened out to cover the private bar, and really the elements in the private bar that are the ones that the administration views as the biggest threat, which are the major of private law firms that have a lot of resources and a lot of experience in litigating against the government.

So it started with a memo attacking Covington Burling, and then executive orders targeting Perkins, Cooey, Paul Weiss, jennerin Block and Wilmer Hale tell us about the executive orders and whether there's any legal basis for them.

So it started with a memo attacking Covington Burling, and then executive orders targeting Perkins, Cooey, Paul Weiss, jennerin Block and Wilmer Hale tell us about the executive orders and whether there's any legal basis for them.

Those executive orders just simply shocked me. They are astounding documents to read. So the executive orders are really attempts to take down these firms because they go far beyond revoking security coherences. They also terminate all contracts with the firms, so that if the government, any arm of the government, has hired the firms to do anything mose contracts would end. And the single most devastating piece of it, they require businesses that have relationships with the firms to disclose those relationships and then instruct the agencies to terminate their contracts with those businesses. So what that does is it strikes at the client of the firm. So what it says to the firm's clients is that if you continue to retain these firms, you will lose all your government contracts, and that, of course strikes at the heart of these firms and their business model and their basic income and ability to survive as a firm. And you asked about the legal basis for these orders, the orders cite no legal basis. Typically in executive order and the pre Trump euro we'd most often start with a recitation of what the legal basis for the order is and what the authority is where the statutes are. These orders don't do that in any way, shape or form, and in fact, they include a lot of language that shows that the purposes of these orders are clearly unconstitutional and illegal, and just flush that out of it. First of all, they make claim that the basis of the order is that the administration doesn't like representations that have been undertaken by lawyers of these firms, and so those lawyers have a right they undertake those representations. You know, the First Amendment gives them the right to both express their use. There's a right of access to the court system. These firms have no obligation to only undertake litigation and representations that President Trump approves of. And then secondly, they did this without any hearing of any kind. So these orders just came completely out of the blue. There was no hearing, an opportunity for these firms to contest whatever the quote charges might be against them. And then a final element that's very concerning is that it really impinges on the rights of the clients of these firms to choose their lawyers. In our country, the basic system for regulating lawyer conduct is governed by the states and by the courts, and there are proceedings and rules about what happens when a lawyer is accused of unethical or improper conduct. Those lawyers received notice of the charges basically in an opportunity to defend themselves. Nothing like that happened in these cases. And indeed, the executive branch of the federal government, the president, has no general free roaming authority to impost discipline on lawyers. SENI laterally, so I'm unaware of any arguments. I have trouble even thinking of an argument of how these orders can be legal.

Those executive orders just simply shocked me. They are astounding documents to read. So the executive orders are really attempts to take down these firms because they go far beyond revoking security coherences. They also terminate all contracts with the firms, so that if the government, any arm of the government, has hired the firms to do anything mose contracts would end. And the single most devastating piece of it, they require businesses that have relationships with the firms to disclose those relationships and then instruct the agencies to terminate their contracts with those businesses. So what that does is it strikes at the client of the firm. So what it says to the firm's clients is that if you continue to retain these firms, you will lose all your government contracts, and that, of course strikes at the heart of these firms and their business model and their basic income and ability to survive as a firm. And you asked about the legal basis for these orders, the orders cite no legal basis. Typically in executive order and the pre Trump euro we'd most often start with a recitation of what the legal basis for the order is and what the authority is where the statutes are. These orders don't do that in any way, shape or form, and in fact, they include a lot of language that shows that the purposes of these orders are clearly unconstitutional and illegal, and just flush that out of it. First of all, they make claim that the basis of the order is that the administration doesn't like representations that have been undertaken by lawyers of these firms, and so those lawyers have a right they undertake those representations. You know, the First Amendment gives them the right to both express their use. There's a right of access to the court system. These firms have no obligation to only undertake litigation and representations that President Trump approves of. And then secondly, they did this without any hearing of any kind. So these orders just came completely out of the blue. There was no hearing, an opportunity for these firms to contest whatever the quote charges might be against them. And then a final element that's very concerning is that it really impinges on the rights of the clients of these firms to choose their lawyers. In our country, the basic system for regulating lawyer conduct is governed by the states and by the courts, and there are proceedings and rules about what happens when a lawyer is accused of unethical or improper conduct. Those lawyers received notice of the charges basically in an opportunity to defend themselves. Nothing like that happened in these cases. And indeed, the executive branch of the federal government, the president, has no general free roaming authority to impost discipline on lawyers. SENI laterally, so I'm unaware of any arguments. I have trouble even thinking of an argument of how these orders can be legal.

So Paul Weis caved and made a deal. But three law firms are fighting the executive order suing the Trump administration. That's Perkins Coohy, Wilmer and Hale and generin Block. Let's talk about the Perkins Cooey suit because they were targeted first, and that suit has gone the farthest.

So Paul Weis caved and made a deal. But three law firms are fighting the executive order suing the Trump administration. That's Perkins Coohy, Wilmer and Hale and generin Block. Let's talk about the Perkins Cooey suit because they were targeted first, and that suit has gone the farthest.

So Perkins Coohy immediately filed a lawsuit and sought a temporary restraining order, which the judge granted, and the judge said the executive order against he sent chills down her spine. And today the government has not put in any papers defending the legality of the executive order against Perkins. Instead, the government has sought to remove the judge, arguing that she's biased. So I don't know what the government's argument will be on why the order against Perkins was legal. We haven't seen that yet. Paul Weiss took a very different path. Instead, The ahead of Paul Weise met with President Trump directly one on one. The meeting was said to be three hours long, and then President Trump and Brad carp who's head of Paul Weis, ironed at an agreement and President Trump withdrew the executive order. And I think there are a couple of things to really focus on here. So the biggest one is that this was a shakedown of Paul Weiss that Paul Wise. You know, there's a lot of debate now about whether Paul Weis did the right thing by reaching an agreement with President Trump. But I think the larger picture to look at is that Paul Whites never should have been in this situation in the first but that the White House really put Paul Wess under an existential threat that never should have been there. I myself, I'm disappointed that it has played out this way because if firms like Paul Weiss don't push back against illegal executive orders like this, then who will? So it sends a message to the legal profession that is very disheartened because the Trump administration has made plain that they're not stopping with Jess Perkins, Pooty and Paul Weiss. They're going to continue to target firms.

So Perkins Coohy immediately filed a lawsuit and sought a temporary restraining order, which the judge granted, and the judge said the executive order against he sent chills down her spine. And today the government has not put in any papers defending the legality of the executive order against Perkins. Instead, the government has sought to remove the judge, arguing that she's biased. So I don't know what the government's argument will be on why the order against Perkins was legal. We haven't seen that yet. Paul Weiss took a very different path. Instead, The ahead of Paul Weise met with President Trump directly one on one. The meeting was said to be three hours long, and then President Trump and Brad carp who's head of Paul Weis, ironed at an agreement and President Trump withdrew the executive order. And I think there are a couple of things to really focus on here. So the biggest one is that this was a shakedown of Paul Weiss that Paul Wise. You know, there's a lot of debate now about whether Paul Weis did the right thing by reaching an agreement with President Trump. But I think the larger picture to look at is that Paul Whites never should have been in this situation in the first but that the White House really put Paul Wess under an existential threat that never should have been there. I myself, I'm disappointed that it has played out this way because if firms like Paul Weiss don't push back against illegal executive orders like this, then who will? So it sends a message to the legal profession that is very disheartened because the Trump administration has made plain that they're not stopping with Jess Perkins, Pooty and Paul Weiss. They're going to continue to target firms.

And to demonstrate the chilling effect of these orders, Scadden Arps reached a one hundred million dollars deal for pro bono services to avoid being targeted in one of these executive orders by Trump. So what's the message if firms like Paul Weiss and scad and Arps won't stand up to Trump?

And to demonstrate the chilling effect of these orders, Scadden Arps reached a one hundred million dollars deal for pro bono services to avoid being targeted in one of these executive orders by Trump. So what's the message if firms like Paul Weiss and scad and Arps won't stand up to Trump?

So I think it really reflects the incredible power of the federal government that Trump is really harnessing here in illegitimate ways. Now, Paul Waits's calculation was, even when they won the lawsuit, and you can be sure were highly confident of winning this lawsuit, it wouldn't save them because it would send the message to all their clients that do business with the federal government, to all the criminal defendants whom they are represented or being prosecuted by the federal government, that they will not get fair treatment from the federal government as long as they're represented by a firm that the administration doesn't like, and so that's an existential threat for a firm like Paul Weite, and they never should have been in that situation. One thing that's interesting is there are some discrepancies between the way the White House has described the agreement and the way Paul Weite has described it. Paul Weiss has really broadcast that it didn't agree to much beyond what it would ordinarily do. And if the agreement is true to the firm's values and some of the things in the agreement, like a commitment to not accept clients and matters based on the politics and political leanings of the clients, is the value that Poul Wite says it has always had, and saying that pol Weis would do pro bono work on behalf of it veteran combat anti Semitism. Paul Weiss's position is that's all fine with them today, would do this work anyway. But to me, there are a couple of aspects of the agreement that don't strike me as business as usual. So one is Paul Weiss has agreed to an audit of its employment practices by a mutually agreed expert. So that means that Paul Weiss now has to reach an agreement with the administration as to who will review their employment practices. And the administration has taken a position, particularly around issues of race and gender discrimination that is really incredibly aggressive and not at all clear that is required by law. And so we'll see what happens with that the audit of Paul Weis's hiring practices. And then the second piece of language that particularly concerns me is that the commitment to do forty million dollars worth of pro bono work, it lists a couple of projects and then it says and mutually agreed project. Does that mean that Paul Wise needs to go back to the Trump administration to get approval as to whether particular pro bono representations counter don't count towards the forty million dollars. That troubles me in terms of giving the White House or direct voice in what cases Paul Wise now will select. We'll see how it plays out. I mean, I think it's very unclear what this agreement will mean in practice, but those are some of my particular concrens with the substance of it. Of course, the message sent by the agreement is far broader, and it's the message that Paul Weis won't stand up to the Trump administration than who will. And I think that that's an important question to ask.

So I think it really reflects the incredible power of the federal government that Trump is really harnessing here in illegitimate ways. Now, Paul Waits's calculation was, even when they won the lawsuit, and you can be sure were highly confident of winning this lawsuit, it wouldn't save them because it would send the message to all their clients that do business with the federal government, to all the criminal defendants whom they are represented or being prosecuted by the federal government, that they will not get fair treatment from the federal government as long as they're represented by a firm that the administration doesn't like, and so that's an existential threat for a firm like Paul Weite, and they never should have been in that situation. One thing that's interesting is there are some discrepancies between the way the White House has described the agreement and the way Paul Weite has described it. Paul Weiss has really broadcast that it didn't agree to much beyond what it would ordinarily do. And if the agreement is true to the firm's values and some of the things in the agreement, like a commitment to not accept clients and matters based on the politics and political leanings of the clients, is the value that Poul Wite says it has always had, and saying that pol Weis would do pro bono work on behalf of it veteran combat anti Semitism. Paul Weiss's position is that's all fine with them today, would do this work anyway. But to me, there are a couple of aspects of the agreement that don't strike me as business as usual. So one is Paul Weiss has agreed to an audit of its employment practices by a mutually agreed expert. So that means that Paul Weiss now has to reach an agreement with the administration as to who will review their employment practices. And the administration has taken a position, particularly around issues of race and gender discrimination that is really incredibly aggressive and not at all clear that is required by law. And so we'll see what happens with that the audit of Paul Weis's hiring practices. And then the second piece of language that particularly concerns me is that the commitment to do forty million dollars worth of pro bono work, it lists a couple of projects and then it says and mutually agreed project. Does that mean that Paul Wise needs to go back to the Trump administration to get approval as to whether particular pro bono representations counter don't count towards the forty million dollars. That troubles me in terms of giving the White House or direct voice in what cases Paul Wise now will select. We'll see how it plays out. I mean, I think it's very unclear what this agreement will mean in practice, but those are some of my particular concrens with the substance of it. Of course, the message sent by the agreement is far broader, and it's the message that Paul Weis won't stand up to the Trump administration than who will. And I think that that's an important question to ask.

I guess we'll find out as Trump continues to target law firms. Thanks for being here. That's Professor Matthew Diller of Fordham Law School coming up next. The Supreme Court takes a look at Louisiana's map. I'm June Grosso. When you're listening to Bloomberg.

I guess we'll find out as Trump continues to target law firms. Thanks for being here. That's Professor Matthew Diller of Fordham Law School coming up next. The Supreme Court takes a look at Louisiana's map. I'm June Grosso. When you're listening to Bloomberg.

We're in the business of complying with federal court decisions, and when they told us that we needed to draw a second mait black district, that's what we did.

We're in the business of complying with federal court decisions, and when they told us that we needed to draw a second mait black district, that's what we did.

That's how Louisiana Solicitor General Ben Aguinaga summed up his state's position in the challenge to its congressional map at the Supreme Court. At issue is the map drawn by Republicans to create a new majority black district as required by a court order, and at the same time to protect incumbent Republicans, including House Speaker Mike Johnson. So it's a case that involves the interplay between race and politics in drawing political boundaries and the oral arguments signaled a deep divide among the justices over whether race was the predominant factor driving the new map, which the Court has said is unconstitutional. Chief Justice John Roberts mocked the new district, which runs a jagged course over two hundred and fifty miles, saying it looked like a snake that runs from one end of the state to the other.

That's how Louisiana Solicitor General Ben Aguinaga summed up his state's position in the challenge to its congressional map at the Supreme Court. At issue is the map drawn by Republicans to create a new majority black district as required by a court order, and at the same time to protect incumbent Republicans, including House Speaker Mike Johnson. So it's a case that involves the interplay between race and politics in drawing political boundaries and the oral arguments signaled a deep divide among the justices over whether race was the predominant factor driving the new map, which the Court has said is unconstitutional. Chief Justice John Roberts mocked the new district, which runs a jagged course over two hundred and fifty miles, saying it looked like a snake that runs from one end of the state to the other.

And you think the drawing of this district was not predominantly based on rape. I think that it runs from one side of the state angling up to the other, picking up popular black populations as it goes along.

And you think the drawing of this district was not predominantly based on rape. I think that it runs from one side of the state angling up to the other, picking up popular black populations as it goes along.

But the three liberal justices suggested the district shape was a product of politics, something the Court has previously said is a permissible factor. Here's Justice Katanji Brown Jackson questioning Attorney Stuart Nathy.

But the three liberal justices suggested the district shape was a product of politics, something the Court has previously said is a permissible factor. Here's Justice Katanji Brown Jackson questioning Attorney Stuart Nathy.

Is the reason why we're looking at a snake like map rather than the compact map is because of political considerations. Politics is the only reason that the state chose that map over the compact maps.

Is the reason why we're looking at a snake like map rather than the compact map is because of political considerations. Politics is the only reason that the state chose that map over the compact maps.

Joining me is elections. Law expert Richard Brofald, a professor at Columbia Law School. Rich explained the issue before the justices.

Joining me is elections. Law expert Richard Brofald, a professor at Columbia Law School. Rich explained the issue before the justices.

This is a very strange and unusual case in order to discuss the issue, you actually have to go back to a prior case. And so a couple of years ago, lawsuit was brought in Louisiana by black voters claiming that the congressional map in Louisiana discriminated against black voters because they were underrepresented that had a discriminatory effect. Louisiana is something like one third black. The state has six congressional districts, but only one of them had a black majority. The plaintiffs said it was relatively easy to create a compact district that followed traditional districting patterns in part of the state that would create a second black majority district. They went to court and they won. It was a five day trial, lots of exhibits, lots of witnesses. They wanted the district court, and that was subsequently affirmed by the Fifth Secret Court of Appeals, which is itself a pretty conservative court.

This is a very strange and unusual case in order to discuss the issue, you actually have to go back to a prior case. And so a couple of years ago, lawsuit was brought in Louisiana by black voters claiming that the congressional map in Louisiana discriminated against black voters because they were underrepresented that had a discriminatory effect. Louisiana is something like one third black. The state has six congressional districts, but only one of them had a black majority. The plaintiffs said it was relatively easy to create a compact district that followed traditional districting patterns in part of the state that would create a second black majority district. They went to court and they won. It was a five day trial, lots of exhibits, lots of witnesses. They wanted the district court, and that was subsequently affirmed by the Fifth Secret Court of Appeals, which is itself a pretty conservative court.

And how did the Louisiana legislature come up with this map?

And how did the Louisiana legislature come up with this map?

The plaintiffs had a map that they liked which would have created that second black majority district, but the usual rules to allow the legislature to crack at it and to see if they can do it in time, otherwise a court will create a map. So this went to the Louisiana legislature and the governor said, we need to do a map. We would have liked to fight this case more, but we've already lost twice in the district court, in the Court of Appeals. We need to write our own map rather than having a court imposmon on us. When the legislature sat down to draw, they had a problem because it's a Republican majority legislature, Republican governor, Republican delegation, and several of the Republican members of Congress and Louisiana are very powerful, including the Speaker of the House, the majority leader, and somebody else they really liked. And so they decided, the legislature in Louisiana that they would sacrifice one Republican district, but not the district that made sense in terms of the plaintiff's original lawsuit seeking a black majority district. They kind of cobbled together a new district that stretched across the state and got rid of a different white Republican congressman in order to preserve the districts of the Speaker, the Majority leader, and a member of Congress who they favored. This news district is a black majority district that comes out of this lawsuit. Now, some white plaintiffs have sued, claiming that this district is unconstitutional because it's unconstitutionally race based. That is a racial gerrymander, that the decision to draw this district was primarily based on race, and the Supreme Court has for some time said that that's on constitution. The state is defending it, as are the original plaintiffs, the black voters, on the grounds that no, it's not racially predominant, it's really politically predominant. The reason this district has this odd shape is not really because of race, but because the legislature wanted to basically protect Republican incumbents. And a different lower court than the one that heard the original case said, no, this is racial predominance. The only reason this district exists is to create a black majority district. And that's the argument before the Supreme Court. And it's kind of an odd one.

The plaintiffs had a map that they liked which would have created that second black majority district, but the usual rules to allow the legislature to crack at it and to see if they can do it in time, otherwise a court will create a map. So this went to the Louisiana legislature and the governor said, we need to do a map. We would have liked to fight this case more, but we've already lost twice in the district court, in the Court of Appeals. We need to write our own map rather than having a court imposmon on us. When the legislature sat down to draw, they had a problem because it's a Republican majority legislature, Republican governor, Republican delegation, and several of the Republican members of Congress and Louisiana are very powerful, including the Speaker of the House, the majority leader, and somebody else they really liked. And so they decided, the legislature in Louisiana that they would sacrifice one Republican district, but not the district that made sense in terms of the plaintiff's original lawsuit seeking a black majority district. They kind of cobbled together a new district that stretched across the state and got rid of a different white Republican congressman in order to preserve the districts of the Speaker, the Majority leader, and a member of Congress who they favored. This news district is a black majority district that comes out of this lawsuit. Now, some white plaintiffs have sued, claiming that this district is unconstitutional because it's unconstitutionally race based. That is a racial gerrymander, that the decision to draw this district was primarily based on race, and the Supreme Court has for some time said that that's on constitution. The state is defending it, as are the original plaintiffs, the black voters, on the grounds that no, it's not racially predominant, it's really politically predominant. The reason this district has this odd shape is not really because of race, but because the legislature wanted to basically protect Republican incumbents. And a different lower court than the one that heard the original case said, no, this is racial predominance. The only reason this district exists is to create a black majority district. And that's the argument before the Supreme Court. And it's kind of an odd one.

And what are the Supreme Court precedents on this question?

And what are the Supreme Court precedents on this question?

Supreme Court has said in the past that if something is drawn primarily from the basis of race, and there's no other justification for it, then it may be unconstitutional on the legal protection clause. But if it's done primarily for party, that's parties in gerrymandering, and you can challenge that. And the question of whether something is based on race or on party has really been before the court several times. But that's kind of what they have to decide here. Is this district primarily based on partisanship because that's why the legislature drew it the way they did it, Or is it based on race because they wouldn't have been drawing a new district at all but for the earlier judgment that Louisiana needed a second black majority district. Obviously you couldn't remedy Voting Rights Act violations unless you took race into account in drawing the remedy. But the question is sort of when does race too much? That's where the court has settled out over the less several decades. You can't ignore race, and sometimes you have to take race into account. But if you give race too much attention, they use the notion of predominance, and unless it's justified by something else like the Voting Rights Act, then it violates ecal protection clause.

Supreme Court has said in the past that if something is drawn primarily from the basis of race, and there's no other justification for it, then it may be unconstitutional on the legal protection clause. But if it's done primarily for party, that's parties in gerrymandering, and you can challenge that. And the question of whether something is based on race or on party has really been before the court several times. But that's kind of what they have to decide here. Is this district primarily based on partisanship because that's why the legislature drew it the way they did it, Or is it based on race because they wouldn't have been drawing a new district at all but for the earlier judgment that Louisiana needed a second black majority district. Obviously you couldn't remedy Voting Rights Act violations unless you took race into account in drawing the remedy. But the question is sort of when does race too much? That's where the court has settled out over the less several decades. You can't ignore race, and sometimes you have to take race into account. But if you give race too much attention, they use the notion of predominance, and unless it's justified by something else like the Voting Rights Act, then it violates ecal protection clause.

Did you hear a divide between the conservative justices and the liberal justices on the use of race in this case.

Did you hear a divide between the conservative justices and the liberal justices on the use of race in this case.

Well, the conservative justices, who I think, yes, they were troubled by it. I think they were slightly frustrated by the fact that to the Louisiana Conservative Republican let's state is defending the map, and the state basically kept making the point the reason we did this is because we had a judgment against us, and I think some of the conservatives maybe kind of wondered, you know, maybe you should have challenged that, do you agree with that judgment against you? And of course the state's position is now, we don't agree with the judgment against us, but we lost twice and we didn't want the courts to impose a map on us. So I think the conservatives were somewhat frustrated in this case because they're not directly reviewing the original lower court case that said Louisiana violated the Voting Rights Act. They never took that case. What they're reviewing is the state's remedy, in which, although it's clear that race plays an important role in their redoing the map altogether, I think the states argument was that this particular configuration reflects our political judgment that if we had to sacrifice one white Republican congressman, we chose Congressman X and not Congresswoman Why.

Well, the conservative justices, who I think, yes, they were troubled by it. I think they were slightly frustrated by the fact that to the Louisiana Conservative Republican let's state is defending the map, and the state basically kept making the point the reason we did this is because we had a judgment against us, and I think some of the conservatives maybe kind of wondered, you know, maybe you should have challenged that, do you agree with that judgment against you? And of course the state's position is now, we don't agree with the judgment against us, but we lost twice and we didn't want the courts to impose a map on us. So I think the conservatives were somewhat frustrated in this case because they're not directly reviewing the original lower court case that said Louisiana violated the Voting Rights Act. They never took that case. What they're reviewing is the state's remedy, in which, although it's clear that race plays an important role in their redoing the map altogether, I think the states argument was that this particular configuration reflects our political judgment that if we had to sacrifice one white Republican congressman, we chose Congressman X and not Congresswoman Why.

There's been a lot of talk lately about the stand off between the Trump administration and the courts, and the question of whether the Trump administration is actually following complying with court orders. Did you see subtle references to that during the oral arguments? You had the Louisiana Solicitor General saying right, we're in the business of complying with federal court decisions, and Justice Jackson clarifying with him later that the court order was the reason why Louisiana drew up the map, and it didn't matter whether the order was right or wrong.

There's been a lot of talk lately about the stand off between the Trump administration and the courts, and the question of whether the Trump administration is actually following complying with court orders. Did you see subtle references to that during the oral arguments? You had the Louisiana Solicitor General saying right, we're in the business of complying with federal court decisions, and Justice Jackson clarifying with him later that the court order was the reason why Louisiana drew up the map, and it didn't matter whether the order was right or wrong.

The question is whether or not the fact that you had a court order was good enough reason for you to do it. Is that what you understand the basic question to be. That's correct, not just one order, but two layers of orders. Yes, you're honor and I guess I'm still a little confused as to why it matters whether the court order was right or not. You were still being compelled by the court to do what you did in this case. Correct, That's correct, Justice Jackson.

The question is whether or not the fact that you had a court order was good enough reason for you to do it. Is that what you understand the basic question to be. That's correct, not just one order, but two layers of orders. Yes, you're honor and I guess I'm still a little confused as to why it matters whether the court order was right or not. You were still being compelled by the court to do what you did in this case. Correct, That's correct, Justice Jackson.

That was my impression as well, is that this listener general was being very good about saying, we follow court orders. We lost once, we took an appeal, and then we follow the court orders. And some of the justices were pressing him, well, what if it was completely wrong? You know, would you follow it if it was completely wrong? And he was saying, you know, we're not going to get the judgment of deciding whether there's completely wrong.

That was my impression as well, is that this listener general was being very good about saying, we follow court orders. We lost once, we took an appeal, and then we follow the court orders. And some of the justices were pressing him, well, what if it was completely wrong? You know, would you follow it if it was completely wrong? And he was saying, you know, we're not going to get the judgment of deciding whether there's completely wrong.

We didn't like it.

We didn't like it.

We defended our position, we thought we were right, we took an appeal, we thought we ran an appeal, we lost the appeal, and I think our solution was, instead of keeping fighting, we want to be able to control our own map.

We defended our position, we thought we were right, we took an appeal, we thought we ran an appeal, we lost the appeal, and I think our solution was, instead of keeping fighting, we want to be able to control our own map.

Which do you have any inkling for what the court might do here?

Which do you have any inkling for what the court might do here?

First off, never partict the Supreme Court, but I think there seemed to be enough understanding of this by at least some of the justices that you might say that justice is in the middle, like Kavanaugh and Barrett, of the tight squeeze that the state was in, and the idea that the state should have some space, some discretion to accommodate a court and also to accommodate its own political preferences. Corsa, Glito, and Thomas were clearly very unhappy with this map. Roberts said very little as far as I could tell, and I think maybe I'm overreading it, but I think there was some sympathy I saw in Barrett and Cavanaugh for the situation that the state was in. You have the impression from the very conservative justices and even from some of the justices in the middle, that they may be looking to rethink the Voting Rights Act and rethink how much attention race should be given in districting. But my impression is at least some of the justices may be realizing that this is not the vehicle for that, because given the state's defenses so heavily based on partisan considerations, which I think they were pretty good at showing were real and not pretend.

First off, never partict the Supreme Court, but I think there seemed to be enough understanding of this by at least some of the justices that you might say that justice is in the middle, like Kavanaugh and Barrett, of the tight squeeze that the state was in, and the idea that the state should have some space, some discretion to accommodate a court and also to accommodate its own political preferences. Corsa, Glito, and Thomas were clearly very unhappy with this map. Roberts said very little as far as I could tell, and I think maybe I'm overreading it, but I think there was some sympathy I saw in Barrett and Cavanaugh for the situation that the state was in. You have the impression from the very conservative justices and even from some of the justices in the middle, that they may be looking to rethink the Voting Rights Act and rethink how much attention race should be given in districting. But my impression is at least some of the justices may be realizing that this is not the vehicle for that, because given the state's defenses so heavily based on partisan considerations, which I think they were pretty good at showing were real and not pretend.

Tell us a little bit about how the Supreme Court has sort of been chipping away at the power of the Voting.

Tell us a little bit about how the Supreme Court has sort of been chipping away at the power of the Voting.

Rights Act, well, I mean, candidly. The one case that's most relevant is the case that they didn't the Albama redistrict in Case Milligan, which was as ided two years ago, and this case follows immediately on it, where by a five to four vote. They actually upheld the lower court judgment that the Alabama congressional district being planned had a racially disparate impact and that it denied fair representation to black voters in Alabama and required the creation of a second black majority district in Alabama. That was a five to four case, and it was a bit of a surprise because they previously issued a stay against the lower court order in that case, so that he allowed the old map to be used one more election. You know, in other areas, the court has certainly cut back. They have made it now almost impossible for plaintiffs to bring voting right sack claims challenging various mechanisms like voter ID and issues with a claim is that certain you know, voter registration and voter ID rules the disparate impact on black or other minority voters to court in the case called Bernovich some years ago threw that out. Now more than ten years ago. They got rid of Section five, which was the preclearance requirement, which was probably the most important piece of the voting rightsack requiring certain states which had a very bad track record of racial discrimination to get their voting law. Change is preclued by the Department of Justice now about ten years ago, and they've been sending signals at least a number of justices that they are troubled by the reader which the Voiding Rights Act is being used to challenge voting laws, voting rules, and things like districting plans. But right now, the most recent case, that Alabama case, is one where they actually are continuing to enforce it. Some people are seeing this as another challenge. I think if the Court is going to start cutting back on the role of Section two the Voting Rights Act in challenging districting plans, I'll go out on a limb and say this is probably not the case, but you could imagine it happening in the not too distant future.

Rights Act, well, I mean, candidly. The one case that's most relevant is the case that they didn't the Albama redistrict in Case Milligan, which was as ided two years ago, and this case follows immediately on it, where by a five to four vote. They actually upheld the lower court judgment that the Alabama congressional district being planned had a racially disparate impact and that it denied fair representation to black voters in Alabama and required the creation of a second black majority district in Alabama. That was a five to four case, and it was a bit of a surprise because they previously issued a stay against the lower court order in that case, so that he allowed the old map to be used one more election. You know, in other areas, the court has certainly cut back. They have made it now almost impossible for plaintiffs to bring voting right sack claims challenging various mechanisms like voter ID and issues with a claim is that certain you know, voter registration and voter ID rules the disparate impact on black or other minority voters to court in the case called Bernovich some years ago threw that out. Now more than ten years ago. They got rid of Section five, which was the preclearance requirement, which was probably the most important piece of the voting rightsack requiring certain states which had a very bad track record of racial discrimination to get their voting law. Change is preclued by the Department of Justice now about ten years ago, and they've been sending signals at least a number of justices that they are troubled by the reader which the Voiding Rights Act is being used to challenge voting laws, voting rules, and things like districting plans. But right now, the most recent case, that Alabama case, is one where they actually are continuing to enforce it. Some people are seeing this as another challenge. I think if the Court is going to start cutting back on the role of Section two the Voting Rights Act in challenging districting plans, I'll go out on a limb and say this is probably not the case, but you could imagine it happening in the not too distant future.

I mean, you were surprised by that Alabama case. I was stunned, and I'm wondering if it's an exception rather than the rule, because it sort of stood out right.

I mean, you were surprised by that Alabama case. I was stunned, and I'm wondering if it's an exception rather than the rule, because it sort of stood out right.

But this case is an immediate follow on. The thing is this case is not a direct review of that case. In some ways, it is arguably an indirect review of that case. But the Louisiana case was very, very similar to the Alabama case, so it would be a real stretch I think to say that the district is racially predominant when the state was acting because of a court order, and the factors that led to this particular district design work at least to some degree political. There's an interesting bit of dialogue between Justice Cavanon one of the advocates about how do you decide whether something is racially predominant or politically predominant? It fifty to fifty is a sixty forties and seventy thirty, and the Swister General for Louisiana saying, we think this is about seventy percent political, and that if it's in the sixty eighty percent political, ought to be seen as politically predominant or not racially predominant.

But this case is an immediate follow on. The thing is this case is not a direct review of that case. In some ways, it is arguably an indirect review of that case. But the Louisiana case was very, very similar to the Alabama case, so it would be a real stretch I think to say that the district is racially predominant when the state was acting because of a court order, and the factors that led to this particular district design work at least to some degree political. There's an interesting bit of dialogue between Justice Cavanon one of the advocates about how do you decide whether something is racially predominant or politically predominant? It fifty to fifty is a sixty forties and seventy thirty, and the Swister General for Louisiana saying, we think this is about seventy percent political, and that if it's in the sixty eighty percent political, ought to be seen as politically predominant or not racially predominant.

I wonder how he came up with those numbers. Thanks so much, rich That's Columbia Law School professor Richard Brefault coming up next. Only works created by humans can get a copyright. I'm June Grass. When you're listening to Bloomberg, we.

I wonder how he came up with those numbers. Thanks so much, rich That's Columbia Law School professor Richard Brefault coming up next. Only works created by humans can get a copyright. I'm June Grass. When you're listening to Bloomberg, we.

Are fat in five four.

Are fat in five four.

Now here's mister midnight jack.

Now here's mister midnight jack.

Down, Oh good evening night owls, and thank you for allowing me into your living rooms.

Down, Oh good evening night owls, and thank you for allowing me into your living rooms.

You're meddling with things you don't understand well, ladies.

You're meddling with things you don't understand well, ladies.

And gentlemen, please stay tuned for a live television first as we attempt to commune with the Devil.

And gentlemen, please stay tuned for a live television first as we attempt to commune with the Devil.

The horror movie Late Night with the Devil is about a seventies talk show host who keeps the cameras rolling during a live demonic possession that goes horribly awry. It sounds scary, right, but what actually scared a lot of filmgoers and critics even more was the use of AI to create art in three still images used in transitions of the talk show. The social media backlash even included calls to boycott the movie. The use of AI in creative works can be a controversial and murky area, but now a federal appellate court has made one thing about artificial intelligence clear. A work completely generated by AI cannot get copyright proteid. In a landmark decision, the DC Circuit Court of Appeals found unanimously that human authorship is required to get a copyright for a work. My guest is intellectual property litigator Terrence Ross, a partner Katon Neutchen Rosenmann. So Terry tell us about the issues in this case before the DC's Circuit Court, where a computer scientist wanted a copyright for an AI generated piece of art.

The horror movie Late Night with the Devil is about a seventies talk show host who keeps the cameras rolling during a live demonic possession that goes horribly awry. It sounds scary, right, but what actually scared a lot of filmgoers and critics even more was the use of AI to create art in three still images used in transitions of the talk show. The social media backlash even included calls to boycott the movie. The use of AI in creative works can be a controversial and murky area, but now a federal appellate court has made one thing about artificial intelligence clear. A work completely generated by AI cannot get copyright proteid. In a landmark decision, the DC Circuit Court of Appeals found unanimously that human authorship is required to get a copyright for a work. My guest is intellectual property litigator Terrence Ross, a partner Katon Neutchen Rosenmann. So Terry tell us about the issues in this case before the DC's Circuit Court, where a computer scientist wanted a copyright for an AI generated piece of art.

Now we have the first appellate court decision on whether or not artificial intelligence can create works that can be copyrighted, and this involves a computer scientist by the name of doctor Stevens. Paller, and he came up with his own generative artificial intelligence, which he has dubbed the Creativity Machine. And just so everybody understands, AI gets used in a lot of misleading contexts and commercials and advertising. Nowadays, real artificial intelligence is called generative AI because it's capable of learning and it improves itself without human interaction. And so doctor Toller came up with this creativity machine, and he asked it to paint a picture for him and rendered a lovely work, multi colored work of what appeared to me to be a garden scene. But doctor Toller gave it the name A Recent Entrance to Paradise, and he printed that off. He took it to the US Copyright Office and filed an application to register that work for copyright registration purposes, and on the form said it was created by this creativity machine. Not surprisingly, the US Copyright Office denied that application for registration and by way the historical background, this didn't come as a surprise to anybody. Way back in nineteen seventy three, the US Copyright Office, in its internal regulations announced that only humans can obtain copyright registrations. So this is a really long standing position of the Copyright Office, not something unique to this case or unique to the current trend in AI.

Now we have the first appellate court decision on whether or not artificial intelligence can create works that can be copyrighted, and this involves a computer scientist by the name of doctor Stevens. Paller, and he came up with his own generative artificial intelligence, which he has dubbed the Creativity Machine. And just so everybody understands, AI gets used in a lot of misleading contexts and commercials and advertising. Nowadays, real artificial intelligence is called generative AI because it's capable of learning and it improves itself without human interaction. And so doctor Toller came up with this creativity machine, and he asked it to paint a picture for him and rendered a lovely work, multi colored work of what appeared to me to be a garden scene. But doctor Toller gave it the name A Recent Entrance to Paradise, and he printed that off. He took it to the US Copyright Office and filed an application to register that work for copyright registration purposes, and on the form said it was created by this creativity machine. Not surprisingly, the US Copyright Office denied that application for registration and by way the historical background, this didn't come as a surprise to anybody. Way back in nineteen seventy three, the US Copyright Office, in its internal regulations announced that only humans can obtain copyright registrations. So this is a really long standing position of the Copyright Office, not something unique to this case or unique to the current trend in AI.

Also not really surprising. When doctor Toller appealed the decision of the Copyright Office, he lost.

Also not really surprising. When doctor Toller appealed the decision of the Copyright Office, he lost.

The DC Circuit affirmed the District Court, which in turn had affirmed the US Copyright Office. The DC Circuit agreed with everybody else who had looked at this and said that copyright registrations can't be granted to robots. I think the consensus was the case would come out this way, and it's really driven by the factual predicate. Doctor Toller was unequivocal in telling the Copyright Office and every step on appeal that he was not the creator of this drawing, that it was the creativity machine, a generative AI, that had rendered the drawing. So there was no dispute on the facts. There was no line drawing to be done, there's no gray areas, had a nice crisp clear presentation of that central fact. Given that lack of de speed on facts, it was really then driven by the law. And the interesting thing about the DC Circuit's opinion, which differed from a Copyright Office decision in the District Court decision, is a laser like focus by the DC Circuit on the text of the Copyright Act in nineteen seventy six. And this is sort of the trend in appellate courts and the Supreme Court these days what is referred to by lawyers as textual analysis. It is no longer some right wing theory propagated by Justice Scalia. This concept of textual literalism has just seized the appellate courts. In the Supreme Court, you see both the so called liberal justice of the Supreme Court and the conservative justices on the Supreme Court agreeing that you apply this sort of textual analysis whenever there's a statute of constitution. This is a sea change from twenty years ago, and here you see it being done by the DC Circuit in connection with.

The DC Circuit affirmed the District Court, which in turn had affirmed the US Copyright Office. The DC Circuit agreed with everybody else who had looked at this and said that copyright registrations can't be granted to robots. I think the consensus was the case would come out this way, and it's really driven by the factual predicate. Doctor Toller was unequivocal in telling the Copyright Office and every step on appeal that he was not the creator of this drawing, that it was the creativity machine, a generative AI, that had rendered the drawing. So there was no dispute on the facts. There was no line drawing to be done, there's no gray areas, had a nice crisp clear presentation of that central fact. Given that lack of de speed on facts, it was really then driven by the law. And the interesting thing about the DC Circuit's opinion, which differed from a Copyright Office decision in the District Court decision, is a laser like focus by the DC Circuit on the text of the Copyright Act in nineteen seventy six. And this is sort of the trend in appellate courts and the Supreme Court these days what is referred to by lawyers as textual analysis. It is no longer some right wing theory propagated by Justice Scalia. This concept of textual literalism has just seized the appellate courts. In the Supreme Court, you see both the so called liberal justice of the Supreme Court and the conservative justices on the Supreme Court agreeing that you apply this sort of textual analysis whenever there's a statute of constitution. This is a sea change from twenty years ago, and here you see it being done by the DC Circuit in connection with.

This case and take us through the process. The DC Circuit Court went through.

This case and take us through the process. The DC Circuit Court went through.

The DC Circuit marched through the Copyright Act and they said, you know, there's a distinction in the text of the Copyright Act between machines and authors, and they laid out that machines don't own property because under the Act, copyrights are property and authors get to own copyrights, but machines don't own property. Machines don't have a lifetime because copyright registrations are measured in part by the lifetime of the author plus a certain number of years. But machines don't have a lifetime. Machines have no errors. There's nobody who inherits from machine, in part because it doesn't have a death, it doesn't have a lifetime. And yet there's a provision in there that says the errors of authors obtain their rights, So how do you account for that? And then there's also provision in the text about the nationality and domicile of authors. Yet machines don't have nationality. Machines don't have don't Indeed, the court pointed out that in the text of the Copyright Act nineteen seventy six, every time a machine is referenced, it is as a tool being used by human authors. And they thought that was telling. And there's an express reference to computer programs. Computer programs don't get to register themselves. They're simply a tool used by human beings to create works. And they thought that this distinction between machines and authors in the text was determinative here. And if you follow their logic, if you agree with the logic that we followed, the text seems inescapable that an author for purposes of copyright has to be a human being.

The DC Circuit marched through the Copyright Act and they said, you know, there's a distinction in the text of the Copyright Act between machines and authors, and they laid out that machines don't own property because under the Act, copyrights are property and authors get to own copyrights, but machines don't own property. Machines don't have a lifetime because copyright registrations are measured in part by the lifetime of the author plus a certain number of years. But machines don't have a lifetime. Machines have no errors. There's nobody who inherits from machine, in part because it doesn't have a death, it doesn't have a lifetime. And yet there's a provision in there that says the errors of authors obtain their rights, So how do you account for that? And then there's also provision in the text about the nationality and domicile of authors. Yet machines don't have nationality. Machines don't have don't Indeed, the court pointed out that in the text of the Copyright Act nineteen seventy six, every time a machine is referenced, it is as a tool being used by human authors. And they thought that was telling. And there's an express reference to computer programs. Computer programs don't get to register themselves. They're simply a tool used by human beings to create works. And they thought that this distinction between machines and authors in the text was determinative here. And if you follow their logic, if you agree with the logic that we followed, the text seems inescapable that an author for purposes of copyright has to be a human being.

What arguments did doctor Toller make to try to get a copyright?

What arguments did doctor Toller make to try to get a copyright?

So Teller makes a couple arguments. The only one that they gave much credence to was dictionary definition. There are dictionary definitions where you look up creator and the definition suggests it could be a machine. But as VC Circuit pointed out, we don't go to a dictionary definition unless they're ambiguity in the statue. And here they said, you know, we're doing a textual analysis. Here, we're looking strictly the text, and the text is clear as can be that there is a distinction drawn between authors who get copyrights and machines who are merely tools used by authors, and therefore we don't need to look at any dictionary definition. Now. The rest of the arguments made by Taller they described as public policy arguments. And again this is telling. They said, on all these other public policy arguments you have, you take those to the Congress. And there's a great quote in here. They say, our duty as a court is to apply the statute as written. That's a quote, apply the statute is written. I mean, this would make Justice Scalia so happy that this has become the norm.

So Teller makes a couple arguments. The only one that they gave much credence to was dictionary definition. There are dictionary definitions where you look up creator and the definition suggests it could be a machine. But as VC Circuit pointed out, we don't go to a dictionary definition unless they're ambiguity in the statue. And here they said, you know, we're doing a textual analysis. Here, we're looking strictly the text, and the text is clear as can be that there is a distinction drawn between authors who get copyrights and machines who are merely tools used by authors, and therefore we don't need to look at any dictionary definition. Now. The rest of the arguments made by Taller they described as public policy arguments. And again this is telling. They said, on all these other public policy arguments you have, you take those to the Congress. And there's a great quote in here. They say, our duty as a court is to apply the statute as written. That's a quote, apply the statute is written. I mean, this would make Justice Scalia so happy that this has become the norm.

Now, so this work was created wholly by AI. What about works that are created with a mixture of human and AI input? Are they copyrightable?

Now, so this work was created wholly by AI. What about works that are created with a mixture of human and AI input? Are they copyrightable?

So this is the issue that is really getting all the discussion in the academic circles that I run in. And Taller made arguments like that which the DC Circuit again lumped into the public policy type arguments. And what they said is that we only decide cases that are presented to us. These what they described as line drawing arguments. You know, where do you draw the line between a human author and a machine author? These line drawing arguments aren't presented to us here, and so we're not going to decide those. And they recognize that there were disagreements over how much of a contribution by AI makes it a machine generated work as opposed to human generated work, and the d C Circus said that's not this case. Doctor Toller has never made that argument. He's been crystal clear that the machine, the robot, did all the drawing here, and that's all we have to decide.

So this is the issue that is really getting all the discussion in the academic circles that I run in. And Taller made arguments like that which the DC Circuit again lumped into the public policy type arguments. And what they said is that we only decide cases that are presented to us. These what they described as line drawing arguments. You know, where do you draw the line between a human author and a machine author? These line drawing arguments aren't presented to us here, and so we're not going to decide those. And they recognize that there were disagreements over how much of a contribution by AI makes it a machine generated work as opposed to human generated work, and the d C Circus said that's not this case. Doctor Toller has never made that argument. He's been crystal clear that the machine, the robot, did all the drawing here, and that's all we have to decide.

So I read that the Copyright Office how's allowed the registration of works made by humans who use AI?

So I read that the Copyright Office how's allowed the registration of works made by humans who use AI?

That is correct. There have been several of those because those were allowed. I'm not sure how we ever get a review in a court of law. That at some point we will have a case where the copywriter says not enough human involvement, too much machine involvement, and then that will get us a review and we might understand this better. But think about it in these terms. Humans use machines all the time to create works. As a newsperson, you're doing that with your typewriter. Authors are doing that with their typewriters, laptops. Journalists, news networks are doing it with cameras. Radio newscasters are sticking a microphone in front of the sports hero and recording his thoughts. Does that mean the humans not involved? I don't think so. Humans use machines all the time and there should be no difference with respect to using AI to help. So I think that's the answer to that question, it's simply the machine being used by human. It's not the machine getting a cop right registration.

That is correct. There have been several of those because those were allowed. I'm not sure how we ever get a review in a court of law. That at some point we will have a case where the copywriter says not enough human involvement, too much machine involvement, and then that will get us a review and we might understand this better. But think about it in these terms. Humans use machines all the time to create works. As a newsperson, you're doing that with your typewriter. Authors are doing that with their typewriters, laptops. Journalists, news networks are doing it with cameras. Radio newscasters are sticking a microphone in front of the sports hero and recording his thoughts. Does that mean the humans not involved? I don't think so. Humans use machines all the time and there should be no difference with respect to using AI to help. So I think that's the answer to that question, it's simply the machine being used by human. It's not the machine getting a cop right registration.

Maybe I'll have AI assistance in writing the lead into this segment.

Maybe I'll have AI assistance in writing the lead into this segment.

Oh god, I'm sure you could.

Oh god, I'm sure you could.

Explain the importance of this decision. What the stakes are here?

Explain the importance of this decision. What the stakes are here?

No, Jude, this is a surprisingly important issue. If you remember, almost two years ago, the Writer's Guilt of America went on strike and stopped all production of film and television shows, and one of the core issues that was presented was the use by the studios of artificial intelligence to write scripts. The writers viewed this as an existential threat to their work, that it would put writers out on the street because artificial intelligence would simply take over and do all the script writing. And that was one of the concessions that they obtained when that strike was settled. But the point here is that if artificial intelligence scripts cannot be copyrighted, then that shifts the bargaining power to the writers, because a studio spending two hundred fifty million dollars on a big hit score generate a billion dollars in revenues cannot afford to go without a copyright. And so this is actually very important. In the computer context. Artificial intelligence is being used to help coders write new applications, new software. If again, those companies, the Microsofts of the world, can't get copyrights on their new computer programs because of the use of artificial intelligence, that will limit their willingness to employ artificial intelligence in that way, and so again the computer scientists, the coders will keep their jobs. So this is really important. And the problem is people don't understand the extent of which copyright impacts the economy. It is really critical, and the founders saw it this way. The Founders viewed copyright. It's one of the most important drivers of the US economy and that came to fruition. And by stopping robots from getting copyrights, we preserve enormous amounts of creative position in the economy across multiple businesses. And that's why this decision is so important, not just in an abstract sense, but as a very real consequence for United States economy in multiple industries.

No, Jude, this is a surprisingly important issue. If you remember, almost two years ago, the Writer's Guilt of America went on strike and stopped all production of film and television shows, and one of the core issues that was presented was the use by the studios of artificial intelligence to write scripts. The writers viewed this as an existential threat to their work, that it would put writers out on the street because artificial intelligence would simply take over and do all the script writing. And that was one of the concessions that they obtained when that strike was settled. But the point here is that if artificial intelligence scripts cannot be copyrighted, then that shifts the bargaining power to the writers, because a studio spending two hundred fifty million dollars on a big hit score generate a billion dollars in revenues cannot afford to go without a copyright. And so this is actually very important. In the computer context. Artificial intelligence is being used to help coders write new applications, new software. If again, those companies, the Microsofts of the world, can't get copyrights on their new computer programs because of the use of artificial intelligence, that will limit their willingness to employ artificial intelligence in that way, and so again the computer scientists, the coders will keep their jobs. So this is really important. And the problem is people don't understand the extent of which copyright impacts the economy. It is really critical, and the founders saw it this way. The Founders viewed copyright. It's one of the most important drivers of the US economy and that came to fruition. And by stopping robots from getting copyrights, we preserve enormous amounts of creative position in the economy across multiple businesses. And that's why this decision is so important, not just in an abstract sense, but as a very real consequence for United States economy in multiple industries.

That's what's defined as a high stakes case. Always a pleasure Terry, thanks so much. That's Terrence Ross of Catain Muchen Rosenman. And that's it for this edition of The Bloomberg Law Show. Remember you can always get the latest legal news on our Bloomberg Law Podcast. You can find them on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, and at www dot bloomberg dot com, slash podcast slash Law, and remember to tune into The Bloomberg Law Show every weeknight at ten pm Wall Street Time. I'm June Grosso and you're listening to Bloomberg

That's what's defined as a high stakes case. Always a pleasure Terry, thanks so much. That's Terrence Ross of Catain Muchen Rosenman. And that's it for this edition of The Bloomberg Law Show. Remember you can always get the latest legal news on our Bloomberg Law Podcast. You can find them on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, and at www dot bloomberg dot com, slash podcast slash Law, and remember to tune into The Bloomberg Law Show every weeknight at ten pm Wall Street Time. I'm June Grosso and you're listening to Bloomberg