Hello, Michael Fullilove here. In this episode, we're talking about Russia's brutal and somewhat hapless invasion of Ukraine, the lessons for militaries around the world, as well as developments in the United Kingdom and Australia.

Hello, Michael Fullilove here. In this episode, we're talking about Russia's brutal and somewhat hapless invasion of Ukraine, the lessons for militaries around the world, as well as developments in the United Kingdom and Australia.

First, it's very difficult to occupy places where you're not welcome. Secondly, logistics is incredibly important and you ignore it at your peril. But in modern warfare, the consumption of ammunition - consumables - is immensely intense. Unless you can sustain that, you will be in trouble, however clever you are.

First, it's very difficult to occupy places where you're not welcome. Secondly, logistics is incredibly important and you ignore it at your peril. But in modern warfare, the consumption of ammunition - consumables - is immensely intense. Unless you can sustain that, you will be in trouble, however clever you are.

Sir Lawrence Freedman is my guest on this episode of the Director's Chair. I'm Michael Fullilove, the executive director of the Lowy Institute. On the 24th of February, Russia - a nuclear weapons power and a permanent member of the UN Security Council - launched its unprovoked and brutal invasion of Ukraine. President Putin expected Kyiv to fall within days. Instead, we've seen the Ukrainian people displaying fierce moral and physical courage in the defence of their homeland. Russia's assault on Kyiv was repulsed, and in the past few months, we've seen Ukraine's armed forces making sweeping gains in the east and south of their country, culminating in the liberation of the key city of Kherson last week. Mr Putin intended this war to show Russia's strength and the West's weakness. Instead, he has revealed Russia's weakness and the West's strength. But winter is coming, and the war is still far from over. To discuss this war and what it means for the world, I'm very pleased to be joined today on The Director's Chair by Sir Lawrence Freedman. Lawry is one of the world's most renowned strategic thinkers. He studied at the University of Manchester, York and Oxford. He worked at the IISS and Chatham House before being appointed Professor of War Studies at King's College London in 1982. He's the author of Command: The Politics of Military Operations from Korea to Ukraine, published by Penguin this year. And most importantly, he's in Australia as the Distinguished Fellow for International Security at the Lowy Institute. Lawry, thank you for joining me on The Director's Chair.

Sir Lawrence Freedman is my guest on this episode of the Director's Chair. I'm Michael Fullilove, the executive director of the Lowy Institute. On the 24th of February, Russia - a nuclear weapons power and a permanent member of the UN Security Council - launched its unprovoked and brutal invasion of Ukraine. President Putin expected Kyiv to fall within days. Instead, we've seen the Ukrainian people displaying fierce moral and physical courage in the defence of their homeland. Russia's assault on Kyiv was repulsed, and in the past few months, we've seen Ukraine's armed forces making sweeping gains in the east and south of their country, culminating in the liberation of the key city of Kherson last week. Mr Putin intended this war to show Russia's strength and the West's weakness. Instead, he has revealed Russia's weakness and the West's strength. But winter is coming, and the war is still far from over. To discuss this war and what it means for the world, I'm very pleased to be joined today on The Director's Chair by Sir Lawrence Freedman. Lawry is one of the world's most renowned strategic thinkers. He studied at the University of Manchester, York and Oxford. He worked at the IISS and Chatham House before being appointed Professor of War Studies at King's College London in 1982. He's the author of Command: The Politics of Military Operations from Korea to Ukraine, published by Penguin this year. And most importantly, he's in Australia as the Distinguished Fellow for International Security at the Lowy Institute. Lawry, thank you for joining me on The Director's Chair.

My pleasure.

My pleasure.

All right. Let's begin by talking about the missile that landed in Poland yesterday, killing two people. It appears that the missile came from Ukrainian air defence and was not a strike by Russia. NATO's called this a tragic mistake and said that ultimately the blame still rests with Russia. What effect will this incident have, do you think, on the debate on the war? And are you surprised that it's taken this long for the war to spill over beyond Ukraine's borders, even if it was a mistake?

All right. Let's begin by talking about the missile that landed in Poland yesterday, killing two people. It appears that the missile came from Ukrainian air defence and was not a strike by Russia. NATO's called this a tragic mistake and said that ultimately the blame still rests with Russia. What effect will this incident have, do you think, on the debate on the war? And are you surprised that it's taken this long for the war to spill over beyond Ukraine's borders, even if it was a mistake?

I think the fact that it was a mistake is important. I think it was also important the speed with which this was acknowledged to be a mistake. It was quite interesting when the news first came through. You had inevitably on social media, lots of speculation about how this was a deliberate attempt by the Russians to goad NATO or prove that NATO's ineffectual. Then you have the Russians saying this was a provocation and the British had been responsible, because they all seemed to think that we're more capable than we are. And then the social media started to look at the evidence and conclude this was the Ukrainian air defence missiles. This all happened quite quickly. So instead of, you know, what happens when Russians make a mistake, which is it's denied and demonstrated to be a provocation and so on. It was acknowledged very quickly. That's important because it gives you trust in what's being said. Beyond that, I don't think it's that important. It's a reminder that these things can spill over. Chance events can have quite important consequences. And the more the longer the war goes on, the more likely it is that there'll be more chance events that have sad consequences. But I don't think it changes NATO's attitude to the war, the American attitude to the war. It certainly doesn't change the Ukrainian or Russian attitude to the war. It's a reminder of just what a dangerous game the Russians are playing, what a nasty game the Russians are playing - in sending missiles to, well, all over Ukraine, to places where they've got no hope of making any military inroads anymore.

I think the fact that it was a mistake is important. I think it was also important the speed with which this was acknowledged to be a mistake. It was quite interesting when the news first came through. You had inevitably on social media, lots of speculation about how this was a deliberate attempt by the Russians to goad NATO or prove that NATO's ineffectual. Then you have the Russians saying this was a provocation and the British had been responsible, because they all seemed to think that we're more capable than we are. And then the social media started to look at the evidence and conclude this was the Ukrainian air defence missiles. This all happened quite quickly. So instead of, you know, what happens when Russians make a mistake, which is it's denied and demonstrated to be a provocation and so on. It was acknowledged very quickly. That's important because it gives you trust in what's being said. Beyond that, I don't think it's that important. It's a reminder that these things can spill over. Chance events can have quite important consequences. And the more the longer the war goes on, the more likely it is that there'll be more chance events that have sad consequences. But I don't think it changes NATO's attitude to the war, the American attitude to the war. It certainly doesn't change the Ukrainian or Russian attitude to the war. It's a reminder of just what a dangerous game the Russians are playing, what a nasty game the Russians are playing - in sending missiles to, well, all over Ukraine, to places where they've got no hope of making any military inroads anymore.

Well, let's go back to when that nasty game began on the 24th of February. Many commentators at the time believed there was no way Putin would invade Ukraine. How did they get it so wrong?

Well, let's go back to when that nasty game began on the 24th of February. Many commentators at the time believed there was no way Putin would invade Ukraine. How did they get it so wrong?

Well, I think that I mean, I would include myself as somebody who was very skeptical. It was impossible to say no way when when so many troops were gathered around the borders and so many people who didn't know a lot about these things well thought it was quite likely that it would happen. There were reasons for skepticism. One of which no Russians one spoke to, who wer writing, seemed to think it would happen. So it seemed like a potentially, if it was a bluff, very orchestrated. It was also very stupid thing to do. And I think that was certainly my view, not because I thought the Ukrainians would necessarily resist as well as they did, but because you just can't subjugate a population of that size. The idea seemed pretty preposterous. So I could imagine something in the East, in the Donbass to sort that out for Russia. But the ambitious conquest that they attempted was a surprise. So, you know, it's a fact of intelligence assessments that the hardest thing to assess is somebody else's stupidity, and I think this was stupid. What I think is as interesting is - and this goes for all of the people who called the invasion right - is how much it turned out the Russians were overestimated. They made so many surprising errors in their initial military moves that what could have been almost a fait accompli that would have turned then into some sort of insurgency I believe, the Russians found they had a big fight on their hands and they still got a big fight on their hands here. This would not have been expected in February that we'd still be fighting in the way we're fighting.

Well, I think that I mean, I would include myself as somebody who was very skeptical. It was impossible to say no way when when so many troops were gathered around the borders and so many people who didn't know a lot about these things well thought it was quite likely that it would happen. There were reasons for skepticism. One of which no Russians one spoke to, who wer writing, seemed to think it would happen. So it seemed like a potentially, if it was a bluff, very orchestrated. It was also very stupid thing to do. And I think that was certainly my view, not because I thought the Ukrainians would necessarily resist as well as they did, but because you just can't subjugate a population of that size. The idea seemed pretty preposterous. So I could imagine something in the East, in the Donbass to sort that out for Russia. But the ambitious conquest that they attempted was a surprise. So, you know, it's a fact of intelligence assessments that the hardest thing to assess is somebody else's stupidity, and I think this was stupid. What I think is as interesting is - and this goes for all of the people who called the invasion right - is how much it turned out the Russians were overestimated. They made so many surprising errors in their initial military moves that what could have been almost a fait accompli that would have turned then into some sort of insurgency I believe, the Russians found they had a big fight on their hands and they still got a big fight on their hands here. This would not have been expected in February that we'd still be fighting in the way we're fighting.

One of the amazing moments was when that attributed, quote appeared from Zelenskyy very early on, when supposedly there was an offer of safe passage from the Americans. And his response was, I don't need a ride on an ammo.

One of the amazing moments was when that attributed, quote appeared from Zelenskyy very early on, when supposedly there was an offer of safe passage from the Americans. And his response was, I don't need a ride on an ammo.

Yeah.

Yeah.

Looking back, how important was President Zelenskyy's decision to stay in Kyiv and fight? What would have happened if he had fled the capital, as Ashraf Ghani did in Afghanistan.

Looking back, how important was President Zelenskyy's decision to stay in Kyiv and fight? What would have happened if he had fled the capital, as Ashraf Ghani did in Afghanistan.

Or as the Emir of Kuwait did in August 1990? So if he'd been killed or captured by the Russians, that would have been an important statement. I don't think actually would have stopped the Ukrainians fighting. I think it's always likely that Ukrainians would fight. I mean, they've got a history of resilience and suffering and determination. So there are other characters in Ukraine who would have stepped forward. So I don't think it was necessarily important in that way. But what it did was cement the idea of Zelenskyy as a national leader, and that's not how he particularly appeared, didn't appear as a strong figure almost up to the start of the war. You and remember, most Americans first heard of Zelenskyy when he was being badgered by Trump to dish the dirt on Hunter Biden in exchange for weapons. So Zelenskyy had not appeared as a politically strong president. Then all of a sudden he's a true world leader and all his skills in from the entertainment business, as well as a pretty shrewd business sense as well understanding of social media. All of these came to the fore and that became critical in what was essential to Ukraine, not only in rallying the people to fight, but in getting external support. They would have done something without Zelenskyy. He could have done it from Poland or from the devil or wherever he might have gone to. But I think he managed to create a symbolism around himself that was very powerful.

Or as the Emir of Kuwait did in August 1990? So if he'd been killed or captured by the Russians, that would have been an important statement. I don't think actually would have stopped the Ukrainians fighting. I think it's always likely that Ukrainians would fight. I mean, they've got a history of resilience and suffering and determination. So there are other characters in Ukraine who would have stepped forward. So I don't think it was necessarily important in that way. But what it did was cement the idea of Zelenskyy as a national leader, and that's not how he particularly appeared, didn't appear as a strong figure almost up to the start of the war. You and remember, most Americans first heard of Zelenskyy when he was being badgered by Trump to dish the dirt on Hunter Biden in exchange for weapons. So Zelenskyy had not appeared as a politically strong president. Then all of a sudden he's a true world leader and all his skills in from the entertainment business, as well as a pretty shrewd business sense as well understanding of social media. All of these came to the fore and that became critical in what was essential to Ukraine, not only in rallying the people to fight, but in getting external support. They would have done something without Zelenskyy. He could have done it from Poland or from the devil or wherever he might have gone to. But I think he managed to create a symbolism around himself that was very powerful.

As you know, we hosted President Zelenskyy in a Zoom event about a month ago, and we and we experienced this phenomenon that has been commented upon about how clever and professional the Ukrainians are at targeting their messages to the audience, to audiences to which Zelenskyy is speaking. In his remarks, I suddenly discovered that he was quoting to me a speech that Chancellor Angela merkel had given to the Lowy Institute in 2014, quite a specific reference that was artfully worked into his remarks. And afterwards I asked my colleagues and I asked the Ukrainian ambassador, did did we provide that material to Kiev? And the answer was no. And so somebody sitting in Kiev with missiles fall raining down on their ears has spent a couple of hours on the Lowy Institute website digging up the perfect content to add to this speech. And that's a level of sort of deft statecraft that frankly, you don't get, you know, usually from presidents of the United States and prime minister of Great Britain. So we saw that just the deadly effectiveness of the Ukrainians in the information war.

As you know, we hosted President Zelenskyy in a Zoom event about a month ago, and we and we experienced this phenomenon that has been commented upon about how clever and professional the Ukrainians are at targeting their messages to the audience, to audiences to which Zelenskyy is speaking. In his remarks, I suddenly discovered that he was quoting to me a speech that Chancellor Angela merkel had given to the Lowy Institute in 2014, quite a specific reference that was artfully worked into his remarks. And afterwards I asked my colleagues and I asked the Ukrainian ambassador, did did we provide that material to Kiev? And the answer was no. And so somebody sitting in Kiev with missiles fall raining down on their ears has spent a couple of hours on the Lowy Institute website digging up the perfect content to add to this speech. And that's a level of sort of deft statecraft that frankly, you don't get, you know, usually from presidents of the United States and prime minister of Great Britain. So we saw that just the deadly effectiveness of the Ukrainians in the information war.

They're very effective. And it's partly an age thing. They're young. They understand how the media works, partly the contrast with Putin sitting at his long desk and avoiding human contact and almost looking like a pantomime villain. Partly I think it's the message is absolutely clear. I think when people talk about information operations, they talk about causing disorientation and confusion, raising doubts, raising questions, not a bit of it with Ukraine. It's been a very simple message from day one. Give us the ammunition. Give us the give us the kit. We need more of it. We're fighting your battles. This is what we need provided urgently from day one. That's been Lansky's message. Then, as you say, if you look at a series of parliamentary speeches he did to two different parliaments, every one was tailored every way and they weren't all soft. I mean, the in the House of Commons was full of Churchill. The one to the Bundestag was quite tough and it was critical. And each time they're clearly working out what the message should be. They don't always work, you know, and always get the one to the question. Israel, I think, played too much on the the Holocaust angle and that that always makes the Israelis a bit wary. But by and large, I think they've been extremely successful. The proof of that is in the amount of support that Zelensky Zelensky's been able to get.

They're very effective. And it's partly an age thing. They're young. They understand how the media works, partly the contrast with Putin sitting at his long desk and avoiding human contact and almost looking like a pantomime villain. Partly I think it's the message is absolutely clear. I think when people talk about information operations, they talk about causing disorientation and confusion, raising doubts, raising questions, not a bit of it with Ukraine. It's been a very simple message from day one. Give us the ammunition. Give us the give us the kit. We need more of it. We're fighting your battles. This is what we need provided urgently from day one. That's been Lansky's message. Then, as you say, if you look at a series of parliamentary speeches he did to two different parliaments, every one was tailored every way and they weren't all soft. I mean, the in the House of Commons was full of Churchill. The one to the Bundestag was quite tough and it was critical. And each time they're clearly working out what the message should be. They don't always work, you know, and always get the one to the question. Israel, I think, played too much on the the Holocaust angle and that that always makes the Israelis a bit wary. But by and large, I think they've been extremely successful. The proof of that is in the amount of support that Zelensky Zelensky's been able to get.

Have you been surprised by how unimpressive the Russian military performance has been and what effect does that have on Russia's prestige around the world?

Have you been surprised by how unimpressive the Russian military performance has been and what effect does that have on Russia's prestige around the world?

Sort of surprised. I mean, if you look back, as I've done in the book I've just written, check and now mention if you look back, say, Chechnya, the Russian military performance was not impressive. So there's been an assumption that the benefits of two decades of high oil prices and lots of money coming in to to the Russian state being spent on military modernization was having an effect. And people assumed that Syria in particular demonstrated this. But that was a very limited operation, basically air power against an enemy without air defenses. And I think people got over impressed by that without noting that the Russians had never tried anything big for some time. Certainly what they did in 2014 with Ukraine, the Ukrainians didn't resist very effectively. But given the upheavals in Ukraine, that was not necessarily surprising. So I think part of what it is in terms of both the Russian underestimation of the Ukrainians, but also our underestimation of the Ukrainians meant that we were surprised that the Russians struggled as much as they had a better grasp of what they were facing. I think their military campaign might have been better judgment thing about the big military operations as if they go wrong on the first day. Even if you're Russia, it's quite hard to recover your sort of on the back foot thereafter, which is what happened with the Russians.

Sort of surprised. I mean, if you look back, as I've done in the book I've just written, check and now mention if you look back, say, Chechnya, the Russian military performance was not impressive. So there's been an assumption that the benefits of two decades of high oil prices and lots of money coming in to to the Russian state being spent on military modernization was having an effect. And people assumed that Syria in particular demonstrated this. But that was a very limited operation, basically air power against an enemy without air defenses. And I think people got over impressed by that without noting that the Russians had never tried anything big for some time. Certainly what they did in 2014 with Ukraine, the Ukrainians didn't resist very effectively. But given the upheavals in Ukraine, that was not necessarily surprising. So I think part of what it is in terms of both the Russian underestimation of the Ukrainians, but also our underestimation of the Ukrainians meant that we were surprised that the Russians struggled as much as they had a better grasp of what they were facing. I think their military campaign might have been better judgment thing about the big military operations as if they go wrong on the first day. Even if you're Russia, it's quite hard to recover your sort of on the back foot thereafter, which is what happened with the Russians.

What about the role of the US so far?

What about the role of the US so far?

I think Biden's played it pretty well. I mean, personally, I would have preferred that if he'd been a bit quicker and more ambitious with some of the kit. But he's held the alliance together. He's given it purpose. Is acknowledge what inevitably going to be concerned about nuclear escalation as being a priority and made that position very clear. It hasn't been done by subterfuge, he said. These are the things that we're going to avoid because of that. And in the end, an enormous amount of resource has been handed over to Ukraine. And I think because of the American system where lots of people speak and you never quite sure with what authority. By and large, they've understood that the Ukrainians can't be strong armed into a negotiation and a deal that they can't sell to themselves. That leaves a chunk of the country under you and Russian control. And I think that gave us an important part of the messaging by Ukraine. But I think once people saw the criminal activity, genocidal activity and strict use of the term that Russia was engaged, it was very hard to to say that all that, you know, that that's a terrible thing that's going on. But, you know, we've got to be realistic and so on. I think there's limits to realism here. And the Americans have accepted that. And I think as indeed of the Germans and the French and so on as well, since says the scale of what the Russians were trying to do became apparent and it became apparent another part of the messaging that if you gave Ukraine decent weapons, they could use them. They were very professional. They showed a lot of strategic acumen, more so than the Russians.

I think Biden's played it pretty well. I mean, personally, I would have preferred that if he'd been a bit quicker and more ambitious with some of the kit. But he's held the alliance together. He's given it purpose. Is acknowledge what inevitably going to be concerned about nuclear escalation as being a priority and made that position very clear. It hasn't been done by subterfuge, he said. These are the things that we're going to avoid because of that. And in the end, an enormous amount of resource has been handed over to Ukraine. And I think because of the American system where lots of people speak and you never quite sure with what authority. By and large, they've understood that the Ukrainians can't be strong armed into a negotiation and a deal that they can't sell to themselves. That leaves a chunk of the country under you and Russian control. And I think that gave us an important part of the messaging by Ukraine. But I think once people saw the criminal activity, genocidal activity and strict use of the term that Russia was engaged, it was very hard to to say that all that, you know, that that's a terrible thing that's going on. But, you know, we've got to be realistic and so on. I think there's limits to realism here. And the Americans have accepted that. And I think as indeed of the Germans and the French and so on as well, since says the scale of what the Russians were trying to do became apparent and it became apparent another part of the messaging that if you gave Ukraine decent weapons, they could use them. They were very professional. They showed a lot of strategic acumen, more so than the Russians.

You mentioned the nuclear issue a couple of weeks ago that was running very hot and you were getting we were getting various messages from Moscow about the prospect of using nuclear weapons. They seem to have put that in the box more recently. How concerned are you about the prospect of use of a tactical nuclear weapon?

You mentioned the nuclear issue a couple of weeks ago that was running very hot and you were getting we were getting various messages from Moscow about the prospect of using nuclear weapons. They seem to have put that in the box more recently. How concerned are you about the prospect of use of a tactical nuclear weapon?

My view from the start was I couldn't see any military value or the political value in the use of a tactical nuclear weapon. You have the caution you have to bring in with anything to do with Putin was that he's done one stupid thing and do another. But I think people are missing the role that nuclear weapons played from day one in this, which is relevant to Biden's attitude as well, which is that you're saying that Putin said absolutely explicitly from day one, if NATO intervenes directly on behalf of the Ukrainians, put forces on the ground to put aircraft in the air, then this could escalate to something terrible, whether it would or not. You know, we're not going to find out, I don't think. But it worked. It worked within the Biden So he wouldn't have a no fly zone. Work with some of the limitations on the range of systems being handed over to Ukraine. And that would be jeopardized if if nuclear weapons were actually used. Probably to not a lot of benefit. So I think the Russia it suited the Russians at one point, I think to stir the pot to get people. Worried. There's a sort of nonsensical thing about a dirty bomb, which, of course is not a nuclear weapon. It's an irradiating weapon, but nothing like a nuclear weapon. You know, the Chinese way it helps, I think, was is there clearly was not stopping anybody supporting Ukraine and just alarming people who might otherwise have been friendly to Russia. So I think they come back down. I don't think the issue will ever quite go away until somebody pronounces this war over.

My view from the start was I couldn't see any military value or the political value in the use of a tactical nuclear weapon. You have the caution you have to bring in with anything to do with Putin was that he's done one stupid thing and do another. But I think people are missing the role that nuclear weapons played from day one in this, which is relevant to Biden's attitude as well, which is that you're saying that Putin said absolutely explicitly from day one, if NATO intervenes directly on behalf of the Ukrainians, put forces on the ground to put aircraft in the air, then this could escalate to something terrible, whether it would or not. You know, we're not going to find out, I don't think. But it worked. It worked within the Biden So he wouldn't have a no fly zone. Work with some of the limitations on the range of systems being handed over to Ukraine. And that would be jeopardized if if nuclear weapons were actually used. Probably to not a lot of benefit. So I think the Russia it suited the Russians at one point, I think to stir the pot to get people. Worried. There's a sort of nonsensical thing about a dirty bomb, which, of course is not a nuclear weapon. It's an irradiating weapon, but nothing like a nuclear weapon. You know, the Chinese way it helps, I think, was is there clearly was not stopping anybody supporting Ukraine and just alarming people who might otherwise have been friendly to Russia. So I think they come back down. I don't think the issue will ever quite go away until somebody pronounces this war over.

Winter's about to set in, so operations will become more difficult and the conditions much harsher. How will General Winter affect the course of the war in the coming months, do you think?

Winter's about to set in, so operations will become more difficult and the conditions much harsher. How will General Winter affect the course of the war in the coming months, do you think?

It won't stop the fighting. I don't think that's the case. It it holds it up the ground bogey. So it's harder for the Ukrainians to advance quickly. But the conditions will become harsher. And this is an endurance test, which, again, what in terms of what one knows, the support being given by allies to Ukraine in cold weather, keep their better, be better prepared for it. There's all sorts of question marks about whether the Russians have got enough kit, whether they care enough about the people they've mobilized to to fit them out properly. And you can you know, you're not going to survive in those conditions. You know, you'll give up or go home. So I think there will be operations. And I would have thought after Kherson, you know, we know that the Russians are going to a desperate to try to establish lines that they can hold in the hope that by the end of the winter, the Russians used their mobilized people more effectively to have some sort of new offensive capability or better even a better defensive capability, which is why I don't think the Ukrainians will want to stop. I think they'll they'll they'll want to push as hard as they can and hard as conditions allow.

It won't stop the fighting. I don't think that's the case. It it holds it up the ground bogey. So it's harder for the Ukrainians to advance quickly. But the conditions will become harsher. And this is an endurance test, which, again, what in terms of what one knows, the support being given by allies to Ukraine in cold weather, keep their better, be better prepared for it. There's all sorts of question marks about whether the Russians have got enough kit, whether they care enough about the people they've mobilized to to fit them out properly. And you can you know, you're not going to survive in those conditions. You know, you'll give up or go home. So I think there will be operations. And I would have thought after Kherson, you know, we know that the Russians are going to a desperate to try to establish lines that they can hold in the hope that by the end of the winter, the Russians used their mobilized people more effectively to have some sort of new offensive capability or better even a better defensive capability, which is why I don't think the Ukrainians will want to stop. I think they'll they'll they'll want to push as hard as they can and hard as conditions allow.

So if you squint your eyes, how will this end?

So if you squint your eyes, how will this end?

It's very difficult to know how it end because I don't think Russia has a plan for ending the war. And we know how Ukraine wants it to as far as they're concerned. They want to just get the Russians out of their country and they'll keep on pushing until they've got at some point there, they'll expect to negotiation and they've got cards to play in that negotiation. The whole question of the future of sanctions against reparations, issues of war crimes, there's lots of things that will need discussing. It's not a quick way to end the war, a negotiation like that, because it won't end quickly, won't be implemented quickly. So that's one problem. There's no easy negotiated solution, even if the Russians wanted war. But I think the real problem is that I don't think Putin knows how to end it now. He puts in a negotiated solution for Putin would mean him acknowledging that provinces, which he has just declared to be Russian are not Russian. He's already, you know, bizarrely claimed person for a forever part of Russia and therefore become the first Russian leader to have to abandon a Russian city. It was this strange behaviour and he's caught himself. Whether this is deliberate or not, whether he wanted to bind to his successors as much as himself. I don't know. But. But now to end the war in negotiation, he will have to repudiate his big claim, his most recent claim about the war's objectives. I don't think he can do that. And also, as soon as the war ends, there's a reckoning. What was this for? What are the costs? What's happening to our economy? Is it worth it? And there's no good answers to those questions. This is a terrible blunder. It's a catastrophe for Ukraine. But in the end, one for it for Russia as well. So my suspicion is the most likely way this ends is not through a full negotiation between the governments, but a military military agreement on a ceasefire, disengagement, which will come as, again, this is a possibility. It's not a prediction which will come when the Russian military appreciate their position is untenable.

It's very difficult to know how it end because I don't think Russia has a plan for ending the war. And we know how Ukraine wants it to as far as they're concerned. They want to just get the Russians out of their country and they'll keep on pushing until they've got at some point there, they'll expect to negotiation and they've got cards to play in that negotiation. The whole question of the future of sanctions against reparations, issues of war crimes, there's lots of things that will need discussing. It's not a quick way to end the war, a negotiation like that, because it won't end quickly, won't be implemented quickly. So that's one problem. There's no easy negotiated solution, even if the Russians wanted war. But I think the real problem is that I don't think Putin knows how to end it now. He puts in a negotiated solution for Putin would mean him acknowledging that provinces, which he has just declared to be Russian are not Russian. He's already, you know, bizarrely claimed person for a forever part of Russia and therefore become the first Russian leader to have to abandon a Russian city. It was this strange behaviour and he's caught himself. Whether this is deliberate or not, whether he wanted to bind to his successors as much as himself. I don't know. But. But now to end the war in negotiation, he will have to repudiate his big claim, his most recent claim about the war's objectives. I don't think he can do that. And also, as soon as the war ends, there's a reckoning. What was this for? What are the costs? What's happening to our economy? Is it worth it? And there's no good answers to those questions. This is a terrible blunder. It's a catastrophe for Ukraine. But in the end, one for it for Russia as well. So my suspicion is the most likely way this ends is not through a full negotiation between the governments, but a military military agreement on a ceasefire, disengagement, which will come as, again, this is a possibility. It's not a prediction which will come when the Russian military appreciate their position is untenable.

And could Putin survive that? Could could Ukraine spell the end for Vladimir Putin?

And could Putin survive that? Could could Ukraine spell the end for Vladimir Putin?

It certainly could. He could survive. He could go. I think Kremlin watchers are are unsure. I don't know any of them who declare themselves confident on what the future holds. I mean, in our countries, somebody who was responsible for such a mess would go. That is one of the advantages of our democracies, however embarrassing it can be at times. There's no obvious way there is an election in 2024 in Russia, but there's no obvious way. Of taking him out of power. The we can see, but doesn't mean to say that people in Moscow aren't thinking about it. There's all sorts of power plays clearly going on amongst the ultra nationalists, the vacuum group Chechens. There's lots of different factions involved in all of this. So yeah, it could mean I mean, the ADU certainly means he's a much diminished international figure.

It certainly could. He could survive. He could go. I think Kremlin watchers are are unsure. I don't know any of them who declare themselves confident on what the future holds. I mean, in our countries, somebody who was responsible for such a mess would go. That is one of the advantages of our democracies, however embarrassing it can be at times. There's no obvious way there is an election in 2024 in Russia, but there's no obvious way. Of taking him out of power. The we can see, but doesn't mean to say that people in Moscow aren't thinking about it. There's all sorts of power plays clearly going on amongst the ultra nationalists, the vacuum group Chechens. There's lots of different factions involved in all of this. So yeah, it could mean I mean, the ADU certainly means he's a much diminished international figure.

As you say. The Ukraine war is a reminder of how difficult it is to invade and occupy another country, a lesson that great powers seem to constantly forget. What are the other big lessons out of this war for militaries, do you think?

As you say. The Ukraine war is a reminder of how difficult it is to invade and occupy another country, a lesson that great powers seem to constantly forget. What are the other big lessons out of this war for militaries, do you think?

Well, you know, the first wars are run as pedagogic exercises. Every war is a bit different. And what people think is timeless lessons often are timeless. What this war shows is what a lot of wars have showed. First, it's very difficult to occupy places where you're not welcome. Secondly, logistics is incredibly important and you ignore it at your peril. But in modern warfare, the consumption of ammunition consumables is immense and intense. And unless you can sustain that, you'll be in trouble. However clever you are at fighting. It warns that not to get overexcited by things like cyber. Now we know it was tried. It's important, but it is not decisive. It shows that what we thought was going to be decisive, which is airpower. Turns out not to have been so decisive because the Russians weren't prepared for Ukrainian air defense effort. It's a reminder that there is one way of fighting a war which ignores the Geneva Conventions and seeks to coerce, brutalize an enemy into capitulation, which after the Second World War, we, we said, doesn't work because of the experience of the Blitz or the allied bombings of Germany might have know. Undoubtedly, the atomic bombs did make a point. But Japan was beaten in all respects by that anyway. And it doesn't seem to work this time. The contrast between the two ways of fighting has been very sharp. The Ukrainians didn't have very much else of a choice. I mean, fighting a pretty traditional regular war in lines that would have been recognized by any Second World War general and kept that like drones and so on, that wasn't a member most respected. It's perfectly comprehensible in in very classical military terms. The Russians have been fighting that sort of war not particularly well, while also fighting a much broader coercive war against the Ukrainians, also against the West with energy prices and so on. And, you know, they've demonstrated that they can cause pain, but not that they can gain political effect as a result of this.

Well, you know, the first wars are run as pedagogic exercises. Every war is a bit different. And what people think is timeless lessons often are timeless. What this war shows is what a lot of wars have showed. First, it's very difficult to occupy places where you're not welcome. Secondly, logistics is incredibly important and you ignore it at your peril. But in modern warfare, the consumption of ammunition consumables is immense and intense. And unless you can sustain that, you'll be in trouble. However clever you are at fighting. It warns that not to get overexcited by things like cyber. Now we know it was tried. It's important, but it is not decisive. It shows that what we thought was going to be decisive, which is airpower. Turns out not to have been so decisive because the Russians weren't prepared for Ukrainian air defense effort. It's a reminder that there is one way of fighting a war which ignores the Geneva Conventions and seeks to coerce, brutalize an enemy into capitulation, which after the Second World War, we, we said, doesn't work because of the experience of the Blitz or the allied bombings of Germany might have know. Undoubtedly, the atomic bombs did make a point. But Japan was beaten in all respects by that anyway. And it doesn't seem to work this time. The contrast between the two ways of fighting has been very sharp. The Ukrainians didn't have very much else of a choice. I mean, fighting a pretty traditional regular war in lines that would have been recognized by any Second World War general and kept that like drones and so on, that wasn't a member most respected. It's perfectly comprehensible in in very classical military terms. The Russians have been fighting that sort of war not particularly well, while also fighting a much broader coercive war against the Ukrainians, also against the West with energy prices and so on. And, you know, they've demonstrated that they can cause pain, but not that they can gain political effect as a result of this.

A lot of speculation about what the war in Ukraine might or might not mean for Taiwan. Do you have any thoughts about whether what has happened this year makes a Chinese operation against Taiwan more or less likely? And how much more difficult would it be to mount that kind of amphibious invasion?

A lot of speculation about what the war in Ukraine might or might not mean for Taiwan. Do you have any thoughts about whether what has happened this year makes a Chinese operation against Taiwan more or less likely? And how much more difficult would it be to mount that kind of amphibious invasion?

Well, I don't think it would make a Chinese operation more likely because it showed pitfalls have shown how true it is, a reminder that the best laid plans and so on go wrong. And how hard it is to to occupy a country that doesn't want to be occupied. And I think for China, you know, given that that I mean, the Russians, too, have been talking about, in a way reunifying a country. But for China to use the similar sort of messages as the Russians have been using, would, I think really be very difficult in this context and certainly would undermine that. Their basic message as to what the whole thing was about. It's a much more difficult operation, which obviously a bigger China is much bigger and Taiwan is much smaller, but it's amphibious and we know how difficult those are. The Americans have said they would defend Taiwan. Whether all future presidents will say that, who knows? So there's many big uncertainties for them. I think they wish to emphasize the force was it was on the table and the ambition is still there just because he really doesn't want the Taiwanese to try and change their legal status, because that would be a trigger and it would be very hard. I think given all that has been said, for the Taiwanese to do that and not get a big Chinese response, whether that would be all out war or a blockade, which is a war like out, I don't know, a blockade as problems, but it would certainly keep up the pressure and would raise issues for the U.S. and its allies about including Australia, about how they should respond. So I'm optimistic, too. Too strong a word. But you won't get the sense in recent days, including from the G20, that the Chinese have seen what's happened to Putin and don't want to fall into the same the stakes of getting themselves so isolated, of underestimating the West, so much of taking big military risks that they just get themselves into a dire situation. So it'd be interesting to see how this year, the coming year unfolds as whether with, you know, Biden having successful navigated the midterms inevitably president for life after the party Congress. Whether the two leaders are confident enough to carry on the work of of just calming relations down. Am I. I think Biden's concept of the floor is quite a good one. You know, you're not going to have announcement of peace in our time and a beloved, but something that would recognize that these two countries really just have to work together. You can't they can't ignore each other or just go into an endless competition. And if that happens, then maybe things will calm down. But it will require the, you know, the Chinese to rethink some of their foreign policy and how they relate to the rest of the world and the wolf warrior diplomacy and all of that, which, you know, Australia knows a lot about. Indeed, Australia, you know, is going to be a key test, I think, of of whether China can manage a different sort of of relationship with with countries with which you may not have a natural affinity.

Well, I don't think it would make a Chinese operation more likely because it showed pitfalls have shown how true it is, a reminder that the best laid plans and so on go wrong. And how hard it is to to occupy a country that doesn't want to be occupied. And I think for China, you know, given that that I mean, the Russians, too, have been talking about, in a way reunifying a country. But for China to use the similar sort of messages as the Russians have been using, would, I think really be very difficult in this context and certainly would undermine that. Their basic message as to what the whole thing was about. It's a much more difficult operation, which obviously a bigger China is much bigger and Taiwan is much smaller, but it's amphibious and we know how difficult those are. The Americans have said they would defend Taiwan. Whether all future presidents will say that, who knows? So there's many big uncertainties for them. I think they wish to emphasize the force was it was on the table and the ambition is still there just because he really doesn't want the Taiwanese to try and change their legal status, because that would be a trigger and it would be very hard. I think given all that has been said, for the Taiwanese to do that and not get a big Chinese response, whether that would be all out war or a blockade, which is a war like out, I don't know, a blockade as problems, but it would certainly keep up the pressure and would raise issues for the U.S. and its allies about including Australia, about how they should respond. So I'm optimistic, too. Too strong a word. But you won't get the sense in recent days, including from the G20, that the Chinese have seen what's happened to Putin and don't want to fall into the same the stakes of getting themselves so isolated, of underestimating the West, so much of taking big military risks that they just get themselves into a dire situation. So it'd be interesting to see how this year, the coming year unfolds as whether with, you know, Biden having successful navigated the midterms inevitably president for life after the party Congress. Whether the two leaders are confident enough to carry on the work of of just calming relations down. Am I. I think Biden's concept of the floor is quite a good one. You know, you're not going to have announcement of peace in our time and a beloved, but something that would recognize that these two countries really just have to work together. You can't they can't ignore each other or just go into an endless competition. And if that happens, then maybe things will calm down. But it will require the, you know, the Chinese to rethink some of their foreign policy and how they relate to the rest of the world and the wolf warrior diplomacy and all of that, which, you know, Australia knows a lot about. Indeed, Australia, you know, is going to be a key test, I think, of of whether China can manage a different sort of of relationship with with countries with which you may not have a natural affinity.

I'll come back to Australia at the end, but before I leave Ukraine, let me ask you about your own country's role in that war. You alluded earlier, I think, to how your politics has been a little embarrassing recently. Yeah. Is Ukraine a rare bright spot for for British foreign policy? I mean, Boris promised a global Britain and a completely different kind of foreign policy. One British official said to me recently that on Ukraine, Brexit, Britain has been the moral conscience of Europe. Do you agree with that?

I'll come back to Australia at the end, but before I leave Ukraine, let me ask you about your own country's role in that war. You alluded earlier, I think, to how your politics has been a little embarrassing recently. Yeah. Is Ukraine a rare bright spot for for British foreign policy? I mean, Boris promised a global Britain and a completely different kind of foreign policy. One British official said to me recently that on Ukraine, Brexit, Britain has been the moral conscience of Europe. Do you agree with that?

Yeah, I mean, I think oddly, through all our travails, which are largely about economics and the cost of Brexit and the impact of COVID and the impact of the war, I mean, so we share a lot of problems with other European countries that we've managed to give our own twist to. The foreign policy actually hasn't been a moderately bright spot anyway. The integrated review was quite well received. And I think on Ukraine, you know, the government took a position early on and this was not just, you know, when when they were sure that what the intelligence was saying even before that the defence secretary, who's been one of the key figures in in the policy, was challenging what Putin was saying on Ukraine when others were after. It's not I mean, it's not a competition to show who's most moral. But the fact is that the British position vis a vis Northern Europe, as well as the Ukrainians is strengthened as a result because that's been consistent, has put resources where the policy was. While the French and the Germans appeared to equivocate, I mean, I think the French and the Germans equivocate far less now, but for a while they did. And, you know, I don't think we should underestimate the consequences if the British and the Americans. But the British I mean, the British were not first in the sense that lots of them, the Canadians and Americans and others were coming in after 2014. But on this crisis, the British did push harder than most. So as one who's been pretty critical of our governments, I think, obviously got it right.

Yeah, I mean, I think oddly, through all our travails, which are largely about economics and the cost of Brexit and the impact of COVID and the impact of the war, I mean, so we share a lot of problems with other European countries that we've managed to give our own twist to. The foreign policy actually hasn't been a moderately bright spot anyway. The integrated review was quite well received. And I think on Ukraine, you know, the government took a position early on and this was not just, you know, when when they were sure that what the intelligence was saying even before that the defence secretary, who's been one of the key figures in in the policy, was challenging what Putin was saying on Ukraine when others were after. It's not I mean, it's not a competition to show who's most moral. But the fact is that the British position vis a vis Northern Europe, as well as the Ukrainians is strengthened as a result because that's been consistent, has put resources where the policy was. While the French and the Germans appeared to equivocate, I mean, I think the French and the Germans equivocate far less now, but for a while they did. And, you know, I don't think we should underestimate the consequences if the British and the Americans. But the British I mean, the British were not first in the sense that lots of them, the Canadians and Americans and others were coming in after 2014. But on this crisis, the British did push harder than most. So as one who's been pretty critical of our governments, I think, obviously got it right.

You have a new prime minister. Yeah, I guess he's fortunate in his predecessor. In a way.

You have a new prime minister. Yeah, I guess he's fortunate in his predecessor. In a way.

He doesn't have big shoes to follow, you know.

He doesn't have big shoes to follow, you know.

How do you assess Rishi Sunak? Do you have any kind of early hints about his international inclinations?

How do you assess Rishi Sunak? Do you have any kind of early hints about his international inclinations?

You know, he was chancellor who's coming in in a major economic crisis. The budget day today is going to mean raising taxes. Bad news for lots of families. He's an accountant, essentially. He's a spreadsheet man and.

You know, he was chancellor who's coming in in a major economic crisis. The budget day today is going to mean raising taxes. Bad news for lots of families. He's an accountant, essentially. He's a spreadsheet man and.

Been a bit a bit raised some questions about the defense budget when he was chancellor.

Been a bit a bit raised some questions about the defense budget when he was chancellor.

He did, but I thought chancellor's raised questions about the defence budget. But he kept the Defense Secretary in position and he kept the former secretary who's actually been a Trump supporter in position. My sense is, unlike many prime ministers, he's not leaping into the international arena. He's been to the G20 instances. He can't ignore it. And like most prime ministers, you'll get drawn in much more, even if he wants to concentrate on domestic. It matters. But my sense is he doesn't particularly want a major reappraisal of foreign policy. He's got enough to do on the home front and therefore will continue with the policies he's inherited. I think the major thing people are looking for is sort of building on on what's happened as a result of Ukraine and the fact that, you know, there's not a lot of bandwidth left in British politics. Whether or not he needs to ease relations with the EU on a number of issues. And then again, there are some early signs of that is not is not is not picking fights to to impress his backbenches, which has been a problem with the last couple of prime ministers.

He did, but I thought chancellor's raised questions about the defence budget. But he kept the Defense Secretary in position and he kept the former secretary who's actually been a Trump supporter in position. My sense is, unlike many prime ministers, he's not leaping into the international arena. He's been to the G20 instances. He can't ignore it. And like most prime ministers, you'll get drawn in much more, even if he wants to concentrate on domestic. It matters. But my sense is he doesn't particularly want a major reappraisal of foreign policy. He's got enough to do on the home front and therefore will continue with the policies he's inherited. I think the major thing people are looking for is sort of building on on what's happened as a result of Ukraine and the fact that, you know, there's not a lot of bandwidth left in British politics. Whether or not he needs to ease relations with the EU on a number of issues. And then again, there are some early signs of that is not is not is not picking fights to to impress his backbenches, which has been a problem with the last couple of prime ministers.

Finishing on Australia. Lawry, you've been a regular visitor to this country for a long time. You've as part of your fellowship here at the Institute, you've spent time in Canberra speaking to officials. What has struck you this time about the Australian strategic debate?

Finishing on Australia. Lawry, you've been a regular visitor to this country for a long time. You've as part of your fellowship here at the Institute, you've spent time in Canberra speaking to officials. What has struck you this time about the Australian strategic debate?

It's much more focused, I would say. You know, when I first started coming to Australia, which was not long after the end of the Cold War, you know, it was, you know, whether or not there was any distinctive Australian contribution to me seemed to be up in the air. Then you have, you know, China is the great opportunity that not such a great opportunity and may be a problem now, definitely a problem much closer alliance, therefore, with the U.S. and with the UK potentially with orcas. So it seems to be a much more focused debate. But big issues are big issues about whether it's wise to tie yourself so closely to the to American policy. Is there a defence policy, security policy that that is that is more parochial and doesn't play such a big role in the wider Indo-Pacific region? Can you get the feeling that the balance of opinion is swung to? We have a role to play and we and it can be played. It's a much more, much more. No, I would say there's an evident and sure consensus, but it's more focused. The questions are the same questions that that keep up. And it's always a very interesting debate and I think Brit Brits coming to Australia or you're quite comfortable with the US and we recognise elements of it because the questions that we ask ourselves. You know, we're an island nation. We're not absolutely mandated to get involved in other people's problems. Geography is actually being quite kind to us. We have the close relationship with the Americans, which permeates all our defence. Is this wise? What would happen if you have another Trumpist type president? I mean, all these issues we face you face, except, you know, China looms large for you. Whereas Russia looms larger for us.

It's much more focused, I would say. You know, when I first started coming to Australia, which was not long after the end of the Cold War, you know, it was, you know, whether or not there was any distinctive Australian contribution to me seemed to be up in the air. Then you have, you know, China is the great opportunity that not such a great opportunity and may be a problem now, definitely a problem much closer alliance, therefore, with the U.S. and with the UK potentially with orcas. So it seems to be a much more focused debate. But big issues are big issues about whether it's wise to tie yourself so closely to the to American policy. Is there a defence policy, security policy that that is that is more parochial and doesn't play such a big role in the wider Indo-Pacific region? Can you get the feeling that the balance of opinion is swung to? We have a role to play and we and it can be played. It's a much more, much more. No, I would say there's an evident and sure consensus, but it's more focused. The questions are the same questions that that keep up. And it's always a very interesting debate and I think Brit Brits coming to Australia or you're quite comfortable with the US and we recognise elements of it because the questions that we ask ourselves. You know, we're an island nation. We're not absolutely mandated to get involved in other people's problems. Geography is actually being quite kind to us. We have the close relationship with the Americans, which permeates all our defence. Is this wise? What would happen if you have another Trumpist type president? I mean, all these issues we face you face, except, you know, China looms large for you. Whereas Russia looms larger for us.

And just finally, you mentioned AUKUS, the technology sharing arrangement that was announced by the three governments last September. At its heart of it is a commitment on the part of the United States and the United Kingdom to help Australia build a fleet of nuclear propelled submarines. What's your assessment of the wisdom for a country like Australia with our geography of having nuclear propelled submarines? It's obviously a very difficult task for a country without an indigenous nuclear industry or nuclear weapons to attempt this. What are your thoughts on the achievability and the wisdom of the nuclear subs?

And just finally, you mentioned AUKUS, the technology sharing arrangement that was announced by the three governments last September. At its heart of it is a commitment on the part of the United States and the United Kingdom to help Australia build a fleet of nuclear propelled submarines. What's your assessment of the wisdom for a country like Australia with our geography of having nuclear propelled submarines? It's obviously a very difficult task for a country without an indigenous nuclear industry or nuclear weapons to attempt this. What are your thoughts on the achievability and the wisdom of the nuclear subs?

I think - I think the wisdom needs debating. I mean, I'm not saying it's wrong, but it has implications of because - this is a UK issue as well - you're always going to be tied to the Americans and to a degree, to the Brits, but mainly to the Americans as a result of becoming, having a nuclear fleet. Nuclear submarines are very good. They're very effective. They give you a lot of distance. They're hard to detect and they worry opponents. So there's nothing particularly wrong with the ambition. If you can get them, they'll be very effective. Whether you'll get them remains to be seen. It's a mega procurement project. Everybody I've asked in the Australian Government has been very positive, the trilateral relations are working well and that there's a sort of, having made this commitment, especially the way it was made in September 2021, which wasn't the most elegant diplomatic move, shall we say, having made the commitment, you're really under some obligation to try to make it work. You don't have a lot of latitude, I think, in this. And the Americans and Brits have got d reason to have another nuclear partner. It helps. So I think on balance, I'd be positive. But I think you have to be cautious. I think the other technology sharing stuff is in the short term is very important potentially. And I think there'll be a lot of tests of the relationship that will be, will come before you're really onto the big tests of how far you can take whatever plan comes out next March, how well you can take that forward. We'll be seeing whether you're actually able to make things work in the other areas of technology sharing.

I think - I think the wisdom needs debating. I mean, I'm not saying it's wrong, but it has implications of because - this is a UK issue as well - you're always going to be tied to the Americans and to a degree, to the Brits, but mainly to the Americans as a result of becoming, having a nuclear fleet. Nuclear submarines are very good. They're very effective. They give you a lot of distance. They're hard to detect and they worry opponents. So there's nothing particularly wrong with the ambition. If you can get them, they'll be very effective. Whether you'll get them remains to be seen. It's a mega procurement project. Everybody I've asked in the Australian Government has been very positive, the trilateral relations are working well and that there's a sort of, having made this commitment, especially the way it was made in September 2021, which wasn't the most elegant diplomatic move, shall we say, having made the commitment, you're really under some obligation to try to make it work. You don't have a lot of latitude, I think, in this. And the Americans and Brits have got d reason to have another nuclear partner. It helps. So I think on balance, I'd be positive. But I think you have to be cautious. I think the other technology sharing stuff is in the short term is very important potentially. And I think there'll be a lot of tests of the relationship that will be, will come before you're really onto the big tests of how far you can take whatever plan comes out next March, how well you can take that forward. We'll be seeing whether you're actually able to make things work in the other areas of technology sharing.

Sir Lawrence Freedman, it's lovely having you with us at the Lowy Institute and it's been a pleasure speaking with you today. Thank you for joining me on The Director's Chair.

Sir Lawrence Freedman, it's lovely having you with us at the Lowy Institute and it's been a pleasure speaking with you today. Thank you for joining me on The Director's Chair.

My pleasure.

My pleasure.

We've talked today about what General Winter might have in store for the war in Ukraine. Wherever it goes from here, we're all hoping for Ukrainian Spring. The Director's Chair is a podcast from the Lowy Institute, produced on Gadigal Land. The producers for this episode were Shane McLeod and Darcy Milne, with research by David Vallance. If you've enjoyed this episode, please leave a review in your podcast app. You can find all our past episodes at our website. lowyinstitute.org/directorschair. I'm Michael Fullilove. Thank you for listening.

We've talked today about what General Winter might have in store for the war in Ukraine. Wherever it goes from here, we're all hoping for Ukrainian Spring. The Director's Chair is a podcast from the Lowy Institute, produced on Gadigal Land. The producers for this episode were Shane McLeod and Darcy Milne, with research by David Vallance. If you've enjoyed this episode, please leave a review in your podcast app. You can find all our past episodes at our website. lowyinstitute.org/directorschair. I'm Michael Fullilove. Thank you for listening.