Lute force. If it doesn't work, you're just not using enough. You're listening to Software Radio, Special Operations, Military Nails and straight talk with the guys in the community.

Lute force. If it doesn't work, you're just not using enough. You're listening to Software Radio, Special Operations, Military Nails and straight talk with the guys in the community.

Hi, and welcome to another wonderful episode of soft Rep Radio. I am your host, Rad and I have the wonderful pleasure of having this guest on that I'm about to introduce. But first I just have to mention to check out the soft rep dot com merch store. That's what keeps the gas going on the fireplace, you guys buying those torchlights and coffee mugs and everything that's branded with our logo. We love it, okay, and we love to get tagged by it, So make sure you go check out the merch store. The second thing is our book club at soft rep dot com forward slash book hyphen Club. That's all up in my brain. I'm trying to remember all of this, guys, so book club, So join the book club. Now, my guest comes from the United States Army and I'm going to read you his bio to introduce you to retire Colonel John antol And, so let me go ahead and read this. John Antell is a soldier, historian, author, leadership development expert and master storyteller. In one of his many books or in a single session, John will teach you how to improve your leadership and raise your team's effectiveness. He has published fourteen books and hundreds of magazine articles on military history, military technology, and leadership topics. John served thirty years in the US Army and retired from the US Army as a colonel. He is an airborne and ranger qualified and commanded tank and cavalry units. In his post army career, John has become a successful author, magazine correspondent and editor, video game producer, military consultant, film personality, public speaker, radio talk show host, explainer, integrator, journalist, and leadership coach. He has been awarded the prestigious Draper Leadership Award, the Silver Order of the Saint George Medal, and numerous military medals, including three separate awards of the Legion of Merit. In October twenty seventeen, John was awarded the Congressional Veteran Commendation CVC by Congressman Sam Johnson of Texas. In short, John's life purpose is to develop leaders and inspire service. Welcome to the show, rad Thank.

Hi, and welcome to another wonderful episode of soft Rep Radio. I am your host, Rad and I have the wonderful pleasure of having this guest on that I'm about to introduce. But first I just have to mention to check out the soft rep dot com merch store. That's what keeps the gas going on the fireplace, you guys buying those torchlights and coffee mugs and everything that's branded with our logo. We love it, okay, and we love to get tagged by it, So make sure you go check out the merch store. The second thing is our book club at soft rep dot com forward slash book hyphen Club. That's all up in my brain. I'm trying to remember all of this, guys, so book club, So join the book club. Now, my guest comes from the United States Army and I'm going to read you his bio to introduce you to retire Colonel John antol And, so let me go ahead and read this. John Antell is a soldier, historian, author, leadership development expert and master storyteller. In one of his many books or in a single session, John will teach you how to improve your leadership and raise your team's effectiveness. He has published fourteen books and hundreds of magazine articles on military history, military technology, and leadership topics. John served thirty years in the US Army and retired from the US Army as a colonel. He is an airborne and ranger qualified and commanded tank and cavalry units. In his post army career, John has become a successful author, magazine correspondent and editor, video game producer, military consultant, film personality, public speaker, radio talk show host, explainer, integrator, journalist, and leadership coach. He has been awarded the prestigious Draper Leadership Award, the Silver Order of the Saint George Medal, and numerous military medals, including three separate awards of the Legion of Merit. In October twenty seventeen, John was awarded the Congressional Veteran Commendation CVC by Congressman Sam Johnson of Texas. In short, John's life purpose is to develop leaders and inspire service. Welcome to the show, rad Thank.

You very much very kind of you and much more than I deserve.

You very much very kind of you and much more than I deserve.

You know, you just put yourself into the selfless service lifestyle where you just probably wanted to do good.

You know, you just put yourself into the selfless service lifestyle where you just probably wanted to do good.

Well, I tell you the I'm still trying to make an effort. Since January twenty twenty one, I was a member of the Army Science Board for three years. And when I left the Army Science Board, I realized that we still needed to coach, teach and mentor our military to understand the changing methods of war. And we are transitioning from twenty years of fighting jihatis and fighting in the Middle East, and now we're looking at peer competition. As you can see, the whole world is on fire.

Well, I tell you the I'm still trying to make an effort. Since January twenty twenty one, I was a member of the Army Science Board for three years. And when I left the Army Science Board, I realized that we still needed to coach, teach and mentor our military to understand the changing methods of war. And we are transitioning from twenty years of fighting jihatis and fighting in the Middle East, and now we're looking at peer competition. As you can see, the whole world is on fire.

It really is. And you have a book, right, and it's called Next War, Right, I mean, this is something that is this is your lane, and so you bring this to the show to talk about. I was watching some of your highlight reel, right. You have a YouTube video out there right now, Next War, and I was watching your highlight reels of that and that you're talking already like with a crystal ball of what is currently happening right today. Even though I don't like to date our podcast, but I mean You've got Israel and Hamas going at it wholeheartedly. You've got Ukraine and Russia battling it out right now. And these are, you know, inavertently like proxies for a lot of others to be involved in. And then you have Azerbaijan and Armenia right these triple threats that have been going on, that have been under the radar or not under the radar. People are just like batting a blind eye to it. And I kind of talk to my oil change the other day, kay hear me, and I said, are you ready for a super sonic missile to blow up the grocery store across from us? WHI we're getting this oil change right now?

It really is. And you have a book, right, and it's called Next War, Right, I mean, this is something that is this is your lane, and so you bring this to the show to talk about. I was watching some of your highlight reel, right. You have a YouTube video out there right now, Next War, and I was watching your highlight reels of that and that you're talking already like with a crystal ball of what is currently happening right today. Even though I don't like to date our podcast, but I mean You've got Israel and Hamas going at it wholeheartedly. You've got Ukraine and Russia battling it out right now. And these are, you know, inavertently like proxies for a lot of others to be involved in. And then you have Azerbaijan and Armenia right these triple threats that have been going on, that have been under the radar or not under the radar. People are just like batting a blind eye to it. And I kind of talk to my oil change the other day, kay hear me, and I said, are you ready for a super sonic missile to blow up the grocery store across from us? WHI we're getting this oil change right now?

Yeah. Yeah, We're in dangerous times. We're in dangerous times. And since January twenty twenty one, when I left the Army Science Board, I started to spend a lot of time briefing, having ZOOM and MS team calls with soldiers, leaders and government leaders throughout our nation also our allies. And so I've given over two hundred and eighty presentations since January twenty twenty one. Yeah, and those presentations mostly by MS teams or ZOOM MS teams is the preferred method right now. But the point is is almost all virtual, but many but several dozens in person, and I don't charge for these. All I care about is that we learn together and that we try to move our understanding, our situation, awareness of the changing methods of war, and in many ways, you know, just move the needle to get us to act in time, because I think that we're urgently we need to have a sense of urgency. We're running out of time. If we're not careful, we're going to find ourselves in a much greater conflict against peer competitors very soon. I mean, if you think about it, World War II wasn't really thought of as World War two until about nineteen forty forty one, maybe even forty two by some people. We are right now in a situation where there's the greatest war in Europe since World War Two. There's a major conflict in the Middle East which is going to expand Israel is going to be fighting both Hamas, Hezbollah and possibly Iran. We could be in a war this Friday in the Middle East. Our aircraft carriers are in position, our aircraft could be there because if we do not act after we've set this deterrent up, then no one will ever believe that we will act, and all of our deterrence fails, and therefore we just bring on more war. So the first thing we have to do is not so much to try to prognosticate where everything will happen and what will happen next, but understand the changing trends, the changing methods of war, and then be able to apply those with some foresight and imagination. And if you look at what happened in Israel, the horrific, horrific Hamas attack on Israel that happened on Saturday, October seventh and is now developing into a major war, this is a failure of imagination on the part of US intelligence, Israeli intelligence, and European intelligence, and a failure of imagination amongst the leadership. We get so consumed with our internal squabbles and our internal desires that we forget about the people out there who really want to kill us and how we need to protect them, and the government's job, and the leaders of our nation and other nations, their job is to protect their people. And the problem with Israel was that they have done some things that have made that less capable than more. And Israel now is going to show you in their fight against Thomas and others, an extraordinary capability because they understand the changing methods of war. They have adapted to these and developed the systems, the tactics, techniques, and procedures in order to do extraordinary things in the battle space. And we're going to see that unfold in the days ahead.

Yeah. Yeah, We're in dangerous times. We're in dangerous times. And since January twenty twenty one, when I left the Army Science Board, I started to spend a lot of time briefing, having ZOOM and MS team calls with soldiers, leaders and government leaders throughout our nation also our allies. And so I've given over two hundred and eighty presentations since January twenty twenty one. Yeah, and those presentations mostly by MS teams or ZOOM MS teams is the preferred method right now. But the point is is almost all virtual, but many but several dozens in person, and I don't charge for these. All I care about is that we learn together and that we try to move our understanding, our situation, awareness of the changing methods of war, and in many ways, you know, just move the needle to get us to act in time, because I think that we're urgently we need to have a sense of urgency. We're running out of time. If we're not careful, we're going to find ourselves in a much greater conflict against peer competitors very soon. I mean, if you think about it, World War II wasn't really thought of as World War two until about nineteen forty forty one, maybe even forty two by some people. We are right now in a situation where there's the greatest war in Europe since World War Two. There's a major conflict in the Middle East which is going to expand Israel is going to be fighting both Hamas, Hezbollah and possibly Iran. We could be in a war this Friday in the Middle East. Our aircraft carriers are in position, our aircraft could be there because if we do not act after we've set this deterrent up, then no one will ever believe that we will act, and all of our deterrence fails, and therefore we just bring on more war. So the first thing we have to do is not so much to try to prognosticate where everything will happen and what will happen next, but understand the changing trends, the changing methods of war, and then be able to apply those with some foresight and imagination. And if you look at what happened in Israel, the horrific, horrific Hamas attack on Israel that happened on Saturday, October seventh and is now developing into a major war, this is a failure of imagination on the part of US intelligence, Israeli intelligence, and European intelligence, and a failure of imagination amongst the leadership. We get so consumed with our internal squabbles and our internal desires that we forget about the people out there who really want to kill us and how we need to protect them, and the government's job, and the leaders of our nation and other nations, their job is to protect their people. And the problem with Israel was that they have done some things that have made that less capable than more. And Israel now is going to show you in their fight against Thomas and others, an extraordinary capability because they understand the changing methods of war. They have adapted to these and developed the systems, the tactics, techniques, and procedures in order to do extraordinary things in the battle space. And we're going to see that unfold in the days ahead.

Yeah, one hundred percent. A lot of things that we didn't know are going to be in battle will, like even from video games, if you will, will be starting to show up on our news feeds when you see these things that we've never seen before being deployed. You know, these new munitions that we never knew about. Something that's been classified this whole time is now being used in a big conflict that we're like, what was that thing? Yeah, and you just really.

Yeah, one hundred percent. A lot of things that we didn't know are going to be in battle will, like even from video games, if you will, will be starting to show up on our news feeds when you see these things that we've never seen before being deployed. You know, these new munitions that we never knew about. Something that's been classified this whole time is now being used in a big conflict that we're like, what was that thing? Yeah, and you just really.

Often actually been practicing with these weapons. So the difference is is that if you have a secret weapon, if you will, unless it is able to deploy by itself and use by itself, if humans have to use it, if units of soldiers have to use it, they have to practice with it ahead of time. There's many cases in history where countries had military technology was very an tried to show it up right before the battle, but nobody knew how to use it. But the Israelis are an exception here. They have integrated this into their training, integrated into their system. I mean, just imagine the Israelis have mobilized three hundred and sixty thousand soldiers in three days.

Often actually been practicing with these weapons. So the difference is is that if you have a secret weapon, if you will, unless it is able to deploy by itself and use by itself, if humans have to use it, if units of soldiers have to use it, they have to practice with it ahead of time. There's many cases in history where countries had military technology was very an tried to show it up right before the battle, but nobody knew how to use it. But the Israelis are an exception here. They have integrated this into their training, integrated into their system. I mean, just imagine the Israelis have mobilized three hundred and sixty thousand soldiers in three days.

Right because they have a ready reserve right of like IDF and male female from seventeen or sixteen, all the way, you have to do their forced service for two years. But then they we see photos, right, we see photos of the IDF walking around with their guns slung in civilian clothing like eating gelato. Okay, so it's like, you know, they're supposed to be always up, they're ready for this type of a situation. I guess that would bring me to say, we all saw what happened or hear about what's happening, and it's ever evolving. But why do you think it took you know, six hours for them to give any kind of reaction force to the initial onslaught with all of these armed personnel on the ground, I'm sure.

Right because they have a ready reserve right of like IDF and male female from seventeen or sixteen, all the way, you have to do their forced service for two years. But then they we see photos, right, we see photos of the IDF walking around with their guns slung in civilian clothing like eating gelato. Okay, so it's like, you know, they're supposed to be always up, they're ready for this type of a situation. I guess that would bring me to say, we all saw what happened or hear about what's happening, and it's ever evolving. But why do you think it took you know, six hours for them to give any kind of reaction force to the initial onslaught with all of these armed personnel on the ground, I'm sure.

Yeah, they're going to do a detailed after action review of what their problems were but I tell everyone there, but for the grace of God, go us. I mean, the Israelis are very good at what they do at defending their nation, and their military is extremely serious, much more serious sometimes than ours. And our problem is is that they were surprised. And how were they surprised. Well, again, it's a failure of imagination when you believe a certain line of thinking that well, Hamas is coming around. They've been real nice to us lately. We beat them hard in the May twenty twenty one war, and they learned their lesson, you know, they learned their lesson, so they would never dare do anything. When you start to believe that narrative, then you disregard the obvious indicators that start to pop up, and you come up with excuses for why they won't happen. So we've done the same thing.

Yeah, they're going to do a detailed after action review of what their problems were but I tell everyone there, but for the grace of God, go us. I mean, the Israelis are very good at what they do at defending their nation, and their military is extremely serious, much more serious sometimes than ours. And our problem is is that they were surprised. And how were they surprised. Well, again, it's a failure of imagination when you believe a certain line of thinking that well, Hamas is coming around. They've been real nice to us lately. We beat them hard in the May twenty twenty one war, and they learned their lesson, you know, they learned their lesson, so they would never dare do anything. When you start to believe that narrative, then you disregard the obvious indicators that start to pop up, and you come up with excuses for why they won't happen. So we've done the same thing.

The dominoes lie where we have let's say Palestine. You know, I know they're not rocks per se, but I usually say they throw slingsh shots. That Israel, you know, to try to attack them. Back in the day, kids throwing rocks, you know, and then Israel having armament against Gaza and that influence. But today and Hamas throwing rockets, right, So yeah, where do they go from not having much in some of these you know, volleys that they get involved with all of a sudden thousands and thousands of these missiles. And I understand paragliders are using and being they're being inventive and they're being outside the box thinkers, you know, But where are all these rockets and all of these you know, where do you think the dominoes are being pushed off here?

The dominoes lie where we have let's say Palestine. You know, I know they're not rocks per se, but I usually say they throw slingsh shots. That Israel, you know, to try to attack them. Back in the day, kids throwing rocks, you know, and then Israel having armament against Gaza and that influence. But today and Hamas throwing rockets, right, So yeah, where do they go from not having much in some of these you know, volleys that they get involved with all of a sudden thousands and thousands of these missiles. And I understand paragliders are using and being they're being inventive and they're being outside the box thinkers, you know, But where are all these rockets and all of these you know, where do you think the dominoes are being pushed off here?

Well, it's quite clear, and only we need leaders with foresight. Foresight is the ability to see and solve problems in the short run and create solutions for the long term. So we have to be able to solve problems in the short run and create solutions for the long term. And we're our lack of leadership across the board is sad because this is what causes us to drive into cascating failures, cascading wars. I mean, have you noticed that the wars now are happening with increasing frequency And they're not small things, they're major wars. So our challenge is is that our leadership really needs.

Well, it's quite clear, and only we need leaders with foresight. Foresight is the ability to see and solve problems in the short run and create solutions for the long term. So we have to be able to solve problems in the short run and create solutions for the long term. And we're our lack of leadership across the board is sad because this is what causes us to drive into cascating failures, cascading wars. I mean, have you noticed that the wars now are happening with increasing frequency And they're not small things, they're major wars. So our challenge is is that our leadership really needs.

To change, and we need human intelligence that was on the ground. There's got to be a humid out there, that's uh right.

To change, and we need human intelligence that was on the ground. There's got to be a humid out there, that's uh right.

But if you ignore it because you've been told no, that's not really what they mean. They really are getting together because they they're just trying to posture. You can talk yourself out out of bad things all the time. Now, failure of imagination is crucial. This was a complete failure of imagination. The Israelis are very good at this. They normally developed up multiple courses of action with many possibilities. They red team with folks that are trained to act like the enemy and think like the enemy and say this is what the enemy will do. Somehow they ignored all of that. This is the same danger that we have. Now. You can use red teaming in any organization you have, but for national purposes and for the army, it's truly important. For the military, it's truly important. We've got to look at some of the worst cases. Now you put this into context of the United States. What can we learn from the surprise that Hamas gave Israel? Now the rockets and all that you mentioned. Just to answer your question, Hamas and Hezbela are proxy armies of Irad, pure and simple. Anybody who says otherwise is making an excuse. Now, they're making an excuse because they don't want to get into a larger conflict. But you see, there's two kinds of ways to look at most of these problems. There's the black swan. We all know what that means. It's kind of like what happened on nine to one one, when something out of the blue seems to shoot out. And then there's the gray rhino. And the gray rhino is something that you see oft in the distance is coming towards you, but you ignore it, and you ignore it until it hits you. And our problem is we have some gray rhinos out there that are a huge and some black swans, and you couple those and you've got real problems. The Israelis disregarded the intel. The indicators didn't believe that Hamas would act and did not alert their folks, and their folks were not prepared. The soldiers in camps, their police in stations were not prepared for this kind of attack. Now they should have been thinking about this because I'll tell you in nineteen forty eight, when Israel first got its independence, and Israelis were living in Kibesim and Nahab's settlements, Knackoll settlements and all this. They were armed, and they were prepared, and they were better prepared for this kind of attack in nineteen forty eight than they are today. Why, well, we've gotten a lot softer over the years. We don't carry weapons anymore, at least in Israel. They're not even allowed to carry weapons. In many cases. Most people don't know that. They don't have a second Amendment. An armed population is didn't more difficult for this kind of thing to happen against a disarmed population, it's much easier. So Israel has changed and they rely on their military to do stuff. And their common thought is that hold in place and hide and the military will come save us. It's kind of the same thing that many people in the United States believe in the police. Things won't happen. If anything happens, I'll call nine one one and the police will arrive. Well, mostly the police arrived after the fact, and the army in Israel arrived after the fact. Now that is hurting the Israeli the idef, the Israeli defense forces to the core. They are sickened by this whole thing, and they are going to seek their revenge. Joh On Hamas and then later other enemies should those other enemies continue to attack. And today there's been a lot of action in the Lebanon, Israeli border with Hesbelah, so actions that could erupt into greater conflict. So we could see this easily get into a larger war. But what's important isn't the ability to kind of to be some kind of prognosticator that says, I know exactly what's going to happen. No one knows what's going to happen tomorrow. But what we can do is we can study the past. Now we can learn to gain foresight. And one of the things I've been trying to impel the US military to do is to study the wars of the last three years. Now there are four of them. There were three up until Saturday. The first was the second to going to Kerabak War in twenty twenty forty four day decisive victory of Azerbai John against Armenian And this was their first war in history to be won primarily by robotic systems.

But if you ignore it because you've been told no, that's not really what they mean. They really are getting together because they they're just trying to posture. You can talk yourself out out of bad things all the time. Now, failure of imagination is crucial. This was a complete failure of imagination. The Israelis are very good at this. They normally developed up multiple courses of action with many possibilities. They red team with folks that are trained to act like the enemy and think like the enemy and say this is what the enemy will do. Somehow they ignored all of that. This is the same danger that we have. Now. You can use red teaming in any organization you have, but for national purposes and for the army, it's truly important. For the military, it's truly important. We've got to look at some of the worst cases. Now you put this into context of the United States. What can we learn from the surprise that Hamas gave Israel? Now the rockets and all that you mentioned. Just to answer your question, Hamas and Hezbela are proxy armies of Irad, pure and simple. Anybody who says otherwise is making an excuse. Now, they're making an excuse because they don't want to get into a larger conflict. But you see, there's two kinds of ways to look at most of these problems. There's the black swan. We all know what that means. It's kind of like what happened on nine to one one, when something out of the blue seems to shoot out. And then there's the gray rhino. And the gray rhino is something that you see oft in the distance is coming towards you, but you ignore it, and you ignore it until it hits you. And our problem is we have some gray rhinos out there that are a huge and some black swans, and you couple those and you've got real problems. The Israelis disregarded the intel. The indicators didn't believe that Hamas would act and did not alert their folks, and their folks were not prepared. The soldiers in camps, their police in stations were not prepared for this kind of attack. Now they should have been thinking about this because I'll tell you in nineteen forty eight, when Israel first got its independence, and Israelis were living in Kibesim and Nahab's settlements, Knackoll settlements and all this. They were armed, and they were prepared, and they were better prepared for this kind of attack in nineteen forty eight than they are today. Why, well, we've gotten a lot softer over the years. We don't carry weapons anymore, at least in Israel. They're not even allowed to carry weapons. In many cases. Most people don't know that. They don't have a second Amendment. An armed population is didn't more difficult for this kind of thing to happen against a disarmed population, it's much easier. So Israel has changed and they rely on their military to do stuff. And their common thought is that hold in place and hide and the military will come save us. It's kind of the same thing that many people in the United States believe in the police. Things won't happen. If anything happens, I'll call nine one one and the police will arrive. Well, mostly the police arrived after the fact, and the army in Israel arrived after the fact. Now that is hurting the Israeli the idef, the Israeli defense forces to the core. They are sickened by this whole thing, and they are going to seek their revenge. Joh On Hamas and then later other enemies should those other enemies continue to attack. And today there's been a lot of action in the Lebanon, Israeli border with Hesbelah, so actions that could erupt into greater conflict. So we could see this easily get into a larger war. But what's important isn't the ability to kind of to be some kind of prognosticator that says, I know exactly what's going to happen. No one knows what's going to happen tomorrow. But what we can do is we can study the past. Now we can learn to gain foresight. And one of the things I've been trying to impel the US military to do is to study the wars of the last three years. Now there are four of them. There were three up until Saturday. The first was the second to going to Kerabak War in twenty twenty forty four day decisive victory of Azerbai John against Armenian And this was their first war in history to be won primarily by robotic systems.

No kidding, right, like a drone or some type of.

No kidding, right, like a drone or some type of.

The first time this unmanned combat aerial vehicles and loitering munitions were used on such a scale for such a great effect to win decisively when you consider the Armenians held the high ground, not Hills mountains. They had defensive positions that were dug in for twenty six years, and all of that didn't matter. The Azerbaijohnny's were able to change the situation. Studying that war gives you great insight and provide you with the fuel for foresight to see where the rest of the wars are going to happen and how they're going to happen.

The first time this unmanned combat aerial vehicles and loitering munitions were used on such a scale for such a great effect to win decisively when you consider the Armenians held the high ground, not Hills mountains. They had defensive positions that were dug in for twenty six years, and all of that didn't matter. The Azerbaijohnny's were able to change the situation. Studying that war gives you great insight and provide you with the fuel for foresight to see where the rest of the wars are going to happen and how they're going to happen.

Your YouTube video it's next war, right that you have out there, That's what it is. That was about four weeks ago that you put that up and then you know, I was watching it. Just really informative and I just want to let my listener know that that's out there, right you can. We're going to put it in the comments so that if you want to just click on that YouTube link, we'll get that information. I just want to let you know that it's incredible to watch the footage that you have there where it shows just these you know, makeshift they would be like a VBIED right right, right, like just just completely correct a vehicle born improvised explosive device.

Your YouTube video it's next war, right that you have out there, That's what it is. That was about four weeks ago that you put that up and then you know, I was watching it. Just really informative and I just want to let my listener know that that's out there, right you can. We're going to put it in the comments so that if you want to just click on that YouTube link, we'll get that information. I just want to let you know that it's incredible to watch the footage that you have there where it shows just these you know, makeshift they would be like a VBIED right right, right, like just just completely correct a vehicle born improvised explosive device.

Right, and the changing methods of war are such that soon we will have AI enabled swarms of loiding munitions linked with every other system that can be linked and networked, and they will go from point A to point B to point B point C, and they will kill and destroy all of the things underneath it according to their targeting parameters. So what we're going to get is an increased temple of war. Anyway I've developed from this study of war. Of these three wars, and again the go to Kira Bak war was the first one. The second one was the Israeli Hamas War of twenty twenty one, which the Israelis won in eleven days. Now how much US was badly beaten in that war. They sued for peace and sued for a ceasefire, and the Israelis granted it to them because it wasn't anything like what happened this last Saturday. There's going to be no ceasefire now. And then the third war courses the Russo Ukrainian War, the greatest war in Europe since World War Two, the most bloody and the most innovative. In fact, if you were to say, how do you represent in one word the Ukrainian armed forces and that word would be innovation. The fact that they've survived and that they're on the offensive, even if the offensive hasn't been as successful as many people would like, is truly amazing, because if you do the calculus, if you add up all the correlation of forces, Russia should have won in the second week.

Right, and the changing methods of war are such that soon we will have AI enabled swarms of loiding munitions linked with every other system that can be linked and networked, and they will go from point A to point B to point B point C, and they will kill and destroy all of the things underneath it according to their targeting parameters. So what we're going to get is an increased temple of war. Anyway I've developed from this study of war. Of these three wars, and again the go to Kira Bak war was the first one. The second one was the Israeli Hamas War of twenty twenty one, which the Israelis won in eleven days. Now how much US was badly beaten in that war. They sued for peace and sued for a ceasefire, and the Israelis granted it to them because it wasn't anything like what happened this last Saturday. There's going to be no ceasefire now. And then the third war courses the Russo Ukrainian War, the greatest war in Europe since World War Two, the most bloody and the most innovative. In fact, if you were to say, how do you represent in one word the Ukrainian armed forces and that word would be innovation. The fact that they've survived and that they're on the offensive, even if the offensive hasn't been as successful as many people would like, is truly amazing, because if you do the calculus, if you add up all the correlation of forces, Russia should have won in the second week.

Right according to the Grand scheme. If we look at the map that's flat at school, it says Russia's right here, so big, they should win.

Right according to the Grand scheme. If we look at the map that's flat at school, it says Russia's right here, so big, they should win.

Okay, if it was just a mathematical equation and you added up that Russia has, and you added up everything Ukraine has, well, Ukraine would have lost in the second week. In fact, in it's a sad story about the United States because in nineteen sixty seven or sixty eight they had their first major input into large computer systems, and Department of Defense says, we've added up all the correlation of forces, when will we win in Vietnam? And they said, you want in nineteen sixty two?

Okay, if it was just a mathematical equation and you added up that Russia has, and you added up everything Ukraine has, well, Ukraine would have lost in the second week. In fact, in it's a sad story about the United States because in nineteen sixty seven or sixty eight they had their first major input into large computer systems, and Department of Defense says, we've added up all the correlation of forces, when will we win in Vietnam? And they said, you want in nineteen sixty two?

You know, but obviously, yeah, well, here's what I blame for Ukraine's success is the twenty year old who's been now at combat since February twenty second, of like twenty twenty two. Okay, so he's already been. He's been doing it since he's about eighteen seventeen, eighteen years old now, so he's been in combat. But before that, that young man didn't have any type of like military training, and what he was doing before that was most likely playing airsoft wargames in a free society where that was a normal thing and they can go and play those war games on the weekend, okay, And so there's any training he got and Call of Duty or any of these video games where it requires thought process, flyings coming up with crazy tactics, and now all of a sudden you have the same twenty year old who grew up on that technology. Whereas in Russia you got these guys that are just a little bit you know, their economy wasn't giving them video games. They're very oppressed. They don't have the same freedom to get on the internet like they were in Ukraine. And so you have these old time Russian tactics coming at these Ukrainians who are there's old timers. You got some fifty year olds who know the old school tactics of Russia tactics, but they have that that's from their wartime, right, That fifty year old had his time, you know, fighting, But that young twenty year old who's sneaking through the lines, who's dropping precision little you know, pin drop munitions, that kid right there, you know, he's the unique innovator. Those are the innovators.

You know, but obviously, yeah, well, here's what I blame for Ukraine's success is the twenty year old who's been now at combat since February twenty second, of like twenty twenty two. Okay, so he's already been. He's been doing it since he's about eighteen seventeen, eighteen years old now, so he's been in combat. But before that, that young man didn't have any type of like military training, and what he was doing before that was most likely playing airsoft wargames in a free society where that was a normal thing and they can go and play those war games on the weekend, okay, And so there's any training he got and Call of Duty or any of these video games where it requires thought process, flyings coming up with crazy tactics, and now all of a sudden you have the same twenty year old who grew up on that technology. Whereas in Russia you got these guys that are just a little bit you know, their economy wasn't giving them video games. They're very oppressed. They don't have the same freedom to get on the internet like they were in Ukraine. And so you have these old time Russian tactics coming at these Ukrainians who are there's old timers. You got some fifty year olds who know the old school tactics of Russia tactics, but they have that that's from their wartime, right, That fifty year old had his time, you know, fighting, But that young twenty year old who's sneaking through the lines, who's dropping precision little you know, pin drop munitions, that kid right there, you know, he's the unique innovator. Those are the innovators.

Yeah, there's a lot to be said for what you just talked about and many points of truth. There a couple of things that I think all your listeners need to understand. Video games don't really trade you through war. What's interesting is that being able to adapt to technology does being able to use different types of technology and understand how to use it. That's really good. But call of duty is not warfare, but.

Yeah, there's a lot to be said for what you just talked about and many points of truth. There a couple of things that I think all your listeners need to understand. Video games don't really trade you through war. What's interesting is that being able to adapt to technology does being able to use different types of technology and understand how to use it. That's really good. But call of duty is not warfare, but.

The controller that they're using, sir, you know the controller that the building that Xbox. Yes, it's being used by EOD guys for the robot.

The controller that they're using, sir, you know the controller that the building that Xbox. Yes, it's being used by EOD guys for the robot.

Absolutely, But for instance, the Ukrainians are losing ten thousand drones a month. They're losing ten thousand drones a month small uas. Primarily that's the quad copter drones. The key to those is a good operator, you see, because every one of those are FPV drones first person view drones where they are in fact operated one drone by one person. So they have to be able to be really skilled because you can fly a drone in your house and that's cool, but you try to fly it outside and that's harder. And you try to fly it outside carrying your grenade, going through the trees and coming up tree top level and dropping it on a tank. That takes skill. So there's a whole bunch of skills that have to be trained with. Now in the United States, we should have drone racing clubs everywhere to train drone operators, you know, but we don't. In the military, we should do that as well, we don't. The ability to have well trained drone operators is crucial, and of course the technology will change. But the more you can adapt to technology, the better off you are. And America has a bit of advantage there because we have a technological society. But the enemy also know this and they will do everything they can to take away our electrons, you know. So what I've been trying to do, and I gave three briefings this week before we've even talked a tenth Mountain Division just yesterday. I try to get the leaders and the staffs of these units to see the trends, to see how war is changing, and those changes are really crucial to change your thinking and your mindset, because, for instance, the first is that we have a transparrent battlespace. Everything on the battlespace can be seen by sensors from ground level all the way up to satellite. A peer competitor once to find you. They have so many means now there's no place that you can hide. That means there are no sanctuaries because missiles and rockets now can fly tremendous ranges with great precision. In the past, they could only shoot so far and you could be out of the range of the artillery. But now you are always under the guns. You are never out of the range of their striking power. So therefore they see you and they can strike you. So we have to develop a concept called masking. It is not a doctrinal term in our military. I'm trying to get people to embrace it. Masking is the full spectrum, multi domain effort to deceive enemy sensors and disrupt enemy targeting. To deceive their sensors and disrupt their targeting, there's a whole bunch of things you can do to deceive their sensors, and there's things you can do to disrupt their targeting. You can't necessarily be invisible, you can't be necessarily in an impregnable position. I mean, there are very few impregnable positions in the world. You can dig a foxhole and get out of bursting radius of some artillery. You can dig a deep bunker and you can get out of the range of some things, but bunker busting missiles will find you. Drones can fly into the openings. All those things can happen. So there are no places on the battlefield that are now completely safe. What does that mean, Well, think about what that means as far as our ability to mass forces. Why are the Ukrainians having problems trying to break through the Russian defenses Because every time they mass more than four or five vehicles, the Russians see that and the target that sticks out gets hammered. The target that sticks out on this battlespace gets hammered. They'll see it and in seconds they have a kill chain that goes very rapidly from sensor to shooter, and they'll launch systems, launch effects against those targets and destroy them. So if you have ten vehicles together, or ten vehicles in a command post, wow, that's a real target that sticks out and you'll be seen immediately. You got more than that cluster together, and you're going to be annihilated. Now, the Israelis have less of a problem with this with hamas their rockets are primarily designed to strike general areas. They are not very precise. Now that doesn't mean they don't have some precision weaponry, and any one of their drones can be absolutely precise because it's human operated, it's remotely human operated. But the Israelis are amassing their forces now and they're starting their assault into Gaza and other places, and as they do this, you'll see many videos of them clustered together. They would never be able to do that in Ukraine, and we cannot do that on future battlespaces against peer competitors. Now tomorrow, we could end up in war by design or mistake. In Europe, the Russians, if they wanted to hit us, imagine our post camps and stations in Romania, in Poland, in Germany are peacetime. We're in peacetime barracks. We're all within range of their weaponry and they know exactly where we are. So if they wanted to conduct the first strike to kill a lot of Americans. They have the missile capability and the ISR capability to do it. Now. Retribution is what holds them back to terrence. But if they don't believe in our deterrence anymore, then we just become a soft target. One of the jobs our military has to be is to turn those soft targets into hard positions so that they become very hard nuts to crack. And the enemy will say, why why we shouldn't do this because we don't have the capability.

Absolutely, But for instance, the Ukrainians are losing ten thousand drones a month. They're losing ten thousand drones a month small uas. Primarily that's the quad copter drones. The key to those is a good operator, you see, because every one of those are FPV drones first person view drones where they are in fact operated one drone by one person. So they have to be able to be really skilled because you can fly a drone in your house and that's cool, but you try to fly it outside and that's harder. And you try to fly it outside carrying your grenade, going through the trees and coming up tree top level and dropping it on a tank. That takes skill. So there's a whole bunch of skills that have to be trained with. Now in the United States, we should have drone racing clubs everywhere to train drone operators, you know, but we don't. In the military, we should do that as well, we don't. The ability to have well trained drone operators is crucial, and of course the technology will change. But the more you can adapt to technology, the better off you are. And America has a bit of advantage there because we have a technological society. But the enemy also know this and they will do everything they can to take away our electrons, you know. So what I've been trying to do, and I gave three briefings this week before we've even talked a tenth Mountain Division just yesterday. I try to get the leaders and the staffs of these units to see the trends, to see how war is changing, and those changes are really crucial to change your thinking and your mindset, because, for instance, the first is that we have a transparrent battlespace. Everything on the battlespace can be seen by sensors from ground level all the way up to satellite. A peer competitor once to find you. They have so many means now there's no place that you can hide. That means there are no sanctuaries because missiles and rockets now can fly tremendous ranges with great precision. In the past, they could only shoot so far and you could be out of the range of the artillery. But now you are always under the guns. You are never out of the range of their striking power. So therefore they see you and they can strike you. So we have to develop a concept called masking. It is not a doctrinal term in our military. I'm trying to get people to embrace it. Masking is the full spectrum, multi domain effort to deceive enemy sensors and disrupt enemy targeting. To deceive their sensors and disrupt their targeting, there's a whole bunch of things you can do to deceive their sensors, and there's things you can do to disrupt their targeting. You can't necessarily be invisible, you can't be necessarily in an impregnable position. I mean, there are very few impregnable positions in the world. You can dig a foxhole and get out of bursting radius of some artillery. You can dig a deep bunker and you can get out of the range of some things, but bunker busting missiles will find you. Drones can fly into the openings. All those things can happen. So there are no places on the battlefield that are now completely safe. What does that mean, Well, think about what that means as far as our ability to mass forces. Why are the Ukrainians having problems trying to break through the Russian defenses Because every time they mass more than four or five vehicles, the Russians see that and the target that sticks out gets hammered. The target that sticks out on this battlespace gets hammered. They'll see it and in seconds they have a kill chain that goes very rapidly from sensor to shooter, and they'll launch systems, launch effects against those targets and destroy them. So if you have ten vehicles together, or ten vehicles in a command post, wow, that's a real target that sticks out and you'll be seen immediately. You got more than that cluster together, and you're going to be annihilated. Now, the Israelis have less of a problem with this with hamas their rockets are primarily designed to strike general areas. They are not very precise. Now that doesn't mean they don't have some precision weaponry, and any one of their drones can be absolutely precise because it's human operated, it's remotely human operated. But the Israelis are amassing their forces now and they're starting their assault into Gaza and other places, and as they do this, you'll see many videos of them clustered together. They would never be able to do that in Ukraine, and we cannot do that on future battlespaces against peer competitors. Now tomorrow, we could end up in war by design or mistake. In Europe, the Russians, if they wanted to hit us, imagine our post camps and stations in Romania, in Poland, in Germany are peacetime. We're in peacetime barracks. We're all within range of their weaponry and they know exactly where we are. So if they wanted to conduct the first strike to kill a lot of Americans. They have the missile capability and the ISR capability to do it. Now. Retribution is what holds them back to terrence. But if they don't believe in our deterrence anymore, then we just become a soft target. One of the jobs our military has to be is to turn those soft targets into hard positions so that they become very hard nuts to crack. And the enemy will say, why why we shouldn't do this because we don't have the capability.

I'd imagine peace time. Could we not have like, you know, patriot missile systems and stuff? I mean, like.

I'd imagine peace time. Could we not have like, you know, patriot missile systems and stuff? I mean, like.

Systems are great. Patriots. Missile systems are very expensive in their high end against high end targets. They are important to have. They have to be alert all the time, yeah, and maintained and up kept and like them to cover everything which we don't readiness, Yeah we don't.

Systems are great. Patriots. Missile systems are very expensive in their high end against high end targets. They are important to have. They have to be alert all the time, yeah, and maintained and up kept and like them to cover everything which we don't readiness, Yeah we don't.

I mean.

I mean.

Israel is a small country and their iron dome system works very well. But they spent a tremendous amount and so a way to help them to create this iron dome system that provides this bubble over Israel. We don't have anything like this over the United States, you know, like they do. We have anti ballistic missile systems that are designed to shoot down you know, nuclear warheads if they're launched on a major scale. But our camps, post and stations all across the world in North North Korea has missiles that could hit our camps in South Korea within minutes. We're not in hardened positions. Guam, we have air defense systems there, but we're not in hardened positions. Pearl Harbor. Nobody could hit us at Pearl Harbor. I mean we're too far away. Right. Wait a minute, Wait a minute, what happened to World War Two when these guys had propelled driven air cranes and hit us. I mean, so we have to think this through. That is a problem with no imagination. You see, we have set ourselves in a box thinking we're the best in the world. Nobody wants to fight us, and we're fine. Well, the enemy doesn't see it that way. They see us as weak. They see us having fled from Afghanistan. They see us having across the world stage lost a lot of our capabilities to deter war.

Israel is a small country and their iron dome system works very well. But they spent a tremendous amount and so a way to help them to create this iron dome system that provides this bubble over Israel. We don't have anything like this over the United States, you know, like they do. We have anti ballistic missile systems that are designed to shoot down you know, nuclear warheads if they're launched on a major scale. But our camps, post and stations all across the world in North North Korea has missiles that could hit our camps in South Korea within minutes. We're not in hardened positions. Guam, we have air defense systems there, but we're not in hardened positions. Pearl Harbor. Nobody could hit us at Pearl Harbor. I mean we're too far away. Right. Wait a minute, Wait a minute, what happened to World War Two when these guys had propelled driven air cranes and hit us. I mean, so we have to think this through. That is a problem with no imagination. You see, we have set ourselves in a box thinking we're the best in the world. Nobody wants to fight us, and we're fine. Well, the enemy doesn't see it that way. They see us as weak. They see us having fled from Afghanistan. They see us having across the world stage lost a lot of our capabilities to deter war.

I mean we've fled quite a bit, actually, not just Afghanistan, but all the past have fled out. I mean all the way back to NOM fled out. You know. It's like, you know, they're just I mean, honestly, you know, I don't know how.

I mean we've fled quite a bit, actually, not just Afghanistan, but all the past have fled out. I mean all the way back to NOM fled out. You know. It's like, you know, they're just I mean, honestly, you know, I don't know how.

You couldn't send a weaker and more confused message, right, You know very well, if you have a bully, you got to send that bully a clear message. You know, if you sit there and you cower, the bully is going to take you down. But if you send him a message that this fight, even if you're smaller, is going to be so bad, it's going to be so tough on him that he's going to regret at the rest of his life, then you have a chance to deter And if you don't, then you have a chance to fight. And the worst thing you can do is die fighting rather than die as a victim. You know. So our challenges, our challenges is that we've got to send better messaging with real action, and it's the actions that count, and our actions so far have been contrary to deterrence.

You couldn't send a weaker and more confused message, right, You know very well, if you have a bully, you got to send that bully a clear message. You know, if you sit there and you cower, the bully is going to take you down. But if you send him a message that this fight, even if you're smaller, is going to be so bad, it's going to be so tough on him that he's going to regret at the rest of his life, then you have a chance to deter And if you don't, then you have a chance to fight. And the worst thing you can do is die fighting rather than die as a victim. You know. So our challenges, our challenges is that we've got to send better messaging with real action, and it's the actions that count, and our actions so far have been contrary to deterrence.

We just need to spray paint Wolverine yeah on everything we get.

We just need to spray paint Wolverine yeah on everything we get.

I hope we never get to the case where we have to defend the United States with high school kids at their hometown.

I hope we never get to the case where we have to defend the United States with high school kids at their hometown.

Red Dawn, I said, Wolverines, Right, we know exactly what I understand.

Red Dawn, I said, Wolverines, Right, we know exactly what I understand.

I follow it completely.

I follow it completely.

Yeah.

Yeah.

The point is is that is that our military needs to get harder, smarter, and tougher and focused on war fighting. Unfortunately, there's a misfocus in many ways and we need to change that. And commanders right now across the military, we're having trouble getting commanders because people don't want to accept command because if they do, they have a very high propensity of being called toxic for something or any other city.

The point is is that is that our military needs to get harder, smarter, and tougher and focused on war fighting. Unfortunately, there's a misfocus in many ways and we need to change that. And commanders right now across the military, we're having trouble getting commanders because people don't want to accept command because if they do, they have a very high propensity of being called toxic for something or any other city.

Well, and they also need to be given command so that they could be called toxic because they're not even be giving the opportunity to be toxic because the houses in disarray, they're fighting against themselves when they should be working to you know, support bills for Ukraine, Israel and infrastructure and you know American citizens.

Well, and they also need to be given command so that they could be called toxic because they're not even be giving the opportunity to be toxic because the houses in disarray, they're fighting against themselves when they should be working to you know, support bills for Ukraine, Israel and infrastructure and you know American citizens.

Well, American democracy has always been messy, and we'll get through that. Some people will argue, you know, different cases and make a lot of hay out of certain things, but what we have to do is we have to have focused, clear, strong leadership in order to deture war. Just like when you deter a bully, and our military needs to be harder, tougher, and smarter. Now, we have a lot of great people in the military, Army, Navy, Marines, Air Force, Coast Guard, Space Force. Those guys are working hard in many cases, but they have to have the foresight and the imagination to understand what's coming. We did not understand what was coming on December seventh, nineteen forty one, as most of your listeners know, that's when Japan, Japan attack Pearl Harbor started for US World War two, and we were surprised. We never thought they would do that. We thought they might, you know, attack US in the Philippines, little piece meal stuff. They were tremendous in their first six months. They wrecked havoc across the Pacific for a year.

Well, American democracy has always been messy, and we'll get through that. Some people will argue, you know, different cases and make a lot of hay out of certain things, but what we have to do is we have to have focused, clear, strong leadership in order to deture war. Just like when you deter a bully, and our military needs to be harder, tougher, and smarter. Now, we have a lot of great people in the military, Army, Navy, Marines, Air Force, Coast Guard, Space Force. Those guys are working hard in many cases, but they have to have the foresight and the imagination to understand what's coming. We did not understand what was coming on December seventh, nineteen forty one, as most of your listeners know, that's when Japan, Japan attack Pearl Harbor started for US World War two, and we were surprised. We never thought they would do that. We thought they might, you know, attack US in the Philippines, little piece meal stuff. They were tremendous in their first six months. They wrecked havoc across the Pacific for a year.

You know.

You know.

Basically, we're at our with send. Had they been better at it, we would have been really bad. So our challenge is is that what happens if we have another situation like that. Our military is being paid and trained to stop that situation through deterrence. That means we have to be so tough that they will not attack us. And right now we have a lot of soft targets out there and a lot of soft thinking and not the kind of training that we need because we're not training for the next war. We're actually training, in many cases for past wars.

Basically, we're at our with send. Had they been better at it, we would have been really bad. So our challenge is is that what happens if we have another situation like that. Our military is being paid and trained to stop that situation through deterrence. That means we have to be so tough that they will not attack us. And right now we have a lot of soft targets out there and a lot of soft thinking and not the kind of training that we need because we're not training for the next war. We're actually training, in many cases for past wars.

So let's let's let let me let me pick up the training then real quick with you, colonel, because retire, colonel, forgive me, but colonel, you get those Colonel.

So let's let's let let me let me pick up the training then real quick with you, colonel, because retire, colonel, forgive me, but colonel, you get those Colonel.

You're always you always have the title. And I'm honored, yes, colonel in the United States Army, and I'm very proud of that. You can call me John, antel or John, doesn't matter. And I've been called worse.

You're always you always have the title. And I'm honored, yes, colonel in the United States Army, and I'm very proud of that. You can call me John, antel or John, doesn't matter. And I've been called worse.

Go ahead, So with your how proud you are, I would never call you soft? Right, that's a two shape point because I got a friend that's a private in a guard unit, and I don't think he's soft. He doesn't think he's soft, But is his training soft?

Go ahead, So with your how proud you are, I would never call you soft? Right, that's a two shape point because I got a friend that's a private in a guard unit, and I don't think he's soft. He doesn't think he's soft, But is his training soft?

We don't rise to the level of our expectations, fall to the level of our training.

We don't rise to the level of our expectations, fall to the level of our training.

M And so if this is a regimented training program that's constantly put out to these guys and somebody wrote it and they might have been soft.

M And so if this is a regimented training program that's constantly put out to these guys and somebody wrote it and they might have been soft.

Well is that here's the deal? You have the are you hard? Are you you have the discipline to make your soldiers camouflage? What does it take to learn to be to camouflage your soldiers. It takes discipline and equipment, and if you don't have the equipment, you make it up. Now, you look at most pictures of American soldiers and they're poorly camouflaged. And camouflaging vehicles and camouflaging command post crucial in a transparent battle space. That's essential. The discipline that we need to lead the army and the Air Force and the Navy and the Marines and the Space force. You know, in the years they had through these tough times, has got to be armed with the foresight of what those wars will look like. And again I go back to we need to study the four wars that have just happened since twenty twenty. The second to go in too, Karabakh War twenty twenty, the Israeli Haimas War twenty twenty one, the Ukrainian War twenty twenty two going on, and now the Israeli Hamas War. I'm calling it the October War twenty twenty three, but it's it's going to go on longer than a month. So our challenge is is that we have to study these and our leaders need to be studying this. I had a general officer who retired and was talking to me about a subject and I said, well, sir, you know while you were in command, this was going on and I'm sure you were studying it. And he said, why was too busy commanding to study war?

Well is that here's the deal? You have the are you hard? Are you you have the discipline to make your soldiers camouflage? What does it take to learn to be to camouflage your soldiers. It takes discipline and equipment, and if you don't have the equipment, you make it up. Now, you look at most pictures of American soldiers and they're poorly camouflaged. And camouflaging vehicles and camouflaging command post crucial in a transparent battle space. That's essential. The discipline that we need to lead the army and the Air Force and the Navy and the Marines and the Space force. You know, in the years they had through these tough times, has got to be armed with the foresight of what those wars will look like. And again I go back to we need to study the four wars that have just happened since twenty twenty. The second to go in too, Karabakh War twenty twenty, the Israeli Haimas War twenty twenty one, the Ukrainian War twenty twenty two going on, and now the Israeli Hamas War. I'm calling it the October War twenty twenty three, but it's it's going to go on longer than a month. So our challenge is is that we have to study these and our leaders need to be studying this. I had a general officer who retired and was talking to me about a subject and I said, well, sir, you know while you were in command, this was going on and I'm sure you were studying it. And he said, why was too busy commanding to study war?

Well, I mean, what do you You got to read at least sun Su, right, or at least Swartzkoff's stories and have an understanding, right, if you're going to be a position of.

Well, I mean, what do you You got to read at least sun Su, right, or at least Swartzkoff's stories and have an understanding, right, if you're going to be a position of.

That, well, you need to be a leader. You need experience and knowledge in depth. So you need to understand things like in the military Sunsu and clause of its and all that. But you also need you know, in breath, I'm sorry, in breath, you need to understand and it basically the overall in breadth of it. But you also need to study in depth the campaigns that are happening now. Because the war's nature is relatively the same over the years, which is why Sunsu the Art of War classfits from the eighteenth century of nineteenth century. Those studies are valuable to us because the nature of war hasn't changed in the big picture, but the methods of war changed dramatically. Obviously, there were no machine guns in the American Revolution. Now there are machine guns. You can't fight the way you fight in the American Revolution against machine guns. That'd be crazy, all right, And we learned that in World War One, basically, So we have to change our thinking with the methods, changing methods of war, and artificial intelligence is driving a tremendous change in warfare. Weapons are now as you saw on the video that we talked about earlier that I sent out to everyone, those weapons are now able to see the battle space with high definition and send back streaming video, and all of that can be collected for intelligence and information for strike information, and you know you've hit the target and to win the information war. So you've got all these capabilities now, and we've got to change how we think about how to fight simply just some simple things like the first strike. In every case, we're not going to be attacking our peer competitors. I can't imagine the preemptive war against China or Russia. It's not out of the realm of possibility.

That, well, you need to be a leader. You need experience and knowledge in depth. So you need to understand things like in the military Sunsu and clause of its and all that. But you also need you know, in breath, I'm sorry, in breath, you need to understand and it basically the overall in breadth of it. But you also need to study in depth the campaigns that are happening now. Because the war's nature is relatively the same over the years, which is why Sunsu the Art of War classfits from the eighteenth century of nineteenth century. Those studies are valuable to us because the nature of war hasn't changed in the big picture, but the methods of war changed dramatically. Obviously, there were no machine guns in the American Revolution. Now there are machine guns. You can't fight the way you fight in the American Revolution against machine guns. That'd be crazy, all right, And we learned that in World War One, basically, So we have to change our thinking with the methods, changing methods of war, and artificial intelligence is driving a tremendous change in warfare. Weapons are now as you saw on the video that we talked about earlier that I sent out to everyone, those weapons are now able to see the battle space with high definition and send back streaming video, and all of that can be collected for intelligence and information for strike information, and you know you've hit the target and to win the information war. So you've got all these capabilities now, and we've got to change how we think about how to fight simply just some simple things like the first strike. In every case, we're not going to be attacking our peer competitors. I can't imagine the preemptive war against China or Russia. It's not out of the realm of possibility.

But I'm not in on it. I don't want that. I mean, like, if it's coming from US, I don't want it from America's side, right, I don't want Yeah, so.

But I'm not in on it. I don't want that. I mean, like, if it's coming from US, I don't want it from America's side, right, I don't want Yeah, so.

If we go into war against Russia or China, and we are at war right now with Russia, hybrid war, so we have to consider that. We have to think that through because we are at war with Russia now and we don't consider ourselves at war, but I assure you Russia does. They're losing soldiers of high mars every day. They know who makes them. They know America is the enemy, you know, So we need to start thinking about that because they want revenge. So we have to open our minds a bit and start thinking differently. You know, we have this complacency that we've developed because we are so rich and so big and on everything else, that we think no one can attack us. And over history, if you study history, you'll see that that doesn't always, that doesn't work. Eventually somebody does. Now, if the Chinese were to attack in the Pacific and conduct a first strike, they have learned from what Russia did in Ukraine. Russia had a first strike on the first week of the war. From February twenty fourth on, they started to hit the Ukrainians. They hit twenty nine and eleven targets. That was not enough. They thought they would slap their little cousins around and say hey, we're coming. Pay attention. We're your big brothers. If you don't, we'll beat you up. Instead, the Ukrainians said, f.

If we go into war against Russia or China, and we are at war right now with Russia, hybrid war, so we have to consider that. We have to think that through because we are at war with Russia now and we don't consider ourselves at war, but I assure you Russia does. They're losing soldiers of high mars every day. They know who makes them. They know America is the enemy, you know, So we need to start thinking about that because they want revenge. So we have to open our minds a bit and start thinking differently. You know, we have this complacency that we've developed because we are so rich and so big and on everything else, that we think no one can attack us. And over history, if you study history, you'll see that that doesn't always, that doesn't work. Eventually somebody does. Now, if the Chinese were to attack in the Pacific and conduct a first strike, they have learned from what Russia did in Ukraine. Russia had a first strike on the first week of the war. From February twenty fourth on, they started to hit the Ukrainians. They hit twenty nine and eleven targets. That was not enough. They thought they would slap their little cousins around and say hey, we're coming. Pay attention. We're your big brothers. If you don't, we'll beat you up. Instead, the Ukrainians said, f.

You, We're going to fight like hell and then yeah, we're going to die try and yep.

You, We're going to fight like hell and then yeah, we're going to die try and yep.

Yeah, So the Russians weren't ready for any of that. They had they foresight on this. Had they thought through what the Ukrainians were going to do, they might have attacked that was that first strike with everything they had. So imagine everything they had and just completely annihilated any capacity to do war and govern the country because the first strike gives them great capability because they have surprise. So put that in China's place. China watched this and studied it. They know, so if they do a first strike, it will be everything they got.

Yeah, So the Russians weren't ready for any of that. They had they foresight on this. Had they thought through what the Ukrainians were going to do, they might have attacked that was that first strike with everything they had. So imagine everything they had and just completely annihilated any capacity to do war and govern the country because the first strike gives them great capability because they have surprise. So put that in China's place. China watched this and studied it. They know, so if they do a first strike, it will be everything they got.

So since Russia came in and tried to just pitter patter in the beginning, if you will with Crimea in twenty twelve, fourteen to today, with what they're doing in February of last year, don't you think that they've kind of like decimated the idea of keeping any infrastructure if they wanted just to move in within a two week mindset and then just take over. Now they're just like laying it out flat and just like blowing the entire cities apart, and just no cause for concern on you know, civilians whatsoever, because they're all just you know, they just don't It seems like almost a genocide.

So since Russia came in and tried to just pitter patter in the beginning, if you will with Crimea in twenty twelve, fourteen to today, with what they're doing in February of last year, don't you think that they've kind of like decimated the idea of keeping any infrastructure if they wanted just to move in within a two week mindset and then just take over. Now they're just like laying it out flat and just like blowing the entire cities apart, and just no cause for concern on you know, civilians whatsoever, because they're all just you know, they just don't It seems like almost a genocide.

Yeah, excellent comment. The Russians came in with a flawed idea. They were believing their own propaganda and Putin lives in an echo chamber, so it only takes one guy to make the decision. And Z lives in an echo chamber, so it only takes one guy to make a decision. There's very few people in the Communist Party in China that will say to Z, that's not a good decision. Ze, you shouldn't do that. I mean, he has purged anyone that he doesn't trust, and so everybody else is pretty much saying yes, sir, yes, sir. So the challenge we have here is that only one guy makes a decision, and he can make a very bad decision. For instance, historically, why did Hitler declare war on the United States after Pearl Harbor. He did not have to. Hitler, Germany was not obliged by any treaty with Japan. To declare war in the United States. But he did. He didn't even advise anybody. He didn't go to his generals and say, hey, what do you think. He just declared war on the United States. He was already at war with Russia, he was already at war with most with Britain. So he decides, just let's add another enemy. The guy was in this case and the general officers, the German generals, when he announced this at a party conference meeting, they went, what now we're at war with the US. Well that changed all sorts of things and they had no plans engaged, they had submarines out there, all these things that had to change. So the bottom line is that leaders can make bad decisions. We've seen that, and it is very probable that z the Emperor of China will decide to do something against Taiwan that will happen in the next twenty four to thirty six months. And if that happens, we are in a major conflagration. And that can all be by his miscalculation of him thinking he can win. Now, I believe that we have a very resilient and capable military, but we need to be more focused in order to deter the war. It is better to deter the war than it is to fight the war and then have to recoup all that. So if we're harder now, if we're more disciplined now, if we're stronger now, if we're more our focus now, we might be able to do that. And we look at what's happening, I mean with Ukraine, with Israel, Hamas, all of these things can easily, as we've talked about earlier.

Yeah, excellent comment. The Russians came in with a flawed idea. They were believing their own propaganda and Putin lives in an echo chamber, so it only takes one guy to make the decision. And Z lives in an echo chamber, so it only takes one guy to make a decision. There's very few people in the Communist Party in China that will say to Z, that's not a good decision. Ze, you shouldn't do that. I mean, he has purged anyone that he doesn't trust, and so everybody else is pretty much saying yes, sir, yes, sir. So the challenge we have here is that only one guy makes a decision, and he can make a very bad decision. For instance, historically, why did Hitler declare war on the United States after Pearl Harbor. He did not have to. Hitler, Germany was not obliged by any treaty with Japan. To declare war in the United States. But he did. He didn't even advise anybody. He didn't go to his generals and say, hey, what do you think. He just declared war on the United States. He was already at war with Russia, he was already at war with most with Britain. So he decides, just let's add another enemy. The guy was in this case and the general officers, the German generals, when he announced this at a party conference meeting, they went, what now we're at war with the US. Well that changed all sorts of things and they had no plans engaged, they had submarines out there, all these things that had to change. So the bottom line is that leaders can make bad decisions. We've seen that, and it is very probable that z the Emperor of China will decide to do something against Taiwan that will happen in the next twenty four to thirty six months. And if that happens, we are in a major conflagration. And that can all be by his miscalculation of him thinking he can win. Now, I believe that we have a very resilient and capable military, but we need to be more focused in order to deter the war. It is better to deter the war than it is to fight the war and then have to recoup all that. So if we're harder now, if we're more disciplined now, if we're stronger now, if we're more our focus now, we might be able to do that. And we look at what's happening, I mean with Ukraine, with Israel, Hamas, all of these things can easily, as we've talked about earlier.

You know, everybody's pissed off right now, yeah, yeah, And so what.

You know, everybody's pissed off right now, yeah, yeah, And so what.

Does it take for us to see the rhino coming? What does it take for us to say, okay, we better get ready now. Now? In the United Kingdom, the British Commander in Chief of the British Army, he has said, he said last year, this is our nineteen thirty seven moment. We have got to get ready for this war. And he's been putting the British Army on a very strong war footing. And in fact, I've even had an opportunity to brief some members of the British Army in the Royal Artillery and they took an early brief from me, and then they took another one six months later and said, look at what we've done based on what you talked about to change our methods.

Does it take for us to see the rhino coming? What does it take for us to say, okay, we better get ready now. Now? In the United Kingdom, the British Commander in Chief of the British Army, he has said, he said last year, this is our nineteen thirty seven moment. We have got to get ready for this war. And he's been putting the British Army on a very strong war footing. And in fact, I've even had an opportunity to brief some members of the British Army in the Royal Artillery and they took an early brief from me, and then they took another one six months later and said, look at what we've done based on what you talked about to change our methods.

Nineteen thirty seven was before what we called the World War, like you know it was, you know, I think Hitler was still talking to the boy Scouts about how to create the Hitler youth in nineteen thirty seven exactly, all right, and.