Hi, everyone, I'm Kitty Kuric, And this is next question. What pops into your head when I say the American dream? Have you achieved it? Did your parents? How would you know if you did? Perhaps no other concept is more iconically American than this idea that if you work hard, you can make it, whatever that means to you. But in recent years, it seems like the one thing most people can agree on is that the American dream is getting harder and harder to achieve. But what we can agree on is why so thank goodness for David Leonhardt. You may know him from his column at the New York Times, where he also runs the morning newsletter, which I read every day. His new book, ours was The Shining Future, aims to identify what's gone wrong to make the American dreams slip out of reach for so many. David has really done his research. His analysis of how our modern economy came to be as fascinating and illuminating, and it's so accessible because he lays all this out using the personal stories of the politicians, activists, and regular old people who shape the last one hundred years or so of America's sense of itself as a place where anyone can make it. As you'll hear in our interview, David is an optimist. He has a couple of diagnoses for both the political right, perhaps even more so for his fellow progressives on the left. But what pulses through David's book is the hope that comes from understanding how we got here so we can actually chart our path forward. Hi, David Leonhard, how are you.

Hi, everyone, I'm Kitty Kuric, And this is next question. What pops into your head when I say the American dream? Have you achieved it? Did your parents? How would you know if you did? Perhaps no other concept is more iconically American than this idea that if you work hard, you can make it, whatever that means to you. But in recent years, it seems like the one thing most people can agree on is that the American dream is getting harder and harder to achieve. But what we can agree on is why so thank goodness for David Leonhardt. You may know him from his column at the New York Times, where he also runs the morning newsletter, which I read every day. His new book, ours was The Shining Future, aims to identify what's gone wrong to make the American dreams slip out of reach for so many. David has really done his research. His analysis of how our modern economy came to be as fascinating and illuminating, and it's so accessible because he lays all this out using the personal stories of the politicians, activists, and regular old people who shape the last one hundred years or so of America's sense of itself as a place where anyone can make it. As you'll hear in our interview, David is an optimist. He has a couple of diagnoses for both the political right, perhaps even more so for his fellow progressives on the left. But what pulses through David's book is the hope that comes from understanding how we got here so we can actually chart our path forward. Hi, David Leonhard, how are you.

I've good, Katie. Thanks so much for having me.

I've good, Katie. Thanks so much for having me.

I'm really excited to talk to you about your book. I'm a big fan of your work, and like everyone else, i read your morning newsletter right after I read my own, so I feel like I'm in touch with you on a daily basis. But I'm fascinated by your latest book called ours was the Shining Future, And gosh, where do I start? I think I'm always interested in the germ of the idea, the why of this book. I'm sure you're reporting through the years. You've been at the New York Times for what twenty four years? Yeah, covering big issues, primarily domestic ones. So where did the germ for this book come from? David?

I'm really excited to talk to you about your book. I'm a big fan of your work, and like everyone else, i read your morning newsletter right after I read my own, so I feel like I'm in touch with you on a daily basis. But I'm fascinated by your latest book called ours was the Shining Future, And gosh, where do I start? I think I'm always interested in the germ of the idea, the why of this book. I'm sure you're reporting through the years. You've been at the New York Times for what twenty four years? Yeah, covering big issues, primarily domestic ones. So where did the germ for this book come from? David?

The main thing that I've written about Katie in my time at the Times has been the economy. And I've written a lot about people's frustrations with the American economy, the idea that it isn't delivering what they wanted to deliver. There's this amazing thing now in which even when the economy is growing and the unemployment rate is relatively low, Americans say that they're not that happy with the economy. Now's a good example of exactly that phenomenon. And what I decided I really wanted to unpack was how did we get here? And I wanted to tell a story about how we ended up with an economy that feels disappointing to so many people. And so that's what I've set out to do. It's really a book written for people who who want to understand the economy and are really smart, and who also feel like, hey, you know what, the way it's talked about a lot in the media, frankly, is just too technical and it's hard to follow. And that's what I want to do. And I wanted to explain both how we've ended up here and frankly, as you know this, I'm an optimist by nature, and so even with all these problems, I also wanted to explain how is it we could end up in a better place than we're in today.

The main thing that I've written about Katie in my time at the Times has been the economy. And I've written a lot about people's frustrations with the American economy, the idea that it isn't delivering what they wanted to deliver. There's this amazing thing now in which even when the economy is growing and the unemployment rate is relatively low, Americans say that they're not that happy with the economy. Now's a good example of exactly that phenomenon. And what I decided I really wanted to unpack was how did we get here? And I wanted to tell a story about how we ended up with an economy that feels disappointing to so many people. And so that's what I've set out to do. It's really a book written for people who who want to understand the economy and are really smart, and who also feel like, hey, you know what, the way it's talked about a lot in the media, frankly, is just too technical and it's hard to follow. And that's what I want to do. And I wanted to explain both how we've ended up here and frankly, as you know this, I'm an optimist by nature, and so even with all these problems, I also wanted to explain how is it we could end up in a better place than we're in today.

I love someone who breaks it down. I am your target market to a t I hope I'm smart. I'm certainly curious, but sometimes economic reporting does feel too abstract to me. So I really appreciate someone who can connect the dots and identify macro trends because I'm fascinated too, like you are, David, Like how did we get here? What were the forces socioeconomic forces in particular, that led us to this moment? And I have to say, as I looked at your book, I really looked at it in terms of my own life, because not that it's all about me, but I was born in nineteen fifty seven. I am certainly the beneficiary of what is traditionally known as the American dream. Born to parents who my mom didn't work. My dad made a modest salary, although he was highly intelligent and focused on education for his kids. His priority was to send us to good schools so we could advance our status in life. I think for my sisters, maybe to marry somebody who was very successful, but actually my dad really wanted my older sisters to have a job and to contribute to society. And my sister Emily was ten years older than I and my sister Kiki seven years older, so he was really a man ahead of his time in some ways. But I mentioned that because I feel like I really benefited from the notion of upward mobility, and I think I got in. I think I was born in the nick of time, honestly from what you describe in your book, which is from World War Two to the seventies and eighties, kind of what was the economic environment and then how things started to change in the seventies and eighties, But they didn't change in a way that it impacted me, because I graduated from college in nineteen seventy nine and I was and I think all the kids in our family were able to make a better living than my dad did. And that's not just say we had a wonderful childhood and I wouldn't trade it for anything, but we were the typical examples of doing better than your parents, right, Yes, So I'd love you to kind of break down and kind of give us the cliff notes of what happened not only over the last forty years, but what happened before that, and how things seemed to change.

I love someone who breaks it down. I am your target market to a t I hope I'm smart. I'm certainly curious, but sometimes economic reporting does feel too abstract to me. So I really appreciate someone who can connect the dots and identify macro trends because I'm fascinated too, like you are, David, Like how did we get here? What were the forces socioeconomic forces in particular, that led us to this moment? And I have to say, as I looked at your book, I really looked at it in terms of my own life, because not that it's all about me, but I was born in nineteen fifty seven. I am certainly the beneficiary of what is traditionally known as the American dream. Born to parents who my mom didn't work. My dad made a modest salary, although he was highly intelligent and focused on education for his kids. His priority was to send us to good schools so we could advance our status in life. I think for my sisters, maybe to marry somebody who was very successful, but actually my dad really wanted my older sisters to have a job and to contribute to society. And my sister Emily was ten years older than I and my sister Kiki seven years older, so he was really a man ahead of his time in some ways. But I mentioned that because I feel like I really benefited from the notion of upward mobility, and I think I got in. I think I was born in the nick of time, honestly from what you describe in your book, which is from World War Two to the seventies and eighties, kind of what was the economic environment and then how things started to change in the seventies and eighties, But they didn't change in a way that it impacted me, because I graduated from college in nineteen seventy nine and I was and I think all the kids in our family were able to make a better living than my dad did. And that's not just say we had a wonderful childhood and I wouldn't trade it for anything, but we were the typical examples of doing better than your parents, right, Yes, So I'd love you to kind of break down and kind of give us the cliff notes of what happened not only over the last forty years, but what happened before that, and how things seemed to change.

One of the really nice things for me in going around and starting to talk about my book is hearing people's own stories of the American dream, their personal stories. I tell my own personal story, my family's at the start of the book, and so I love hearing other people's. So, yes, look, you captured it in your personal story. And I'll put some numbers around that. So, an American child born in nineteen forty had a ninety two percent chance of growing up to have a higher household income as an adult than their parents did. And that is the entire society, right, every racial group, ninety two percent. That's a virtual guarantee. Right. That means even people who got quite ill or who were laid off at some point in their life still grew up to make more money than their parents did ninety two percent. And so how did we get there? And I think it is very important to say that we're talking about the forties, the fifties, and the sixties. These are decades with horrible racism, horrible sexism, really bad religious bigotry as well. And so it's not that we want to go back to the society that we had then, But even for groups that were experiencing really vicious discrimination. This progress applied so in the forties and fifties, even before the great victories of the civil rights movement, the white black pay gap shrunk and the white black life expectancy gap shrunk. And the reason is because we were building the society that was basically bottom up or middle out prosperity, in which we were build holding a society in which people were able to get jobs even if they didn't have a college degree, that allowed them to enjoy really good standard of living. And the word I use to describe what we had is democratic capitalism, small d democratic capitalism. Look, I really believe the evidence shows that capitalism is the best system for organizing a society. The Soviet Union didn't work, Cuba doesn't work right, South Korea Lorks much better than North Korea. China got prosperous after it moved toward capitalism and away from communism. But not every form of capitalism works equally well. And a kind of rough and tumble form of capitalism where we have taxes really low and we don't have regulations and workers can't join unions, just works much less well than democratic capitalism, where we're investing in the future, and ordinary people are able to form grassroots organizations and advocate for themselves. And that's really what we had in the forties and the fifties and the sixties.

One of the really nice things for me in going around and starting to talk about my book is hearing people's own stories of the American dream, their personal stories. I tell my own personal story, my family's at the start of the book, and so I love hearing other people's. So, yes, look, you captured it in your personal story. And I'll put some numbers around that. So, an American child born in nineteen forty had a ninety two percent chance of growing up to have a higher household income as an adult than their parents did. And that is the entire society, right, every racial group, ninety two percent. That's a virtual guarantee. Right. That means even people who got quite ill or who were laid off at some point in their life still grew up to make more money than their parents did ninety two percent. And so how did we get there? And I think it is very important to say that we're talking about the forties, the fifties, and the sixties. These are decades with horrible racism, horrible sexism, really bad religious bigotry as well. And so it's not that we want to go back to the society that we had then, But even for groups that were experiencing really vicious discrimination. This progress applied so in the forties and fifties, even before the great victories of the civil rights movement, the white black pay gap shrunk and the white black life expectancy gap shrunk. And the reason is because we were building the society that was basically bottom up or middle out prosperity, in which we were build holding a society in which people were able to get jobs even if they didn't have a college degree, that allowed them to enjoy really good standard of living. And the word I use to describe what we had is democratic capitalism, small d democratic capitalism. Look, I really believe the evidence shows that capitalism is the best system for organizing a society. The Soviet Union didn't work, Cuba doesn't work right, South Korea Lorks much better than North Korea. China got prosperous after it moved toward capitalism and away from communism. But not every form of capitalism works equally well. And a kind of rough and tumble form of capitalism where we have taxes really low and we don't have regulations and workers can't join unions, just works much less well than democratic capitalism, where we're investing in the future, and ordinary people are able to form grassroots organizations and advocate for themselves. And that's really what we had in the forties and the fifties and the sixties.

Can you describe a little bit more, kind of unraveled the term democratic capitalism, a little bit more for us versus sort of unfettered capitalism.

Can you describe a little bit more, kind of unraveled the term democratic capitalism, a little bit more for us versus sort of unfettered capitalism.

Yes. So I think one of the things to know about capitalism is both that it's superior to the alternatives, but it also has a predictable set of excesses and problems. Right, Capitalism on its own doesn't solve climate change. Capitalism on its own doesn't tend to build schools where kids can go, or roads for us to travel on. And capitalism on its own tends to lead to rising inequality. And so what you really need is a government to intervene and do things like invest in the future, building big roads and building airports, building schools for people. If you don't have the government involved and workers can't join labor unions, I think we've sort of lost sight of just how important labor unions are.

Yes. So I think one of the things to know about capitalism is both that it's superior to the alternatives, but it also has a predictable set of excesses and problems. Right, Capitalism on its own doesn't solve climate change. Capitalism on its own doesn't tend to build schools where kids can go, or roads for us to travel on. And capitalism on its own tends to lead to rising inequality. And so what you really need is a government to intervene and do things like invest in the future, building big roads and building airports, building schools for people. If you don't have the government involved and workers can't join labor unions, I think we've sort of lost sight of just how important labor unions are.

Yeah, I want to get into that.

Yeah, I want to get into that.

And so that's a great example. If the government isn't involved to make sure that blue collar workers can join labor unions. Businesses can pretty easily get rid of labor unions and labor unions for all their flaws, and they are flawed. I've been in a labor union. I've been a manager at The New York Times who's managed unionized employees. I'm well aware of their flaws. But corporations have their flaws too, And if we have corporations with our unions, we end up with this really unbalanced society. And so, to me, democratic capitalism is a system in which we acknowledge both the phenomenal strengths of capitalism and also the ways in which, left to its own devices, it doesn't tend to produce living standards that rise rapidly for most people. And just the simplest way to think about this is for the bottom ninety nine percent of the income distribution, wage growth was faster in the forties, fifties, and sixties than it's been since the nineteen eighties. So really, for most people, since we've moved to this more bare knuckle form of capitalism in the eighties, income growth has just been much more disappointing.

And so that's a great example. If the government isn't involved to make sure that blue collar workers can join labor unions. Businesses can pretty easily get rid of labor unions and labor unions for all their flaws, and they are flawed. I've been in a labor union. I've been a manager at The New York Times who's managed unionized employees. I'm well aware of their flaws. But corporations have their flaws too, And if we have corporations with our unions, we end up with this really unbalanced society. And so, to me, democratic capitalism is a system in which we acknowledge both the phenomenal strengths of capitalism and also the ways in which, left to its own devices, it doesn't tend to produce living standards that rise rapidly for most people. And just the simplest way to think about this is for the bottom ninety nine percent of the income distribution, wage growth was faster in the forties, fifties, and sixties than it's been since the nineteen eighties. So really, for most people, since we've moved to this more bare knuckle form of capitalism in the eighties, income growth has just been much more disappointing.

You describe what was happening in the forties, fifties, and sixties. But let's talk about when it all started to go bad, and that was in the seventies and eighties, and you trace a number of societal forces that came together to create a lot of inequality and to really result in a realignment of what had been traditional political parties. Can you talk about that?

You describe what was happening in the forties, fifties, and sixties. But let's talk about when it all started to go bad, and that was in the seventies and eighties, and you trace a number of societal forces that came together to create a lot of inequality and to really result in a realignment of what had been traditional political parties. Can you talk about that?

Yes, I mean the sixties and seventies was a time of really just phenomenal chaos, as people who lived through it can remember. I mean, we had the crime rate really start to rise in the early sixties. And I want to say something important here, which is the mainstream media, which you and I are both part of of the time, and the left half of the political spectrum, basically denied that rising crime was a problem. And they were wrong about that rise in crime really was a problem in the sixties and seventies.

Yes, I mean the sixties and seventies was a time of really just phenomenal chaos, as people who lived through it can remember. I mean, we had the crime rate really start to rise in the early sixties. And I want to say something important here, which is the mainstream media, which you and I are both part of of the time, and the left half of the political spectrum, basically denied that rising crime was a problem. And they were wrong about that rise in crime really was a problem in the sixties and seventies.

Why do you think they denied it? Why do you think they underplayed it?

Why do you think they denied it? Why do you think they underplayed it?

I think there is an instinct among liberals to say that poverty is that economics are the root cause of everything. And I understand that instinct. I've just written a book about economic history, and so the idea that crime was rising in the nineteen sixties, when the economy was still very good, and thus it couldn't be just because of economics. Meete people uncomfortable. So LBJ said, Hey, the way to deal with rising crime is let's pass my war on poverty and that I'll deal with it, Whereas in fact it was a much more complex set of reasons why crime was rising. It was basically people were coming to question the society in all kinds of ways. Think about the early sixties. It's SDS, it's in the Republican Party, it's Barry Goldwater. People were saying, wait a second, something about this post war situation feels a little off to us, And it wasn't really about the economy, which was still doing quite well. So crime starts to rise. In the sixties, we have the Vietnam War, we have the assassination of multiple prominent political figures, we have Watergate, and then in the mid seventies we have this really terrible economic crisis, mostly because of foreign reasons, the oil embargo. But Americans looked around and they said, wow, society just is kind of breaking down. And I completely understand why. People looked at the government and they basically said, maybe that's the problem. Maybe we just need a lot less government. And I actually in the book, I try to describe sympathetically the conservative movement that said, hey, if we have a lot less government, all our problems will be solved. One of the characters in my book is Robert Bork, who's famous as a Supreme Court nominee, but is an incredibly important economic thinker in the Reagan movement, more important than many people realize. And I try to tell his story in a way that let's readers understand why he came to those views. But let's also be honest that that Robert Bork revolution in economic policy made a lot of promises about how great things would be if we only got government out of the way. They said, living standards would rise for everyone, we would all become more prosperous. And the United States did move more toward a form of rough and tumble capitalism than a lot of other countries, and yet our results have been so disappointing. I mean, Katie, the first chart in my book shows life expectancy in every rich country. In nineteen eighty the United States had a normal life expectancy for a rich country. For the last fifteen years or so, We've had the single worst life expectancy of any rich country in the world. We've got to try something else.

I think there is an instinct among liberals to say that poverty is that economics are the root cause of everything. And I understand that instinct. I've just written a book about economic history, and so the idea that crime was rising in the nineteen sixties, when the economy was still very good, and thus it couldn't be just because of economics. Meete people uncomfortable. So LBJ said, Hey, the way to deal with rising crime is let's pass my war on poverty and that I'll deal with it, Whereas in fact it was a much more complex set of reasons why crime was rising. It was basically people were coming to question the society in all kinds of ways. Think about the early sixties. It's SDS, it's in the Republican Party, it's Barry Goldwater. People were saying, wait a second, something about this post war situation feels a little off to us, And it wasn't really about the economy, which was still doing quite well. So crime starts to rise. In the sixties, we have the Vietnam War, we have the assassination of multiple prominent political figures, we have Watergate, and then in the mid seventies we have this really terrible economic crisis, mostly because of foreign reasons, the oil embargo. But Americans looked around and they said, wow, society just is kind of breaking down. And I completely understand why. People looked at the government and they basically said, maybe that's the problem. Maybe we just need a lot less government. And I actually in the book, I try to describe sympathetically the conservative movement that said, hey, if we have a lot less government, all our problems will be solved. One of the characters in my book is Robert Bork, who's famous as a Supreme Court nominee, but is an incredibly important economic thinker in the Reagan movement, more important than many people realize. And I try to tell his story in a way that let's readers understand why he came to those views. But let's also be honest that that Robert Bork revolution in economic policy made a lot of promises about how great things would be if we only got government out of the way. They said, living standards would rise for everyone, we would all become more prosperous. And the United States did move more toward a form of rough and tumble capitalism than a lot of other countries, and yet our results have been so disappointing. I mean, Katie, the first chart in my book shows life expectancy in every rich country. In nineteen eighty the United States had a normal life expectancy for a rich country. For the last fifteen years or so, We've had the single worst life expectancy of any rich country in the world. We've got to try something else.

After this break, David breaks down how trickle down economics worked and didn't work the way Republicans hoped, and the surprising ways it's affected how long we live here in the US. If you want to get smarter every morning with a breakdown of the news and fascinating takes on health and wellness and pop culture, sign up for our daily newsletter, Wake Up Call by going to Katiecuric dot com. Now back to my conversation with David Leonhardt. Well, connect those dots. I mean, Reagan was trickled down economics, less regulation, All kinds of things were happening right in the eighties, and this sort of individualism almost iron ran kind of attitude about wealth, right, So what were the ramifications of that?

After this break, David breaks down how trickle down economics worked and didn't work the way Republicans hoped, and the surprising ways it's affected how long we live here in the US. If you want to get smarter every morning with a breakdown of the news and fascinating takes on health and wellness and pop culture, sign up for our daily newsletter, Wake Up Call by going to Katiecuric dot com. Now back to my conversation with David Leonhardt. Well, connect those dots. I mean, Reagan was trickled down economics, less regulation, All kinds of things were happening right in the eighties, and this sort of individualism almost iron ran kind of attitude about wealth, right, So what were the ramifications of that?

So there were certainly things that the Reagan administration didn't change, and I know conservatives sometimes look back and say, well, wait a second, he didn't get rid of Medicare and Social Security. That's true, but he changed so much. I mean, tax rates when he came into office were up, with the top tax rate up around seventy percent, it's never again been so high. It's sort of fluctuated in the thirties, depending on whether we have a Republican or Democratic president. He really unwound regulation in a lot of ways. He allowed companies. This was Bork's biggest involvement. He allowed companies to become so so much larger. The government stopped doing so much antitrust. And the theory was, if only we just let the market work, everyone will benefit.

So there were certainly things that the Reagan administration didn't change, and I know conservatives sometimes look back and say, well, wait a second, he didn't get rid of Medicare and Social Security. That's true, but he changed so much. I mean, tax rates when he came into office were up, with the top tax rate up around seventy percent, it's never again been so high. It's sort of fluctuated in the thirties, depending on whether we have a Republican or Democratic president. He really unwound regulation in a lot of ways. He allowed companies. This was Bork's biggest involvement. He allowed companies to become so so much larger. The government stopped doing so much antitrust. And the theory was, if only we just let the market work, everyone will benefit.

Well, that's trickle down economics, right, which David Stockman ended up disavowing.

Well, that's trickle down economics, right, which David Stockman ended up disavowing.

That is trickle down economics. And look, it was a theory and it had a argument behind it. And now more than forty years later, we can look at the results. And I know that true believers of the Reagan Revolution will say, well, that's because we never fully tried it. But that, to me is a little bit like Marxists who say communism work if only we actually tried it. Like, we moved a long way towards the vision Reagan wanted, and the results we've gotten since nineteen eighty for very affluent people have been great. They've been great for stock prices and top incomes, and for the vast majority of Americans, they've been less good than they used to be, and I think it's important to reflect on that.

That is trickle down economics. And look, it was a theory and it had a argument behind it. And now more than forty years later, we can look at the results. And I know that true believers of the Reagan Revolution will say, well, that's because we never fully tried it. But that, to me is a little bit like Marxists who say communism work if only we actually tried it. Like, we moved a long way towards the vision Reagan wanted, and the results we've gotten since nineteen eighty for very affluent people have been great. They've been great for stock prices and top incomes, and for the vast majority of Americans, they've been less good than they used to be, and I think it's important to reflect on that.

How does that directly impact life expectancy? Connect those dots for me, David, Yes.

How does that directly impact life expectancy? Connect those dots for me, David, Yes.

Thank you for that question. So what we know is that life expectancy has really diverged by class. So it's really diverged by whether you have a four year degree or whether you don't. For people with a four year college degree, the life expectancy trends are actually still pretty good. I mean, COVID was variable for everyone, but that's true around the world. The life expectancy trends for Americans with a college degree have still been pretty good. The damning statistic I told you about how the US now has the lowest life expectancy of a high income country is overwhelmingly driven by people without a four year college degree. The causal mechanisms are really complex, but I also think it's not that hard to understand the big picture. We also know that the income gap between people with a college degree and people without one has grown enormously. We know people without a college degree are much less likely to be in households where children are growing up with two parents. We know they're much less likely to be able to go to college and to finish college their children, not just them. And so I think what we've ended up with is we've ended up with this that we have ended up with this kind of laissez faari society in which not only has income inequality increased, but we've lost a lot of the institutions churches, labor unions, community institutions, employers that came to a town and would be there for decades, that helped people build good and improving lives, and that has had a whole set of both economic and social causes that have been very damaging.

Thank you for that question. So what we know is that life expectancy has really diverged by class. So it's really diverged by whether you have a four year degree or whether you don't. For people with a four year college degree, the life expectancy trends are actually still pretty good. I mean, COVID was variable for everyone, but that's true around the world. The life expectancy trends for Americans with a college degree have still been pretty good. The damning statistic I told you about how the US now has the lowest life expectancy of a high income country is overwhelmingly driven by people without a four year college degree. The causal mechanisms are really complex, but I also think it's not that hard to understand the big picture. We also know that the income gap between people with a college degree and people without one has grown enormously. We know people without a college degree are much less likely to be in households where children are growing up with two parents. We know they're much less likely to be able to go to college and to finish college their children, not just them. And so I think what we've ended up with is we've ended up with this that we have ended up with this kind of laissez faari society in which not only has income inequality increased, but we've lost a lot of the institutions churches, labor unions, community institutions, employers that came to a town and would be there for decades, that helped people build good and improving lives, and that has had a whole set of both economic and social causes that have been very damaging.

All these things resulted in a political realignment with many Democrats becoming Republicans, and there were a lot of reasons for that as well, But can you explain some of the factors.

All these things resulted in a political realignment with many Democrats becoming Republicans, and there were a lot of reasons for that as well, But can you explain some of the factors.

If I could ask conservatives and Republicans to be self reflective, I would say, please look at these results since nineteen eighty with an open mind and ask what's worked and what happened. And I want to say there are a whole bunch of conservatives who are actually doing that. Even some members of Congress and a bunch of conservative intellectuals were saying we need to go in a different direction. I talk about them in the book. If I could ask Democrats to be a little bit self reflective, I would say, ask yourself, why is it that the Democratic Party has increasingly become the party of relatively well off professionals, And ask yourself, why is it that so many working class people look at the Democratic Party and say that party isn't my party. I feel like they talk down to me. Historically, Democrats have reacted to this by saying, well, it's mostly about racism, and look, it is partly about racism, right. Donald Trump has said a lot of racist things. The Republican Party at times has really used race baiting stereotypes. I want to be very clear about that. But I think progressives make a big mistake when they say the only reason anyone could ever not vote for US is because they're ignorant or because they're bigoted. I think that's both really bad political strategy to tell people that you need to vote for US or where you're ignorant. I also think it's empirically wrong when you look at a whole set of issues. College graduates and working class people have different views on a whole bunch of things. It's not just about race, And I think the clearest evidence of this has probably come in the last five years when we have seen Latinos, Asian Americans, and although the numbers are small, they're noticeable in the data, Black Americans, particularly working class people of all these groups shift away from the Democratic Party. And I would really encourage Liberals and Democrats to ask themselves, why is it that we're struggling so much to get working class votes, Why is it that increasingly true among Latinos and Asian Americans? And why is it that there are you know, twenty states in this country North Carolina, Florida, Texas where we basically can ever win an election. I don't think it's just that Republicans are cheating or they're doing these things. I think that the Democratic Party has sent a message that it's the party of educated people in a way that is off putting to many other people.

If I could ask conservatives and Republicans to be self reflective, I would say, please look at these results since nineteen eighty with an open mind and ask what's worked and what happened. And I want to say there are a whole bunch of conservatives who are actually doing that. Even some members of Congress and a bunch of conservative intellectuals were saying we need to go in a different direction. I talk about them in the book. If I could ask Democrats to be a little bit self reflective, I would say, ask yourself, why is it that the Democratic Party has increasingly become the party of relatively well off professionals, And ask yourself, why is it that so many working class people look at the Democratic Party and say that party isn't my party. I feel like they talk down to me. Historically, Democrats have reacted to this by saying, well, it's mostly about racism, and look, it is partly about racism, right. Donald Trump has said a lot of racist things. The Republican Party at times has really used race baiting stereotypes. I want to be very clear about that. But I think progressives make a big mistake when they say the only reason anyone could ever not vote for US is because they're ignorant or because they're bigoted. I think that's both really bad political strategy to tell people that you need to vote for US or where you're ignorant. I also think it's empirically wrong when you look at a whole set of issues. College graduates and working class people have different views on a whole bunch of things. It's not just about race, And I think the clearest evidence of this has probably come in the last five years when we have seen Latinos, Asian Americans, and although the numbers are small, they're noticeable in the data, Black Americans, particularly working class people of all these groups shift away from the Democratic Party. And I would really encourage Liberals and Democrats to ask themselves, why is it that we're struggling so much to get working class votes, Why is it that increasingly true among Latinos and Asian Americans? And why is it that there are you know, twenty states in this country North Carolina, Florida, Texas where we basically can ever win an election. I don't think it's just that Republicans are cheating or they're doing these things. I think that the Democratic Party has sent a message that it's the party of educated people in a way that is off putting to many other people.

Yeah. A perfect example, I think is probably one of the biggest mistakes of the Hillary Clinton campaign, and that was when she said this.

Yeah. A perfect example, I think is probably one of the biggest mistakes of the Hillary Clinton campaign, and that was when she said this.

You know, to just be grossly generalistic, you can put half of Trump's supporters into what I call the basket of deplorables. Right, the races, sex is homophobic, xenophobic, islamophobic, you name it. And unfortunately there are people like that and he has lifted them up.

You know, to just be grossly generalistic, you can put half of Trump's supporters into what I call the basket of deplorables. Right, the races, sex is homophobic, xenophobic, islamophobic, you name it. And unfortunately there are people like that and he has lifted them up.

I can't blame people for being insulted, and you can't tar any huge group of Americans with such a big brush. And I think it completely ignored the economic circumstances that they were in for reasons it had nothing to do with race. That was because we shifted from an industrial to a technological society. The fact that manufacturing had dried up, these cities had become, you know, just shadows of their former selves. So I don't blame people well for being highly offended by that comment.

I can't blame people for being insulted, and you can't tar any huge group of Americans with such a big brush. And I think it completely ignored the economic circumstances that they were in for reasons it had nothing to do with race. That was because we shifted from an industrial to a technological society. The fact that manufacturing had dried up, these cities had become, you know, just shadows of their former selves. So I don't blame people well for being highly offended by that comment.

No, I agree, And it's just part of a much larger pattern. Right, that's maybe the clearest expression of it. But you know, there was a study of Texas after the twenty twenty election to try to determine why Latino voters moved toward the Republican Party, who was done by a progressive group, and one of the things that they pointed out was a lot of Latinos in Texas were uncomfortable with the immigration system right now. They were worried about border security. That doesn't fit the democratic narrative, right of how we're supposed to think of immigration. Another thing that people were concerned about is they really wanted the economy to reopen once vaccines were available, and they were unhappy with the idea that we were going to have these extended shutdowns. That's another thing where I think sort of a lot of Democrats and a lot of college graduates said, the only way you can be in favor of reopening is if you don't understand science. And I think it's more complicated than that.

No, I agree, And it's just part of a much larger pattern. Right, that's maybe the clearest expression of it. But you know, there was a study of Texas after the twenty twenty election to try to determine why Latino voters moved toward the Republican Party, who was done by a progressive group, and one of the things that they pointed out was a lot of Latinos in Texas were uncomfortable with the immigration system right now. They were worried about border security. That doesn't fit the democratic narrative, right of how we're supposed to think of immigration. Another thing that people were concerned about is they really wanted the economy to reopen once vaccines were available, and they were unhappy with the idea that we were going to have these extended shutdowns. That's another thing where I think sort of a lot of Democrats and a lot of college graduates said, the only way you can be in favor of reopening is if you don't understand science. And I think it's more complicated than that.

Do you think some of this is because of the evaporation of the sensible middle and the inability to compromise between these two very polarized parties.

Do you think some of this is because of the evaporation of the sensible middle and the inability to compromise between these two very polarized parties.

I do, and I've spent a lot of time looking at polling data, and I talk about it in the book. I think there is a middle in this country, the political middle. And it's what it's interesting is it's not on the middle of every issue. It's actually left of center on economics. So the middle of this country is in favor of a higher minimum wage, and they're in favor of expanding medicaid, and they like labor unions, not every union, but they believe that people should be able. But they're well to the right of where the Democratic Party is on a lot of social issues. We can say they're in the middle, or they're a little right of center. I don't know what it is, but put it this way, they're not as far left as where the Democratic Party is. And so a lot of those voters look at the two parties and they kind of struggle to see themselves in either one.

I do, and I've spent a lot of time looking at polling data, and I talk about it in the book. I think there is a middle in this country, the political middle. And it's what it's interesting is it's not on the middle of every issue. It's actually left of center on economics. So the middle of this country is in favor of a higher minimum wage, and they're in favor of expanding medicaid, and they like labor unions, not every union, but they believe that people should be able. But they're well to the right of where the Democratic Party is on a lot of social issues. We can say they're in the middle, or they're a little right of center. I don't know what it is, but put it this way, they're not as far left as where the Democratic Party is. And so a lot of those voters look at the two parties and they kind of struggle to see themselves in either one.

Especially when they say sort of young liberals. I think that have really pulled the party further to the left and at a pace that I think may feel too fast for older Americans, even liberal one.

Especially when they say sort of young liberals. I think that have really pulled the party further to the left and at a pace that I think may feel too fast for older Americans, even liberal one.

Yes, and look, part of the reason Joe Biden got the nomination and became the president is because one of the more moderate sections of the Democratic Party are black voters. And the way the calendar worked the South Carolina primary, which is overwhelmingly black voters, came in this moment where it wasn't clear what's going to happen, and black voters flocked to Joe Biden right. Which is a reminder that a lot of what we hear on social media, on university campuses, again sometimes in the media is a version of liberalism that is more upscale than actually the way many people are. To put a fine point on it. I think the Democratic Party would probably solve some of its problems if it spent more time listening to voters of color who have community college degrees or who don't have a college degree, and less time listening to white voters who have graduate degrees. And white voters with graduate degrees really drive not only white voters, but white voters with graduate degrees holing shit are disproportionately in sort of influential jobs in the progressive atmosphere.

Yes, and look, part of the reason Joe Biden got the nomination and became the president is because one of the more moderate sections of the Democratic Party are black voters. And the way the calendar worked the South Carolina primary, which is overwhelmingly black voters, came in this moment where it wasn't clear what's going to happen, and black voters flocked to Joe Biden right. Which is a reminder that a lot of what we hear on social media, on university campuses, again sometimes in the media is a version of liberalism that is more upscale than actually the way many people are. To put a fine point on it. I think the Democratic Party would probably solve some of its problems if it spent more time listening to voters of color who have community college degrees or who don't have a college degree, and less time listening to white voters who have graduate degrees. And white voters with graduate degrees really drive not only white voters, but white voters with graduate degrees holing shit are disproportionately in sort of influential jobs in the progressive atmosphere.

I've always wondered why Democrats don't talk more directly to working class voters that their outreach seems to be. I mean, maybe I'm wrong. I don't obviously know every strategy that's being employed, but I do feel, and maybe it's not covered enough, that there does seem to be a disconnect between blue collar voters and Democrats that is really surprising.

I've always wondered why Democrats don't talk more directly to working class voters that their outreach seems to be. I mean, maybe I'm wrong. I don't obviously know every strategy that's being employed, but I do feel, and maybe it's not covered enough, that there does seem to be a disconnect between blue collar voters and Democrats that is really surprising.

So one of the things that I enjoyed doing this book. In this book was taking people whose names are well known, but telling you parts of their stories that are not well known. And I mentioned Robert Bork about that, But another person who I talk about who I think his legacy is aged better than Robert Bork's is Robert F. Kennedy, the original one, not the junior. And when he ran for president in nineteen sixty eight, there were a lot of people who the Democratic Party was starting to have this development of the kind of more elite, very socially liberal, and people told RFK, don't talk about crime, and he said, no, I'm going to talk about crime. I know that Richard Nixon and George Wallace are demograguing crime and they're talking about it in ways that are meant to spark racism. But people's concerns about crime are legitimate, and Kennedy ran this campaign in which he made law and order central to his campaign. Journalists said, where is the great liberal Robert Kennedy because of the way he was talking about crime. He talked about Vietnam and actually very nuanced ways, because he understood that many Americans were unhappy with Vietnam, but also many working class people were frustrated that their kids had gone to fight. And the reason why I think he's important is Robert Kennedy didn't try to win working class votes by telling people, hey, just vote on economic policy, ignore my social policy. He treated working class voters with respect on both social policy and economic policy, and I think part of what modern Democrats should be reflective on is you can't just tell people don't vote against your economic interests. I mean, Katie, you and I know that the fanciest parts of New York City and all these resort towns, they vote Democratic. They're voting against their economic interests, right, They're voting to raise their own taxes. So lots of people vote against their economic interests. And I think Democrats lose working class voters when they say, hey, let's just ignore social policy and just talk about taxes. And RFK didn't do that.

So one of the things that I enjoyed doing this book. In this book was taking people whose names are well known, but telling you parts of their stories that are not well known. And I mentioned Robert Bork about that, But another person who I talk about who I think his legacy is aged better than Robert Bork's is Robert F. Kennedy, the original one, not the junior. And when he ran for president in nineteen sixty eight, there were a lot of people who the Democratic Party was starting to have this development of the kind of more elite, very socially liberal, and people told RFK, don't talk about crime, and he said, no, I'm going to talk about crime. I know that Richard Nixon and George Wallace are demograguing crime and they're talking about it in ways that are meant to spark racism. But people's concerns about crime are legitimate, and Kennedy ran this campaign in which he made law and order central to his campaign. Journalists said, where is the great liberal Robert Kennedy because of the way he was talking about crime. He talked about Vietnam and actually very nuanced ways, because he understood that many Americans were unhappy with Vietnam, but also many working class people were frustrated that their kids had gone to fight. And the reason why I think he's important is Robert Kennedy didn't try to win working class votes by telling people, hey, just vote on economic policy, ignore my social policy. He treated working class voters with respect on both social policy and economic policy, and I think part of what modern Democrats should be reflective on is you can't just tell people don't vote against your economic interests. I mean, Katie, you and I know that the fanciest parts of New York City and all these resort towns, they vote Democratic. They're voting against their economic interests, right, They're voting to raise their own taxes. So lots of people vote against their economic interests. And I think Democrats lose working class voters when they say, hey, let's just ignore social policy and just talk about taxes. And RFK didn't do that.

Let's go back to unions real quick, David, because they were thriving. What happened to unions? It was it deregulation. Was this these new attitudes about capitalism? How did unions kind of fall apart? Did they overreach?

Let's go back to unions real quick, David, because they were thriving. What happened to unions? It was it deregulation. Was this these new attitudes about capitalism? How did unions kind of fall apart? Did they overreach?

Yes? They did. They did overreach, and they and a lot of union leaders actually cared less about continuing to build a movement and cared more just about their own immediate members and didn't understand that if they cared only about their immediate members rather than attracting new union members, eventually the labor movement would shrivel, which is exactly what happened. So absolutely, union leaders overreached. I tell some of that story in the book. They deserve significantly. It's also the case that the government became quite hostile to labor unions. And if you don't have the government playing referee, if you just have kind of corporations and workers out there, If it's a question between can a single corporation prevent a bunch of individual workers from joining a union, the answer is almost always yes. I mean, look what Starbucks has done recently. When people organize at a shop, Starbucks somehow finds lots of little violations among the people who decided to join a union and schedules them with really bad shifts or you know, says we need to let you go. And so there are lots of ways for companies, sometimes within the rules, to make sure that unions don't form. And the government basically stopped playing a version of an impartial referee or judge and really let corporations shrink unions. And that's what happened.

Yes? They did. They did overreach, and they and a lot of union leaders actually cared less about continuing to build a movement and cared more just about their own immediate members and didn't understand that if they cared only about their immediate members rather than attracting new union members, eventually the labor movement would shrivel, which is exactly what happened. So absolutely, union leaders overreached. I tell some of that story in the book. They deserve significantly. It's also the case that the government became quite hostile to labor unions. And if you don't have the government playing referee, if you just have kind of corporations and workers out there, If it's a question between can a single corporation prevent a bunch of individual workers from joining a union, the answer is almost always yes. I mean, look what Starbucks has done recently. When people organize at a shop, Starbucks somehow finds lots of little violations among the people who decided to join a union and schedules them with really bad shifts or you know, says we need to let you go. And so there are lots of ways for companies, sometimes within the rules, to make sure that unions don't form. And the government basically stopped playing a version of an impartial referee or judge and really let corporations shrink unions. And that's what happened.

Well, union's overreached, But I think it's important to point out that corporations got greedy, yes, right, I mean that was a big factor too. They didn't want to pay people necessarily fair wages. They wanted to make sure their quarterly profits were good for their shareholders. I mean, the whole balance of power really shifted.

Well, union's overreached, But I think it's important to point out that corporations got greedy, yes, right, I mean that was a big factor too. They didn't want to pay people necessarily fair wages. They wanted to make sure their quarterly profits were good for their shareholders. I mean, the whole balance of power really shifted.

It did. And you know, when you talk about greed, that's really a form of culture. And culture is hard to talk about because it's imorphous, right, It's people's attitudes, and you can't necessarily pass a bill that changes the culture. But I really emphasized the importance of culture in the book because I don't think the corporate executives of the past were any morally superior to the corporate executives today, but they did behave differently because the culture was different. I mean, Mitt Romney's dad, George Romney, was the CEO of a car company in Detroit, and it hit so many of its benchmarks that he was due a huge bonus. And he went to the board and he said, I think this is unseemly. I don't think it's healthy for our country or our company to have me making so much more than any workers. Will you please take back this bonus? I mean, my goodness, can.

It did. And you know, when you talk about greed, that's really a form of culture. And culture is hard to talk about because it's imorphous, right, It's people's attitudes, and you can't necessarily pass a bill that changes the culture. But I really emphasized the importance of culture in the book because I don't think the corporate executives of the past were any morally superior to the corporate executives today, but they did behave differently because the culture was different. I mean, Mitt Romney's dad, George Romney, was the CEO of a car company in Detroit, and it hit so many of its benchmarks that he was due a huge bonus. And he went to the board and he said, I think this is unseemly. I don't think it's healthy for our country or our company to have me making so much more than any workers. Will you please take back this bonus? I mean, my goodness, can.

You imagine any of the corporate CEOs who are making hundreds of millions of dollars today? Saying their salaries were unseemly.

You imagine any of the corporate CEOs who are making hundreds of millions of dollars today? Saying their salaries were unseemly.

Yeah. I mean, it's just and again, it's not that he was. It's not that he's inherently a better person. It's that he lived in a different culture, a less selfish.

Yeah. I mean, it's just and again, it's not that he was. It's not that he's inherently a better person. It's that he lived in a different culture, a less selfish.

He sounds like a better person to me.

He sounds like a better person to me.

That's fair. But so I would say it is at least in part that he lived in a less selfish, and let's be honest here, more patriotic and communitarian culture, and he reflected those values in his behavior.

That's fair. But so I would say it is at least in part that he lived in a less selfish, and let's be honest here, more patriotic and communitarian culture, and he reflected those values in his behavior.

We'll be right back with David Leonhardt.

We'll be right back with David Leonhardt.

One.

One.

If you'd loved listening to Kelly Corrigan in my recent conversation with David Brooks, you'll definitely love her podcast, Kelly Corrigan wonders. Kelly has this every woman wisdom that people just gravitate to. Oprah Magazine calls her the voice of a generation. Huffington Post calls her the poet laureate of the ordinary. You might know her books about family life. All four were New York Times bestsellers. I met her when she was a guest on The Today Show almost twenty years ago, and we've stayed in touch ever since. On her show, Kelly wonders about family ties, our deepest ambitions and how to be useful with people like Brian Stevenson, Anna Quinlan, Jenny Wallace, Neil Katilla, Claire Danes, and Kate Bohler. I saw somewhere that someone said she's like a cross between Tina Fey and Krista Tippett. So jump on board, tune into Kelly Corrigan Wonders. I'd say you might as well subscribe. Actually, wherever you're listening to this podcast, we're back with David Leonhart. I want to talk about that communitarian culture, because I know that's something you address in the book as well. But I want to finish the union conversation so they start to weaken. I think is PAPCO one of the big turning points during the I hate to keep pointing a finger at the late Ronald Reagan, but the air traffic controllers that was a huge inflection point, wasn't it in terms of union power and muscle?

If you'd loved listening to Kelly Corrigan in my recent conversation with David Brooks, you'll definitely love her podcast, Kelly Corrigan wonders. Kelly has this every woman wisdom that people just gravitate to. Oprah Magazine calls her the voice of a generation. Huffington Post calls her the poet laureate of the ordinary. You might know her books about family life. All four were New York Times bestsellers. I met her when she was a guest on The Today Show almost twenty years ago, and we've stayed in touch ever since. On her show, Kelly wonders about family ties, our deepest ambitions and how to be useful with people like Brian Stevenson, Anna Quinlan, Jenny Wallace, Neil Katilla, Claire Danes, and Kate Bohler. I saw somewhere that someone said she's like a cross between Tina Fey and Krista Tippett. So jump on board, tune into Kelly Corrigan Wonders. I'd say you might as well subscribe. Actually, wherever you're listening to this podcast, we're back with David Leonhart. I want to talk about that communitarian culture, because I know that's something you address in the book as well. But I want to finish the union conversation so they start to weaken. I think is PAPCO one of the big turning points during the I hate to keep pointing a finger at the late Ronald Reagan, but the air traffic controllers that was a huge inflection point, wasn't it in terms of union power and muscle?

Yes, And it's actually I think it's an important example. So Ronald Reagan comes to office. The air traffic controllers who indorsed Ronald Reagan, which is fascinating, perhaps feeling empowered because they had endorsed this new president and most unions obviously had not made just unbelievable demands really in terms of wage increases and in terms of being able to take time off. I walk through some of them in the book. It just in terms of you look at them and you're like, WHOA, that's too much. And Ronald Reagan said, if you go on strike, I'll fire you. And the air traffic controllers didn't believe it, and they went on strike and he fired them, And so they do deserve some blame in that story. But the message that it sent, which was before a lot of companies pushed back against unions, often very hard, but once unions formed, they didn't try to destroy them, typically at their own company or through government policy. And Reagan's policy was basically a version of hey, the gloves are off in a way that they weren't under Dwight Eisenhower and Richard Nixon and previous Republicans. And it's not simply trying to restrain unions from expanding into new regions or it restrained their wage increases. It's fine to go after them and really try to eliminate them. And that's what happened in a lot of industries is as well as globalization, but the cultural change was vital.

Yes, And it's actually I think it's an important example. So Ronald Reagan comes to office. The air traffic controllers who indorsed Ronald Reagan, which is fascinating, perhaps feeling empowered because they had endorsed this new president and most unions obviously had not made just unbelievable demands really in terms of wage increases and in terms of being able to take time off. I walk through some of them in the book. It just in terms of you look at them and you're like, WHOA, that's too much. And Ronald Reagan said, if you go on strike, I'll fire you. And the air traffic controllers didn't believe it, and they went on strike and he fired them, And so they do deserve some blame in that story. But the message that it sent, which was before a lot of companies pushed back against unions, often very hard, but once unions formed, they didn't try to destroy them, typically at their own company or through government policy. And Reagan's policy was basically a version of hey, the gloves are off in a way that they weren't under Dwight Eisenhower and Richard Nixon and previous Republicans. And it's not simply trying to restrain unions from expanding into new regions or it restrained their wage increases. It's fine to go after them and really try to eliminate them. And that's what happened in a lot of industries is as well as globalization, but the cultural change was vital.

Well, let's talk about globalization and how that impacted unions as well. Well, they just lost some of their power because the world became flatter, as Tom Friedman would say, right.

Well, let's talk about globalization and how that impacted unions as well. Well, they just lost some of their power because the world became flatter, as Tom Friedman would say, right.

Yes, they did. So that's interesting. That's definitely the case from the past. Weirdly, I think though, that might be reason to believe that unions can play a bigger role going forward than they have over the last fifty years. It's certainly the case that if a factory wants to avoid being unionized, it can move to another state or another country. But let's think about how our economy has changed. So much more of it is now service businesses. A hospital can't move in the same way that a factory can. A warehouse that is serving a particular region for online orders can't move in the same way that a factory can. A restaurant can't, and so unions have a lot of challenges today. The law is still really stacked against them, and I don't think we'll see a resurgence in unions until we see some legal changes the same way we've recently seen legal changes in healthcare and legal changes in other ways climate policy. I think it will take changes in the law. But if you got those changes in the law, I do really think you could imagine more of the workforce being unionized because we're now moving away from manufacturing and we're moving toward businesses that are inherently local and thus the business camp so easily simply pick up and move.

Yes, they did. So that's interesting. That's definitely the case from the past. Weirdly, I think though, that might be reason to believe that unions can play a bigger role going forward than they have over the last fifty years. It's certainly the case that if a factory wants to avoid being unionized, it can move to another state or another country. But let's think about how our economy has changed. So much more of it is now service businesses. A hospital can't move in the same way that a factory can. A warehouse that is serving a particular region for online orders can't move in the same way that a factory can. A restaurant can't, and so unions have a lot of challenges today. The law is still really stacked against them, and I don't think we'll see a resurgence in unions until we see some legal changes the same way we've recently seen legal changes in healthcare and legal changes in other ways climate policy. I think it will take changes in the law. But if you got those changes in the law, I do really think you could imagine more of the workforce being unionized because we're now moving away from manufacturing and we're moving toward businesses that are inherently local and thus the business camp so easily simply pick up and move.

But aren't we seeing the pendulum swing slightly already, David? In terms of some of the activities we've seen at Amazon, for example, Hollywood ongoing you aw strike and fast food workers and the minimum wage, it does seem like there's something in the atmosphere.

But aren't we seeing the pendulum swing slightly already, David? In terms of some of the activities we've seen at Amazon, for example, Hollywood ongoing you aw strike and fast food workers and the minimum wage, it does seem like there's something in the atmosphere.

I think there absolutely is. I think everything you said is right, and the only thing I would tack on with apologies for being repetitive, is I don't think it will last without some changes in the law because at a lot of these companies where the workers are expressing interest, they ultimately fail before unions because it's still too easy for companies to vent them from doing so.

I think there absolutely is. I think everything you said is right, and the only thing I would tack on with apologies for being repetitive, is I don't think it will last without some changes in the law because at a lot of these companies where the workers are expressing interest, they ultimately fail before unions because it's still too easy for companies to vent them from doing so.

So where do we go from here? I guess the question is, David, you know you use the past tense in your title. I think intentionally it's ours was the Shining Future. Now it's based on something Mary Anton and immigration rights advocate wrote at the turn of the century, mine is the Shining Future. So you know, you started this conversation by saying you were an optimist. So how do we get out of this mess? How do we restore some equilibrium and honestly some equality to people because income inequality is just so outrageous in this country.

So where do we go from here? I guess the question is, David, you know you use the past tense in your title. I think intentionally it's ours was the Shining Future. Now it's based on something Mary Anton and immigration rights advocate wrote at the turn of the century, mine is the Shining Future. So you know, you started this conversation by saying you were an optimist. So how do we get out of this mess? How do we restore some equilibrium and honestly some equality to people because income inequality is just so outrageous in this country.

It is, and you know, the white black wage gap is is almost as large as it was when Harry Truman was president, and so all forms of inequality are just really, really quite outrageous. Yeah, you're right. The title is ours was the Shining Future. If I had a longer title, maybe it would be ours was the Shining Future, and it could be again.

It is, and you know, the white black wage gap is is almost as large as it was when Harry Truman was president, and so all forms of inequality are just really, really quite outrageous. Yeah, you're right. The title is ours was the Shining Future. If I had a longer title, maybe it would be ours was the Shining Future, and it could be again.

But that's not colin.

But that's not colin.

Yeah, but so I love that question. Here to me is the reason to have optimism, not that we will get over our problems, but that we can get over our problems. I know that many people think that our system is rigged, that our democracy doesn't work, and I actually agree in certain ways it's rigged and our democracy don't.

Yeah, but so I love that question. Here to me is the reason to have optimism, not that we will get over our problems, but that we can get over our problems. I know that many people think that our system is rigged, that our democracy doesn't work, and I actually agree in certain ways it's rigged and our democracy don't.

Well, I've heard you talk about upward mobility and how it's really declined, and you know, I think their statistics about forty plus percent of people never leave their socioeconomic group they were born in. So you know, they're not like the current kids. They're not climbing up, they're staying down.

Well, I've heard you talk about upward mobility and how it's really declined, and you know, I think their statistics about forty plus percent of people never leave their socioeconomic group they were born in. So you know, they're not like the current kids. They're not climbing up, they're staying down.

Yes, and so inequality, it's just it's really really high. What I would ask people to reflect on is how has this country changed before, not just in the long ago past, but I'll get to this, but also fairly recently. And I think it's almost always changed through grassroots political movements. Usually grassroots political movements that seemed like the odds were too long when they began. So how did the union movement in this country begin? It began, the modern one began in the nineteen thirties when unions lost every fight that they had fought for years and years and years, and then we were in the depression, and it won because people like a. Philip Randolph and others kept fighting and not only persuaded workers to join unions, but persuaded the federal government to change the law. That's the lesson of the labor movement that shortened hours and helped build the middle class. It's also the lesson of the civil rights movement. We look back on the civil rights movement as a glorious victory, as we should, but it didn't feel that way in the moment to a lot of organizers. It felt like defeat after defeat after defeat, and then a little bit of progress. But they kept at it. And what they did was they tried to shape public opinion, and they built these grassroots movements and they changed the law. And I think that's the lesson of the labor movement, the civil rights movement, the women's movement, the disability rights movement. If someone saying wait a second, or all of his examples coming from the political left, I actually think it's the lesson of the anti abortion movement fifty years ago. They were furious about Roe v. Wade, and so what did they do. They organized, and they won local elections, and they basically took over the Republican Party and they were able to appoint judges who are friendly to them. Whether you celebrate these changes or abhor them, this is how our country changes. And I think we've gotten a little distracted from the material living standards of most people. We don't really have large grassroots movements that are focused on improving their lives. And I still really believe that if those movements come together, the biggest lesson of history is not that our society is irrevocably broken, but that we haven't done the things that we need to do to fix it. And American democracy, for all the challenges to it, and I do not want to minimize the authoritarian challenges to American democracy right now, for all of the challenges to American democracy, it's still has the tools to build a much better society. And indeed, the only way we've built a better society in the past is through those democratic tools.

Yes, and so inequality, it's just it's really really high. What I would ask people to reflect on is how has this country changed before, not just in the long ago past, but I'll get to this, but also fairly recently. And I think it's almost always changed through grassroots political movements. Usually grassroots political movements that seemed like the odds were too long when they began. So how did the union movement in this country begin? It began, the modern one began in the nineteen thirties when unions lost every fight that they had fought for years and years and years, and then we were in the depression, and it won because people like a. Philip Randolph and others kept fighting and not only persuaded workers to join unions, but persuaded the federal government to change the law. That's the lesson of the labor movement that shortened hours and helped build the middle class. It's also the lesson of the civil rights movement. We look back on the civil rights movement as a glorious victory, as we should, but it didn't feel that way in the moment to a lot of organizers. It felt like defeat after defeat after defeat, and then a little bit of progress. But they kept at it. And what they did was they tried to shape public opinion, and they built these grassroots movements and they changed the law. And I think that's the lesson of the labor movement, the civil rights movement, the women's movement, the disability rights movement. If someone saying wait a second, or all of his examples coming from the political left, I actually think it's the lesson of the anti abortion movement fifty years ago. They were furious about Roe v. Wade, and so what did they do. They organized, and they won local elections, and they basically took over the Republican Party and they were able to appoint judges who are friendly to them. Whether you celebrate these changes or abhor them, this is how our country changes. And I think we've gotten a little distracted from the material living standards of most people. We don't really have large grassroots movements that are focused on improving their lives. And I still really believe that if those movements come together, the biggest lesson of history is not that our society is irrevocably broken, but that we haven't done the things that we need to do to fix it. And American democracy, for all the challenges to it, and I do not want to minimize the authoritarian challenges to American democracy right now, for all of the challenges to American democracy, it's still has the tools to build a much better society. And indeed, the only way we've built a better society in the past is through those democratic tools.

But you talk about establishing a communitarian sensibility, what is that and does that have to be hand in hand with some of these grassroots movements?

But you talk about establishing a communitarian sensibility, what is that and does that have to be hand in hand with some of these grassroots movements?

Yes, I think the good news is that it probably would go hand in hand.

Yes, I think the good news is that it probably would go hand in hand.

What is it exactly?

What is it exactly?

It's the idea that I care deeply about the people in my community, and not just in a sort of ephemeral way. I care about them. They are a priority to me, even maybe before other parts of the world. And I know that's a kind of controversial thing to say, particularly maybe on the left. But if you had corporate executives who said, you know what, I'm not neutral about whether I'm going to save jobs in my own town or move jobs to another town or another country. That is the kind of thing that the corporate executives in the past felt. They said, you know what, I'm not going to leave Milwaukee. I'm going to build a beautiful theater in Milwaukee because I care about Milwaukee. I'm not neutral about my own community. And I really do think I don't know the exact way we get back to that, but I really do think a certain amount of communitarianism and patriotism, the idea that hey, we're all in this together. We care about other parts of the world, but we're Americans and we care about this and we're going to fix our country, Americans of all races and all religions and all different parts of the world. That kind of communitarianism is different from oh, we're agnostic about whether this job is in the United States or not in the United States. It's a different culture.

It's the idea that I care deeply about the people in my community, and not just in a sort of ephemeral way. I care about them. They are a priority to me, even maybe before other parts of the world. And I know that's a kind of controversial thing to say, particularly maybe on the left. But if you had corporate executives who said, you know what, I'm not neutral about whether I'm going to save jobs in my own town or move jobs to another town or another country. That is the kind of thing that the corporate executives in the past felt. They said, you know what, I'm not going to leave Milwaukee. I'm going to build a beautiful theater in Milwaukee because I care about Milwaukee. I'm not neutral about my own community. And I really do think I don't know the exact way we get back to that, but I really do think a certain amount of communitarianism and patriotism, the idea that hey, we're all in this together. We care about other parts of the world, but we're Americans and we care about this and we're going to fix our country, Americans of all races and all religions and all different parts of the world. That kind of communitarianism is different from oh, we're agnostic about whether this job is in the United States or not in the United States. It's a different culture.

But given the polarization, and I'm so tired of that word, David, but given how vitriolic our civil discourse has become, how we've been our social fabric has been shredded. As David Brooks often talks about, I mean, how do you even start doing that?

But given the polarization, and I'm so tired of that word, David, but given how vitriolic our civil discourse has become, how we've been our social fabric has been shredded. As David Brooks often talks about, I mean, how do you even start doing that?

It's incredibly difficult. Surely I won't be the one who's able to solve it. I would just remind people that there are people in our past who've looked at even steeper odds and didn't give up, but said, all we can do is try to make this a better country. I mean, I mentioned a Philip Randolph before he built the first meaningful union of black employees in the United States in the nineteen thirties, right, and then he faced down FDR when FDR told him to cancel a march meant to integrate wartime factories. And so our country has faced these incredibly long odds for certain groups before, and what they've done is they've found ways to organize, and they've found ways to be incredibly strategic, sometimes ruthlessly strategic. Here's what we're going to do to make this a better country. It's not guaranteed to succeed, but I don't really know what the alternative is for us to get out of these problems that we have today.

It's incredibly difficult. Surely I won't be the one who's able to solve it. I would just remind people that there are people in our past who've looked at even steeper odds and didn't give up, but said, all we can do is try to make this a better country. I mean, I mentioned a Philip Randolph before he built the first meaningful union of black employees in the United States in the nineteen thirties, right, and then he faced down FDR when FDR told him to cancel a march meant to integrate wartime factories. And so our country has faced these incredibly long odds for certain groups before, and what they've done is they've found ways to organize, and they've found ways to be incredibly strategic, sometimes ruthlessly strategic. Here's what we're going to do to make this a better country. It's not guaranteed to succeed, but I don't really know what the alternative is for us to get out of these problems that we have today.

And I think really strong leaders that can help inspire people to do all the things you're talking about, strong leadership at the national, state, and local level.

And I think really strong leaders that can help inspire people to do all the things you're talking about, strong leadership at the national, state, and local level.

Yeah, and look, many people lament just how old our political leaders are not just the president, not just the likely nominee from the other party, but the leaders in Congress. And that's true. It's somewhat bizarre how old our political leaders are. You can look at that, though, and say there is an opportunity They're not going to be around that much longer in the grand sweep of things, and we really do need new leaders, right We need people who can come forward and express fresh visions of what inspires America.