This is Masters in Business with Barry Ridholds on Bloomberg Radio. So I'm I'm really excited about this week's guest. Jason's Wige. He is a reporter, columnist, author. UM. You probably know his work as the Weekend Investor column in the Wall Street Journal. I'm a big fan of some of his books, including Your Money and Your Brain, which is one of the earliest looks at neuroeconomics and neurofinance. He has a book coming up, uh it's an updated version of inspired by Ambrose Bierce's Devil's Dictionary. It's called The Devil's Financial Dictionary. And we we talked about that. We talk a little bit about journalism and what it's gonna be like going forward, or the impact of social media, Twitter, etcetera. I've read him for so many years and know his work for for just so long. It was really interesting sitting down and talking with him about his assess and who his mentors and influences were, and what sort of advice he would give to somebody in the in the finance world. And I just found it to be really quite fascinating. We probably went about ninety minutes, so given how long that is. UM rather than me, Babil, Let me just say here is my conversation with Jason's Why this is Masters in Business with Barry Ridholds on Bloomberg Radio This week on Masters in Business, our special guest is journalist and author Jason's Wage. He is a columnist for The Wall Street Journal. He is also the author of the upcoming The Devil's Financial Dictionary, loosely based on Ambrose Bierce's famous Devil's Dictionary. I actually have read several of his previous books and really enjoyed him, one of which Your Money and Your Brain Might have been one of the first books that looked at behavioral economics from the investor's perspective. He also helped Danny Kahneman edit Thinking Fast and Slow, as well as being the editor of the revised edition of Benjamin Graham's classic The Intelligent Investor. Jason's Wide Welcome to Bloomberg. Great to be here. Mary. So you have a long and storied history and financial journalism, and we'll we'll get into some of the more granular stuff, but let's let's just go a little bit over your background. UM, I would be remiss if I didn't mention in two thousand and thirteen you won the Lobe Award for Personal Finance Writing. You've also been a writer for Money magazine, Time, CNN, you covered mutual funds for Forbes, and today you're the personal finance writer at The Journal. How did you find your way into financial journalism? Well, I think, like a lot of your guests, Barry, I'm gonna talk about luck. I think I'm anybody who has done read intably well in just about any field who doesn't credit luck first and foremost is kidding himself? Or isn't that fascinating? When when I finally sit down and put together the Book of Masters in Business, how many guests, and not just guests who had like one lucky break, but guys who were billionaires like Howard Marks and Leon Cooperman. He'd say, well, you know, you got really lucky. That's an amazing statement, isn't it. It's and I think it's totally true. And we all like to pride ourselves on our abilities and our skills, but without luck, I'm not sure any of us would be where we are today. I mean, I always wanted to be a writer. I was always fascinated by business. I have no formal training in business or economics. You went to Columbia, but you didn't go to Columbia Business school. You went to Columbia College, And would you study undergraduate art history? And so of course that makes perfect sense. You go from that to prest fun right, and and I think it's probably worth pointing out that, uh, one of your former guests, Charlie Ellis, also also spent some time studying art history. What a delightful gentleman. He's great, one of the best. So so you you The real question I always wanted to ask you, and I'll do it now, is how did you manage to avoid a career and asset management. Uh? Well, I think I I learned early enough in my career as a financial journalist that uh, luck is supremely important in investment management, and very early on I had a hard time distinguishing luck from skill. And I still do. You need a long period and lots of data and the right decision making environment to stand a chance of telling whether something is luck or skill. But that's just a long way of saying that I didn't want to go into investment management because I felt I I sort of knew where the fundamental body was buried. And the body that was buried was that a lot of people who think they're skillful are just lucky. And I didn't really want to go through my professional career with that on my conscience. I guess I have other things on my conscience than that. The flip side of that is a lot of people who think they're unlucky merely or unskillful. Correct. So you mentioned you always were fascinated by business. We always interested in stocks and investing or was that something you came to later. Yeah, I bought my first stock when I was sixteen, Barry, it was, and it was a fascinating experience, especially in hindsight. I bought a stock based on an absolutely god awful book that when I was sixteen thought was pretty persuasive. It was called How I Made two Million Dollars in the Stock Market by Nicholas Darvis. I read that a long time. Yeah, and you remember that thing he talks about where you know, increasing volume on rising price proceeds price exactly and you wait for the price to confirm the volume, and then you then you buy. So you're a closet technician, Well I was, at least I was. This is actually an interesting story because I I did exactly what he suggested. I took graph paper and I tracked ten stocks and um I had a copy of the SNP Stock Guide. This was five or six. It's not a great time to be an equity investor in the first place. And I found a stock that was called and I'm saying called mac a F. I didn't know what it was. The SNP Stock Guide said that it uh it produced liquorice and I think ball bearings or something like that, and uh so and it it turned out to be a perfect Darvis stock. And I bought a hundred shares at nine and five eighths with my you know, summer earnings, and it went up to twelve and seven eighths in a matter of days. And I didn't know a thing about the company other than this ridiculous theory that appeared to be confirmed. It turned out later to be mc andrews and Forbes Ron Perlman's original takeover vehicle. And I think this was around the time that he was first amassing shares. So I bought it for the wrong reason. I made money in it for the wrong reason, and I got stopped out at twelve and seven eighths, but this was so I didn't know I had been stopped out until the trade confirm arrived in the mail about a week later, and I went bonkers and I was like, I'm writing this thing all the way to twenty and I called my parents broker and I said, get me back in and then he flat out refused, and my dad had to buy it for me and went to fourteen and a quarter or something, and my dad browbeat me into selling it. And then where did it ultimately go? I it did very well in the long run. I don't think it did too well. Right after that, you're listening to Masters in Business on Bloomberg Radio. My guest this week is Jason's Wide, author of the upcoming The Devil's Financial Dictionary. Before we get into the book, I want to talk a little bit about social media. I see you tweeting pretty regularly. One of the questions I had for you as a professional journalist, what's the impact of Twitter, and to a lesser degree, blobs on the changing nature of financial journalism. Well, I think it's I think it's really big, Barry, and it's it's good and bad, And maybe let me talk about the bad first. You know, uh, up until a few years ago, certainly until ten years ago, probably five, um reading and investing public could rely on major media outlets to be their filters of information. If you saw something in the Wall Street Journal or the New York Times, for that matter, you could be fairly sure it was reliable, vetted, somebody had looked into what it wasn't just a random It's just not somebody spouting or repeating information generated by people with an axe to grind without checking at first. And I think the danger that we're in in a world dominated by social media and kind of insta pundits through the blog of sphere that's literally a blog inst the plan yeah I know, um, but I wasn't referring to them in particular, is that it's it's much harder today to make qualitative judgments as a consumer of news about what's reliable and what's not, because you're just drinking from a fire hose all day long. And I think the value of Twitter is that by giving you those mic o bursts of information and opinion from people, you get to see that, you get to see what they think in short spurts, and you can fairly quickly form a judgment about how objective they are, how reliable their information is, and I think ultimately it's going to help people separate the good from the bad. You know, one of my favorite aspects about Twitter is just how easy it is to derive a conclusion from somebody's Twitter numbers. So if someone's got eighty thousand tweets and a hundred and forty seven followers, that's a pretty fair assessment that this person is not pranking out quality tweets. On the other hands, when and Warren Buffett is probably the extreme opposite of that, He's got four tweets and six million followers. But between those extremes there's a spectrum. And you know, I have under a hundred thousand followers, My partner has over a hundred thousand followers, and we have a lot less tweets than we have followers. So somebody who's looking at that can say, oh, there has to be something worthwhile and substance if here not that followers or everything. Otherwise, if that was the case, Justin Bieber would be philosopher king. And we know that's not the case, but that's a real good shorthand to say, hey, is this person putting out anything of quality? Is there some way to double check, validate, see if the crowd has any wisdom and they've endorsed this person. Isn't it remarkable? Barry? How how hard that simple algorithm you've just expressed is for so many people to understand? I mean every day on Twitter you see recommended lists of people who tweet, and then you look at them and you see, oh, here's somebody they're recommending because he has fifty thou followers without even noting that he follows eighty thousand people and he's tweeted forty thousand times. So you know, a lot of people are still using followers alone. No, it can't be as the metric. You have to it has to be a combination of quantitative and qualities. You have to say, has the crowd vallet you know, it's sort of like when when you go to Metacritic, you basically say what were the reviews? Like what did the audience say? When when you get a movie like Jurassic Park or Mission Impossible and both the reviewers like it and the crowd likes it. So that's how I use the Twitter numbers, and we've now lost half our audience let's let's let's turn to The Devil's Financial Dictionary, which comes out in October. I've got a preliminary copy of of the book, and that's one of the reasons why I wanted to sit down and chat with you. I found it. Let me let me rather than me telling you what I think, let me go some of the early reviews. Bob Schiller, Nobel winner and Professor of Finance at Yale University. The most amusing presentation of principle is the finance I've ever seen. John Bogel, founder of the Vanguard Group. Laugh, cry, and learn as you enjoy the sparkling Devil's Financial Dictionary. The List of people who have given you blurbs Burton Malkiel, author author of Random Walked Down Wall Street, delightfully humorous and stunningly irreverent. James Grant opened this wonderful book to any page, try not to laugh, I dare you. And then Bill Sharp essentially created the Sharp ratio and another Nobel laureate at Stanford The run of People You got to um. I was like disappointed, No Buffett, and then I scrolled down and there's Warren Buffett's blured it. It's Um, it's an amazing run of people. Tell us a little bit about the motivation and thought process behind the book. Well, I've always loved Ambrose Beers's Devil's Dictionary. You know. Beers is maybe the most unjustly elected author of the nineteenth century in America. He was a contemporary of Mark Twain's. He was at least as brilliant. He wrote some of the most devastating epigrams ever written. And um, he was brutally cynical about American society and institutions, and he took on a few He he basically compiled The Devil's Dictionary as a collection of satirical definitions of terms most people think of in a very conventional way. And he just blew up every sort of bit of conventional wisdom and turned them all on their head. And it just occurred to me about two years ago that this project that I had had in mind for about fifteen years would be easier to do than I realized. And I just started doing it in my spare time. And my wife heard me cackling in the kitchen at night, and I really, if I was bothering her, I must be having fun. And I just kept at it. And you know, my goal was to try to do something like what Beers did and bring it to the world of Wall Street. And you know a couple of definitions from the original Devil's Dictionary or worth keeping in mind. I mean these are bear in mind. I'm going to read these. And first comes the word, then comes to the part of speech, then comes to the definition. So this is ambrose beers ambidextrous adjective able to pick with equal skill a right hand pocket or a left I gotta like that. In the in the last thirty seconds we have of this segment, Um, what are some of your favorite ones from the new Financial Devil's Dictionary. I'll give you one of my favorite day trader see idiot. Yeah, that's to get some hate mail on that one. That might be my favorite too. And maybe we can, maybe we can get into some of the longer ones. A bit later, you're listening a Master's in Business on Bloomberg Radio. I'm speaking with jason's Wage, personal finance writer and author of numerous books, his most recent being The Devil's Financial Dictionary. Tell me, uh, some of your favorite selections from this volume? Well, Barry, maybe I can, maybe I can read one quickly, and you know, I'll read the definition, the part of speech, and then I have to warrnt everybody. There are what I call flights of fancy in these, okay, which are these little um imaginary passages featuring people who bear no resemblance to anyone you and I might? Alright, So option nown the right to buy or sell a financial asset at a fixed price on or before a specific time from the Latin opt o. I choose a boon for stockholders whose clients don't understand how options work and generate a fortune in commissions as they attempt to learn. And here comes the flight of fancy stockholders of stockbrokers. Stockbrokers, explained you, asking me, a client of the broker age firm born rich and how I put two children through Harvard by trading options. Unfortunately they were my broker's children. That's great, so um obviously ambrosepers huge, huge influence. You mentioned you were working on this at night. How long did it take you to assemble this is a pretty thorough financial distinary. How how long did this stake? It didn't take very long, actually, U. You know a lot of these I'd had in my head for a long time, so it's just a matter of getting it out and on some page. Yeah. The real what I'm trying to do with this book is in each case when I define a term, I'm saying to myself, you know, after more than a quarter century of you know, researching and reporting on the financial markets, can I take everything I've learned and boil it down into a hundred fifty words or less? And then if I can do that, how about fifty words? And in some cases I got them down to a single word? Give me us an example other than the day trader. Um. Uh, well, there's one which is human adjective biased. We're gonna talk a little more about the biases and cognitive issues of humans coming up in a bit. Uh. Who is the ideal audience for this? Is this scared for the professional? Is this for a mom and pop investor? Who are you thinking about when you were writing this? Well? Really everybody. There's a lot of inside jokes in this book that I think only a professional audience will get and will certainly be annoyed by and I hope amused by. I think one of the wonderful things about the Wall Street community is that people do have an ability to laugh at themselves. UM, at least the better people in the in the field do. And there's a lot to laugh about, so to say the least, I'm curious as to how the research for this win. I know you said this has been kicking around your head for fifteen years, but yeah, I just picture you doing a pretty deep dive, if not wearing the white gloves and the stacks of Yale, certainly working your way through UM either Lexus or Google to try and find some so early ideology of some of these words. Yeah, a lot in a lot of cases, because it is a true dictionary. So I was trying to get at where a lot of these terms derived from. And in many cases, people who use these terms all day long don't really know what they mean, so they're just using them as jargon, not as as true exactly. And and so yes, there's I did a lot of historical and archival research trying to figure out when a certain term was first used, where came from. I spent a lot of time with the Oxford English Dictionary and UM all kinds of historical research as well. And you have quite the background as an editor. One of the questions I had to ask, So, the very famous classic book by Benjamin Graham, The Intelligent Investor, you actually were the editor of the revised edition. How on earth did that invitation come along? Well, I don't think it hurt that I was a Graham afficionado. I mean I I first read The Intelligent Investor in March when I started as a financial journalist at Forbes Magazine, and I probably read it cover to cover at least six times. I'd read almost all of Graham's shorter writings as well, and all the biographies of him that existed at the time. But ultimately it was it was uck like everything else we've been talking about. Um. A friend of mine had written a book for Harbercollins. Uh, one of the top editors at the publishing house, was out to lunch with her and said, uh, you know, we have this book. Who do you think should do it? And she said, oh, well, there was only one person who should do it, and she told him to ask me. And why did she do that? Because we had both been at a party about a month beforehand. We hadn't seen each other in years. I had seen her across the room and I said, oh, I haven't seen her in years, and so I made a special point going to say hi. And if I hadn't said hi to her, she would have recommended somebody else. You're listening to Master's in Business on Bloomberg Radio. We're speaking with Jason's Wide, personal finance writer and author. Um. One of the things I wanted to really go over with you, uh, is your perspective as a personal finance columnist. And I'm going to start by quoting you and then and then we'll discuss it. You once wrote, my job is to write the exact same thing between fifty and one hundred times a year in such a way that neither my editors nor my readers will ever think I'm repeating myself. Explain. Um, Yeah, there's a simple reason for that, Barry. I'm and I think you and I think alike on this. There's there's really only a handful of things you can tell investors about their portfolios that are true before you get into things that are bad for them. And you know, we could disagree about the number. There might be six things they are good for people, there might be thirty, but there aren't a hundred. And I'm and there's at most a couple dozen. So We're not going to see a daily television show for you where an hour day you wax eloquence on the issues of the moment. Well, probably not, because you know, as I, as I also mentioned in the same piece you're quoting from, you know, five per cent of the time, the right thing for people to do is nothing. And uh, there's a financial media that exists all day long, NonStop, having to provide people with what appears to be information, well certainly content content. And if you you can't do that, if you believe that the right thing to tell people to do is nothing, So that Jason's wide TV show would be have a broadly diversified asset allocation model, rebalance regularly, watch your fees, see you tomorrow. Yeah, diversify, buy and hold, minimize your costs and your taxes. And I keep your hands in your pockets, don't. Don't just do something? Sit there right and keep other people's hands out of your pockets. That makes sense. So let me let me re ask that that question in a slightly different way, along the same spirit of that that question, what does good financial advice look like? Good financial advice on keeps people from being their own worst enemies? You know. Benjamin Graham famously wrote about that in the introduction to the Intelligent Investor, and I think it all really boils down to one very very simple thing, which is that markets regrets to the mean, and the way you in the short run, the way you attract attention to yourself if you're providing financial advice, is by encouraging people to bet against regression to the mean. So if an asset is rapidly going up in price, you tell people buy more while you still can, and if it's going down, you tell him to sell before it's too late. But if you're trying to help people get on the right side of regression to the mean, then you give them countercyclical advice. When an asset is going up and Brice, you tell them be cautious, and when it's going down, you tell them to become more aggressive. Quite interesting, So let me ask you the flip side of that. Uh, why is it that so much bad advice seems to hang around and not die? Why why? Or or as slightly differently, why is there so much zombie advice for investors? Well? I think it boils down to something very simple. Barry. I think you know, humans have a profound um, a profound desire to believe in magic. People want to be lied to? And was it you who recently wrote um the three ways to make money as a as a writer lie to. If you, if you tell people to truth, truth who don't want to hear it, you're not gonna make any money. If you tell people truth who want to hear the truth, they're they're gonna make some money. But if you a lot of the people who want to be lied to, you're gonna make the most amount of Yeah, if you, if you tell the truth to people who want to be lied to, you'll starve. That's unbelievable. It's true. And so what is it within our makeup that wants us to be told the soft, easy, comfortable thing and not Hey, here, here's you know, tough love, here's the cold, hard reality. The sooner you learn that, the better off you are. Well, people are people are machines, right, and their machines that are designed to optimize a few things. Pattern recognition, self enhancement m HM, and self delusion. I mean, human beings are really good at those three things. We're we almost certainly have evolved to maximize is those things and that's why people are so susceptible to bad advice, because bad advice praise on that stuff emotionally, praise to those emotional hot buttons. Exactly. Interesting. So let's let's talk about some more good advice. Who are the young writers that you were reading today that you find to be giving the sort of good advice or or good writing that is beneficial to investors? And yeah, I think I I think I I like some of the same people you do. Barry Well, it's not a coincidence. You being here is just my confirmation bias that works, Yes, exactly, and mine too. Um. You know the first person I would name would be Morgan. How is only the Moley fool? I think? Um? I think he does just incredibly sharp, really insightful stuff. Love his work. Ben Carlson a wealth of common sense, really that's his does great stuff. James Osborne at Basin Asset Management does also really cool stuff. There's a bunch of other people as well, I'm who are terrific. It's amazing how the meritocracy of financial writing, how these names have risen up to the top fairly quickly. Ben Carlson as an example, I mean he started blogging. I don't know, a year ago, maybe less really relative, maybe it's two years ago relatively short time, quickly found an institutional audience and puts out really really good stuff on a regular Yeah. And I think this is a very hopeful sign for the future. You know, there are a lot of people and Charlie Munger is one worrying what does he blog away? I know I recognized that he. Uh, he's very worried about the institutional impact of the decline of the traditional great newspaper. And we don't know yet what's going to replace it. But the fact that that really talented, bright young people have been able to sort of rise to the top, I think is is a hopeful sign for the future. I can't say I I disagree. Um, what are the writers do you read? Who else have you read over the years that really stood out as as a powerful and influential voice to you? Well, a lot of them are are now of another generation. Um, Charlie Ellis was a very big influence on me. I'm Ben Graham, of course. Uh. Probably the single biggest influences on the on the way I try to think, uh would be Richard Feineman, the physicist m yes um uh. Who's wonderful books these oral streets, And there's a series of them. There's four or five of them I think are among the most engaging books on how to think. I believe you could find anywhere. And of course Danny Kahneman the Thinking Fast Uh and Slow Ye was a huge influence on me as well, and I was very fortunate to be able to work with him and help him on the book that that was a fascinating book, which leads to a question. So you and I both found behavioral economics fairly early in our career. How did you stumble into that space? Uh? Well, I realized around that I was running out of interesting questions. I didn't think. I I didn't think by any means I had all the answers. But as someone who didn't have professional training in finance or economics, but who sort of sat at the feet of the smartest people, I could find a lot of the questions were starting to feel repetitive to me, my questions and other people's questions. And there was still this this fundamental mystery that nobody seemed to have an answer to, which is why do smart people do such stupid things? When it comes to money. It's amazing. History is replete with examples, whether it's Isaac Newton, Mark Twain, go down the list of various brilliant, insightful people who will manage to just blow up in the stock mark. Ye. And and that's really the central question that has obsessed me for the past twenty years is why do smart people become stupid when money comes into the room. Well, we've run out of time for this segment. If you enjoy this conversation, be sure and check out our podcast extras with a tape keeps rolling and we continue our conversation. Uh. If you want to catch more of Jason's wives work, you can follow him on Twitter. Your Twitter handle is Jason's wag w s J. I'm Barry RIH Halts. Be sure and check out my daily column on Bloomberg View dot com. Follow me on Twitter at rid Halts. You've been listening to Masters in Business on Bloomberg Radio. Welcome to the podcast Extras. My guest this week is Jason's Wage and there's so much stuff I want to ask you about. You know, it's funny those segments that are seven minutes, eight minutes, six minutes, eleven minutes, I lose a little bit of rhythm because I'm always aware of the time. And then we get to this segment and we could kind of take our shoes off and kick back and relax. So let me go over some of the questions that I skipped that I wanted to to ask you. And these are really print real questions printed out. You know you can you can get the home copies if you want. Um. We talked briefly about Twitter and blogs and social media. Um. What I wanted to ask was not so much about commentary in and now lissis, which is always its own separate page in a newspaper, but what about just straight up reporting. We keep seeing various media outlets just ending various local reporting, city hall that the other thing, what does this mean for the future of of actual not what you and I do, but actual reporting with people go out and try and find the facts in current events and tell the rest of the world about it. Yeah, I think that I think you know, all of this is like is sort of like a Newton's law of thermodynamics, right, Barry. I mean, for everything created, something is destroyed. And you know, the the Internet and the advent of social media have democratized the spread and for that matter, in the generation of news and information, so that anyone with a cell phone hand become a broadcaster or a reporter. The problem is that anybody who has done shoe leather investigative reporting in one of the great newsrooms of America like the Wall Street Journal or or the New York Times or the Washington Post or the l A Times, any of the great or or once great newspapers in this country or magazines for that manner, can tell you that reporting is brutally hard work to get it right. It's really hard work to do. It's really hard work to prevent yourself from injecting your own viewpoint, bias, personality. It's and it's absolutely essential to a functioning democrat. It's I mean, it's not. The press is not called the fourth Estate for nothing. And Charlie Munger's fear, and this is the fear that I share, is that when reporting gets atomized the way we see it unfolding on the Internet and in social media, you don't have that institutional memory and historical tradition, and most importantly, that professional training in newsrooms the way you once did. You don't have reporters doing two three five years of understudy with unmasters, and and so the attention to fairness and detail and proper methodology falls by the wayside. And if you think about House of Cards, for example, the you know, the TV I'm going to call it a melodrama with that's very compelling, with Kevin Spacey and Robin Wright, House of Cards, House of Games, House of Cards, um, you know, in that show, over and over again, you see these journalists at a newspaper clearly modeled after the Washington Post doing things that are so unscrupulous that if you did them once at the Wall Street Journal, you would be summarily fired. And it's it now just goes without passing, without mention. I think the American public sort of takes it for granted that journalists are sloppy creeps who, you know, invade people's privacy and lie to their sources regularly, and in fact, believe it or not, journalists in a traditional newsroom environment are phenomenally ethical people who who would you could put most journalists thumb in a screw and tighten it before you would get them to tell a lie. That I don't disagree with that it's always the bed eggs that that spoil everybody's perception. But I want to mention something you just said earlier, that anybody with a cell phone can can broadcast and and literally, I'm gonna do this. I'm gonna do this right now. I'm gonna use periscope and broadcast a few seconds of our interview off of a phone. That this is fascinating technology that did not exist forget twenty five years ago, this didn't exist eight months ago. Exactly. It's amazing that the technology for this exists today. And so how do you compete with that? How do you build a television station and go through the training of reporters and journalists when everyone and anyone can be a citizen journalist. What happens to that business model that digital technology is challenging. It's amazing. Well, first of all, Barry, thank you for not pointing the camera at your feet. Um. And secondly, I said, can't off of shoes and get comfortable, and uh, literally, that's what we did. And secondly, I'm you know, look, you're raising an incredibly troubling question and we don't yet know the answer because we don't how this is going to play out. I think ultimately the better emerging news organizations. And you know, we could all think of you know, some of the candidates right like, you know, maybe Vice or some some outfit like that. Um, we'll get the capital and the experience and the professionalism that they need to build something that competes with the traditional newsroom like the Wall Street Journal or Bloomberg, and um, that could take a long time now, and ultimately those organizations are going to have to cannibalize the existing great news organizations to staff themselves up with people who have the experience and the ethical background to run uh, proper news organization. I'm running, I'm running out of battery here, so I'm gonna kill periscope and I think that that's done. But um, that was just thirty of that. UM, I think you're onto something with that, which which leads me to a question I wanted to get to earlier, um, and didn't. It's actually two related questions. The first is this comes right from you, from your money and your brain. People who received frequent news updates on their investments earn lower returns than those who get no news whatsoever. Discuss Yeah, this is based on a series of fascinating experiments done by a psychologist named Paul Andreas and in the nineteen eighties he was at Columbia for a while and Harvard, and he took UH. He took experimental subjects and divided them into two groups. Some got essentially no no updated information on their chosen investment portfolios, and others got frequent, in fact, almost constant news updates. And then he tracked their investment performance. And he found that the more often people got news, the more often they traded. And we know what the net outcome of that is for the average invest The more you trade, the less you learn. And it's a direct relationship. It's just if A then B. If you get more news information, more updates, you will act on it because it will feel informative to you, even if it's just even if the news is just noise, you will feel you have to act on it because it seems like news and it seems significant. I call a lot of what gets reported falls into the recency effects. Look, we get a non farm payroll every month. It doesn't mean that it changes the value of what your investment is. And half of the time when it's an aberration to the upisode of the downside, it's still within the statistical range of probabilities that reflect nothing other than oh, something is slightly often this reporting, and so it's a little more were a little less than people were expecting, and yet everybody reacts and overreacts to it. Yeah, I mean we're you know, everyone sort of comes with a default hair trigger mechanism. I mean, this example has been used so many times it's it's almost dull at this point. But you know, in evolutionary time, when our ancestors were evolving on the you know, the planes of the African savannah, you know, if you thought you might see a lion and you overreacted to what you thought was the lion, well you lived to you know, pass on, and if person was blase about that, not a whole lot of progeny. Right. The thing is, most of the time it wasn't a lion. Most of the time it was just the wind, you know, waving a patch of grass. But that one time it was a lion. If you overreacted, you survived and you passed your jeans on. And if you underreacted, you were lion food. That that makes perfect sense. So I've used the phrase behavioral economics repeatedly your behavioral finance. But the book Your Your Money, or Your Brain, which you talked about the New Science of Neuroeconomics, describe the difference between behavioral economics and neurofinance. How do you how do you define that? Yeah, it's really I think it's a I think it's a very simple distinction. In neuroeconomics or or neurofinance simply uses the tools and techniques of neuroscience. Two extend existing research and findings in psychology and economics, and by those tools and techniques, it's primarily methods of measuring brain activity m R. Yeah, like a functional MRI I, a pet scan, a cat scan, um. It could also be uh various um um uh tools for monitoring brain waves or electromagnetic activity in the brain. So so the way I like to define that behavioral economics is you can see the results of this issue in someone's actual behavior. They did this, they bought that, they sold that, whereas neuro you're actually looking inside their brain in some way and seeing what's going on organically as opposed to behaviorally. Yeah, And if you think about it, uh, there's there's not much difference between the two in a way behavioral economics is telling you what minds do, and neuroeconomics is telling you what brains do. It's we already a great distinction. We can already observe the behavior. Because somebody buys high and sells low. They made a decision in their mind to do this. We see, we see their action, we see what they did, so we know what happened. What neuroeconomics does is it says, these are the specific circuits in the brain that generated the behavior you've observed in in your psychological experiments. Let me shift gears on you, and and let's talk a little bit about the problem with predictions. What's the problem? So we all make forecasts. Everybody, everybody in will state has a Here's where the d will be in a year. Here's what I think these earnings are gonna be. What's the problem with predictions. Well, I think that there's a there's many problems with them, Barry. I think the first problem is that people are people are very poor at learning from their predictive errors, particularly when the consequences aren't high or the feedback is noisy. To define that, what do you mean by that? Well, think about it this way. I'm you know. Uh, think of the quarterfinal match in the US Open between the Williams sisters. You know, Venus and Serena are playing. Every stroke has three characteristics. The feedback their feedback of every stroke. So if Venus hits the ball, it's in or it's out, and she knows that immediately. So the feedback is prompt and it's unambiguous. Secondly, every stroke matters. It's consequential if if you miss too many shots, you lose, and you lose millions of dollars in front of millions of people. Other than that, though, really it's just a game. Other than that, it's just a game. So in in a sport like professional tennis, feedback is extremely reliable, in a very powerful way of learning from your mistakes. If you take it seriously and you practice, you will get good at it. You'll get a lot better. The financial markets are different. The feedback is not prompt out nor isn't unambiguous. I mean, let's say you and I decide today Netflix is going up, so we buy Netflix. Well, on the next tick, Netflix goes up, so we're right. But the next ticket goes down and now we're wrong, so we get up. We go to the bathroom. We come back, it's up. We're right. We go out for lunch, we come back, it's down. Now we're wrong. What is the feedback telling us? It's really noisy. The feedback is noise. Prices fluctuated, that's what it's telling you. So there is useful feedback in market prices, but it takes a long time to unfold, and you have to develop a real skill in interpreting the feedback, and a lot of people can't do that. And the task at the same time manage the money or uh, you know, pick the particular securities and the consequences. The consequences for a lot of people are enormous. It depends how much skin you have in the game, right, how much of your reputation, your personal reputation is riding on the line. If you're an employee, just a face in a crowd at a giant asset management firm, uh, consequences might not be all that great. The consequences for you aren't in being right or wrong. It's whether you're right or wrong relative to the crowd. And so you're not concerned with your absolute performance, whether what you did is right or wrong. You're concerned whether you're gonna stand out for doing something different that might make you or the firm look foolish. Career risk is that is that what you're It's career risk. And so if avoiding career risk steers you toward making timid or sub optimal decisions, you can't learn from normal feedback because the feedback you care about is am I increasing or decreasing my career risk as opposed to am I doing better or worse? As an investor invest investments. That's quite fascinating. So so when we look at predictions in general, you're looking at them with that three pronged analysis, similar to the way you would look at a sporting event, only the results, the timeline, and the all three things are totally different. Yeah, and you know there's I think the other thing that makes all of this baffling is we in in daily life, we have a general belief and it's been popularized as sort of the ten thousand hours rule, you know, outlawyer rule, Mountain Glass exactly if you if you just practice anything long enough and hard enough, you'll get good at it. If that was true, wouldn't all the best fund managers be the guys who've been around the longest. Yes. And also if that were true, everyone would be the Beatles. Everyone who's ever everyone who's ever spent a lot of time plucking on and get are would would be Eric Clapton. And it's not really true because the second essential criterion, the other thing you have to have, is good feedback. I mean, if you you could spend thirty hours playing guitar, but if you're tone deaf and you don't know you stink and nobody will tell you stink, you'll never get good. Well, you'll figure it out when they're not buying your albums or going to your concerts, or when they're paying or when they're paying you not to play. That's a whole different Uh, that's a whole different issue. Um. Another random question. Does money by happiness or is it the anticipation of money that leads to happiness? Well, yeah, I talked about this quite a bit in in my earlier book Your Money in Your Brain and anticipation based on the on the research that's been done, I think is more of what I would call a hot state than I'm actually receiving a gain. So thinking about or imagining or contemplating the money, you'll make if you turn out to be right, is probably more at least as rewarding as getting the money is. I've used that analysis as an explanation for sell the News, and you you kind of imply that in the book as well. Ye. So, so put it into context of investing. Why do stock prices run up to a quarterly earning then you get a good earnings number and the stock goes down? Yeah, there's there's There was a fascinating study published in Science magazine, which, as many of our listeners know, is the is the pre eminent journal of science in the US, and it it looked at monkey brains and they recorded from single neurons deep in the dopamine centers of the monkey's brains how they responded. And essentially, when the monkey receives an expected reward, the dopamine generation at the time the reward is received goes down, So the dopamine activity ramps up as the monkey recognizes the predictive queue. Here comes the banana. Here comes the banana. In this case it was it was sugar water, but same idea. Here comes here comes the banana. I'm going to get the banana. The bananas coming, and that's when the dopamine peaks, then the monkey actually gets the banana and he's like, oh, I got the banana. I've been wanting all along. And so that activity peaks and then it drops. And I think that's why so often in the stock market you see the price of you see the company's stock price just ramp up and and go parabolic when people are expecting a positive earning surprise, the company is going to exceed analysts expectations. Then the actual learnings come out and exactly what people thought they would be just as good, and it goes down. It's a disappointment. There's a Spock quote from Star Trek which I won't even attempt, but it's the same concept of wanting generating more satisfaction than actually having. And I find that that fascinating so related to some of um these cognitive issues. Um, what was it like working with Danny Kahneman on thinking fast and Slow? What? What were your contributions, uh to the book? He I'm trying to remember if he thanked you in his Nobel speech or not, but I didn't, But I I I read the book, or I read the first three quarters of the book on a beach some years ago and found it just absolutely fascinating stuff. Well, we're you know, working with Danny was one of the was one of the great experiences of of my life. Um, certainly one of the great learning experiences. UM. You know. He he's got a remarkable mind and um, he questions everything, and he has he has that wonderful ability that most of us losing our intellectual lifetime of putting ourselves almost into the shoes of a child and saying just asking why why is that? And he's often completely baffled by things that everyone takes for granted as an as an accepted truth, and he he just sort of scratches his head in front of it, says, well why do people think that? And it's not that he's doubting it, he just genuinely doesn't know. And part of that is because he has the most perfectly calibrated sense of what he knows. I think of anybody I've ever certainly anybody I've ever worked with, no Dunning Kruger effect. They're very, very very little. I only saw it once, which was the first day we worked physically together on the book in his apartment, when he talked about the planning fallacy which I know you're familiar with, Barry, but I'll explain it for for our listeners. Uh. He likes to tell a famous a story that's become famous about one of the first major projects that he undertook when he was a young psychologist on the rise in Israel at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. And um, he and some of his colleagues were working on rewriting the standard high school psychology textbook for students in Israel. And that's a big undertaking because it's a you know, it's it's basically a core part of the curriculum. You have to start the textbook from scratch and um. So they asked each other, well, how long we should this take? And so one of them said, oh, I mean, how could it take more than seven or eight months? Another one said maybe a year? And somebody else said, I don't know, a year and a half or something. And Danny's just sitting there listening, puzzled the same way I just described. And then he so he turned, he gets a lightbulb and he over his head and he turns to the dean of education at the at the school they were affiliated with, the Humor University, and says to him, you know, are you aware of other teams, other groups that have done similar projects like this one? And the dean says, well, yeah, you know now that you mention it, I am, And that didn't occur to me before because he was one of the people who had given this low estimate of ten months or something like that. So Danny says, oh, so, of those groups, what what was the average length of time took them to complete the textbook? So the dean sort of pulls his chin for a while, and everyone in the room is sort of shifting uneasily in their seats, and after a long pause, he says, well, I guess of those who completed a similar project, I think it took on average about four years, not counting the guys who were still working and having closed the and so and so. Then Danny says, oh, okay, and what about the ones and how many how many of these teams would you say never completed it? And he said, oh, I guess forty or fifty percent, And so the room goes dead silent. And so the corollary to this is that they finally did finish the textbook, it took either seven or nine years, and if I think there's a second correla, I think I'm remembering this right was never actually used and yeah, it was out of it. And so so the first day Danny and I are working on the book, he says to me, I really want to avoid the planning fallacy. And by the way, I forgot Barry the just to sort of take this the final turn. The reason the planning fallacy is relevant because it brings out a basic flaw in human cognition, which is, when we're faced with any challenge or any set of data, what we tend to do is we think in very narrow framing. So you and I are going to write this textbook. So we think about and we talked to each other and we and you say, well, you know, I'm good at this, and I say, well you're good at it, I'm better. And we think about how qualified we are to do this, how excited we are about performing this task, and all we can really focus on is how we're going to do it better, faster and um and more perfectly than anybody who's ever done it before. But we don't ask ourselves what's the success rate of people who have tried this. There's a database of all the other people who've tried it, what is it? What's in the data? And so we don't look at the base rate. And that's Danny Kahneman is all about base rates. And so the wonderful line he gave me that I use all the time in my thinking and in my writing is he once said to me, the single most important question is what is the base rate? It's so funny you you bring this up today. This is absolutely true. I was having a discussion on the train on the way in about a woman I work with work. A woman I commute with is in fashion, and she's she's on the train. She's always having these angry like she pulls out her her phone so annoyed and she sends nasty emails to people, and I go, what's today? She goes, I get this email from somebody saying that they were so they do these long. I won't mention the brand, but one of us is wearing it, and it's um it's a very well known, famous brand. And she'll get this run off of a production line and three of them were terrible. Oh we have three, and she I go, so, why are you angry? She goes, three out of what three out of fifty three a fifty thousand. I don't know what this means. And I said to her that's called numerator blindness or denominator Basically, they're giving you the numerator and ignoring the context of how many of this? So, so the denominator blindness is So, if you want to impress the person who's sending you this adiotic there were three bad units out of the production run, tell them you have denominator blindness. You're not aware of the context from the lower You're only giving me the top number with no frame of reference. Correct. But but that that reminds me very similar to what is the basics? What is what is the base rate? Exactly? So you know. So Danny says to me that first day, of all people, I don't want to be the one who commits the planning fallacy. I don't want us in a book on cognitive bias, in a book that is going to talk about the planning house. So, uh, I want us to figure out together how long this is likely to take, so that we know what we're in for. And so we had a long conversation and he has a method for d biasing the planning fallacy, and we went through really perfectly, and at the end we concluded it should take a year and a half to two years, two years, and so I worked on the project with him for two years until you know, I had other things that were demanding my attention. Um, but for those two years it was pretty much a full time job for me and for him for that matter. And so at the end to those two years, he said, I'm about a third done, I think. And it took another I think three or four years after that, no kidding. So so he was right when he when he said he was a third done. Uh yeah, except he was wrong in the beginning when we when we decided it would take two years. So you know, when I said that, he he he has a remarkable sense of his own limitations. That was one issue where I think, but even there, he was aware of the fact that that was a problem. He knew it was a problem. He it's just the d biasing method didn't work well. And it's very difficult for most people to the bias, especially considering so many people are so unaware of their own biases. How can you protect yourself if you simply have no conception that hey, I have a cognitive bias he or or I have some aside from the fact that most many of these are already hardwired into you. If you're unaware of your confirmation bias, how are you going to avoid it? I tell people the reason we study this is so at least you have a fighting chance to be biasues. That is key. I mean, the biggest problem with the findings of behavioral economics is that most of the biases it identifies are unconscious, and by definition, you don't know you have this bias. So the single most powerful thing that you can do as an investor or for that manner, a consumer of information, or just an intelligent citizen is to use techniques to try to surface those biases in your own mind, at least make yourself aware of them. You know, It's funny because coming out of a legal background, where the mood court exercises, basically, you prepare a case and at any point in time you may be forced to argue the other side of the case, and it really gives you some degree of objectivity as to the strength and weaknesses of your arguments. And I started as a trader, and this was always something that was drilled into me. Hey, it doesn't matter if you're long or short. You have to be ready when the circumstances change to get out of that position to take the other position. I think a lot of people don't go through those sort of processes of saying because we have this whole conversation all the time, Hey, are you a bull or a bear? Uh? You know, I'm whatever makes sense at the moment, and don't feel the need to declare a major and stick to that regardless of what what the evidence says. Yeah, and it isn't an interesting barrier that, despite how badly reviled, the legal profession is almost as badly as financial journalism. When people are trying to figure out whether there's a conflict of interest at hand, they do call in lawyers because lawyers are better at evaluating that than most other profession. Doctors are not good at it. People on Wall Street are not good at it, and a lot of financial journalists, for that matter, are not good at it. You have to be able to step back and look at both sides of the argument, and that's a bigger challenge. That's that's a skill set that you have to learn. It doesn't necessarily come easy. Once you kind of get into a groove of it, it becomes something that can be done. All right, I know I don't have you all day, so let me get to some of my favorite questions that I ask everybody. UM. In the last ten or fifteen minutes we have, UM, you've mentioned some of your mentors. Who are your earliest mentors, either as a journalist or a UM neuroeconomic neuro economists, neuro finances as a journalist who your early mentioned I'm gonna I think I'm just going to mention one people, one person out of all the people I could mention. UM my beloved editor at Forbes, jim My Coles, who was the long time editor of the magazine and far and away one of the most brilliant editors I or anyone else I have ever encountered. And in when I was a young reporter at Forbes, Jim uh decided that I would be the mutual funds editor, and I'm uh. The one thing I remembered in the nick of time was that that had been his first major job when he came to the magazine in the nineteen fifties. So I knew better than to show disappointment on my face at having been handed such a boring assignment. So I said to him, do you have any advice for me? You did this job once, and he thought about it for a second. He looked at me and he sort of half smiled, and he said, don't get anybody's blood on your hands. And I never forgot it, and I know exactly what he meant by it, which was, you know, don't do your best not to give people advice. You wouldn't take yourself the hypocritic first, do first, do no harm, not not a bad thing. We've been talking a lot about books and investors, and you mentioned The Intelligent Investor by Benjamin Graham. What other books really stood out to you as you developed your your your your BS Detector, your your journalism chops, and your finance jops. Yeah, there's a couple of books I really love. I mean, we talked about Richard Feynman before. I think anybody can pick up any of the oral history books. You just Mr fineman or um, what do you care what other people think? Is another wonderful one. Uh, those books are fabulous even for someone with no background in science. They can teach you a little bit about how to think like a scientist, and that's critical. There's a wonderful little book called um How to Lie with Statistics by Darryl Hoff. It's literally sitting on my night tap, which is such a fabulous book. You know that came in out and I want to say the late fifties. Yeah, it came out in the fifties as a wonderful book. It doesn't seem dated at all. It's it's not, it's not. It will never go out of style. And where are the customers? Yachts? By Fred Schwade Jr. Which was published in and I've never read that, have the book, and I've been dying to get the free time. I can't believe I came on your show and you've never read that. I'm not I'm leaving right now. I'm not exaggerating that. I actually mentioned that to someone in the beginning of the summer, that that's my book to read the summer, and know you're going to read it tonight. It's I started the first chapter and really enjoyed it. What I want you to do is read it aloud. I want you to read it aloud to you. The second person who's mentioned that technique, we didn't allowed to yourself, all right, or to other people. You I'm walk in a room start reading aloud from it. People stop what they're doing, really, and now look at you. Well, normally, when you walk into a room and just start reading a lot from a book, people stop what they're doing. And yeah, but but after they listen for a while, they'll go back to what they're doing. They won't do that with this book. All right, I'm gonna I'm not exaggerating when I say, of all the Wall Street books I have not read, this is the one that I've been most looking forward to reading, not on my night table, on my dresser, but literally in the bedroom. It's it is easily one of the five best books ever written, so ahead of the Goldman sax Elevator book. But move move this up the queue. Okay, it's in the top three. Beforehand, I'm I'm finishing, had a lie with statistics and this was next in my You have to I'm embarrassed to admit that I've had this sitting waiting to be read for six months and I just haven't read it. It's a wonderful book. And uh what other investors influenced you? Uh? You know. Fairly early in my career, I was lucky enough to get to know a bunch of really great wise people, UM, Sir John Templeton, m Phil Coray, Irving Khan. These were all people who had lived through the crash of and had really benefited from it and developed sort of incredibly powerful long term perspective. UM. And I learned a lot from from those guys, Uh and UM, and also from some other people I was lucky to spend time with when it was easier to spend time with them, Michael Price, Bill Miller. UM. Folks like that who you know, sort of gone on to fame and fortune and in some cases some some misfortunes. I'm trying to get Templeton on the show, but as people never response, yeah, he's not returning calls anywhere. U. Miller is a guy who's actually enjoying a little bit of a resurgence. He would be interesting to have a conversation. UM. So we talked a little bit about the changing nature of financial journalism and and media. What do you see as the next major shifts that are that are coming in this space? Well, I think I think what is still desperately needed, UM is UM filters. Um. You know, Twitter does a lot of that, but if you set it upright, if you use it, you have to you have to approach Twitter very very deliberately and intelligently to make it work for you instead of against you. And I think the time is coming when there will be platforms or applications that will intelligently filter material for people and do a real service. I don't think we're there yet, and I don't know what it's going to look like, but I know it's coming and I hope it comes soon. That's that's that's really interesting. And I find that a handful of UM aggregators are are enormously helpful. I not only read a ton of stuff when I put together my morning reads, but I also look at a handful of other aggregators and see what they're looking at. And I don't want to have too much overlap. I want to look and find interesting. But but that's human driven, that's not robot driven. UM. Twitter is really something that I think has so much potential. So long as you mute the annoying and block the intellectually dishonest, that that eliminates a lot of the noises. And I think there's one other. There's one other tip, Barry and and I know you do this and I work very hard at it, which is you really want to use a service like Twitter. Two feed yourself as much disconfirmation as you can. You really want to follow people and try to be followed by people you don't agree with, people you think are wrong, but you think they're intelligently wrong. I have that cast has always had that role with me. We are frequently on the opposite side of the trade. And if I like a market, or if I'm long term bullish and Doug this short term bearish, he forces me to sharpen my argument. On the other hands, I've been negative on gold for about four or five years, and when someone challenges me and their Twitter handle has either the word gold or bullion in it, I know I'm not getting a honest, objective analysis. On the other side, I want someone to explain to me why I should own gold when I don't want to own gold. Um, in a way that's objective and neutral and dispassionate. Don't go looking for that on Twitter. You're not gonna find them. And UM my favorite two questions I asked of all my guests. First, what advice would you give to a millennial or recent college graduate who is just beginning their career in financial journalism? Well, I would First of all, I guess the first advice I would give you is to make sure you're in the right field. There are a lot of smart people who would tell you you're crazy for trying to be a financial journalist right now, and you might want to listen to them. They could be right. The second thing is, I'm I arrive earlier and leave later than everybody else. Every day I'm find the smartest people you can possibly find and learn everything you can from them. Ask everyone, what do you read? Whom do you admire? Who's the smartest person you know? Um? You know, when I started at Forbes in seven, every day I would I would read the Wall Street Journal and I would circle in red pen every quote from somebody who knew more about whatever it was than I did, and then I would call that person up, because in those days you had to call and I would say, I want to buy you breakfast, lunch, dinner, drinks, and then I would just download from the person's brain and then I you know, I learned something I didn't know before. That's quite fascinating, and that worked. You can pick up the phone and call somebody. It worked then, and I think it works now too, although email is easier obviously, to say the least. And and our last question, what is it that you know today about financial reporting, investing and journalism that you wish you knew thirty years ago? Well, my dad, who was a very wise man, had a wonderful expression, which was that, And I think I remember this verbatim. It's remarkable how much you have to learn about something in order to discover how little you need to know about it. He goes right back to Dunnan Krueger. There's the experts know their own skill set. Amateurs have no clue, right, And I think the other the other thing he was driving at is that in order to learn those few true things that are at the core of everything, you have to learn an enormous amount about them. And I guess the thing I most wish I had known at the beginning was where all this would come out, which is that ultimately success as an investor depends on one thing, really only depends on one thing self control. M hm. And you know when Benjamin Graham said, uh, the investor's worst enemy is himself. He wasn't kidding, And in a lot of ways, the entire book The Intelligent Investor boils down to that one sentence. And great investors have self control, and everyone else can't be a great investor. If you don't have self control, you don't belong in the game where you're not going to prevail at least. Hmm. That's quite fascinating. Jason, Thank you so much for spending so much time with us and being being so generous. If people want to find your work, the entire body of your work, I would be remiss if I didn't mention Jason's Wide dot com. For those of you who follow me on Twitter, and you will notice each morning around six ish, you occasionally will see a Today in seven and I will reference what happened that day, and I probably do that once or twice a week. That comes directly from this day in financial history, UM, which I then have to edit down to a hundred forty characters because it usually starts at about three or four hundred characters, and there is an art to getting a paragraph into a tweetable sentence. UM. But I find that fascinating. There's a lot of great quotes there, there's basically who you are, what you've done. Is it safe to say just about every column you've written is either there or linked to from there? That it can be gotten? Yeah, I mean, I'm plus your books plus everything. I like a good hedge fund manager. I'm backfilling. But it but it, but it takes time. I think I have everything back to two thousand thirteen and a lot of stuff back uh ten, fifteen or twenty years or more. In fact, I recently pulled something from your site that you had re added there. I'm trying to remember. It was was like fifteen years ago as a speech you had given, and I linked to it in the Weekend Reads because it was the longer form thing and it I love when I will find something that people haven't seen yet and then it starts just hanging around going viral, and I'm like, oh, I guess everybody else liked it. Also, it was I wasn't out on a limb. That was a speech you gave. Do you know what I'm referring to? I think it was a speech I gave that that I called fat tails thin ice. That the one and and that fifteen years not seen online for a long time and suddenly that goes viral. It's a speech I gave at the Morning Star Investment conferency and UH two thousand one, I think, UM, where I sort of talked about UH, I guess what would I say? A few risks that I'm materialized later and UH that I thought the financial advisor community was dangerously overlooking. Well, I'm We're out of time, and I just wanted to thank you again for spending so much time. UM, you've been listening to Masters in Business on Bloomberg Radio. If you enjoy this conversation, look up an Inch or down an inch on iTunes and you could see any of the other five dozen such podcasts we've had over the past year and change. UM, Jason's wife, thank you again for for coming by my pleasure. Parry, thanks for having me. You're listening to Masters in Business with Barry Ridholts on Bloomberg Radio.