After 9/11, Congress created a bipartisan commission to investigate what happened that day. But after the biggest health emergency our country has seen in a century, the COVID-19 pandemic, there was no congressional commission to find out what went wrong and what went right. So a group of experts, led by the former director of the 9/11 commission, set out to do it themselves. James Lawler, a member of the Covid Crisis Group, joins Boyd to discuss the group's new book, "Lessons from the Covid War."
Inside sources, inside sources. America's voice of reason. Boyd Matheson on Utah's home for elevated conversation. Inside sources on KSL news radio.
After the tragedy of 9 11, congress created a bipartisan 9 11 commission to investigate, to investigate what happened on that day. But after the biggest health emergency in our country in a century, the COVID-19 pandemic,
there was no congressional commission authorized to find out what went wrong, what went right, what could have been done better so that we can make sure we're ready. Not if, but when we have something like it in the future.
But there was a group of experts that had been
uh coalescing around these learned lessons led by the former director of the 9 11 commission and they decided they would set out and do it for themselves. So what did they find out? Let's begin,
think, you know the news of the day. Think again with Boyd Matheson on K S L News radio.
Well, often as we try to cut through the rage to get to the reason. Uh sometimes there's a whole lot of obstacles to do that, but it always requires a group of people who are willing to have a different kind of conversation and that's what we're gonna do right now. I'm really thrilled to have joining us on the program.
Uh A member of the COVID Crisis Group, James Lawler, he's the Director of International Programs and Innovation at the Global Center for Health Security at the University of Nebraska Medical Center. Previously, he served as Homeland Security Council and National Security Council staff. Uh He worked on biodefense pandemic response and health preparedness
and this group has. Well, I'm gonna, I'm gonna let James weigh into this uh just because there's so much to this. Uh So first James, welcome to the program. Uh and this is an extraordinary work. Uh that's, that has been published just at the end of April. Uh But give us just a little bit of the backstory of how you came to really doing this dive into what really happened during COVID and what do we actually need to learn so that we can move forward in a positive way?
Well, thanks Boyd. It's great to be here. This group started as a precursor to what we thought might be a full commission to look at the problems of our COVID response and to create a comprehensive report similar to what was done after 9 11 with the 9 11 commission. And Philip Soli, who was the executive director of that 9 11 commission was the leader of our group.
Unfortunately, that full charter never really materialized. But the group decided that we had learned so much through our two years, almost two years of exploration and interviews and discussions that we really needed to share those lessons
learned. Yeah. So important. I just want to point out for our listeners that uh all of you came to together in this group with the hope that it would become a full blown commission. Um But that as often happens with Congress, uh nothing happened.
Uh And uh so even though you didn't have subpoena power, you didn't have some of the normal things you would have had uh had it gone through Congress, the, the lessons you had already learned were so important uh that you had to just pull those together. And as you said, this was not a gotcha game,
this was not a point, fingers placed blame. Uh This was a what went wrong. What went right, what could have been done better uh for the country? And so let's, let's kind of start with, with that. And uh I think the, the report comes out in, in just very plainspoken, nonpartisan, uh not left, right, battle kind of stuff. Uh But what really uh has to be gotten to in terms of the conversation. So kind of lead us through that a little bit.
Sure. But there are a number of lessons to be learned from our performance to date. And, and I think the group took a very broad based examination of many of the different problems that we had in response. I would say there's a few central themes that I would highlight that are really important. First of all, I think the pandemic has pointed out where our ability to govern effectively. And that's not from a political perspective. It's really the mechanics of,
of government and, and how government acts as a collective doer, an implementer um to, to execute on uh priorities that we have. And, and it used to be that America was always looked upon as the problem solvers. We were the one country that was going to be able to rally and, and to address monumental tasks, sending a person to the moon, defeating fascism in World War two,
rebuilding Europe after world war two, right? Those were huge complex problems that the US was able to develop a plan and implement and
to some degree, I think we've lost that capability over the last couple of decades. And that's one thing that
the, the book really highlights. I think the second thing is part of our problem is the institutions and the structure that we have for responding to health emergencies and preparing for health emergencies is really antiquated. It's anachronistic, it was built for another time, certainly not for the 21st century. And then I, I think the third message that we touch on which to me is one of the most important is our
difficulty communicating with the public. And and really how we were unable to counteract the massive wave of misinformation and disinformation that so undermined our response. And so if I had three things to point to, I think those would be the three most important parts that we highlight in our book.
That's great. Let's dig into those a little bit talking about the fact that the American people have lost confidence in our ability to solve big complex problems as a country.
And uh so dig into that a little bit in terms of what you found. I know you, you kind of went through uh a lot of the, the differences between the, the politics and the really we call them the fake fights and the false choices of, you know, was this a, a red state, blue state problem, a red policy, blue policy. But, but really you got to the policy itself uh being a big part of this, you explain that for us just a little bit,
right? I I think that the, the hyperpartisanship and, and the the falling of COVID perceptions across ideological and, and party lines in, in some ways were, were a symptom
or a byproduct of dysfunction rather than the root cause. Certainly they were contributors and became more so as the pandemic went on. But I think the reality is our response early on was quite poor and would have been poor no matter who was in the White House and, and which administration had been in charge at the time. I think we do point out that there were certainly some things
about the Trump administration that exacerbated that. But I think it's also very fair to point out that the Biden administration has done no better in terms of its response, that we've actually had many more deaths of Americans with COVID since the Biden administration took over. So the point is that there are some structural problems with how the federal government is able or unable to respond.
Uh and how it works with state and local authorities to be able to mount a coordinated and, and reasonable response. And um if we had managed to do things well, early on, I think that would have potentially avoided a lot of the partisanship that became involved later
on. Yeah. And, and I want to stay with that for just one more second. Um because there was something else uh just in glancing over a few of the key lessons there
uh that you talked about how we've kind of developed this,
it's a false narrative in terms of, you know, blue states were, you know, locked down forever and ever. And red states flipped a switch and suddenly everything was open,
uh talk a little bit about what happened that ended up with uh a lot of either blunt force instrument responses and reactions uh versus again getting to good policy and then that communication piece that we'll come back to,
right certainly early on in the first six months and even years of the pandemic, there was far less difference across the political spectrum in terms of who was in charge of uh state or local governments. And, and what their actions were, the, the problem was we, we didn't
do things in a very coordinated or rational way and, and we were often late in how we implement it. And that was another factor is that many of those interventions that we talk about in non pharmaceutical interventions. Um you know, social distancing type, uh actions really depend on timing.
And if you do them early, they have a dramatically enhanced effect. If you do them late, you end up essentially buying all of the pain and cost without much of the benefit. And so, unfortunately, when we left states and local governments to fend for themselves and make these decisions on their own, we ended up with a very ineffective and uncoordinated response. It's not that everybody needed to do everything together. At the same time, you really need to react to what's happening locally, but
you need to be able to do it in a way that's, that's orchestrated. The other thing I'd point out is that across the US, certainly there were real lockdowns that occurred in the spring of 2020. But, but there were no lockdowns after that summer. So I know we talk about lockdowns as being major factors in all sorts of ills and ailments. But the reality is that in the US, we didn't have lockdowns after those first few months. And, and so,
but the problem is we had very ineffective non pharmaceutical interventions as, as you mentioned, implemented as, as blunt instruments, like hammers rather than uh with surgical precision and scalpels, which is how we should have worked.
We're gonna stay with the question just a little bit longer coming up. We're gonna dig a little further into this report. I think this is so important if we don't have a commission by Congress
to figure out what went right, what went wrong and what we can do better like we did with 9 11. we got to get into that and this is a group that did just that. So when we come back, we'll continue the conversation with James Lawler. We'll talk about the public health system, why it's so antiquated, what needs to change and what we need to do in terms of communication strategy to be equal to our policy strategy in the midst of a crisis. Stay with us. More inside sources coming up next.
Think again on inside sources with Boyd Matheson. Boyd Matheson divides rage from reason on inside sources. We're staying with the conversation just a little bit longer and continuing the conversation with James Lawler who was part of the COVID crisis group,
uh which just published a book looking at the lessons learned from the pandemic because once again, Congress failed to act to create a bipartisan commission to really look at what went right, what went wrong, what could have been done better. But this group felt that their duty to publish what they had already started to prepare in the prospects of having this commission created. But again, as often happens in Washington, nothing happened. And so they did it on their own.
So let's take into the institution aspect of it. Uh We talked a little bit on the front end about this ability to solve big problems, complex problems in the nation.
Uh We also talked about this idea that we have to look at the institutions as well as the communications strategy. So what should we be thinking about when it comes to public health institutions? Moving forward? Our
public health institutions were built mostly in a model that came out of the 19th century and they were built to address the health threats to communities at that time where much of our
community health burden was due to poor sanitation and hygiene. Uh lack of vaccinations, don't, don't forget in the 19th century, 30% of deaths in the US were in Children under the age of five, right? That's completely opposite from what we see now where deaths in that, that age group are uh are quite rare and and are now seen as shockingly tragic. We had
uh very few people were admitted to hospitals uh at that time because hospitals really couldn't do much for you. And, and that's a very different environment from what we see now where the majority of, of health and health care issues are addressed by the private sector uh health care delivery system in the US. And, and so public health has really become quite separated from where people get their health care.
Um And, and we need to think about what that means for preparing and responding to health emergencies. Uh certainly there are critical functions that public health still needs to address in modern society. But emergencies, health emergencies certainly are, are mostly addressed uh in the health care delivery sector. The the other thing is our national institutions such as CDC, we really
designed to be scientific support mechanisms for those uh public health authorities early on. And uh CDC was never organized or built to be an emergency response organization. Yeah.
And then just uh talk to us just real quick about uh kind of the interconnectedness of it. All, there was kind of this America first approach to vaccines. There was again, kind of this compartmentalized approach in terms of, of what the state and local governments were doing.
Uh talk to us this kind of from a leadership standpoint. Uh where did that go wrong?
Well, in uh in many different places that I, I uh I like the saying that pandemics are a team sport because they really are, they require coordinated action. You need to have, I think Philip Zeo described it nicely as, as an orchestra or symphony, right? You have to have a conductor that is guiding the orchestra. You have to have a common sheet of music that everybody's playing off of. Uh
and if you don't have those things, what you get is cacophony, which is uh what we experienced unfortunately, during the pandemic. And it's true domestically and it's also true internationally. If we coordinate our efforts, internationally, if we prevent
diseases from flaring up overseas, then we can prevent them from moving to the US and, and creating problems here. And certainly many of the concerning variants we've experienced over the course of the pandemic actually arose overseas and then came to the US. And so for these types of events,
we're, we're really all in it together.
Yeah. And then I want to hit this last area that you raise because it's one that I think is so crucial and that is that uh you have to have a communication strategy equal to the policy strategy or to the health care strategy. Uh And this is one where I think you were equal opportunity, offender of both the Trump administration, the Biden administration. Uh and just uh walk us through that a little bit in terms of poor communication that may have made some of those breakdowns. Uh And more importantly that undermining of trust a little bit worse,
right? I think we were our own worst enemy there with inconsistent messaging coming out initially, both from public health authorities and from political figures in the administration. And that's continued, unfortunately, even until today where I, I think if you listen to messages coming out of the federal government, you would suspect that the pandemic is really over and that there's,
uh, there's nothing left to worry about and we should go back to business as usual. But if you look at the data, it's clear that that's not true. We've, we've lost well over 100,000 people over the last eight months to COVID, which I, I don't think most people would suspect just listening to uh coverage in the media and what's coming out of the administration. So um we need to, to be better at coordinated and strategic communication. We also need to be better at
uh understanding how to push back against uh misinformation and intentional disinformation, especially that's now amplified in social media. Uh I think that was a new and powerful weapon that we were not prepared to address. Yeah.
Such a, such an important piece of the puzzle. Well, this is extraordinary work. This is one more example of never underestimate what a few good people committed to do the right thing
uh can do. Uh And so the, the report, lessons from the COVID war uh is just such an important work. And uh James, we appreciate you staying with us a little bit longer and walking us through some of these key findings uh because this should reframe not only how we look back in terms of what happened, but more importantly, uh how we look forward. Uh So we can do it different because there will be a next time. Uh James Lawler, thank you so much for joining us today.
Thanks. It's been a pleasure to speak with you.
We have to have those kind of breakdowns, bipartisan, honest, authentic. Look, if we want to maintain trust in the institutions, we have to have conversations about what went right, what went wrong, what could have been done better? Especially in a thing like a pandemic. I don't think anybody was thinking, wow, 800,000 Americans have died in the past year from COVID.
We're still missing out on a whole host of things. And so we got to have that crucial conversation and we will always do that here on inside sources. We'll step aside for some bottom of the hour news. When we come back, we'll lighten it just a little bit. We'll go to the White House correspondents dinner and a sober message from President Biden. We'll talk about that coming up next. Stay with us on inside sources on K S L news radio.