Prof Danny Quah, Dean of LKY School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore, returns to Kopi Time to share his insights on the dangers and opportunities stemming from the changing world order. We go over two of his recent pieces; first, an open letter to the US president (penned before the US elections last November, and second, a research paper on the correlation between global trade and geopolitics. Prof Quah dissects the great power rivalry through (i) the perception of win-win versus zero sum and (ii) a tendency to attribute domestic welfare shortfalls (blue collar jobs, health, education, safety) to external factors (trade, immigration, defence spending). He then points out that trade liberalisation and the politics of global engagement have gone hand in hand on the way up (say, from the 1960s to 2010) and down (the past decade and a half). We then discuss a key point—the US shying away from globalisation or green transition does not doom those dynamics. There is a huge world of trade and GDP outside the US. The world is not being swayed; rules and agreements among the rest are proceeding, with the window left open for the US to return one day.
Welcome to COI Time, a podcast series on markets and economists from DBS Group Research. I'm Tu Bei, chief economist, welcoming you to our 153rd episode. Today, we are delighted to have back with us our old friend, Professor Danny Qua, the Kaing Professor in Economics, and also Dean of Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy here at National University of Singapore. Uh, Prof Kwa, such a delight to have you back.
Thank you, Tamir. It's a great pleasure to be back with you and an honor to get to speak to you again on COI time.
Thank you so much. Um, Prwa, there are two major pillars of our conversation today, and both are based on your recent writings. So I'll start with the September 2024, uh, open letter that you had written to the next President of the United States, and the title of the letter was Why America Should Drop Its Obsession with Being number one.
Shall we begin by unpacking your message in that letter?
Well, uh, thank you. Thank you for the opportunity to speak once again about that letter. Um, it was written, as you, as you know, at a time before we knew who the president was gonna be.
So we needed to speak to issues that would continue to endure, not partisan Republican Democrat issues. But the point of the letter was to ask America's leadership.
What, what its nation really wants.
And what
That, uh, that goal means for the rest of the world. So, put another way, does America have a plan? What is your plan, Mr. President?
How does the world prepare for the consequences of your plan?
What agency do we, the rest of the world?
Uh, have as you advance towards your goals. And I phrase this conversation in terms of, as you say, America is wanting to be number one.
That particular phrasing connects to popular American culture, uh, even more, I sometimes like to think, than just America being great again.
It connects to a number of deep undercurrents in academic and leadership thinking. At the same time it connects to every man and every woman in American football stadiums, waving a big finger saying we're number one.
Now, every country, of course, wants to survive.
And for the United States, perhaps part of his thinking is that being number one will maximize its chances of survival.
But part of what I wanted to convey in my letter was that
While that might be a fine goal, not everyone can be number one. In fact, as a matter of logic, everybody in the world except one won't be number one. And lots of people and nations who aren't number one do perfectly well.
Nations historically who have been number one, will sometimes stumble, so they are not guaranteed to constantly thrive. Nations who are not number one actually do more than survive. Nations who are not number one among the world's richest countries per capita, of course, richer even than the United States.
And many of these nations do a wonderful job, a perfectly good job in all cases, taking care of their people, arguably better than the United States.
So my question was, what's with this being number one thing? What's America's plan?
Right, you also uh talked about the goals that the US had promoted worldwide in the past, and you had presciently anticipated that those goals are sort of becoming secondary. So let's talk a little bit about
In our lifetime, the goals that the US has sort of aspired for and now beginning to sort of, you know.
Not look at it in a very convincing manner.
Yeah, um, yeah, I know the, you know, the
You and I, uh, recognized the time when America had a clear plan, and as you say, it was actually a plan that worked for America, and it worked for the world at the same time.
All our interests were aligned.
America spoke about.
Political convergence, the idea that all nations would become more and more similar in some critical political features. America, you and I are economists. Mer spoke also of economic efficiency, that it would be a good thing not to waste resources, but to make use of what we have. And a third plank of America's plan is this idea about how international trade.
It's win-win.
In technical language, it's called comparative advantage. With free exchange, everybody wins.
The unfortunate thing is none of these three ideas political convergence, economic efficiency, competitive advantage.
Seems to have worked out for America. And so the vision that America has for its place in the world.
is now changing, and what is changing too, remains to be carved out. But those three wonderful ideas, political convergence, economic efficiency, competitive advantage drove America.
And it helped all the rest of us. It helped us because it built a multilateral, open trading, rules-based system.
That created a level playing field that all of us could take part in. Singapore, all the nations across Southeast Asia, arguably China itself, we all became part of this vision that America had of a globalized, open, multilateral, rules-based world. And while America might feel
That that world does not work for itself.
The paradoxes, it gifted the rest of the world a wonderful system that worked for us.
And America forgot.
That competitive advantage, win-win means that when we win,
America can also win in having access to cheaper goods and services, and having, taking, being able to take advantage of this wonderful variety of goods that the rest of the world produces for America at affordable prices. America has lost the idea of competitive advantage and replaced it.
With an idea of a zero-sum world.
Where the rest of us, if we win, somehow, somewhere, America must have lost something.
That America is being ripped off. The paradox.
is that this is the system that America built. It was a system that came out of academic thinking, practical business experience. It came out of a political vision that would help the world move to a better place.
This is America's world. America's decided it doesn't work for America anymore.
I think that is the, the great paradox that we're working through as America recalibrates what its journey forwards needs to be.
A pro quo, when we say it hasn't worked out for the US, we're talking about an economy that is uh the richest on a per capita basis among the G7. We're talking about a country that has led the tech waves in every single cycle over the last half a century. It has the deepest capital markets, the most thriving stock market. So when we talk about it hasn't really worked out, are we really talking about a very specific segment of the population and it is related to income inequality? Is that what we're talking about?
OK, the.
You're absolutely right. America is the number one country in the world by all the measures that you have recited and many more. America is admired by all the rest of the world. What's the sense in which America has lost? America used to be 25% of the global economy. It is 25% of the global economy today.
The rise of the rest of the world has not undermined America's position at all in these measures. But I, you're right that I do think there are some specific dimensions.
Where America feels it has lost ground.
Some of it
Um, all of it is very real.
But it's also uh
Uh, the, the way in which these problems have been managed have aggravated.
The situation. So, you referred to a number of things. Let me pick up on what you say, and then perhaps also add a little bit more inequality, which you've mentioned very correctly.
Inequality in America has critically left behind segments of America's own population.
Uh, it has impact social mobility, and in doing that, it has put up frictions, so that the most capable in America.
are tethered by birth.
And are unable to rise to take on the tasks where they could contribute most to economic and social progress. So there's great frustration. Not only is their well-being, uh, damaged, America doesn't operate at full efficiency as a result of high inequality and social immobility. This creates a domestic unease within the nation.
But the way in which this has been aggravated is that a lot of that domestic unease.
Has been channeled one way or another, back to the world at large.
Remember when trade, I said trade was supposed to be win-win.
Many Americans don't see that anymore. What they see is a flood of cheap imports from the rest of the world, China, notably, and they see that as somehow, they see this wave of cheap imports coming to America, making life affordable.
But also conversely, in their view,
Stealing American jobs, dismantling American industry, turning into ghost towns, what were once thriving middle class American communities.
This, these challenges have been aggravated by a political leadership that has not been able to communicate to the people.
The good things that have emerged from these developments, but also notably,
have not been able to build social structures that help reduce the pain and smooth the transition for its population.
This is a case of where.
You have different segments of the population, some benefiting, others not.
And it's the squeaky wheel that gets the grease. Those who have not benefited from the system, but feel they've been disadvantaged.
are the ones that have made themselves politically pivotal.
And so they are moving an entire nation.
And that movement of the entire nation is one that unrolls back so much of the progress that that nation has made in its gifts to the rest of the world.
The political leadership, um, for whatever reason, have not been able to communicate what's going on in this, and have not built structures that help reduce.
The pain of chunks of the American population. And it might be that because they see a different reality as well. They see at a geopolitical level,
An America that once dominated the world in dimensions beyond what you just said, economically, militarily, technologically.
But it is in America that discovered that when it builds a system that's a level playing field.
That allows others through creativity and hard work, to also succeed, so that everyone has a fair shot.
This America discovered that with that fair shot, others actually did very well indeed on that level playing field.
The world that America dominated, we think of as being a unipolar world, and that will receded from unipolarity to now instead, a version of multipolarity, where there are pockets and circles of excellence everywhere across the world, even outside the United States. Now, one would think this is a good thing.
That there's technological excellence in China, in Germany.
In um the Netherlands, in Japan, in Southeast Asia, and Singapore, all of this increases.
And egalitarianism in the world. It makes everybody truly part of the world.
But America's perception of this is filtered through this idea that the world is a zero-sum world.
And then when others win, that means I lose. And you see this over and over in President Trump's narratives on how the rest of the world has ripped off the United States.
There's a, a, a huge gap in communications and understanding, and it is not one that is inherently self-correcting. So it's a very unfortunate world that we find ourselves in. Even though it began with the best of intentions for everyone, so much of the world has benefited from the good things in those intentions.
But America is perhaps singularly upset with the way this world.
In carrying out what it wished.
Ended up being a world that it was no longer unipolar single hegemon on.
So that it seems to me is a is a collection of disparate views, different, but all working in the same direction, to make America feel greatly ill at ease with the world.
Peculiarly, a world that America itself built.
Peculiar indeed, uh, in terms of that feeling ill at ease, uh, the temptation for politicians, it seems to me has been to attribute this outcome which is, you know, not considered acceptable to external policies, so the defense policy and trade policy and immigration policy.
It seems to me that the real dislocation in the United States over the last half a century has been related to domestic policy, it's tax policy and social security policy and health policy and education policy. I was recently looking at WHO's health adjusted life expectancy metric. US ranks number 74 in the world because of wide incidences of morbidity and disabilities. So even people if they live up to 65, 75, they're not living well.
I don't think it's possible to really point finger to an outside actor for that outcome. It's largely in my view, at least related to domestic policy, so to get your sense of where you stand on this.
Yeah, the, you know, the, what, what you have recited earlier and what we are now coming to, uh, is a collection, we began with a collection of ways in which America was clearly the most successful nation. And now, very appropriately, you're pointing to indicators that suggest, what parts of it are not really as successful. What is this domestic, uh, what are the domestic challenges that America faces?
Um, that, no, we referred to earlier, very quickly in terms of inequality.
But, you know, it's, it's much more than just inequality. America, even if it is the number one country in the world by all the earlier measures we said, it is no top performer in infant mortality, in education, which you referred to, in health, in life expectancy, in racial harmony, in public safety, or none of these indicators, is America a top performer. Now,
Is this the fault of leadership? Is this the fault of governance? It is too painful for any leadership to say, this is a problem we created.
It is very natural for nations at that point to say that the outside world must have had something to do with this, through unfair competition, through ways in which they manipulate the system, through how we've been ripped off, and that's why we're suffering the way we are. And
Uh, the, the world in its, uh, global conversation has come to an understanding of how there is this quite varied landscape. Uh, a very, a very careful forensic unpacking of how this has happened, I think at an overarching level has not been done. We have good understanding, I think, of the degree of drug addiction.
In the United States, how fentanyl is among the, you know, the, the top killers of US, uh, of the US population, ages 35 to 49, but we don't have a clear overall accounting of how this measures with
The multilateral system that America built, competition with China, competition with all the rest of the world, but even without that accounting, a lot of the political narrative and a lot of the political understanding within the United States has led to a serious dangerous geopolitical rivalry. And it's a geopolitical rivalry that
You know, touches, makes contact with other trends, other ways of thinking. Let me, if I may, uh, mention just one.
And this is an idea that uh international relations scholars write about.
It's called the tragedy.
of great power competition.
It's a tragedy of any international system with great powers in it.
And the idea here, putting aside all the domestic concerns you and I have gone over. Putting aside the challenges with trade, putting aside the challenges with income inequality, it's a very single issue focused narrative, and that is, the United States being the number one great power, needs to prevent any other hostile hegemonic power from gaining ascendancy.
That rival today is revealed to be China.
But in previous eras, when America had had uh implicit or explicitly adopted this thinking,
The identity of this alternative hegemonic power has varied.
That China is uh governed by the Chinese Communist Party is only secondary to the idea that it is now a rising hostile hegemonic power and its continued ascendance.
Would severely constrain America's freedom of actions and future prospects.
This is a narrative, a realist narrative that um
is embedded in in the thinking of some of America's strategic leaders, and it measures so well with the economic challenges that we're seeing, the domestic problems that we have, you and I have described. All ideas are aligned on this notion that America will once again
The the green, pleasant, lively, great nation that it wants to be, if only it eliminates the possibility of alternative clusters of power. This is a very dangerous way of thinking, but it's aligned now with so much of the mood that emerges from all the other dimensions that you and I have described.
America, it's, I, I feel that the world is in a very dangerous place at this stage, because there's so much alignment on so many different fronts on the idea that geostrategic rivalry, geopolitical rivalry is the critical issue of the day, and that fixing it will fix all of America's problems.
Of course, both you and I have studied in US education institutions. Both you and I have worked in the US. It feels like a very distant world, uh, now than it was then. Um, in your letter, you had a few suggestions for the incoming US president. What were they and are they being heeded to?
OK. Um, so, so I should be clear, I did not ever expect that America would heed any of these suggestions. I thought that there were suggestions that for me, uh, were ways to try and see how to align what America wants.
With what the world needs.
And if America continues on this zero-sum realist strategic rivalry, China shock narrative, we will never get there.
So I wanted to see if there was any way in which we could nudge that thinking towards something that allowed the rest of us in the world space to exercise agency, to move.
The world into a better place. So, let's, let's uh see what those three suggestions were. First thing I said is that
Um,
Ask yourself, America, what is it that really matters to you? What's your plan, right?
And consider the unthinkable. If you are not number one.
What would happen?
So I phrased it as saying, if you're not number one, what changes?
Absolutely nothing.
You will not lose the respect of any of the rest of us. You will continue to be the great economy, and you can be the great society that you already are. Everything about you remains completely unchanged. Does that label of being number one really matter to you?
Uh, rather than perhaps saying, you know, whether America would heed this or not, I might describe to you what some of the pushback against that idea is, because it's not just Americans. For many of the rest of us, we think being number one is really significant. That's why, my goodness, we have university rankings. In your business, you have rankings of financial institutions. Does being number one really matter?
You know, for the great powers in the world, I want to, um, so, bring out the idea that today,
We're no longer the Cold War.
Now, in during the Cold War between America and the Soviets, there was a worldwide contention of political systems.
And these political systems had deep
Irreconcilable ideological conflicts.
Only one.
could stand.
Because they were inconsistent with each other.
If America lost.
was displaced, then it's people's way of life and its entire system of government would be at risk. There's no way to hide that. Then it really did matter to America. But today, America has made China out to be its geopolitical rival.
And it's true
Some of the things that China does are very awkward for the United States.
China's manufacturing prowess have indeed undermined America's employment potential.
But Beijing has absolutely no designs on revising American's society or government. Quite the opposite. The Chinese people want to have American people's way of life. I mean, they might not want to get into all the different things that Americans do with freedom of speech, certain practice of democracy, but in the main, the Chinese people want.
The grassy backyard, the picket fence, the white SUV, they want all these things that Americans have. The Chinese people do not want to replace American people's way of life with anything else.
So, we're in quite a different situation.
I guess a second thought is.
For the rest of us in the world, we realized that being number one means that it, it could mean America has pushed itself to ever higher performance. It saw the challenge from Sputnik.
It created the Apollo space program, it landed people on the moon. It pushed itself to ever higher performance.
Alternatively,
A nation can also be number one by simply keeping others down.
Instead of improving yourself and lifting performance, you spend all your energy keeping others down. So, you know what, America, for the rest of us in the world, being number one is not as meaningful as it used to be now, because we see the games that America is playing, and we don't think this is a good way to be number one.
And being number one, has the very unfortunate.
Uh, unintended consequence of making the world automatically.
Zero sum.
If you're number one, and someone else wants to be number one, they can only ever be number one.
By displacing you. So they win only if you lose. This makes for a 01 b binary view of the world.
And it's not helpful in a world that desperately needs global cooperation on climate change, on energy transition, on battling the world's pandemics.
On, uh, the on regulating artificial intelligence and making sense of modern technology. In a world that needs cooperation, having a 01 binary view of the world.
Having a view of the world that says that someone else wins only if you lose, does not make for any cooperation.
And so this is a particularly bad time to be trying to be, to to be working so hard at keeping to number one.
So, I said that it was uh
Not helpful to be so obsessed with number one. Moving away from this obsession with number one.
Here's a win-win idea.
China can be economically successful.
America can be economically secure.
There's no contradiction between those two, but we have to work to get there. Focusing on being #1 does not help that kind of a collaboration.
I said, I went over ground that, you know, tell me, you and I have gone over, which is that beyond being number one, America needs to take care of its own people. And the way it's performed in many of these social indicators that you and I have described, inequality, social immobility, health, racial harmony, uh, literacy, life expectancy, infant mortality, drugs, addiction, it's not number one in any of these.
And it's neglecting the well-being of its people by chasing obsessively, being #1 in the world. It's leaving out the unfortunate, the weak and the vulnerable. And by constantly focusing, finally, the third thing I said to them was that by constantly trying to be number one.
You are ill at ease in the world.
You cannot feel comfortable in a world that seeks to compete with you along lines and rules that you have told the rest of us to do.
Competition, market-based competition is how we all improve. You told us to do that, but if you are constantly obsessing about being number one, never allowing others to get ahead, having a zero-sum view of the world, you are undermining the best thing you have actually gifted to the world, and you are reducing the well-being, you're harming, damaging the well-being of the world. So, I, I said those three things to them, and, you know, I think you and I.
Being sensible people, we would say, oh, those are things that I can imagine any successful country would want to do, not least a country that's already shown the world how by emulating it.
By being attracted to it, by wanting, by admiring it, and wanting to be like it, you can be successful.
But in this obsession to be number one in creating a zero-sum narrative on the world, America has undermined its own strongest advantage. This is what I said, I don't expect anyone.
To listen to me in this kind, in in that kind of an exchange, but I think it seems to me to be a narrative that makes sense.
Of course, in
the
core of those observations, I think there are some testable predictions. One is that, you know, if you do have a very insecure superpower, you will see a lot of policy volatility because it will decide to do one thing today and change its minds tomorrow, and I think that's what we're seeing playing out in the last 3.5 months since Donald Trump came back to office. I was in Washington DC a few weeks ago and I noticed that this is the, you know, Christmas time basically in perpetuity for the lobbyists of America.
You have the pharma lobby constantly lobbying for tariff on pharma to be taken down or at least put on a temporary hiatus. You have the same kind of lobbying going for the electronic sector and the steel sector is lobbying for even higher protection and higher tariff. So everybody is out for themselves. This clear rules of games that were in place of doing business are being replaced with complexity and uncertainty and all sorts of rent seeking because one basically looks at the administration as one.
We have to engage on a bilateral basis, which bilateral, by which I mean sectoral or company by company, and, and that just creates a lot more uh distortion. Um, so what's your sense? I mean, we've had quite 100 days of trial and, and so your, your observations.
It has been quite a ride. Uh, you're right that we should be experimenting to figure out the best way to do things. Um.
You know, a great economist, Robert Lucas, once said that, you know, large scale social experiments, uh, of the hyperinflation and, and, and similar, and I suspect he would think of what we're going through now is one of those large scale social experiments.
are best viewed from a distance. We want other people, if they're gonna experiment on this, other people should leave us out of it, tell us when you've got an answer, good answer, because as we're going through this process, a lot of harm is being done. There's gonna be a lot of scarring, uh, businesses are gonna go under.
Ordinary people are going to suffer terribly. The jobs will be lost, and, you know, as Trump said, well, you know, we've gone from a world where he promised immediately after the election, America would have the strongest economy in the world to one where now Americans might have to make do with only 2 dolls rather than 30 at Christmas. I, that's a kind of experimentation that, um,
It's not, it does not seem to be clear that it is directed.
And advancing
There is, you know, you said correctly that, uh, as economists, we want to be, we want to be open to the idea that the experiments to move us to better policies. Uh, that's absolutely right. But we also don't want to read into sheer randomness, the idea that there's a cunning plan.
There's an observational equivalence for a large part of this, and we need to wait a bit before we, we attribute to it that uh that there are good things that are going to emerge from this. It's not clear to me that there will be a lot of institutions are being destroyed, a lot of uh
Rules and conventions that are actually, that all of us can can uh agree are good ones are being torn apart.
And it's not clear to me that we're gonna settle at a new, new normal, that will actually be good again.
Well, we'll have to see, and the world right now is going through a very fragile state. Uh, America's economic progress, I think, is, is critical for how economic well-being in the rest of the world will evolve. It was critical for, for how China will continue its journey of growth and development, but America also stands on the brink of a sharp downturn, and there are many indicators that are suggesting that. So,
I would say, uh, yes, some of these things we might call experiments, but it's not clear to me that there's a plan about how where these experiments are going to get us to.
Oh, indeed, uh, pro, before we start this recording, you and I were talking about um the influence of US policy that if nations that are, you know, more comfortable with the transactional zero-sum nature of doing business, they actually find resonance with Trump's words, um, you know, you can think of certain countries that are, you know, non-democracy.
is commodity dependent could very well fall in the camp. So I want you to sort of share with us your thoughts on the impact of US policy shift. I've seen politically, for example, Canada and Australia's election results show that Trump is actually doing the left of center parties a favor because the country sort of coalescing against sort of non-Trumpian views.
Um, but when we talk about the Middle East, for example, there seems to be resonance with Trump's policies. So globally, this big shift out of the US, would it take us down a path where we start moving to the US camp or is Trump actually doing a huge favor to the cause of globalization by moving away but letting the rest of the world see the wisdom of it?
OK, so, OK, so really interesting points that you've raised here. One is I, I don't want to uh give this the suggestion that um
That, you know, that, that, that the president, by being, uh, by acting the way he has, has brought all the rest of us together, and that we see a, a, a way ahead. I mean, that's a little bit like saying, you know, I'm, I'm hitting my head with a 2 by 4, but it's a good thing because look how well I feel when I stopped doing that. And we can't say blame, when we can't give Trump.
Uh, the credit for that, that we've you know, sort of come to a better place as a result of his sort of messing us around, if that is indeed what's happening. The, there's an optimistic side in my reading of what you say. And, and that is that um
America might be disrupting the international system hugely.
But what it's not trying to do.
is to replace that international system.
It is not happy with the international system, but it does, it's not come to us with a plug-in replacement for that system. It's not got those, the, the, the new version of political convergence, economic efficiency, and comparative advantage that here instead is what it's doing. America seeks to change its trade relations with the world.
But it doesn't seek to change the world's trade relations.
It is not seeking to replace the system, and if that is indeed what's happening, then there is space for the rest of us to build our own system. And let me, let me say why there's some evidence for thinking that this is not just wishful thinking.
Cast our minds back.
To when there was a TPP.
TPP was supposed to be this grand plan that would bring a huge part of the world to a high new level in trading relations, right? So TPP was coming along and then Trump
On the first day of Trump 1.0 tore up TPP.
And what we had relied on, what the rest of the world had relied on would happen, was certainly not in place anymore. It was an epic fail from a single act.
But we were hoping, uh, we were hoping that that uh that single act, uh, destroyed a lot of what had been built to that. So, TPP will no longer existed.
But notice, but remember what happened after that. Japan and other like-minded partners said, well, there's a lot of this that has been torn up, that's actually quite good still. So let's make CPTPP.
Right. So that's the rest of us go off. America has decided it doesn't want to be part of this. That's the rest of us go off and see what we can make of this, and CPTPP came into being. And remember what happened.
Trump did not say a single thing about CPTPP. It did not want TPP, but was quite happy to let Japan and other nations continue with the CPTPP. It was trying to change its trade relations with the world, but was not trying to change.
The world's trade relations. And that's actually gives us some hope, because if America does not seek to change or revise the international economic system, but seeks merely to edit that system.
And then edit only those parts of the system that lap onto America's shores. The rest of us have space.
To create our own open trading rules-based.
Almost multilateral system. It will be confined to just those of us who are like-minded in our beliefs in competitive advantage and free trade, but that's still pretty good.
So I think of that as being a possibility is whether it's a possibility that emerges because Trump was recalcitrant, I don't think it is, or whether it's a possibility that it's open because Trump and the American administration have decided to focus on America itself, that possibility is open for us and we need.
To jump onto it.
So, I think that, you know, you, you, you describe this in terms of what a uh a representative of the nation might do. Let's bring this home to Singapore.
Singapore is an economic creation.
As we like to say here, it has no natural resources, it doesn't have the usual things that make nations wealthy. It's built on economic ideas, and hard work, creativity of its entrepreneurs and people. So,
Singapore, Singapore's uh continued success relies on the kinds of economics that has benefited it for the last 60 years. There's an open trading system, globalization. Singapore is small, like all other small countries, it will always produce.
Too much of what these people are good at.
And not enough of what these people need.
It has to have trade, and it has to have trade, and that trade can be open to it.
Even without the United States. As long as we recognize that America, for now at least, is not seeking to create an international system in its own image, it only seeks to control that part of the international system that comes into contact with it. And just to hammer home that point, today,
If you count up all the world's national exports.
America imports 13% of that.
America is still a very big consumer in the world. It used to be much bigger.
If we were no longer able to export 13% of what the rest of the world produces to America, it would be very painful for us.
But we would live.
We would be OK. We would trade with each other, we would create new ways in which the rest of us can collaborate. And America would be off by itself. It would want to control everything that it comes into contact with, and whether that means it shrinks back into a continental entity.
That that as my friend Graham Allison likes to say, it's surrounded by friends to the north and south, and fish to the east and west and nothing else.
Well, that might be the world that we need to move towards. And I don't think that that's, I mean, it'll be a poorer world. It be a world where it's harder for us to get certain things done, but it's a livable world, a global economy minus X, where X equals the United States, is one that we might want to start to imagine. And we see this already in many institutions that have been built up.
There is something called the MPIA, the Multi-party Interim Appeal Arbitration Agreement.
When America decided that the appellate body at the World Trade Organization was no longer something that suited America, America worked in such a way to prevent the appellate body from becoming quarried. So the appellate body which judges trade disputes between nations can no longer operate.
Now, in a world where America is truly central, that freezes trade throughout the world. But what our 16 nations did in 2020 was that they got together and they said, let's set up a replacement for that. Let's call it MPIA. And moreover, let's situate it within the WTO. The MPIA sits within the WTO and what it does is, it does arbitration of trade disputes.
It did it originally for the 16 who signed on. Today it's now 55. That's still only about a third of WTO's 166, but it's getting things going. So, I think of this as ways to build pathfinder multilateralism.
It's no longer multilateralism as we knew it that America gifted us, but it's a way for small groups to slowly emerge and surface, uh, vehicles, platforms where we can cooperate, and that might be the world we move towards. So, you know, like you say, Trump has done these terrible things to the international trading system.
It's disrupted the world's geopolitics, and there are lessons we need to take away from that.
For me, the critical lesson is not appeasement, not going to America and saying, you want this, let me do it your way.
Not retaliation, to like China, America did this, we're gonna hit back against China, but there's a lot of space between appeasement and retaliation, and that space gives the rest of us rule to be creative, but how we engage with each other in the world. So, so that's, that's what I think of as the optimistic side of uh, of this description.
Oh, I, I like it very, very much. And like you, I've been thinking about this, to your point of, you know, high 80% of global trade being non-US. So we are calling it TOTUS TOTUS trade outside the United States. And to us, the toto world is not just a very high chunk of trade, but 96% of the global population, 75% of global GDP by market prices, and 85% of global GDP.
In PPP terms. So yes, Prof, I think that leaving the door open for the US, hopefully the US will, you know, change its mind at some point, but even if it doesn't, the world needs to go on setting their own rules. Now some of the things you just said, Prof, I think I saw echoes of that in an article that you published or rather working paper, the last version is from last month.
Uh, correlated trade and geopolitics driving at fractured world order. So I think some of the things that you already talked about are embedded in the paper, but maybe if there's some stuff that we haven't talked about, some of the insights from that paper.
Sure. Uh, well, thank you for bringing attention to that paper. I actually just got the manuscript proofs for that. It's coming volume, uh, that Danny Roderick, uh, is, is a co-editor on. The, um, so what this, what this paper does is it treats many of these issues that we've discussed maybe in a slightly more directed economic focused technical way.
And what it says is that for the longest time, we have thought that economics was to glue the whole the world together.
Because you and I, we've studied competitive advantage, we've seen the world become more integrated, and we know how more prosperous the world is as a result of that. And the question that you and I would ask and other economist would ask is, why would anyone turn their backs on this, right? Economics is a glue that keeps the world together, no matter what else happens. In, uh, in some ways of international relations thinking,
Uh, such as some of the ones that we've just described, realism and others, the world is naturally always at odds with each other. The world is naturally always in, in deadly zero-sum competition.
But the reason the world doesn't fragment entirely is because there's a glue that holds the world together, and that's economics. So that is a a conventional way of thinking about the evolution of the international system. So, what my paper pointed out is that actually, uh, the economics and geopolitics don't work at odds.
Not always, and in fact, for the last 20 years, they've worked together in a remarkably coherent way. It's not been a world where great power politics threatened to fragment the world and then economics kept it together. It's the opposite. Over the last 80 years,
uh, was, there was the beginnings of the international trading system. People began to see how trade would benefit each other, and there was a big movement to create these great trade institutions, WTO and before that, GATT.
America was for a long time, uh, suspicious of this. It's set outside GATT.
And then in the 1950s, President Eisenhower said, of course, America should be in debt, because
The international trading system is one where, if America failed,
In supporting the international trading system, supporting a system of free markets and open trade, it would cause great dismay and disappointment.
Throughout the free world, when the Soviet Union was stepping up its
Different and separate foreign economic efforts. The Soviet Union, remember, was against free trade and open markets.
America found it useful, not only economically, but politically, to be for it. So Eisenhower brought America into GATT and then the world trading system. So, 80 years ago, at the beginnings of the modern international world, geopolitics and economics weren't working at odds, they were working together.
Now, I said that, actually, in contrast to what the popular vision is, for most of the last 80 years, economics and geopolitics have worked together. OK, so that's how it was at the beginning of this era. What about towards the end? Well, towards the end, geopolitics has once again started to pull the world apart, but now, economics is also pulling the world apart. You know, this does not contradict IMF's and, you know, your and my calculations for how trade is good for the world. It is that
Economically, nations, many nations have come around to the view that trade can cause high inequality.
Can be um.
Destructive of my domestic industry. And unless I am prepared to put effort and energy into it, it will dislocate my domestic worker population. This you and I would think of as creative destruction. This is the forces of competition. This is how the world has always been. But nations in the world have moved to a point where they've convinced themselves.
That China's manufacturing prowess leaves them no recourse because they cannot compete with China anymore. So, bizarrely, the world of globalized trade with China in it, and the, the sort of uh
The, the lack of care that so many governments in the world have applied to taking care of their own people, means that the forces of trade are now also pulling the world apart.
At the beginning, both economics and geopolitics brought us together. In the last few years, economics and geopolitics are both threatening to tear the world apart. So, unlike a world where trade kept the world together,
And evil geopolitics that tried to pull the world apart was bad economics. We had to keep it in check. Actually, the reality is trade and geopolitics are correlated, hence the title of my paper, correlated Trade and Geopolitics. We need to recognize this, if we're gonna move into a world where once again, globalization and trade can help improve people's well-being without
Disrupting, once again, the geopolitical tensions that would tend to pull us apart.
Well, this is absolutely fascinating, and I take tremendous resonance out of that. Uh, what I'm gonna do, Prof, is that I'll put links to both the open letter as well as the paper on our show notes, because I think uh this is a very valuable reading. Uh, I cannot thank you enough for your insights. Thank you so much.
Thank you so much, Tara, and good luck on everything. This is a wonderful series that uh you are, you are doing.
More power to you. I'm a big fan. Keep up the good work.
I'm, I'm
so appreciative of your words. I'd also like to thank our listeners. Uh, Kobe Time was produced by Ken Delbridge at Spice Studios. Daisy Sharma and Violet Lee provided additional assistance. This is for information only. It does not constitute any investment advice. All 153 episodes of the podcast are available on Apple, Google, and Spotify, as well as on YouTube. As for our research publication, you can find them all by Googling DBS Research Library. Have a great day.