Three decades on from the collapse of Barings Bank the prospect of sweeping deregulation in the financial system risks paving the way for a repeat. That at least is the opinion of Nick Leeson, the former rogue derivatives trader who brought down one of the UK’s most venerated financial institutions. He sat down with Bloomberg Radio Anchor Caroline Hepker and Finance Reporter Will Shaw for an exclusive conversation about how banking has changed in thirty years, how he rebuilt his life after time in jail, and where he imagines the next 'rogue trader' might come from.
Welcome to this special Bloomberg podcast with me Caroline Hepger and alongside our finance reporter Will Shaw. Now, it has been thirty years since Bearings Bank, Britain's oldest merchant bank at the time, collapsed after twenty eight year old derivatives trader Nick Leeson racked up and concealed a billion dollars of trading losses at Bearings Singapore office. Lison became the face of financial misconduct. He served more than four years in Shangy Prison. He wrote a book, Rogue Trader, that was then turned into a Hollywood movie. In the decade since then, Lison's been on the speaker circuit talking about what he calls the most embarrassing period in his life. He's owned a football club in Ireland along the way, and more recently his work to investigate financial misconduct. And Nick Leeson joins us now today. Welcome Nick, good morning.
Thank you very much for having me. I'm looking forward to it.
Yeah, I want to have a discussion because of course it is thirty years now since the collapse of Bearings. How do you think about that whole period in your life, the impact that it had both on Bearings and also on you with that distance.
Now, Yeah, well, I think you summed it up perfectly in the beginning. It's still with huge embarrassment on my part. You go through, you know, a lot of shame, a lot of guilt, embarrassment at the time, but the one that stays with you is the embarrassment because it's the complete opposite of what I wanted to achieve. And up until a certain point, I'd had a fairly good career in the world of banking, and then it all imploded very very quickly when I was in Singapore. So I was, you know, very much the ascending star for a short period of time and then had a very spectacular fall from grace. And that still sits with you. You can, you know, you can recover from a personal perspective, but you still look at that period of my life and am I Am I comfortable with it? Am I at peace with it? Absolutely not, because that just wasn't me and what I wanted to achieve. But it's always going to be the piece of baggage that I carry around.
You were the star trader sent sent from London to Singapore. You made the bank a lot of money over the years, you built up positions, particularly in the Nickey. At what point did you know that the cover up of the trades couldn't be hidden anymore? Like, what was the key moment when you knew it was going to unravel.
It's very difficult to put an absolute definite answer on that. I think I was always as deep as I was getting into the situation, as bad as it was getting, you were always you're always looking for this slight positive, you know, maybe the market to turn around a little bit, or you've managed to overcome a particular investigation from somebody within the bank, and that always gave you the belief that you had a little bit more time to try and solve the situation, which is really all I was ever interested in doing. You know, I know I should never have got into the situation as soon as I was in it and it was getting worse. All I wanted to do was solve it. So you'd grab these positives and when you look back with hindsight, they're all false positives. But they just convinced me that I had a little bit more time to try and turn the situation around. And you know, there were no barriers or controls to what I was doing and I was. I was never pushed back on at all in terms of how far I could take it, unfortunately, and I.
Mean even I mean you flared at one point, and you and you you went a Kuala Lumpur, and even at that point, according to your book, you kind of you didn't think that the bank was going to collapse.
No, no, no, I mean as a young trader working in Singapore. You know, the last thing that you know, I was interested in was what was the capital base of the bank. You know, that was that was a different area. You know, the Treasury would look after the capital base of the bank, how the reporting was done to the Bank of England at the time, and what were the legal limits you could lend to a subsidiary. They weren't something that I thought about. If I phoned Treasury and I asked them fifty million pounds or fifty million dollars or one hundred million dollars, if they paid that over to me, you know, that was the end of the transaction. How it impacted on the rest of the organization in terms of the capital base and how much it was lending to a subsidiary. You know, they weren't processes or thought processes that I was going through, you know, when you look back at the story, and I had six hundred and fifty million pounds of me in Singapore, the capital base of the bank was only two hundred and fifty million legal limit you could.
Endure a subsidiaries fifty and you were because you were in charge of the office in.
Singapore, right, Yeah, I didn't have access to the money, you know. I still had to refer to a treasurer in London to ask for the money, and then he would pay the money over. I'd give him nonsensical reasons for the money, you know, and was definitely definitely concealing the real reason for needing the money at that time. But the fact that it went past so many limits and regulatory limits in terms of you know, twenty percent of the bank's capital being lent to a subsidiary. You know, I was in thirteen times in breach of that. But the Treasury Department allowed that to happen. Doesn't take away any of my guilt or my responsibility, but you know, that's part of the processes that should have been in place to stop this sort of thing happening.
Do you recall the specific time when you started to turn your life around afterwards.
After the collapse of the bank, Yeah, and after.
Your time and your time in prison and all the all the repercussions, Like, what was the kind of key turning point for you and rebuilding?
I don't know if there's a again, I don't know if there's a key turning point. I think it's a slow process. You you know, when you're in prison and you're looking at everything that you've done, that you've done and you've been involved in, you go through this process of really pulling back the layers of what's happened, and you have to really have a long, hard look at yourself. You you know, you you get to a situation where you dislike a lot of things that you've done, which was obvious. But then at some point, and it's probably a couple of years after release, you have to start looking at yourself and protecting yourself. So it becomes about looking at or building back up your self esteem, your self worth, your self confidence, and that comes through, you know. One of the ways that I suppose it's worked for me over the years has been fairly open with the world's media. Yeah, you know, I've never been combative in terms of you know, people looking for me for a story. You know I prefer and I should have started this a lot earlier, I know that. But you know I prefer to be very honest and very open book about about things that happened, and you know the ways that I reacted to things during that period.
But there is still a tension, isn't there? And I think this is also why your story even now is so fascinating to so many people in finance, which is that tension between the rogue trader. And others have mentioned this, like Jerome Cavill. You know, he's talked about he made enormous losses for his bank a few years ago in the Billions, and he talks about being scapegoated versus the kind of controls that should be in place, and that there's that tension there, isn't it. How much responsibility is on the individual versus actually the oversight that should be there, and.
It's a combination of the two. I think anybody who describes themselves as a scapeboat scapegoat is lying. Right. You know what you're doing, you know you shouldn't be doing it. You continue all the same, and therefore you're responsible and you need to take responsibility for your actions. You know, a lot of the other road traders that you can mention, Quaker, Duboli, your own Curvial, Iguci at Diora, there's probably too many to mention. A lot of them talk about pressure to perform. Again, it's rubbish. This is a decision between right and wrong, and you know that it's wrong from the beginning, and you know that you're going down the wrong path, and you continue for various reasons, and you know, I prefer to focus on the reasons rather than trying to blame somebody else. It's a shortcoming in my personality as much as it was with Curvial and Adiboli. They took the wrong path, they made the wrong decision, and they covered up from that particular point. Yes, the bank has a responsibility to make sure that they have systems, controls and policies in place. And you know the fact that their negligent doesn't take away your guilt. I don't think so. Sometimes we have a difference of opinion with the in terms of how the other road traders view some of these things.
Looking back at the reporting at the time, it seems like there was a strong kind of clust dimensioned in some respects as to what happens. You came from Watford, you were the son of a pluster, You rose very fast through the ranks as.
You depicted it.
The leaders of Bearings were sort of posh, foolish, not in control of the company that they were running.
Like to what degree was like clus part of that story?
And do you see is that route still there for people for people to rise high and fast in banks like that today?
But there is. If you're successful, you're gonna You're going to succeed in any business. I think sometimes the trajectory is a bit quicker within the world of banking. But the whole class element element of it, which comes through in the first chapter of Road Trader, is probably the part of the book that I just don't agree with. But you know, I was stuck in prison in Germany. I had massive legal bills that need to be met. So when we were or when I was co authoring the book with Edward Whitley at the time, he wrote that chapter and it was very keen or the publishers were very keen that that was you know that that whole part of it, the class, the class conflict, if you like, was embellished through that first chapter. So it's not something that I ever really felt. I was always you know, I always enjoyed the week spot spent. So let me rephrase that. I never spent a lot of time in the city socializing with the people that worked in the city because they weren't really my type of people. You know. I grew up on a council estate in Watford and I used to like going back home at the weekends to go out with my friends rather than spending my time in the city. For me, it was very much a job of work, and friends that I made in the city at the time were always quite transient, and I think it is a transient industry as people move and push on within that. So there wasn't you know. I just don't agree with the class element or a class warfare element of it that is depicted in the book and some of the media made a big story of at the time. It's just not the way that I felt. I always felt very welcome. I was very socially. A debt which I think was to you know, in my favor throughout that whole period enabled me to move in some of the circles that they did and transgress some of the rules that I did throughout that period as well. But yeah, no, look, I never it was you know, working class versus upper class scenario, which was which was maybe made a bit more of at the time.
At the time, you know, it was certainly a feature, wasn't it in the reporting and in the book, as you say, But that idea of that trajectory, I mean, leave you know, you left school. I think you left school at eighteen. You certainly didn't go to university. You went straight into a bank, not Bearings to start with. You had a couple of different jobs before you got to Bearings. But that kind of route in the city, I mean, even the kind of type of trading that you were doing. That's it's the open outcross all of that. It's kind of it's disappeared. Yeah, it's a thing of the past, isn't it. But is that route still open of that kind of coming into the city and being able to make it.
No, I think it's it's a far harder route these days. And I think if you go back to that period, if you look at you know, you know, I started working the city in nineteen eighty five, so you've got Big Bang nineteen eighty seven. So they've got lots of new banks coming into the city. They're all looking for staff. So you used to get off of the off of the Tube Bank and you'd be handed one of those you know, little magazines and it'd be full of jobs and you could you could quite easily change a job every couple of weeks if you wanted to, with a tiny bit of experience. Tiny bit of experience, and you know, that was enough to give you that opportunity to move into another organization. So I was two years at Coots and Company just down the road here, you know, moved to Morgan Stanley, worked for Morgan Stanley for two years and then then was headhunted to Bearings. It was, you know, there was lots of opportunity, and I think you can't take that away from some of the things that happened during that period. You you know, you've got this process of deregulation where everything is you know, ramping up in terms of how big the city is becoming and how many people are working in the city, and you know, the systems, the controls, the policies weren't in place in some of those organizations in order to safeguard it.
Do you feel like systems and controls are better now that there are more safeguards in place to prevent this kind of thing?
Yeah, one hundred percent. You you know, like I speak at lots of different events and conferences where you know compliance, risk management, governance and the theme, and you know you can't underestimate how many people work in those areas now. You know, like when I think back to my time at Bearings, we had one compliance officer I think she was also the risk manager for two and a half thousand people. You walk into most offices now in Canary Warfare around this area and there's three thousand people working in compliance. So you know it's come on in massive leaps and bounds since that time. The quality of people are better, they're better educated, you know, they're getting better training within those organizations. But when you still have an episode like mcquarie happening within the last two years, where there were four hundred and fifty fictitious traits, you have to question how on earth that happens? And no, I suppose no.
The Trump administration is looking to deregulate quite fast. There's potentially new risk going to a merger and things like AI and crypto. I mean, do you worry about the regulatory environment and the level and the level of risk.
I don't worry for me, you know, maybe you I think there's a worry for the markets. You know, there's always these niche areas that throw up anomaly. So you've got you know, you had the episode with Archagos a few years ago, You've got Credit Suisse who've gone by the wayside over the last number of years. You've got this thing that's happened with the McQuary. So is it one hundred percent safe? Absolutely not.
Well, we're also at a very We're at an interesting point, aren't we, in terms of the Trump administration wanting to roll back the financial crisis era regulations and that that is going to surely put pressure on the UK and Europe to do the same. And for Britain it's very much about trying to you know, financial service has been quite unloved for around Brexit and for quite a long time now. It's perhaps needed in order to boost second growth importance, So you know, is there a concern that that is going to become more of a dominant theme again? How do you get a grip of that.
Well, I think the elastic band went too far in the opposite direction. When you had the global financial collapse and you've got Dodd Frank and everything else that came in around that time, the controls were just too much and that restricted a lot of business getting done. And I think, you know, there's definitely a need to pull back a little bit on that. And you've seen that happen over the last number of years. Whether you're going to go to full deregulation, quite how far it's going to go, is going to open, is going to open certain doors to allow things to go wrong again, And you know, you've got to be very very careful when people talk about deregulation. You know, that throws me back to that period in nineteen eighty seven when I was starting in the city and it was all of that opportunity, you know, the opportunity to move and move into the city, get jobs, move on within the different organizations, but also the controls systems weren't good enough. If you're getting that right and the industry is perfectly safe, then deregulate and pull back on some of that regulation. But mcquarie is the one that worries me. How can you have four hundred and fifty fictitious trades? It is just so basic an oversight. This is like kid stuff. And yet you've got an organization that's missed four hundred and fifty trades. They haven't reconciled them, they've not been able to see that they've they're not been able to guarantee any of those trades. Yet. This has happened less than two years ago.
And I'm sure that Macquarie would want to defend themselves on that point and give their explanation.
I'm sure that I'm sure they would want to, but they wouldn't be able to. They are fictitious trades. The key is in the word fictitious. They didn't exist, So how did you allow them to survive as an offset for a young trader within your organization for so long? That's where you get fined.
Do you think what happened there is a sign of wider risks that are there in the end history and that that's just the tip of an iceberg?
Or no, No, I think it's an isolated case, as was bearings all of those years ago. Now you've got you know, you've got a number of rogue trading episodes that spun off of the back of bearings and came to light because of bearings. You've got haman Arka at summertomo Igucci at Daiwa. You know, these were going on at the same time, so it wasn't an isolated incident. I think mcquarie is an isolated incident. But you know, one incident is too many. Maybe I shouldn't use McQuary's name so much.
One of your jobs is to investigate financial misconduct via via red myst.
Yeah, what does your work there involve. Well, my part of the work is probably more forensic. It goes back to, you know, looking at what my skill sets were when I worked in Coots and Morgan Stanley, and just looking at data and conversations and other things that are going on where there is something conduct within within organizations, and just pulling all that together. You know, I've always thought that I had a fairly photographic memory, so I'm using that again and just pulling those strands of information and seeing where we can expose misconduct within organizations.
And where are you finding is the most prevalent place for that kind of misconduct, So where are.
The weak links. It's all over the place really, to be honest with you. We look at some things which involve a certain amount of sexual harassment. There are certain episodes where that comes to the fore we're seeing that being quite prevalent at the moment. We look at other cases which have resulted, you know, maybe in some trading episodes that aren't correctly following procedure, where there's a lack of surveillance over some of how those trades are being trades are being followed through the organization. It's really quite widespread and it's quite interesting and it's good for me and you know, I'm enjoying it at the moment.
Back to financial services in terms of the UK regulator, I mean we've seen, for example, the SEC chair go In the US, there has been some pressure on the fcchair. And there's always criticism of the UK regulator. I mean, back when it was the FSA, you were quite critical of it in your historic case, but you've also been critical of it recently in the kind of FCA. Guys, how much robustness is there for the FCA. You know, the regulators always are quite criticized. They're often also quite underfunded in lots of ways and are limited in their scope. For example, how do you think the UK's regulatory system is measuring up now.
I think it's improved a lot. I think there needs to be you know, there needs to be more communication and conversations with the banks that they need to work together. I think different regulators are better at doing that, you know, allying with some of the banks and bringing better controls to the FOE. I'm not sure, you know, obviously I'm a million miles away from regulation these days. You know, I would have been a bit closer to it all of those years ago, But you know, it's still a job of work to be done. They're always slightly behind the curve. That's always going to be the case. I think if you look at the number of people who work in the FCA and how many people work in the City of London, there's a huge disparity. So it's very difficult to man mark what's going on within those organizations. So you need the banks to get it right, and you need the banks to have robust, tough controls within their within their own organizations. And then when people do step over the line, when they do commit fraud or they do something that's wrong. They need to be punished. And you know, there's been a bit more of that over the years and you hear of more and more cases, but it does still happen. But I think the banks are catching it far quicker. The FCA has a role within that, but there's still a job of work to be done.
When you're brought in to talk to the corporations about your experiences, is there a particular piece of advice that you give to them.
The piece of vice is really easy and it's you know, I delivered the same piece of advice to my children as well. You know, if you find yourself in a difficult situation, always ask for help and advice. You know, I was surrounded by people that could have helped me, but I didn't do that really simple thing. And you know, back in it's a very different world today than it was in nineteen nineties banking. You know, asking for help was seen as a sign of weakness and you probably would have been just you know, not dismissed from the firm, but dismissed with it quite quite easily. But you should have seen it, or at the time, I should have seen it as a sign of trying to do things correctly. And it's such a simple thing. And you you know, as I explained it to my children, if they find themselves in a difficult situation, just come to me and tell me what's going on. You know that there might be a difficult period, but I'll help you through it. And that's what I needed at the time. And I think, you know, just more communication is such an important tool.
Nick, Can I say, You've had such a colorful life, You've written a couple of books, You've been, as I said to Jail, you've been, you know, widely understood as a kind of road trader, sort of posed a person for that, and yet you've done so many things since then.
Do you sort of mourn.
The life that you might have had had that not happened? How do you know, put it into perspective? Now thirty years later and you're still talking about it, still sort of attached to the financial industry.
How do you think about it? They probably don't like the attachment, but no, it's Look, it's a very real story. It happened. There's no way that you can avoid that. Unfortunately, you do see certain facets of it coming back into not not always just the financial services industry. I think, you know, businesses and industries outside of the world of finance have had to pick up on compliance with some management government. You know, you've got huge failures over the last number of years kaillion and an episode such as that, so everybody's had to up their game in that regard. I don't specifically go into these organizations and try to give advice. I kind of I feel a bit fake if that was the process. You know, I go in, I tell stories. You know, I can go through in fairly, fairly close detail or extensive detail about what happened during that period, because nobody really knows it better than me. And if that then leads them to look at something quite differently within their organization, then I think that's sort of benefit. I also color compliance and risk management parts of learning within those organizations because it's usually fairly dull and most people try not to attend, so bringing me in make sure they get a few more bums on seats, and you know, there's a reason to why you're learning this and why you need to do this properly.
Okay, As as the last thought, if there is another Nick Lison out there, now, what did you say to him or her her stop.
You know, it's it's not worth it. I you know, I remember doing a treasury management conference in the Barbicane, you know, a good few years ago now, and one treasurer came over to me and he said, look, I've got I'd like to ask a piece of advice. And you know, I started off by saying that, you know, I'm not sure I'm the right person for that, but you know, I'll do my best to respond as honestly as I can. And he said, there's a bit of an issue and it was for one of the biggest UK banks at the time. He said, I've got a bit of an issue. I'm not happy with something that's going on within the organization. I've got an email in my outbox that I want to send, but I just don't have the courage to send it at this time. What do you think I should do? And I said, look, you know, I don't know the specific instance, but the one piece of advice I can give you is it's it's far easier to get another job, it's not so easy to get another repute. And you know, you've got to make the right decision on that basis. You know, unfortunately, you know, my reputation might be slightly different than it was back in nineteen ninety five when this when the story came to everybody's attention, but it's still a bad reputation.
Okay, Yeah, that's interesting that you feel that that you're still very much stuck with even though you did the present time and it's a long time ago, you still feel that you're really saddled with it.
Yeah, it's I think you You know, people have asked me if I'm you know, comfortable or content with that particular period in my life. I never will be. I never will be because it's the complete opposite of what I wanted to achieve. Am I content with myself? Yes, you know what I represent, you know, my family values and everything else, But the focus is very different. It's not on being successful and succeeding within the world of fine, which is what I wanted to do. So, you know, you have to change your focus a little bit, and that enables you to move forward. Whereas you know, speaking about it so openly, honestly and regularly means that it's not this you know, it's not this big ogre that follows me around all the time. It's part of my life, it's part of who I am today, but it's not. You know, it doesn't quite have the level of shame, guilt and embarrassment as it did years ago, but it still has a certain amount of embarrassment.