In this week's episode, hosts Jim Ludes and Mark Jacobson examine Trump Administration decisions to unilaterally disarm the United States of its ability to exert influence around the world, including: the effort to shutter USAID, slash funding for the National Endowment for Democracy, eliminate Justice Department efforts to counter Russian influence, and suspend DHS programs to protect American elections--all while Vice President JD Vance and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth alienate American allies in Europe.

In this week's episode, hosts Jim Ludes and Mark Jacobson examine Trump Administration decisions to unilaterally disarm the United States of its ability to exert influence around the world, including: the effort to shutter USAID, slash funding for the National Endowment for Democracy, eliminate Justice Department efforts to counter Russian influence, and suspend DHS programs to protect American elections--all while Vice President JD Vance and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth alienate American allies in Europe.

From the Pell Center at Salve Regina University and the creators of the Active Measures Newsletter, a weekly dive into the latest trends in political warfare, influence, and information campaigns. 

From the Pell Center at Salve Regina University and the creators of the Active Measures Newsletter, a weekly dive into the latest trends in political warfare, influence, and information campaigns.

A weekly dive into the headlines in the Active Measures Newsletter from the Pell Center at Salve Regina University.

The Active Measures Newsletter Podcast

Unilateral Disarmament

Over the last 18 months, the Trump administration has characterized efforts to counter disinformation as attacks on free speech, going so far as refuse visas to European fact-checkers. But the founder and chair of the Cambridge Disinformation Summit, Alan Jagolinzer, sees disinformation not simply as speech, but rather a preparatory act preceding harm—a reframing of the challenge that opens the door to a wide-range of interventions. Hosts Jim Ludes and Mark Jacobson also talk about U.S. and Russian support to Albertan separatists and Claude’s problem with foreign disinformation.

Over the last 18 months, the Trump administration has characterized efforts to counter disinformation as attacks on free speech, going so far as refuse visas to European fact-checkers. But the founder and chair of the Cambridge Disinformation Summit, Alan Jagolinzer, sees disinformation not simply as speech, but rather a preparatory act preceding harm&mdash;a reframing of the challenge that opens the door to a wide-range of interventions. Hosts Jim Ludes and Mark Jacobson also talk about U.S. and Russian support to Albertan separatists and Claude&rsquo;s problem with foreign disinformation.

The conversation explores the complexities of disinformation, particularly its intent to harm and the implications of viewing it through a cross-disciplinary lens. The discussion highlights the intersection of speech and corruption, the role of AI in disseminating disinformation, and the specific case of Alberta separatism as a focal point for foreign influence. The speakers emphasize the need to understand how political warfare exploits existing societal fractures to amplify division and distrust.

Disinformation, Accountability and Democracy with Alan Jagolinzer

Peter Magyar and the Tisza Party won the Hungarian parliamentary elections in April, but Russia’s coordinated influence campaign to discredit him and his party exposes current Russian influence campaigns in the West.  Darren Linville of the Clemson University Media Forensics Hub walks us through the way Russia’s Storm-1516 ecosystem launders fabricated narratives—ranging from corruption and money laundering to military conscription and anti‑Ukraine claims—through fake news sites and outsourced amplification networks, including commercial marketing accounts tied to Africa. Hungary’s election didn’t break for Russia, but Storm‑1516’s low‑cost, high‑engagement tactics pose a persistent threat to democratic processes in the West. Hosts Jim Ludes and Mark Jacobson also review possible Iranian hybrid-warfare in Europe and Japan’s efforts to confront Chinese disinformation.

Peter Magyar and the Tisza Party won the Hungarian parliamentary elections in April, but Russia&rsquo;s coordinated influence campaign to discredit him and his party exposes current Russian influence campaigns in the West.&nbsp; Darren Linville of the Clemson University Media Forensics Hub walks us through the way Russia&rsquo;s Storm-1516 ecosystem launders fabricated narratives&mdash;ranging from corruption and money laundering to military conscription and anti‑Ukraine claims&mdash;through fake news sites and outsourced amplification networks, including commercial marketing accounts tied to Africa. Hungary&rsquo;s election didn&rsquo;t break for Russia, but Storm‑1516&rsquo;s low‑cost, high‑engagement tactics pose a persistent threat to democratic processes in the West. Hosts Jim Ludes and Mark Jacobson also review possible Iranian hybrid-warfare in Europe and Japan&rsquo;s efforts to confront Chinese disinformation.

Peter Magyar and the Tisza Party’s April parliamentary victory in Hungary drew global attention not only for its political impact, but for what it revealed about contemporary Russian influence operations in the West. In this episode, Darren Linvill of Clemson University’s Media Forensics Hub explains how Russia’s Storm‑1516 network spreads fabricated narratives—ranging from corruption and money laundering to military conscription and anti‑Ukraine claims—using fake news sites and outsourced amplification networks, including commercial marketing accounts linked to Africa. Although Hungary’s election outcome ultimately didn’t favor Moscow, Storm‑1516’s low‑cost, high‑engagement tactics continue to pose a serious and persistent threat to democratic societies. Hosts Jim Ludes and Mark Jacobson also examine possible Iranian hybrid‑warfare activities in Europe and Japan’s efforts to counter Chinese disinformation.

Storm-1516 and the Hungarian Election with Darren Linvill

Iran’s digital influence campaigns didn’t start with the current war, and they won’t stop when it ends, says “Jane,” an analyst from the intelligence firm Graphika who asked us not to use her real name.  In fact, last year’s 12-Day War and the current conflict show all the hallmarks of Iran’s international information campaigns, running the gamut from traditional propaganda to hacktivism and AI-generated content, sometimes with international amplification from America’s adversaries.  Hosts Jim Ludes and Mark Jacobson also highlight reporting on the diplomatic dust-up between Germany and Russia over Russian active measures and the real lessons of the 2026 Hungarian elections.

Iran&rsquo;s digital influence campaigns didn&rsquo;t start with the current war, and they won&rsquo;t stop when it ends, says &ldquo;Jane,&rdquo; an analyst from the intelligence firm Graphika who asked us not to use her real name.&nbsp; In fact, last year&rsquo;s 12-Day War and the current conflict show all the hallmarks of Iran&rsquo;s international information campaigns, running the gamut from traditional propaganda to hacktivism and AI-generated content, sometimes with international amplification from America&rsquo;s adversaries.&nbsp; Hosts Jim Ludes and Mark Jacobson also highlight reporting on the diplomatic dust-up between Germany and Russia over Russian active measures and the real lessons of the 2026 Hungarian elections.

An intelligence analyst from Graphika explains how Iran’s digital influence campaigns—spanning propaganda, hacktivism, and AI-generated content—have shaped recent conflicts and will persist beyond them. Hosts Jim Ludes and Mark Jacobson also examine Russian active measures, a Germany–Russia diplomatic clash, and key takeaways from Hungary’s 2026 elections.

Unilateral Disarmament

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