Election interference doesn’t have to change votes to be effective.  The long history of Russian efforts to target specific communities in the United States mirrors domestic efforts to suppress votes.  These measures don’t require AI, social media, or bot-farms—they simply require a decent understanding of one candidate’s voters.  With that, anyone can generate an effective campaign to confuse voters or suppress turn-out with the ultimate goal of undermining confidence in democratic processes and institutions.  Russia has a long history of this tactic, and Mark Jacobson reviews the last decade of Russian campaigns targeting voters in successive American elections.

<p>Election interference doesn&rsquo;t have to change votes to be effective.&nbsp; The long history of Russian efforts to target specific communities in the United States mirrors domestic efforts to suppress votes.&nbsp; These measures don&rsquo;t require AI, social media, or bot-farms&mdash;they simply require a decent understanding of one candidate&rsquo;s voters.&nbsp; With that, anyone can generate an effective campaign to confuse voters or suppress turn-out with the ultimate goal of undermining confidence in democratic processes and institutions.&nbsp; Russia has a long history of this tactic, and Mark Jacobson reviews the last decade of Russian campaigns targeting voters in successive American elections.</p>

From the Pell Center at Salve Regina University and the creators of the Active Measures Newsletter, a weekly dive into the latest trends in political warfare, influence, and information campaigns. 

<p>From the Pell Center at Salve Regina University and the creators of the Active Measures Newsletter, a weekly dive into the latest trends in political warfare, influence, and information campaigns. </p>

A weekly dive into the headlines in the Active Measures Newsletter from the Pell Center at Salve Regina University.

The Active Measures Newsletter Podcast

This short solo episode from Mark Jacobson looks at how foreign influence operations have repeatedly targeted Black American voters, from robocalls in Maryland to Russian IRA social media accounts and AI-generated imagery in 2024. The core argument is that the goal is often not persuasion, but suppression, distrust, and disengagement from democratic participation. Jacobson connects those tactics to a broader warning for the 2026 midterms: even when the technology changes, the strategy stays the same. The real objective is to widen existing divisions and convince people that institutions and elections are not worth trusting.