Welcome back to It's a Members Game with Ryan Gradusky. I want to thank you guys again for being here this week, and once again, if you want to read along and see the data I'm going to provide you, please subscribe to my National Populist newsletter nappopnewsletter dot com. Any of my listeners can get a thirty day free trial. So if you were to tell someone in November of twenty sixteen, right after Donald Trump won his first time winning the presidency, that he was going to build a the first time he won the presidency on what the mainstream media deemed as a grievance culture, a white grievance culture, that he was going to assemble a multicultural, multi racial, working class coalition that would deliver the White House, the Senate, the House of Representatives, and the popular vote. They would not believe you. Perhaps it's why the mainstream media seems so defeated in the light of Trump's most recent victory. His coalition was supposed to be Jim Bobbs and Mary Bell's, not Julio's and Tyrones. But that's what it's become. While the best exit polling information is not yet available, PE Research Center TENSPE considered like the gold standard for presidential exit polling, but they take like six to eight months to assemble all their research. We have some information, We certainly have some precinct information for how certain groups voted according to the AP vote cast, which is the Associated Presses exit polling, and they're they're decent, They're pretty good. Trump won twenty five percent of black men and forty eight percent of Latino men. Those are the two numbers I want listeners to remember, especially when it was the men. Twenty five percent of Black men forty eight percent of Latino men. Obviously, that's not enough to win a presidency. Those two numbers. I mean Trump won because he received the overwhelming majority of white voters, especially whites without white voters without a college degree. That's the back win of his coalition. But if building electoral victory of presidential electoral victories like making a cake, while the white vote is the batter, the Latina vote is the icing, and the black vote is the cherry on top and the frosting, you kind of need all three to especially get to a electoral college or popular vote victory. And so that's a good thing. Trump has a new dynamic, multi ethnic, multiracial coalition, the kind that Republicans have been hoping for for a long time. The bad thing for Republicans, though, is that many of these voters are really loyal to Trump and not to the GOP. A lot of them voted for Trump and then for the Democratic congressman down ballot or Democratic senator. Making you know, a problem and making the problem a little harder was that a lot of them live. A lot of these new Republicans live in non competitive districts. Inn AOC's district. It swung to the right, but it's not a competitive district because it didn't swing hard and not I but I's sway huge. That's why the new Trump coalition is interesting. It's different, and it's is a big mystery of how it will change, how it will grow, and if it will eventually be just kind of how all Republicans vote with me this week. Is a man who predicted the working class multiracial coalition long before anyone else did. Patrick Graffini is the co founder of the polling company Echellent Insights, and he's the author of the book Party of the People Inside the Multiracial Populist Coalition remaking the GOP. Patrick, thank you for joining me.

Welcome back to It's a Members Game with Ryan Gradusky. I want to thank you guys again for being here this week, and once again, if you want to read along and see the data I'm going to provide you, please subscribe to my National Populist newsletter nappopnewsletter dot com. Any of my listeners can get a thirty day free trial. So if you were to tell someone in November of twenty sixteen, right after Donald Trump won his first time winning the presidency, that he was going to build a the first time he won the presidency on what the mainstream media deemed as a grievance culture, a white grievance culture, that he was going to assemble a multicultural, multi racial, working class coalition that would deliver the White House, the Senate, the House of Representatives, and the popular vote. They would not believe you. Perhaps it's why the mainstream media seems so defeated in the light of Trump's most recent victory. His coalition was supposed to be Jim Bobbs and Mary Bell's, not Julio's and Tyrones. But that's what it's become. While the best exit polling information is not yet available, PE Research Center TENSPE considered like the gold standard for presidential exit polling, but they take like six to eight months to assemble all their research. We have some information, We certainly have some precinct information for how certain groups voted according to the AP vote cast, which is the Associated Presses exit polling, and they're they're decent, They're pretty good. Trump won twenty five percent of black men and forty eight percent of Latino men. Those are the two numbers I want listeners to remember, especially when it was the men. Twenty five percent of Black men forty eight percent of Latino men. Obviously, that's not enough to win a presidency. Those two numbers. I mean Trump won because he received the overwhelming majority of white voters, especially whites without white voters without a college degree. That's the back win of his coalition. But if building electoral victory of presidential electoral victories like making a cake, while the white vote is the batter, the Latina vote is the icing, and the black vote is the cherry on top and the frosting, you kind of need all three to especially get to a electoral college or popular vote victory. And so that's a good thing. Trump has a new dynamic, multi ethnic, multiracial coalition, the kind that Republicans have been hoping for for a long time. The bad thing for Republicans, though, is that many of these voters are really loyal to Trump and not to the GOP. A lot of them voted for Trump and then for the Democratic congressman down ballot or Democratic senator. Making you know, a problem and making the problem a little harder was that a lot of them live. A lot of these new Republicans live in non competitive districts. Inn AOC's district. It swung to the right, but it's not a competitive district because it didn't swing hard and not I but I's sway huge. That's why the new Trump coalition is interesting. It's different, and it's is a big mystery of how it will change, how it will grow, and if it will eventually be just kind of how all Republicans vote with me this week. Is a man who predicted the working class multiracial coalition long before anyone else did. Patrick Graffini is the co founder of the polling company Echellent Insights, and he's the author of the book Party of the People Inside the Multiracial Populist Coalition remaking the GOP. Patrick, thank you for joining me.

Thank you Ryan for having me.

Thank you Ryan for having me.

First of all, congratulations on all your success. I mean the Atlantic wrote about you. Everyone's kind of waking up and smelling the Patrick Graffini coffee right now that you kind of had your finger on the pulse. So I want to start with the obvious question, right, why are minorities, especially young minorities, abandoning their father and grandfather's party. You call it a racial de alignment, but what does that actually mean.

First of all, congratulations on all your success. I mean the Atlantic wrote about you. Everyone's kind of waking up and smelling the Patrick Graffini coffee right now that you kind of had your finger on the pulse. So I want to start with the obvious question, right, why are minorities, especially young minorities, abandoning their father and grandfather's party. You call it a racial de alignment, but what does that actually mean.

So we have a long history in this country, I think racially polarized voting that goes back until at least sixty four and the Civil Rights that when you first saw black voters move in a very big and decisive way into the Democratic Party, with often times vote shares over ninety percent. And there was a thought for a while that Hispanics might maybe not follow quite as resoundingly in that direction, but would nonetheless also be a solidly democratic group. And this consensus really among Democrats really reached fever pitch during the Obama era. Obama wins eighty percent of non white voters running for reelection, and you know, and you know, you had this emerging Democratic majority coalition of the Ascendant went by many names, that this idea that as America grows more and more diverse, you will automatically see democratic victories because you know, just simply this, this four to one Democratic voting block is going to represent soon going to represent almost a majority of the public. And that's something that the Republicans could never recover from. But I think that view was always short sighted. It assumed that the non white voter in America would stay the same in you know, certainly many of these political loyalties were formed on the basis of groups that were highly either marginalized, discriminated against, whatever terminology you want to use, oftentimes very poor. In a party system where the Democrats were overwhelmingly seen as the party of the working class, the party of the common man, and that was the self identification of the Democratic Party. That self identification has gone out the window. I think it started to go out the window well before Donald Trump, as the Democrats to become more the party of the college educated, the elite, the woke if if as you were.

So we have a long history in this country, I think racially polarized voting that goes back until at least sixty four and the Civil Rights that when you first saw black voters move in a very big and decisive way into the Democratic Party, with often times vote shares over ninety percent. And there was a thought for a while that Hispanics might maybe not follow quite as resoundingly in that direction, but would nonetheless also be a solidly democratic group. And this consensus really among Democrats really reached fever pitch during the Obama era. Obama wins eighty percent of non white voters running for reelection, and you know, and you know, you had this emerging Democratic majority coalition of the Ascendant went by many names, that this idea that as America grows more and more diverse, you will automatically see democratic victories because you know, just simply this, this four to one Democratic voting block is going to represent soon going to represent almost a majority of the public. And that's something that the Republicans could never recover from. But I think that view was always short sighted. It assumed that the non white voter in America would stay the same in you know, certainly many of these political loyalties were formed on the basis of groups that were highly either marginalized, discriminated against, whatever terminology you want to use, oftentimes very poor. In a party system where the Democrats were overwhelmingly seen as the party of the working class, the party of the common man, and that was the self identification of the Democratic Party. That self identification has gone out the window. I think it started to go out the window well before Donald Trump, as the Democrats to become more the party of the college educated, the elite, the woke if if as you were.

And childiscat ladies, and you know, hyper pro criminality, you know.

And childiscat ladies, and you know, hyper pro criminality, you know.

Exactly exactly so so so I think that that self identity of the Democratic Party. Really, I think loose it right creates the conditions for somebody like Donald Trump to come in, who is a cultural icon, right, who you know is as comfortable ringside as he is in the Oval Office, to come in.

Exactly exactly so so so I think that that self identity of the Democratic Party. Really, I think loose it right creates the conditions for somebody like Donald Trump to come in, who is a cultural icon, right, who you know is as comfortable ringside as he is in the Oval Office, to come in.

Probably more ring side on the Oval office. I mean to be to tell you the truth. No, you are one hundred percent right though about that, And I want to I want to ask you one quick thing. So, like, I hate it when people say the word I don't hate it, but like it gets under my skin. But when when political is like they'll say the Asian vote, Well, what does that mean? Because Pakistanis and Koreans are very different kinds of people, and Republicans quote unquote won the Asian vote back in the night when it was predominantly Korean voters and Vietnamese refugees from the Vietnam War. And as the Asian population changed through mass immigration, the voting tendencies changed, and you're definitely seeing that with Hispanic voters.

Probably more ring side on the Oval office. I mean to be to tell you the truth. No, you are one hundred percent right though about that, And I want to I want to ask you one quick thing. So, like, I hate it when people say the word I don't hate it, but like it gets under my skin. But when when political is like they'll say the Asian vote, Well, what does that mean? Because Pakistanis and Koreans are very different kinds of people, and Republicans quote unquote won the Asian vote back in the night when it was predominantly Korean voters and Vietnamese refugees from the Vietnam War. And as the Asian population changed through mass immigration, the voting tendencies changed, and you're definitely seeing that with Hispanic voters.

That's right. There is no single Asian community. Hispanic community. You know, you see very different voting patterns from place to place. Just go from California to Texas, to Florida, and even pockets of let's say, voters in you know, Dominican voters in Lawrence's, Puerto Ricans in Allentown, Pennsylvania. There's distinct communities. And I think from a why that really mattered this year was that in twenty sixteen, the calculus was that if Donald Trump was going to build a wall, if Donald Trump was going to base his campaign again around stopping illegal immigrants, then Democrats right were really counting on Latino voters really rising up against that right out of a sense of pan Hispanic pan Latino group solidarity. That just didn't happen. It didn't really happen in twenty sixteen, but it really absolutely didn't happen in twenty twenty four when you see, you know, roughly a fifteen to twenty point shift again in the Latino vote towards Trump. And that's partly because I mean, I don't think you can I think it should be blindingly obvious an any Hispanic voter who can vote in a presidential election right as somebody who is a citizen of the United States who immigrated legally to the United States, so they don't identify with the people who are coming here illegally, and in fact their interests are directly contradictory to those folks in terms of these are folks who you know, they believe cut the line, who are taking advantage of the system. And so this idea right that everything can be boiled down to group racial interest solidarity, but just a fundamental flaw on the part of the Democrats.

That's right. There is no single Asian community. Hispanic community. You know, you see very different voting patterns from place to place. Just go from California to Texas, to Florida, and even pockets of let's say, voters in you know, Dominican voters in Lawrence's, Puerto Ricans in Allentown, Pennsylvania. There's distinct communities. And I think from a why that really mattered this year was that in twenty sixteen, the calculus was that if Donald Trump was going to build a wall, if Donald Trump was going to base his campaign again around stopping illegal immigrants, then Democrats right were really counting on Latino voters really rising up against that right out of a sense of pan Hispanic pan Latino group solidarity. That just didn't happen. It didn't really happen in twenty sixteen, but it really absolutely didn't happen in twenty twenty four when you see, you know, roughly a fifteen to twenty point shift again in the Latino vote towards Trump. And that's partly because I mean, I don't think you can I think it should be blindingly obvious an any Hispanic voter who can vote in a presidential election right as somebody who is a citizen of the United States who immigrated legally to the United States, so they don't identify with the people who are coming here illegally, and in fact their interests are directly contradictory to those folks in terms of these are folks who you know, they believe cut the line, who are taking advantage of the system. And so this idea right that everything can be boiled down to group racial interest solidarity, but just a fundamental flaw on the part of the Democrats.

I think, I mean the ultimate I hate when adults talk to other adults like their children, and the fact that like there were people on the media twenty four hours a day saying that Puerto Ricans were going to change their voting behaviors because of the kill Tony comments at the MSG thing that was going to be the ultimate thing they want to care about. Inflation, nothing, just kill Tony's joke about island of garbage in Puerto Rico. What does okay? So I was Gon asked this later, but I want to say now then. So back in twenty twelve, for anyone old enough to remember twenty twelve, we the post Romney synopsis was if you want to win over minority voters, specifically black and especially Latino, you need to be pro amnesty and really forgiving of criminality, be easy on crime. Why and that just didn't work. It just didn't work anytime the Republicans have ever tried to going back to Bob Dole. Why is it that I think that I think that when Black Lives Matter happened, and the riots post BLM especially, and the violence post BLM, and the forgiveness towards violence, and the forgiveness towards rating CBS is a lot of conservative Hispanic voters. And there were millions of conservative Hispanic voters who voted for Hillary Clinton, who voted for Barack Obama. They may be you know, pro life or whatever, but they were Democrats that this is not okay and I'm not okay with this party. Do you think that that was really the inflection point for a lot of working class Latinos because as you said, as you said, you know, illegals cut the line. There is a one of the real values in this country is fairness. People like to believe that people thinks should be fair. If you break the law, you should be punished for the crime, YadA, YadA, YadA. And I think that post twenty twenty, the idea of or fairness, especially towards criminality, woke a lot of working class.

I think, I mean the ultimate I hate when adults talk to other adults like their children, and the fact that like there were people on the media twenty four hours a day saying that Puerto Ricans were going to change their voting behaviors because of the kill Tony comments at the MSG thing that was going to be the ultimate thing they want to care about. Inflation, nothing, just kill Tony's joke about island of garbage in Puerto Rico. What does okay? So I was Gon asked this later, but I want to say now then. So back in twenty twelve, for anyone old enough to remember twenty twelve, we the post Romney synopsis was if you want to win over minority voters, specifically black and especially Latino, you need to be pro amnesty and really forgiving of criminality, be easy on crime. Why and that just didn't work. It just didn't work anytime the Republicans have ever tried to going back to Bob Dole. Why is it that I think that I think that when Black Lives Matter happened, and the riots post BLM especially, and the violence post BLM, and the forgiveness towards violence, and the forgiveness towards rating CBS is a lot of conservative Hispanic voters. And there were millions of conservative Hispanic voters who voted for Hillary Clinton, who voted for Barack Obama. They may be you know, pro life or whatever, but they were Democrats that this is not okay and I'm not okay with this party. Do you think that that was really the inflection point for a lot of working class Latinos because as you said, as you said, you know, illegals cut the line. There is a one of the real values in this country is fairness. People like to believe that people thinks should be fair. If you break the law, you should be punished for the crime, YadA, YadA, YadA. And I think that post twenty twenty, the idea of or fairness, especially towards criminality, woke a lot of working class.

Oh yeah, absolutely absolutely. I mean I think crime and you know, crime in the cities especially, and let's ignore that this was a shift. You know, you really did see a huge shift in the cities, not just among Hispanic voters. I would argue about black voters, Asian voters, but even white voters too. I mean, if you just look at what happened in and around the New York City metro area this time, where you know, Trump within the city goes I mean you think he gets like thirty percent of the vote in New York City, which is crazy. Hi, right, it's high obviously, it's it's nowhere near a majority. But you're talking about some of these suburbs returning two levels we haven't really seen since nineteen eighty eight, in the nineteen eighties, when the discussion in the nineteen eighties was really focused around the hollowing out of the big city is due to crime and you know, flight into the suburbs specifically to avoid you know, high crime in the central city area, and you know, especially around New York, but you also saw it in la You saw it in just a number of major cities that that sort of mindset really is returning Now, at the time, who were the people fleeing the cities? Who are the people kind of leading the outrage about this was sort of your white ethnic voter, right, I mean, that was the sort of Reagan Democrat voter back in the eighties and nineties. And those are the voters that Bill Clinton really tried hard to win back. Now, who lives in those neighborhoods now, right, it's not white ethnic voters. White ethnic voters have left the cities. Who lives in those neighbors in that neighborhoods now are working class Latinos. And I think they are occupying exactly the same place and sort of that urban political firmaments right as white they started, white working class ethnics did in the nineteen sixties, seventies and eighties. And I think you're seeing a shift in the same way that those also, those voting blocks shifted, right. Those were the New Deal Democrats. Those were Democrats who voted for JFK. Right, who but then started voting for Richard Nixon in nineteen sixty eight, nineteen seventy two and became Reagan voters after that. So I think that that is, you know, that's what we're in particular, seeing right stantics, I think there's a trigger. There's certainly a trigger that you mentioned right with these events, and I think this is the long term trajectory these voters are on.

Oh yeah, absolutely absolutely. I mean I think crime and you know, crime in the cities especially, and let's ignore that this was a shift. You know, you really did see a huge shift in the cities, not just among Hispanic voters. I would argue about black voters, Asian voters, but even white voters too. I mean, if you just look at what happened in and around the New York City metro area this time, where you know, Trump within the city goes I mean you think he gets like thirty percent of the vote in New York City, which is crazy. Hi, right, it's high obviously, it's it's nowhere near a majority. But you're talking about some of these suburbs returning two levels we haven't really seen since nineteen eighty eight, in the nineteen eighties, when the discussion in the nineteen eighties was really focused around the hollowing out of the big city is due to crime and you know, flight into the suburbs specifically to avoid you know, high crime in the central city area, and you know, especially around New York, but you also saw it in la You saw it in just a number of major cities that that sort of mindset really is returning Now, at the time, who were the people fleeing the cities? Who are the people kind of leading the outrage about this was sort of your white ethnic voter, right, I mean, that was the sort of Reagan Democrat voter back in the eighties and nineties. And those are the voters that Bill Clinton really tried hard to win back. Now, who lives in those neighborhoods now, right, it's not white ethnic voters. White ethnic voters have left the cities. Who lives in those neighbors in that neighborhoods now are working class Latinos. And I think they are occupying exactly the same place and sort of that urban political firmaments right as white they started, white working class ethnics did in the nineteen sixties, seventies and eighties. And I think you're seeing a shift in the same way that those also, those voting blocks shifted, right. Those were the New Deal Democrats. Those were Democrats who voted for JFK. Right, who but then started voting for Richard Nixon in nineteen sixty eight, nineteen seventy two and became Reagan voters after that. So I think that that is, you know, that's what we're in particular, seeing right stantics, I think there's a trigger. There's certainly a trigger that you mentioned right with these events, and I think this is the long term trajectory these voters are on.

So yeah, and there was this calculation. It seemed like the Democrats were making were racial like alignment, like the quote unquote black and brown voter, even though they are completely different voters. But I mean complete not completely different issues, but a lot of different issues on a lot of different racial solidary that doesn't really exist outside of like Al Sharpton's brain, that that would overcome the fear of safety and concern and economic prosperity. You I think you tweet us. I was looking for the tweet and I couldn't find it. I think you tweeted that you expect like Mexicans to vote like Italians in the near future.

So yeah, and there was this calculation. It seemed like the Democrats were making were racial like alignment, like the quote unquote black and brown voter, even though they are completely different voters. But I mean complete not completely different issues, but a lot of different issues on a lot of different racial solidary that doesn't really exist outside of like Al Sharpton's brain, that that would overcome the fear of safety and concern and economic prosperity. You I think you tweet us. I was looking for the tweet and I couldn't find it. I think you tweeted that you expect like Mexicans to vote like Italians in the near future.

Was that you I've probably said that, you know, I don't know.

Was that you I've probably said that, you know, I don't know.

I don't have a word in your mouth, so I just want to make sure.

I don't have a word in your mouth, so I just want to make sure.

Yeah, No, I mean I think that that's the future, right. I mean, I think we're not there yet, but that's the future. And that's what you really saw, you know, And you know, my grandparents came to this country, came to New York City, right, the natural home for people like them was the Democratic Party. The political machines existed to serve these immigrants who came in to the big cities, and you know, they identified as Democrats for a long time, and the party at the national level was very clearly identified with these sorts of voters, the working class voters who are kind of working their way up in American society. And that simply is no longer the case. And so, you know, really what you're seeing, I think you really saw in this election is Latino's really following the footsteps of those ethnic voters who again, you know, in the early nineteen sixties would have been seventy to eighty percent JFK voters. Now, it didn't hurt that he was Catholic, right, but that was sort of the high water mark. But year after year, decade after decade, you see particularly this white Catholic voter. That's a category that I think makes sense as sort of this precursor, because this was a group of people who was actually discriminated against back in the nineteenth century. But every election grew more and more Republican and is now to a point where that that group of voters is about a Trump plus twenty.

Yeah, No, I mean I think that that's the future, right. I mean, I think we're not there yet, but that's the future. And that's what you really saw, you know, And you know, my grandparents came to this country, came to New York City, right, the natural home for people like them was the Democratic Party. The political machines existed to serve these immigrants who came in to the big cities, and you know, they identified as Democrats for a long time, and the party at the national level was very clearly identified with these sorts of voters, the working class voters who are kind of working their way up in American society. And that simply is no longer the case. And so, you know, really what you're seeing, I think you really saw in this election is Latino's really following the footsteps of those ethnic voters who again, you know, in the early nineteen sixties would have been seventy to eighty percent JFK voters. Now, it didn't hurt that he was Catholic, right, but that was sort of the high water mark. But year after year, decade after decade, you see particularly this white Catholic voter. That's a category that I think makes sense as sort of this precursor, because this was a group of people who was actually discriminated against back in the nineteenth century. But every election grew more and more Republican and is now to a point where that that group of voters is about a Trump plus twenty.

I think now, I think white Catholics voted. I think it was like either sixty six or seventy percent for Trump. I think the only girup that put a more Republican that were Mormons and Evangelic because I doubt Mormons actually do about more Republican other.

I think now, I think white Catholics voted. I think it was like either sixty six or seventy percent for Trump. I think the only girup that put a more Republican that were Mormons and Evangelic because I doubt Mormons actually do about more Republican other.

Than But but the reason I mentioned that, right is because even back in the George of B. Bush era, I remember, it was a fight to win white Calcoluse that was a huge priority of Carl Row. This was this was sort of seen as the key swing group because they were Democrats. Because you had this sort of old white Anglo Saxon Protestant both the white Anglo Saxon Protestant elite, but the white Protestant voters. Those were seen as the core Republican vote. Now it's kind of I mean, I think in many ways it's kind of flipped in the sense of you know that lost both heat is no longer really a reliable Republican constituency. But you know, particularly in the suburbs and the cities, you see this internet like states like Pennsylvania, states like Wisconsin, I do think the shift right was still important among those white Catholic voters. So you know that, you know, particularly in those states that are whiter, where you do have an ethnic voting base, and you do have an white ethnic voting base that lives in cities as opposed to out in rural areas, those are still places that are pre fifty to fifty. That electorate is still up for grabs. And I think Trump made just enough progress, right, I mean that there's still a lot of let's say, low hanging fruit. I think among these there was at least enough low hanging fruit among these voters that you know, he was able to win a state like Wisconsin, which is ninety percent white in terms of its electorate, or state like Pennsylvania, which is like eighty four percent.

Than But but the reason I mentioned that, right is because even back in the George of B. Bush era, I remember, it was a fight to win white Calcoluse that was a huge priority of Carl Row. This was this was sort of seen as the key swing group because they were Democrats. Because you had this sort of old white Anglo Saxon Protestant both the white Anglo Saxon Protestant elite, but the white Protestant voters. Those were seen as the core Republican vote. Now it's kind of I mean, I think in many ways it's kind of flipped in the sense of you know that lost both heat is no longer really a reliable Republican constituency. But you know, particularly in the suburbs and the cities, you see this internet like states like Pennsylvania, states like Wisconsin, I do think the shift right was still important among those white Catholic voters. So you know that, you know, particularly in those states that are whiter, where you do have an ethnic voting base, and you do have an white ethnic voting base that lives in cities as opposed to out in rural areas, those are still places that are pre fifty to fifty. That electorate is still up for grabs. And I think Trump made just enough progress, right, I mean that there's still a lot of let's say, low hanging fruit. I think among these there was at least enough low hanging fruit among these voters that you know, he was able to win a state like Wisconsin, which is ninety percent white in terms of its electorate, or state like Pennsylvania, which is like eighty four percent.

Hey, we'll be right back after this. I said that the Trump campaign. I said, you know, during the campaign, this is early on. I said, you know, you're doubling down on this Latino vote. But in the most critical in almost all the most critical Spring states of I think like maybe six of four of the seven big ones, the electorate is still ninety to ninety five percent white black. It is very little changed. I said, so doubling, quadrupling, tripling down on on getting these Latina voters. There's not enough of them, and I was a little I was concerned. But I think part of Trump's success, right, and maybe Kamala's failure, was Trump's share of the minority vote did go up among almost all minorities, I think, actually of all minorities. But some part of that I wouldn't say the whole thing, but part of that was because the minority share overall fell because they because a lot of especially black voters, had to choose between commeal and the couch, and they chose the couch. They just didn't show up on election day. That made Trump's share. No Trump' share went up on its own, but it probably went up faster and more because Kamala voters just weren't showing up.

Hey, we'll be right back after this. I said that the Trump campaign. I said, you know, during the campaign, this is early on. I said, you know, you're doubling down on this Latino vote. But in the most critical in almost all the most critical Spring states of I think like maybe six of four of the seven big ones, the electorate is still ninety to ninety five percent white black. It is very little changed. I said, so doubling, quadrupling, tripling down on on getting these Latina voters. There's not enough of them, and I was a little I was concerned. But I think part of Trump's success, right, and maybe Kamala's failure, was Trump's share of the minority vote did go up among almost all minorities, I think, actually of all minorities. But some part of that I wouldn't say the whole thing, but part of that was because the minority share overall fell because they because a lot of especially black voters, had to choose between commeal and the couch, and they chose the couch. They just didn't show up on election day. That made Trump's share. No Trump' share went up on its own, but it probably went up faster and more because Kamala voters just weren't showing up.

Yeah, I mean, look, I don't disagree with that, but I think that but both things were Both things were important. I just think inflation was just a dominant issue and narrative that I think there was no way, I mean, you were going to see I think some of these voters who maybe were the twenty sixteen Trump voters who drifted away in twenty twenty. I think you were always going to see some of those come home. And then yeah, I mean, you're right that we were always sweating. And I think the scenario in which my sort of prediction doesn't come true was like, hey, yeah, we do really well, we clean up in the sun Belt, but you know, there's just not enough of these realignment voters in Pennsylvania, let's say, to move things. But you know, it turns out, right. I mean, I think that that black share of the vote is important, even if it's a low share of the vote, if you can cut into those margins.

Yeah, I mean, look, I don't disagree with that, but I think that but both things were Both things were important. I just think inflation was just a dominant issue and narrative that I think there was no way, I mean, you were going to see I think some of these voters who maybe were the twenty sixteen Trump voters who drifted away in twenty twenty. I think you were always going to see some of those come home. And then yeah, I mean, you're right that we were always sweating. And I think the scenario in which my sort of prediction doesn't come true was like, hey, yeah, we do really well, we clean up in the sun Belt, but you know, there's just not enough of these realignment voters in Pennsylvania, let's say, to move things. But you know, it turns out, right. I mean, I think that that black share of the vote is important, even if it's a low share of the vote, if you can cut into those margins.

Of course, I'm not saying they're not important, but I don't know, but.

Of course, I'm not saying they're not important, but I don't know, but.

I think, yeah, but I think that the calculus that you mentioned with turnout two is because the raw vote margin, right, the Democrats get out of the city of Philadelphia, get out of the city of Detroit, is just so important to them. If you take that away, I you largely take away their ability to win states like Pennsylvania and Michigan. Michigan obviously was also a state. I mean, I had a large number of problems that went beyond the black vote, that went into the Arab American vote. Right, I also flipped pretty significantly.

I think, yeah, but I think that the calculus that you mentioned with turnout two is because the raw vote margin, right, the Democrats get out of the city of Philadelphia, get out of the city of Detroit, is just so important to them. If you take that away, I you largely take away their ability to win states like Pennsylvania and Michigan. Michigan obviously was also a state. I mean, I had a large number of problems that went beyond the black vote, that went into the Arab American vote. Right, I also flipped pretty significantly.

I know, there's this one little if you look at a map of the Detroit metro area, there's like this one little red bubble in the middle of it, and that's that's I think, Dearborn. It's like crazy, this Arab majority place. The one really interesting thing that I want to really ask you about because I think you might know. So I'm from New York, Right you can tell based on like everything about me, but the nagas lee voice, the obsession to curse. But the one thing that's really interesting is in the Bronx. Right, the Bronx is it's not a place that's in a swing district. It's not a swing county's not a swing state. There's one elected Republican in the whole borough, and Republicans in twenty and Republicans don't compete there. You'll never get a door knock, you'll never a mail piece, you won't get a doorknocker, you won't get a TV ad. You're you might as well not know there's an election going on if you live there, and if you are a voter, So there's no effort to win these voters over because why bother. Right, But in twenty twelve, Mitt Romney won twenty nine, nine hundred and sixty seven votes. In twenty twenty four, Trump won ninety eight, one hundred and seventy four votes. He made a gain of about about seventy thousand votes. At the same time, Democrats went from three hundred and thirty nine thousand to two hundred and sixty one thousand. There was no effort on the part of Republicans to make this happen. It was one hundred percent organic, and it was repeated in other parts of the New York City metro areas you said. It was repeated in Cicero, Illinois, in Los angele Lists, in some areas throughout the Central Valley of California. They have competitive congressional districts, but not competitive state elections. In places that there was no Republican, real Republican effort to change voters' minds, voters changed organically. And as I said before, Hispanics are not all the same. Some are Central or Caribbeans, some are Central Americans, a lot of are Mexican. Do we I mean, is it all inflation or is something bigger going on? Or is it the Democrat being the party of you know, crazy college, crazy white liberal women and you know, supporting endless criminality.

I know, there's this one little if you look at a map of the Detroit metro area, there's like this one little red bubble in the middle of it, and that's that's I think, Dearborn. It's like crazy, this Arab majority place. The one really interesting thing that I want to really ask you about because I think you might know. So I'm from New York, Right you can tell based on like everything about me, but the nagas lee voice, the obsession to curse. But the one thing that's really interesting is in the Bronx. Right, the Bronx is it's not a place that's in a swing district. It's not a swing county's not a swing state. There's one elected Republican in the whole borough, and Republicans in twenty and Republicans don't compete there. You'll never get a door knock, you'll never a mail piece, you won't get a doorknocker, you won't get a TV ad. You're you might as well not know there's an election going on if you live there, and if you are a voter, So there's no effort to win these voters over because why bother. Right, But in twenty twelve, Mitt Romney won twenty nine, nine hundred and sixty seven votes. In twenty twenty four, Trump won ninety eight, one hundred and seventy four votes. He made a gain of about about seventy thousand votes. At the same time, Democrats went from three hundred and thirty nine thousand to two hundred and sixty one thousand. There was no effort on the part of Republicans to make this happen. It was one hundred percent organic, and it was repeated in other parts of the New York City metro areas you said. It was repeated in Cicero, Illinois, in Los angele Lists, in some areas throughout the Central Valley of California. They have competitive congressional districts, but not competitive state elections. In places that there was no Republican, real Republican effort to change voters' minds, voters changed organically. And as I said before, Hispanics are not all the same. Some are Central or Caribbeans, some are Central Americans, a lot of are Mexican. Do we I mean, is it all inflation or is something bigger going on? Or is it the Democrat being the party of you know, crazy college, crazy white liberal women and you know, supporting endless criminality.

Yeah. I mean, look, I think I mentioned I went back earlier and I mentioned how, you know, you don't really have a single Asian community, you don't have a single Hispanic community. But you see these shifts all over the place. Right, It's as though there actually is right benefiting Republicans in this case. And you know, I think you know what I go back to in my book, right was, you know, the overwhelming majority of people who are non white in America, a large majority don't have a college degree. And just like the overs like the about a sixty percent or near sixty percent majority of American voters don't have a college degree. What we saw in twenty sixteen, that white working class coalition that elected Donald Trump. At this time, what we saw was a just simply a working class coalition that elected Donald Trump. Race was not you know, sort of as critical or pivotal a factor, you know, in terms of our in terms of those voting patterns, in terms of the coalition as it was back in back in twenty sixteen. I think what we can say is they share kind of a common you know, kind of working class sensibility, a certain worldview, and it really is the white college educated liberals who we're off on an eye end of their own in terms of their emphasis on these identity issues, the emphasis on these issues you know, that don't really matter to the large majority of Americans, particularly in a time of high inflation, a border that's out of control, rising crime, and those issues. I think the Democrats chose to really close the election on issues like democracy, abortion, these social issues that don't really necessary that I think people in these communities said, this doesn't really address my key concern here when you know, the prices of eggs is up fifty percent, right, and everything I'm paying for is through the roof. You know, how are you going to help me, you know, afford my grocery built? Right? Those are the central concerns, you know, of this working class coalition, and I think that really unified, right, I mean, and I think that brought together just very different groups of people in this coalition. On the flip side, you've also just seen, yeah, you have seen over the last couple election cycles, you've seen these high education places move further and further to the left. You know, they didn't really move this time but you know some places moved one or two points, they were still a little bit more resistant. The problem is, you know that that coalition that you know, Kama was speaking to on the Ellipse a week before the election, it's not a majority of Americans, right, These are not the concerns that you're twenty twenty four a majority of American American American American people cared.

Yeah. I mean, look, I think I mentioned I went back earlier and I mentioned how, you know, you don't really have a single Asian community, you don't have a single Hispanic community. But you see these shifts all over the place. Right, It's as though there actually is right benefiting Republicans in this case. And you know, I think you know what I go back to in my book, right was, you know, the overwhelming majority of people who are non white in America, a large majority don't have a college degree. And just like the overs like the about a sixty percent or near sixty percent majority of American voters don't have a college degree. What we saw in twenty sixteen, that white working class coalition that elected Donald Trump. At this time, what we saw was a just simply a working class coalition that elected Donald Trump. Race was not you know, sort of as critical or pivotal a factor, you know, in terms of our in terms of those voting patterns, in terms of the coalition as it was back in back in twenty sixteen. I think what we can say is they share kind of a common you know, kind of working class sensibility, a certain worldview, and it really is the white college educated liberals who we're off on an eye end of their own in terms of their emphasis on these identity issues, the emphasis on these issues you know, that don't really matter to the large majority of Americans, particularly in a time of high inflation, a border that's out of control, rising crime, and those issues. I think the Democrats chose to really close the election on issues like democracy, abortion, these social issues that don't really necessary that I think people in these communities said, this doesn't really address my key concern here when you know, the prices of eggs is up fifty percent, right, and everything I'm paying for is through the roof. You know, how are you going to help me, you know, afford my grocery built? Right? Those are the central concerns, you know, of this working class coalition, and I think that really unified, right, I mean, and I think that brought together just very different groups of people in this coalition. On the flip side, you've also just seen, yeah, you have seen over the last couple election cycles, you've seen these high education places move further and further to the left. You know, they didn't really move this time but you know some places moved one or two points, they were still a little bit more resistant. The problem is, you know that that coalition that you know, Kama was speaking to on the Ellipse a week before the election, it's not a majority of Americans, right, These are not the concerns that you're twenty twenty four a majority of American American American American people cared.

About, right. I mean, you have to be very comfortable in life, very comfortable. We're January sixth still lives in your head every single day, like there has to be nothing else, Like you know, you can afford your bills. You know, you're taking your the right amount of magnesium in the morning, like everything is going well for you to be like, oh yeah, you know what I'm thinking about it, January sixth, that's just not where it is. And it was really just college educated whites and black women primarily who were That was the two people that she was speaking the most too repeatedly. Because there was a lot of racial identitarian on the left that the media does not talk about. I mean, the Biden administration was successfully sued for discriminating against white farmers. They were totally opposed to the Harvard case with the discrimination of Asians. I mean, they did a lot of like race baiting of their own, but it was always, you know, the Republicans that were the racist you're listening to it's a numbers game with Ryan Gerdsky. We'll be right back. The interesting thing is that a lot of these voters who vote and this is not This is very common when new people approached a party. This was very common when Nixon and Reagan won in the seventies and eighties and sixties, seventies and eighties. A lot of these voters voted for Trump and then either did not vote down ballot or voted Democrat down back because they were comfortable with a lot of it. Why do you think that is that because the Trump brand is still uniquely different than the Republican brand as far as working class issues goes.

About, right. I mean, you have to be very comfortable in life, very comfortable. We're January sixth still lives in your head every single day, like there has to be nothing else, Like you know, you can afford your bills. You know, you're taking your the right amount of magnesium in the morning, like everything is going well for you to be like, oh yeah, you know what I'm thinking about it, January sixth, that's just not where it is. And it was really just college educated whites and black women primarily who were That was the two people that she was speaking the most too repeatedly. Because there was a lot of racial identitarian on the left that the media does not talk about. I mean, the Biden administration was successfully sued for discriminating against white farmers. They were totally opposed to the Harvard case with the discrimination of Asians. I mean, they did a lot of like race baiting of their own, but it was always, you know, the Republicans that were the racist you're listening to it's a numbers game with Ryan Gerdsky. We'll be right back. The interesting thing is that a lot of these voters who vote and this is not This is very common when new people approached a party. This was very common when Nixon and Reagan won in the seventies and eighties and sixties, seventies and eighties. A lot of these voters voted for Trump and then either did not vote down ballot or voted Democrat down back because they were comfortable with a lot of it. Why do you think that is that because the Trump brand is still uniquely different than the Republican brand as far as working class issues goes.

Well, look, I think that I'm a little bit less pessimistic on this question. And yes, I would say, yeah, there is absolutely Trump is you know, people change parties for the top of the ticket, right, I mean, if you're going to change long standing voting patterns, it's going to be because there's somebody at the top of the ticket who is uniquely, you know, uniquely somebody who you resonate with, somebody who speaks your language, right, somebody who really provides that personal connection and vision. And you know, it takes and may take a couple of cycles before people are voting down ballot, you know, for your congressional campaign at the same rate as they're voting for a Donald Trump at the top of ticket. Who is somebody who realigns these core demographics that said, right, you are seeing the share of the vote earned by Republican down ballot candidates also move up in this Trump you know, Trump era. Yeah, you're seeing it cycle after cycle, Like I mean, I think the basis for comparison, right is, you know, what is a down ballot you know, senate candidate getting compared to their last selection? What were they getting compared to four years ago, six years ago? And that number is os higher in the same way that the Republican presidential vote is oas higher. And we've seen this before. We saw this in the South, right when the South realigned, it always realigned it was voting for Reagan at the top of the ticket and just sending a whole bunch of Democrats to Congress. And that took really until nineteen ninety four for that to break, and that was thirty years after the initial shift towards the Republican party.

Well, look, I think that I'm a little bit less pessimistic on this question. And yes, I would say, yeah, there is absolutely Trump is you know, people change parties for the top of the ticket, right, I mean, if you're going to change long standing voting patterns, it's going to be because there's somebody at the top of the ticket who is uniquely, you know, uniquely somebody who you resonate with, somebody who speaks your language, right, somebody who really provides that personal connection and vision. And you know, it takes and may take a couple of cycles before people are voting down ballot, you know, for your congressional campaign at the same rate as they're voting for a Donald Trump at the top of ticket. Who is somebody who realigns these core demographics that said, right, you are seeing the share of the vote earned by Republican down ballot candidates also move up in this Trump you know, Trump era. Yeah, you're seeing it cycle after cycle, Like I mean, I think the basis for comparison, right is, you know, what is a down ballot you know, senate candidate getting compared to their last selection? What were they getting compared to four years ago, six years ago? And that number is os higher in the same way that the Republican presidential vote is oas higher. And we've seen this before. We saw this in the South, right when the South realigned, it always realigned it was voting for Reagan at the top of the ticket and just sending a whole bunch of Democrats to Congress. And that took really until nineteen ninety four for that to break, and that was thirty years after the initial shift towards the Republican party.

Well it took I really, it took to twenty ten. I mean because Mississippi state legislature was Democrat, West Virginia's was Democrat, Arkansas was Democrats had two Democratic senators from Arkansas in two thousand and eight that who were unopposed by the way, Republicans even run against I think what was it, Lincoln and Blanche link It or something like that. They didn't even run opponents against her because it was too hard for Republican to win Arkansas. That wasn't two thousand and I'm like six, Like that's crazy.

Well it took I really, it took to twenty ten. I mean because Mississippi state legislature was Democrat, West Virginia's was Democrat, Arkansas was Democrats had two Democratic senators from Arkansas in two thousand and eight that who were unopposed by the way, Republicans even run against I think what was it, Lincoln and Blanche link It or something like that. They didn't even run opponents against her because it was too hard for Republican to win Arkansas. That wasn't two thousand and I'm like six, Like that's crazy.

But that's right. So hopefully it doesn't take as long this time. But but this idea of you know, their on a trajectory, but there's always there is this kind of note. There is this a term for it's called down ballot lag right that that you know, people initially kind of say, you know, I'm gonna switch chef for one person, but then they I only realize in the end, yeah, I'm a Republican. And by the way, I mean, look it happens on the other side too, right. You know, in twenty sixteen, you have a lot of people voting didn't like Trump in these suburbs, but still voting for your you know, friendly local Republican congressional candidate. And by twenty eighteen that was no longer you know, that that was sort of out the window. So I think if people are going to get more and more aligned in these you know, with their new parties over time, because I think that's where their values are, right, I mean, they identify, you know, their values are conservative. They identify as conservative. You know, maybe they don't have a party label, then maybe they're moving away from the Democrats. But when you look at where these voters are on the issues, it's not surprising, right well, I mean it's starting to vote that.

But that's right. So hopefully it doesn't take as long this time. But but this idea of you know, their on a trajectory, but there's always there is this kind of note. There is this a term for it's called down ballot lag right that that you know, people initially kind of say, you know, I'm gonna switch chef for one person, but then they I only realize in the end, yeah, I'm a Republican. And by the way, I mean, look it happens on the other side too, right. You know, in twenty sixteen, you have a lot of people voting didn't like Trump in these suburbs, but still voting for your you know, friendly local Republican congressional candidate. And by twenty eighteen that was no longer you know, that that was sort of out the window. So I think if people are going to get more and more aligned in these you know, with their new parties over time, because I think that's where their values are, right, I mean, they identify, you know, their values are conservative. They identify as conservative. You know, maybe they don't have a party label, then maybe they're moving away from the Democrats. But when you look at where these voters are on the issues, it's not surprising, right well, I mean it's starting to vote that.

I mean even in this allig I mean, think about this, if you're old, especially if you were around like that in the nineties. There are more Republicans, and Republicans do better in Queens, New York than in Westchester. Like that is absurd, It was unthinkable. How do the Republicans, I mean, listen, Trump has had twelve years or who will have twelve years when this is all over of absolutely the craziest political story in American history or definitely one of the top three. How does the next Republican whomever it be, or the candidates running for the future, how do they keep that momentum going towards the right, towards the working class.

I mean even in this allig I mean, think about this, if you're old, especially if you were around like that in the nineties. There are more Republicans, and Republicans do better in Queens, New York than in Westchester. Like that is absurd, It was unthinkable. How do the Republicans, I mean, listen, Trump has had twelve years or who will have twelve years when this is all over of absolutely the craziest political story in American history or definitely one of the top three. How does the next Republican whomever it be, or the candidates running for the future, how do they keep that momentum going towards the right, towards the working class.

Look, I think every canon has to chart their own path. That's what I would I would tell any cannon I'm working for or advising that, you know, if you try to go in and you try to be Trump, if you try to literally be Trump, right, Yeah, that's always literally do that. It's not necessarily going to work out well for you, because I think voters want a sense of who you are as a person, what a sense of you know, how you're different.

Look, I think every canon has to chart their own path. That's what I would I would tell any cannon I'm working for or advising that, you know, if you try to go in and you try to be Trump, if you try to literally be Trump, right, Yeah, that's always literally do that. It's not necessarily going to work out well for you, because I think voters want a sense of who you are as a person, what a sense of you know, how you're different.

And also, let's say that Trump is the first hilarious president and ninety nine percent of politicians are not funny at all, right, Like they have the most unfunny people in the world. So it's hard.

And also, let's say that Trump is the first hilarious president and ninety nine percent of politicians are not funny at all, right, Like they have the most unfunny people in the world. So it's hard.

Yeah, no, it will be hard, right from that perspective, So I don't want to underestimate that. With that said, I think the what we're seeing play out now is something we probably would have seen play out anyway, maybe in ten years, five years, whatever, you know, because I think this is where global politics has headed. I noticed some of you followed closely, right, Yeah, but global politics is headed in a place where it's overwhelmingly parties of the right, which are increasingly more populous, you represent the working class in Europe, in America. You're really seeing this in more and more places throughout the world, and it's the parties of the left that you know, increasing represent the educated class. Trump was in a cellar into this, but I think that is the trend for as well, so long as until it's not the trend right right, So, I think that the wind is at the back of sort of more and more minority voters, especially because they're kind of the holdouts at this point. I mean, I think we are almost resaturation with white, non college white working class voters. That you still have a lot of low hanging fruit of minority voters who are just conservative on policy and their values, who still vote Democrat, and so I think the idea is continuing to focus squarely on those voters. Yes, I think Trump was uniquely effective, you know, but Trump was maybe not as effective in some other voting blocks that another candidate would be would be as if it would be more effective in so so, but I think that that is really identifying, you know, who really are the votvoters that pro grabs, Who are the voters who are just in the wrong party right now? And I think we can continue to just say that those are that's who those voters are. So I think whether or not you believe, right, you know, people are saying, well, this can't realign them. You can't continue forever, right, nobody can duplicate this Trump coalition. What I will say, you know, regardless of that, right, I mean, yeah, you're right, parties can't keep winning forever. But I think what will be true is Republicans will now be the home of the working class in the same way right that the Democrats used to be the home of the working class. And I think that's increasingly who they have to represent, who they have to wage their campaigns. This is who we're doing this for.

Yeah, no, it will be hard, right from that perspective, So I don't want to underestimate that. With that said, I think the what we're seeing play out now is something we probably would have seen play out anyway, maybe in ten years, five years, whatever, you know, because I think this is where global politics has headed. I noticed some of you followed closely, right, Yeah, but global politics is headed in a place where it's overwhelmingly parties of the right, which are increasingly more populous, you represent the working class in Europe, in America. You're really seeing this in more and more places throughout the world, and it's the parties of the left that you know, increasing represent the educated class. Trump was in a cellar into this, but I think that is the trend for as well, so long as until it's not the trend right right, So, I think that the wind is at the back of sort of more and more minority voters, especially because they're kind of the holdouts at this point. I mean, I think we are almost resaturation with white, non college white working class voters. That you still have a lot of low hanging fruit of minority voters who are just conservative on policy and their values, who still vote Democrat, and so I think the idea is continuing to focus squarely on those voters. Yes, I think Trump was uniquely effective, you know, but Trump was maybe not as effective in some other voting blocks that another candidate would be would be as if it would be more effective in so so, but I think that that is really identifying, you know, who really are the votvoters that pro grabs, Who are the voters who are just in the wrong party right now? And I think we can continue to just say that those are that's who those voters are. So I think whether or not you believe, right, you know, people are saying, well, this can't realign them. You can't continue forever, right, nobody can duplicate this Trump coalition. What I will say, you know, regardless of that, right, I mean, yeah, you're right, parties can't keep winning forever. But I think what will be true is Republicans will now be the home of the working class in the same way right that the Democrats used to be the home of the working class. And I think that's increasingly who they have to represent, who they have to wage their campaigns. This is who we're doing this for.

Yeah, there's the thing that I agree with you. I so agree with you. And what frustrates me is when I go to Washington and I talk to a member of Congress and they're still repeating lines from Ronald Reagan that make me want a Gauther. Not that I hate Ronald Reagan, but like they're such old, stupid platitudes and they're so still in the hands of like dumb Wall Street like talking points or think tanks. Right, No, you can't touch big tech, you can't regulate anything, you can't protect the working class in any which way. And it makes me want to scream. And there is that component there that kind of still needs to change. What happens when the white working class and the interest of the white working class and the interests of non whites, like they oppose each other on some things like that is always what the Democrats kind of built their electric on that they're that they're that what brings them together is less strong with what what divides them is that is there? Does that still exist? Is immigration still that wedge issue for Latinos that will like because I mean they did vote for the what it for master deportation? Is it that they think that they support that now in large part or they think he's just not going to do it?

Yeah, there's the thing that I agree with you. I so agree with you. And what frustrates me is when I go to Washington and I talk to a member of Congress and they're still repeating lines from Ronald Reagan that make me want a Gauther. Not that I hate Ronald Reagan, but like they're such old, stupid platitudes and they're so still in the hands of like dumb Wall Street like talking points or think tanks. Right, No, you can't touch big tech, you can't regulate anything, you can't protect the working class in any which way. And it makes me want to scream. And there is that component there that kind of still needs to change. What happens when the white working class and the interest of the white working class and the interests of non whites, like they oppose each other on some things like that is always what the Democrats kind of built their electric on that they're that they're that what brings them together is less strong with what what divides them is that is there? Does that still exist? Is immigration still that wedge issue for Latinos that will like because I mean they did vote for the what it for master deportation? Is it that they think that they support that now in large part or they think he's just not going to do it?

Well, look, I mean I think you have to take it a face style. You're right, I mean that Trump made this campaign about immigration away. He didn't even make the twenty sixteen campaign about immigration and you think that you know the things, the solutions, and the rhetoric at least that you know the policy of just simply building a wall. I mean that seems quaint right in terms of what we're talking about. And you know, he just continues to increase to share those you know, vote because I think a lot of those dynamics bold. So yeah, I mean, I don't expect that, you know, Latina and Army of aren't for every single thing, right. I don't think every group is gonna be on board for every single thing right in moving forward. But I think you just have to look at the election results and say, yeah, I mean I think this is sufficient. Uh you know, let's say sufficient. The shift in the direction of Trump in a campaign where he talked about this, I think gives him a lot of.

Well, look, I mean I think you have to take it a face style. You're right, I mean that Trump made this campaign about immigration away. He didn't even make the twenty sixteen campaign about immigration and you think that you know the things, the solutions, and the rhetoric at least that you know the policy of just simply building a wall. I mean that seems quaint right in terms of what we're talking about. And you know, he just continues to increase to share those you know, vote because I think a lot of those dynamics bold. So yeah, I mean, I don't expect that, you know, Latina and Army of aren't for every single thing, right. I don't think every group is gonna be on board for every single thing right in moving forward. But I think you just have to look at the election results and say, yeah, I mean I think this is sufficient. Uh you know, let's say sufficient. The shift in the direction of Trump in a campaign where he talked about this, I think gives him a lot of.

Latitude, right. I suppose even as illegal immigration has changed from being Latino to being a global issue, they also may feel less connection to it. And also their second, third, fourth generation now too, America.

Latitude, right. I suppose even as illegal immigration has changed from being Latino to being a global issue, they also may feel less connection to it. And also their second, third, fourth generation now too, America.

Second, your fourth generation you've also had. I mean, there's a you know, a mass majority of people here are a Mexican. There's very few Mexicans coming over and so Venezuelans. But then you absolutely to have people from their Third World all over the place just using this, you know, using this weakness that we have along the border and exploiting it.

Second, your fourth generation you've also had. I mean, there's a you know, a mass majority of people here are a Mexican. There's very few Mexicans coming over and so Venezuelans. But then you absolutely to have people from their Third World all over the place just using this, you know, using this weakness that we have along the border and exploiting it.

Yeah. I loved how Democrats in the media would always sit there and say, oh, Trump comes off like a strong men. I'm like, yeah, a lot of a lot of Third world countries have voted for strongmen in the past, and their voters don't tend to shy away from that just because you say it's a bad thing. Drick. Thank you so much for being honest. I don't want to hold you up any longer. Where can people read your stuff and read I love, by the way, I love your polling. They break this down I think once a year or twice a year where they break down the different parties within the party you have, like the you have, like the populous wing of the GP. How many people say they belong to that party or versus the accel a corridor version of that party, like the Centrist Party. I love a lot of what you guys do. It's very creative. Where can everyone get your stuff?

Yeah. I loved how Democrats in the media would always sit there and say, oh, Trump comes off like a strong men. I'm like, yeah, a lot of a lot of Third world countries have voted for strongmen in the past, and their voters don't tend to shy away from that just because you say it's a bad thing. Drick. Thank you so much for being honest. I don't want to hold you up any longer. Where can people read your stuff and read I love, by the way, I love your polling. They break this down I think once a year or twice a year where they break down the different parties within the party you have, like the you have, like the populous wing of the GP. How many people say they belong to that party or versus the accel a corridor version of that party, like the Centrist Party. I love a lot of what you guys do. It's very creative. Where can everyone get your stuff?

Yeah, so you can subscribe you my newsletter which is at on substack, but at Patrick Graffini dot com. You can also follow me on x at Patrick Graffini and by my book Party The People Inside the Multi Racial Populist Coalition Remaking the GOP.

Yeah, so you can subscribe you my newsletter which is at on substack, but at Patrick Graffini dot com. You can also follow me on x at Patrick Graffini and by my book Party The People Inside the Multi Racial Populist Coalition Remaking the GOP.

Yeah. Patrick is one of those people who I will read and they'll be like, I don't know about that, Patrick, and then it will happen. I'm like, well, Patrick is right again. So and you've been You've been a stellar, stellar, stellar two years as far as really reading the tea leaves and telling it like it is, and I like it a lot. So thank you again for a thing coming on. Thank you all for listening. Check out my podcast every Monday on the iHeartRadio app, Apple Podcasts, wherever you can get your podcast. Tune in next week and see you then

Yeah. Patrick is one of those people who I will read and they'll be like, I don't know about that, Patrick, and then it will happen. I'm like, well, Patrick is right again. So and you've been You've been a stellar, stellar, stellar two years as far as really reading the tea leaves and telling it like it is, and I like it a lot. So thank you again for a thing coming on. Thank you all for listening. Check out my podcast every Monday on the iHeartRadio app, Apple Podcasts, wherever you can get your podcast. Tune in next week and see you then